Surveys, Audits, and Reviews
This audit was to determine whether USAID complied with federal regulations in awarding a contract for security services in Iraq. The audit found that USAID: (1) did not adequately document the use of less than full and open competition or explain its contractor choice, (2) obtained security services using a letter contract that did not meet Federal Acquisition Regulation requirements, (3) incurred multiple potential funds control violations, and (4) purchased armored vehicles that did not meet U.S. Government armoring standards.
The purpose of this survey was (1) to determine the number of serious security incidents involving private security contractors that occurred between July 1, 2007, and June 30, 2009, and (2) to follow up on the effectiveness of the USAID missions and implementing partners actions in implementing March 2009 audit report recommendations. The survey found that USAID/Iraqs implementing partners did not establish procedures to monitor reporting of serious security incidents and did not consistently report incidents as required by the prior audit recommendations.
This audit was conducted to determine: (1) what types of serious security incidents have been reported by private security firms contracted with USAID/Afghanistans implementing partners; (2) whether USAID/Afghanistan ensured that its implementing partners subcontracted with responsible private security firms; and (3) how much has been spent by USAID/Afghanistans implementing partners for private security services.
This survey of USAID's portfolio of contracts in Iraq provides a programmatic and company based breakdown of all USAID awards. The survey includes the amount spent on subcontractors for tasks such as security.
A joint product of Department of Defense, Department of State, USAID and the Special Inspector for Afghanistan Reconstruction, this report defines a 13 point plan for the future of reconstruction in Afghanistan. Of note is Issue 13, which discusses the plans for improving contractor oversight and efficiency in Afghanistan. The report also briefly discusses the contractors overseeing the Afghan police and military training.
This review assessed whether (1) USAID/Iraq and its contractors have established sufficient controls to prevent trafficking in persons and (2) USAID/Iraqs contractors and subcontractors engaged in trafficking-in-persons practices. The review focused on USAID/Iraqs two support contracts that employed low-skilled, low-wage third-country nationals to provide food service, housekeeping, and maintenance, and there was no indication that those contractors engaged in trafficking.
According to this audit, USAIDs suspension and debarment process has not adequately protected the public interest by responding to contractor impropriety in accordance with Federal guidance.
The objective of this review was to determine whether there has been any indication that Edinburgh International misused USAID funds to pay the Taliban or others in exchange for protection. The review covered the period from January 1 to December 31, 2009. The review found no indication that Edinburgh International had misused USAID funds to pay the Taliban or others in exchange for protection. However, there were indications that Afghan subcontractors working on the project had paid insurgents for protection in remote and insecure areas of Afghanistan. The payments were allegedly made as part of a security arrangement with local communities that very likely included the Taliban or groups that support them.
USAID OIG conducted this survey to compile data on USAID/Iraqs prime awards and subcontracts and determine whether implementers complied with audit requirements for their subcontractors. The report did not include any recommendations but did show that contracts outnumbered cooperative agreements and democracy and governance programs predominated.
This is a joint report issued by the Department of Defense, Department of State, USAID, Army, Navy and Air Force Audit Agencies, as well as the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). Section I contains the Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Afghanistan with objectives and goals for oversight of reconstruction and "other than reconstruction" programs. Detailed programs include building capacity of Afghan National Security Forces, building governance capacity, and administration of reconstruction contracts. Section II concerns projects in Southwest Asia outside of Afghanistan.
This audit was conducted to determine whether USAID/Iraq had managed its contracts and grant agreements with implementing partners to ensure that the partners provided adequate oversight over their private security contractors. The audit found that USAIDs implementing partners were not adequately overseeing the private security contractors reporting of serious incidents to ensure that such incidents were reported properly.
Thus audit of the internal controls over USAID relief commodities at the Freetown port in Sierra Leone revealed that inadequate controls led to significant losses from one shipment, and prompted the USAID OIG to recommending implementing the use of private security personnel contracted by the cooperating sponsors to escort/guard the discharge of U.S. Government relief commodities from the ship to the cooperating sponsors warehouses.