SIGIR issued this report in 2006, and identifies and discusses four key components of effective human resource management: Policy Alignment, Workforce planning, Recruitment, and Continuity. Given the difficulty in the USG retaining quality personnel noted in other SIGIR reports, especially for contract management, this analysis provides a view on the overall challenge of maintaining effective reconstruction staff. 

In a review of the past 9 years of reconstruction and stabilization operations in Iraq, SIGIR reports on the lessons learned in preventing fraud and waste. The report provides case studies of which indicate methods through which future operations can reduce and eliminate the criminality that was widespread early in the Iraq conflict. SIGIR concludes that ensuring strong oversight in theater from the start of an SRO could stop many who might otherwise abuse the system; at the very least, it would increase the likelihood of catching those who do.

In the final report on Iraq Reconstruction efforts, the Special Inspector General reviews the contracting successes and failures over the last decade in Iraq. The report details the flows of money over time, by sector, and by which project as the U.S. supported reconstruction efforts. Private security contractors and military/policy trainers are discussed in sections of the report. 

Hard Lessons, the first comprehensive account of the Iraq reconstruction effort, reviews in detail the United States' rebuilding program, shedding light on why certain programs worked while others fell short of goals. The report spends some time describing the role of private security companies as protectors of the civilian reconstruction teams, noting the number and cost of the contractors to U.S. and other firms operating in Iraq.

In the second of SIGIR's special reports, the Inspector General analyzes the casualties related to reconstruction or stabilization activities in Iraq. The report documents casualties of the U.S. military, civilians, contractors, third country nationals, Iraqi civilians, and people of unknown nationality. 

In this report, SIGIR provides details on how it implemented Inspections programs and what lessons SIGIR derived from its assessment of projects in a war zone. The report also summarizes SIGIR's most significant and notable project assessments, and it describes the impact of SIGIR's work on the oversight of U.S.-funded reconstruction projects in Iraq.

This paper addresses–and proposes an answer to– the question of who should be accountable for planning, managing, and executing stabilization and reconstruction operations (SROs). Since SRO responsibility is distributed among many agencies, the paper proposes to consolidate authority into a single office of contingency operations. 

In July 2008, SIGIR issued an audit report that identified key recurring systemic management issues. This Lessons Learned study builds on that report, documenting many lessons learned by SIGIR auditors from 2004-2012. It devotes an entire recommendation (recommendation number 8) to the vital task of effective accountability and oversight of private security contractors. 

This report focuses on program and project management during the U.S.–led reconstruction mission, and tracks the evolution of the three organizations responsible for providing the strategic oversight and tactical direction of the reconstruction effort: the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, the Coalition Provisional Authority, and the U.S. Mission-Iraq. 

This report examines contracting activity early in the Iraq program and traces its evolutionary development through the war’s succeeding phases. The report provides insight on the U.S. use of LOGCAP, the Restore Iraqi Oil Contracts, police training contracts, and private security contracts. The conclusion of the report outlines six recommendations to improve the U.S. contracting system. 

In a follow up to a 2011 report, the Special Inspector General found that the Department of State is continuing to reduce the scope and size of the Iraq Police Development Program (PDP). SIGIR noted in the report that State continues to downsize the program, but must also try to gain Iraqi buy in in order to make the long term project more sustainable. 

In this report, the Special Inspector General investigated smaller contractors for DoD for their overall business accounting systems , including billing, estimating, and purchasing. The report finds that only 5 of 21 contractors had all the appropriate systems, and that the U.S. must demand better practices from its contractors. Without sufficient systems in place, the U.S. government is at risk for overcharging, waste, and fraud. 

In this review, SIGIR examined six nonprofit organizations to determine the indirect costs they charged for managing their private security contracts. SIGIR found that the organizations charged widely varying indirect costs for managing security contracts in Iraq for tasks that SIGIR believes require a similar level of effort.

In April 2009, SIGIR reported on the DOD system for reporting, investigating, and remediating serious incidents involving PMSCs in Iraq. Because of the planned withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq in December 2011, SIGIR reviewed the U.S. government’s current and planned oversight of PSCs in that country.  SIGIR found that the system for reporting and investigating serious incidents involving U.S. government PSCs has changed little since SIGIR’s 2009 report. Moreover, DOD’s system is projected to remain unchanged through the end of December 2011, when U.S. military forces plan to leave Iraq. 

This report follows up on 45 audit recommendations SIGIR made to the Department of State (DoS) that were unresolved as of July 8, 2011. The objectives of this report were to determine whether DoS took appropriate action to address these recommendations. According to the report, six recommendations to improve the management and oversight of DoS’ $2.5 billion police training contract with DynCorp remain open because DoS has not verified that it hired additional personnel to oversee the contract or improved its policies and procedures for overseeing the contract. 

This report examines subcontracts associated with a contract awarded in September 2007 to Anham, LLC to provide for the receipt, storage, and onward movement of supplies and equipment needed to reconstitute the Iraqi Security Forces and reconstruct the country’s infrastructure.  SIGIR’s objectives for this report were to determine (1) the adequacy of government oversight of Anham and its subcontracting procedures and (2) whether Anham’s costs under the contract are fair and reasonable. 

DynCorp International, under a contract with the Department of State, provides police advisors who assist the Government of Iraq develop police forces capable of maintaining internal security.  Because of the program’s significance in terms of U.S. investment and Iraqi security, the SIGIR examined program outcomes, program management and oversight, and issues that impact the capability and effectiveness of the police forces. SIGIR then recommends improvements to oversight and management of police advisors and on working with the Iraq Government. 

Since 2003, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has obligated about $276 million to Cooperative Housing Foundation International (CHF) to implement the Community Action Program (CAP) in Iraq.  CAP is a key USAID Iraq Mission program that works in rural and urban communities to promote grass-roots democracy and local governance. SIGIR conducted this audit of the oversight of CHF’s implementation of the CAP, determining (among other findings) that CHF costs for security contracts were unreasonable. 

Since May 2004, the DOD has had a series of contracts with Aegis Defense Services, Limited for private security and related services in Iraq. As of April 7, 2011, Aegis had received over $1 billion for its services. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), DOD’s primary user of Aegis services in Iraq, is decreasing its reconstruction activities in Iraq as U.S. military forces plan to withdraw by the end of calendar year 2011. SIGIR’s objectives for this report are to determine if and on what basis Aegis’s contract services have been adjusted to reflect changes in USACE’s reconstruction activities in Iraq. 

This report addresses the Department of State’s management of a $50 million grant to the National Democratic Institute (NDI) for democracy-building activities in Iraq.  In a prior audit, SIGIR found that NDI had significant security costs, and did not have documentation on whether it was meeting its goals (SIGIR 10-012).  In this follow up audit, SIGIR examined NDI’s $50 million grant, the reasonableness, allowability, and allocability of NDI’s claimed security costs, and the extent to which the grantee documented its success in achieving governance, political participation, and civil society goals and objectives. 

In June 2007, the Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC-I) began using funds to hire former insurgents and their passive supporters to guard checkpoints, buildings, and key parts of neighborhoods in Iraq.  Known as the Sons of Iraq (SOI) program, the effort has been credited with helping reduce the overall levels of violence in Iraq.  This report on the SOI program was conducted to determine (1) the program’s contribution to reducing violence in Iraq, (2) the effectiveness of financial management controls, and (3) the status of efforts to integrate SOI personnel into Iraqi ministries.

In the final audit report for FY 2011, the Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction found that there continued to be weak oversight of contracts, increasing the vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse of funds. The report also discusses the fraudulent activities uncovered by the auditors, but notes that finding and prosecuting such cases is far more expensive than if better controls were in place. These weaknesses and poor oversight extended to several security contracts, including one by the private security company DynCorp.

Private security contractors play an important role in Iraq by protecting U.S. personnel, facilities, and property.  In August 2009, the DOD awarded five Theater-wide Internal Security Services (TWISS) contracts for site security in Iraq. The five contracts have a combined not-to-exceed value of $485 million. This report concerns the U.S. government’s (1) oversight of the TWISS contracts, and (2) process for adjusting those contracts as U.S. forces withdraw. 

In this audit, the Special Inspector General examined the Department of State plans for the Iraq Police Development Program, and whether DoS identified the funds and other resources that the Government of Iraq will contribute to the program, as required by law. SIGIR also examined related issues, such as security and overhead, that could affect program operations and costs. 

This report addresses the Department of State’s management of a $50 million grant to the International Republican Institute (IRI) for  democracy-building activities in Iraq.  In a prior audit, SIGIR found that grantee security costs were significant, and DRL did not have documentation on whether grants were meeting goals (SIGIR 10-012).  In this follow-up audit, SIGIR examined the reasonableness, allocability, and allowability of IRI’s claimed security costs. 

The Department of State contract with DynCorp International includes task orders to support the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Iraqi police training program.  Under the task orders, DynCorp has provided police advisors and in-country support for those and other advisors.  SIGIR examined (1) the costs, funding, and award process for the largest and most recent task orders; (2) DoS oversight of the task orders; and (3) the status of implementation of SIGIR’s prior recommendations. 

This audit focused on three contracts awarded to Wamar International, Inc. (Wamar); one being a indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract to purchase and deliver armored vehicles for U.S. and Iraqi forces.  The Joint Contracting Command, Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) administered the contracts, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division provided contract performance oversight. According to the report, the major issues identified by SIGIR--changes in contract cost and schedules, and contract administration and project management--have been addressed. 

This report examines expenditures on the Global Maintenance and Supply Services (GMASS) contract. This contract supports a Multi-National Security Transition Command Iraq program to assist the Iraqi Army in developing a self-sufficient logistics capability. SIGIR’s reporting objective for this audit was to determine whether potential overcharges may have occurred for selected GMASS contract invoices.

This audit reviews two contracts awarded to provide the Iraqi Special Operation Forces with a counter-terrorism communications network and intelligence database. The two contracts together had a total cost of about $19.3 million.  This report finds that due to poor contract management, the networks are not being used to their full potential. 

In September 2007, the Department of Defense competitively awarded five Theater-Wide Internal Security Services (TWISS) contracts to five PSCs for static, or fixed site security services in Iraq.  This report examines the cost of the contracts, the requirements for the static security forces, the government’s process for awarding the contracts, task orders, and modifications, and the oversight provided by the Contracting Officer Representatives. 

In late 2007, the Departments of Defense and State began making organizational and procedural changes to strengthen their oversight, coordination, and control of PSC activities, including PSC movements in areas of combat operations. This audit was conducted to determine whether the changes have improved the oversight, coordination, and control of PMSC missions in Iraq. It also addresses Section 842 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 which states that audit agencies shall examine a number of issues relating to the control of PMSCs.

The objective of this report was to determine the extent to which federal agencies have systematically captured financial data for private security services in Iraq since 2003, and to identify private security contractors and costs. SIGIR reviewed available data from the Departments of Defense, State and USAID. SIGIR recommends that the Secretaries of Defense and State and the Administrator, USAID develop processes for routinely capturing financial information for all contracts and subcontracts for private security services and all other security related costs.

This report responds to a congressional mandate that audits be conducted of the incidents involving private security contractors.  It focuses on the Department of Defense’s oversight of serious incidents (such as attacks, death, injury, and property damage) involving PSCs in Iraq. The report examines DOD’s (1) policies, procedures, and practices for reporting, investigating, and remediating those incidents and (2) efforts to identify trends and lessons learned. 

This report discusses the contract was awarded to AECOM Government Services for Global Maintenance and Supply Services in Iraq (GMASS) to assist the Iraqi Army develop a logistics capability so that it can be self-sufficient.  SIGIR reviewed three task orders under the contract to determine (1) the cost of the three task orders, (2) the outcome of the three task orders, and (3) the adequacy of contract oversight.

This report is on Aegis Defence Services, a major provider of security services to the Department of Defense in Iraq.  As of November 2008, Aegis had received $624.4 million for those services, with approximately 98% of funds for three Reconstruction Security Support Services (RSSS) contracts. This report focuses on the RSSS contracts, examining the cost of the contracts, the contract-award process, and the government’s oversight of Aegis’s bills, inventories, performance, and operations, including the reporting of serious incidents.  It also examines Aegis’s personnel screening, selection, and training processes to determine whether they meet contract requirements.

This report focuses on the Department of Defense’s oversight of incidents involving the firing of weapons reported from May 2008 through February 2009 by its PSCs.  Specifically, the report examines (1) the number and types of serious incidents involving weapons discharges and (2) the extent to which actions taken to investigate and remediate these incidents can be verified.

The Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security is responsible for protecting personnel, facilities, and information—both domestic and abroad.  In mid-2004, the Department negotiated sole-source letter contracts with Blackwater Security Consulting for personal security services in Iraq. In June 2005, the Department awarded its second Worldwide Personal Protective Services contract to three companies, one being Blackwater. This report focuses on these Blackwater contracts and identifies improvements needed in administering the contract and providing more stringent oversight of Blackwater’s cost and performance in Iraq.

Established in 1985, the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) is a U.S. Army program that preplans for the use of corporate resources in support of contingency operations. The focus of this review is LOGCAP Task Orders 130 and 151 which were awarded to Kellogg Brown and Root Services, Inc. (KBR). The purpose of these task orders was to provide services necessary to support, operate, and maintain the staffs of the Chief of Mission and MNF-I at the U.S. Embassy-Iraq and at other Chief of Mission sites in Baghdad, Basrah, Hilla, and Kirkuk. 

This is a follow-up to SIGIR’s October 2007 report. It updates the status of improvements undertaken by the Department of State of in its management of the DynCorp contract for the Iraqi Police Training Program.  This report also updates the status of recommendations made in the January 2007 joint report of SIGIR and the Department of State Office of Inspector General, on Task Order 0338 of the DynCorp contract. 

This audit was to be the second in a series of focused financial reviews conducted by SIGIR. However, shortly after the work began, SIGIR learned that officials with the DoS Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs--the program execution office--did not have the information needed to identify what DynCorp International, LLC provided under the contract or how funds were spent. Because of these problems and initiatives, SIGIR temporarily suspended this work and in the interim issued this report to summarize the information gathered to date. 

This report discusses the results of SIGIR’s review of Task Order 0338, part of a Department of State awarded to DynCorp International, LLC. The Task Order was to provide training services for international police liaison officers, training support equipment, construction of a residential camp on the Adnan Palace grounds in Baghdad to house training personnel, and construction of five regional camps in Iraq. The report focuses on actions taken to establish the residential camp and the performance of unauthorized work by DynCorp. This review was conducted jointly with the Department of State Office of Inspector General.

This audit addresses the type, quantity, and quality of weapons purchased for Iraqi Security Forces. Because of the importance of controlling these sensitive items SIGIR also reviewed compliance with DOD policies for registering weapons serial numbers. SIGIR found that about $133 million was used to purchase more than 370,000 weapons through 19 contracts with 142 separate delivery orders. During the review of contract files, SIGIR did not locate sufficient documentation to show that the weapons had been properly registered. 

The focus of this review is LOGCAP Task Order 130, which was awarded to Kellogg Brown and Root Services, Inc. (KBR) to support, operate, and maintain the Chief of Mission and Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNFI) staffs at the U.S. Embassy-Iraq and at other Chief of Mission sites in Baghdad, Basrah, Hilla, and Kirkuk. The broad objectives of this review were to determine whether the U.S. government is receiving the services paid for under LOGCAP Task Order 130 and whether the support provided is reasonable, efficient, and cost-effective.

This report discusses the leadership and management of Iraq reconstruction projects, including the provision of security. The roles and responsibilities of the major government organizations participating in the Iraq effort are described in the individual summaries in this report. These summaries present how officials view their authority and responsibilities, as well as their coordination with other organizations.

SIGIR initiated this project in order to capture the following information: (1) the extent to which major U.S. contractors have identified, captured, and reported the security costs of their contracting activities; and (2) the impacts of these security costs in relation to the overall original project estimates. This fact sheet is available on a need to-know basis because some of the contractor provided information is marked proprietary by the provider. Requests by mail can be made to SIGIR Office of General Counsel, 400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, VA, 22202.

Task Force Shield was established in September 2003 with the mission of building Iraq’s capacity to protect its oil and electrical infrastructure. To protect the infrastructure, Task Force Shield was to oversee the training and operation of an Iraqi Oil Protection Force (OPF) of 14,400 guards for the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, as well as the training and equipping of 6,000 Iraqi Electrical Power Security Service (EPSS) guards for the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity. SIGIR determined that these programs proved unsuccessful and the contracts should be cancelled. 

The Iraq National Weapons Card Program (INWCP) was created in response to the concerns about the large number of individuals—in particular PMSCs—possessing and carrying weapons in Iraq without obtaining appropriate registration and authorization. The Director of the INWCP requested assistance from the Treasury Attaché, U.S. Embassy Iraq, for the transfer to the Iraqi government of INWCP funds that had been collected for weapons registration. Consequently, the Treasury Attaché, U.S. Embassy-Iraq, asked SIGIR to conduct a count of INWCP funds that were under the supervision of the INWCP Director. SIGIR was also asked to reconcile the funds, to the extent possible, to weapons registration card records held by the INWCP Director.

The report addressed deficiencies in the process for managing 11 contracts, 4 grants, and 1 grant modification awarded for more than $7.3 million to establish and operate the Babylon Police Academy. The overall audit objective was to determine whether disbursing officers in selected locations in southern Iraq complied with applicable guidance and properly controlled and accounted for cash assets and expenditures, which SIGIR found they did not. 

In this audit, SIGIR examined selected contracts to determine whether requirements for the acquisition of equipment were valid, adequately supported, and properly approved, and whether the equipment was accounted for and safeguarded. SIGIR found that some of the contracts failed to include required control provisions regarding government property and property administration standard operating procedures were not consistently followed. 

The audit objective was to determine whether Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) management efficiently and effectively managed the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) III contract to provide for logistics and life support for personnel assigned to the CPA mission. During the audit, the SIGIR identified several problems concerning cost data submitted by the contractor KBR to the CPA for work performed under the Task Order.

The overall objective of this audit was to determine whether the contractor Aegis was providing adequate services, valid documentation, and proper invoices per its contract. SIGIR found that Aegis did not provide sufficient documentation to show that all of its employees who were issued weapons were qualified to use those weapons or that its Iraqi employees were properly vetted to ensure that they did not pose an internal security threat. Also, Aegis was not fully performing several specific responsibilities required by the contract in the areas of personal security detail qualifications, regional operations centers, and security escorts and movement control. 

The objective of the audit was to evaluate the effectiveness of policies, procedures, and property accountability measures used to account for and control materiel at Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) locations. The examination of the 90 randomly selected property records disclosed that 30 property items could not be accounted for by Kellogg Brown and Root, Inc. (KBR), or was missing. This occurred because KBR did not effectively manage government property: specifically, KBR did not properly control CPA property items. As a result, the CPA-IG projected that property valued at more than $1.1 million was not accurately accounted for or was missing.

SIGIR performed this audit after receiving a complaint via the SIGIR Hotline. The audit’s objectives were to determine whether adequate procurement practices were used to acquire armored vehicles and whether the government received appropriate value for the money spent. SIGIR concluded that a $945,000 contract was paid for armored vehicles that will not meet the purpose intended and may not be available for use.

Accountable property for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Baghdad totaled over 20,500 items valued at $61.1 million. To adequately manage this large array of materiel, the CPA assigned responsibility to a contractor, Kellogg Brown and Root, Inc. The contractor was required to safeguard CPA property in its possession through the contractor’s property control system. Based on a statistical sample, this SIGIR audit estimated with 90% confidence that between 5,531 (27%) and 8,419 (41%) of the accountable property valued at between approximately $11.1 and $26.2 million may be unaccounted for.

In this last quarterly report, SIGIR reflects on the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from Iraq. During this process, private contractors were called upon to support the processing and shipment of some 3 million-plus pieces of excess U.S. military equipment either donated to the Iraqi Security Forces, sent back to the U.S., or sent to other theaters of operation.

In this report, the Inspector General reviews the operations of the U.S. government in the last quarter of FY 2012. The report details the multiple investigations of contractor fraud or corruption, and also provides data on the number of private contractors (security and non-security) working for U.S. State Department, USAID, and the Department of Defense. The report notes that despite the 14,960 contractors working for State, the Embassy reduced private security contractors by one third. 

This is the first report issued by SIGIR following the departure of U.S. troops from Iraq. The report discusses, among other important topics, reforming the U.S. approach to stabilization and reconstruction operations. It also contains, on pages 47-51, a summation of the work of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I), now the dominant DOD presence in Iraq, conducting  all U.S. security assistance provided to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) through the ISFF, the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, and Foreign Military Financing (FMF).

In this report, SIGIR focuses upon the transition from military to civilian led reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The report documents a number of different data sets involving private security – the number of security contractors working for State and USAID, the difference between agency reported numbers and the SPOT reported numbers, new security contracts, and where private security contractors are being stationed. The report also summarizes the current status of contractors in general in Iraq, noting the current number and the overall change in number of contractors by agency and by company. The report found that despite decreasing numbers of contracts, the challenges are still high to maintain proper oversight. 

This report records the current numbers of private security contractors working for the U.S. in Iraq – 3,577. The report also discusses the continuing role of private security in Iraq, and comments on the tougher restrictions put in place by the Iraqi government. The Special Inspector General outlines the current contracting presence in Iraq and summarizes the multiple investigations of fraud that have occurred in the last quarter. 

Section 3 of this report addresses contracting for reconstruction in Iraq, and Section 4 addresses the need for PMSCs in Iraq following the draw-down of U.S. troops. The report also discusses completed and ongoing audits related to the use of private security companies in Iraq.

In this report, the section on contracting that begins on page 51 includes a sub-part dedicated to private security companies operating in Iraq and U.S. oversight of PMSCs. 

This report discusses completed SIGIR audits related to PMSC activity in Iraq, including a report on plans for monitoring serious incidents involving PMSCs once U.S. Military Forces Leave Iraq. Section 3 contains a report on contracting and U.S. oversight of contractors in the changing environment, and page 73 reports contractor deaths.

A report on PMSCs appears on page 44. According to SIGIR, at the end of 2010, more than 15,300 contractors were providing security services for DOD (13,603) and USAID (1,741). Although the Department of State is the managing authority for PMSCs in Iraq, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad reported that it could not provide information for security contractors by nationality or civilian agency.

Under the terms of the current U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, all U.S. military forces are scheduled to depart Iraq by December 31, 2011. Concurrent with U.S. military reductions, the Department of State will assume responsibility from the Department of Defense for police training. Security challenges and the use of PMSCs in Iraq is discussed within this context beginning on page 54, and the report is accompanied by a chart of the changes in the U.S. government’s use of PMSCs.

This report analyzes the latest events in Iraq as the U.S. relief and reconstruction effort continues to transform itself into a more traditional foreign assistance mission. The report on security begins on page 44. In this report, the SIGIR follow-up review of the Department of State's oversight of DynCorp International's police–training contract is summarized. This audit identified more than $2.5 billion in taxpayer funds that are vulnerable to waste and fraud because of weak contract oversight.

This report contains a section on Security (page 46) with a subpart on PMSCs that details the number of PMSCs operating in Iraq and discusses operating rules imposed on PMSCs by Iraqi law. The report also summarizes the findings of a SIGIR audit titled “Improved Oversight and Use of Private Security Contractors (PSCs) in Contingency Reconstruction Operations”.

This report contains a number of useful charts and graphs that display the use of contractors generally, and PMSCs specifically, in Iraq. Beginning on page 57, the report contains more information about PMSCs in Iraq, including reports of undue bureaucratic restrictions and operational challenges reported by security companies.

In keeping with the terms of the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, U.S. combat forces withdrew from Iraq's cities at the end of June 2009. However, the security situation remained fragile, and at the time of this report SIGIR reported more than 167,000 contractor employees working in Iraq to support the operations and projects of the U.S. military, and other U.S. government agencies. The section on security begins on page 41, with a portion dedicated to recommendations on contractor oversight. The report also contains information on SIGIR PMSC audits, including incidents of weapons discharges by PMSCs and a separate audit  of funding and performance under Blackwater Security Consulting contracts to provide personal protective services in Iraq.

Among other things, this Quarterly Report analyzes three key issues that will shape the continuing U.S. effort in Iraq: (1) the transfer of police training from the Department of Defense to the Department of State; (2) the management and oversight of the billions in remaining U.S. reconstruction funds; and (3) the changing U.S. presence in the provinces.  Information on the use of contractor personnel, including PMSCs, begins on page 40.

The Security Agreement between Iraq and the U.S., effective January 1, 2009 changed the framework within which U.S. reconstruction programs operate in Iraq. How this agreement impacted PMSCs is discussed on page 44. The report also summarizes a completed audit of Aegis Defence Services, a major provider of security services to the Department of Defense in Iraq.

According to this report, the security environment in Iraq was generally safer at in the second quarter of 2009 than at any time since the 2003 invasion. Nonetheless, the security was fragile, and the number of PSCs providing security “unprecedented.” As such, two of this quarter’s audits focused on the management of PSCs: In one, SIGIR found that the Departments of State and Defense improved their information sharing on PSC operations and serious incident reporting. In the second audit, SIGIR reviewed the Department of Defense Security Services contracts for labor, weapons, and equipment to augment and/or replace military security guard operations at bases and camps throughout Iraq. 

Since April 2003, the U.S. Congress has appropriated billions of dollars for relief and reconstruction in Iraq. This Quarterly Report provides a comprehensive update on how that money has been spent, with information on the top five projects in each construction sector, the top contractors by income, an overview of reconstruction management, and SIGIR's new audits and inspections.

In this report, SIGIR finds that success in the continuing relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq will depend substantially on the Government of Iraq’s capacity to employ its own resources in support of a national recovery plan. As the report explains, in 2008, provincial security responsibilities are to be transferred to Iraqi forces, raising important questions about the continuing protection of U.S. personnel supporting the reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

This report contains a discussion of pending legislation in Iraq to withdraw PMSC immunity. In the section on audits, it was reported that SIGIR produced an overview of over 300 companies that provide security services in Iraq at a total cost of approximately $6 billion. Of note, at the time of this report SIGIR has two ongoing audits of PSCs.

The report presents a province-by-province review of progress on reconstruction and capacity-building in four key areas of concern—economics, essential services, governance, and security. Little is included about PMSCs, though in the report SIGIR estimates that about 70 private security companies have operated in country since 2003, with cumulative contract values totaling approximately $4.5 billion. The report also states that two audits of PMSCs are planned.

This quarter, SIGIR completed the first in a series of focused financial reviews of large contracts funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). The report highlights SIGIR’s review of the work performed by Bechtel under a USAID reconstruction contract that included security services. Beginning on page 43, the report addresses generally contracts for security and justice reform. 

During this quarter, SIGIR auditors completed 8 new audits, including a review of U.S. efforts to support the capacity development of Iraq’s ministries, an examination of the Department of State’s management of funding for Iraqi police training and training support, and a statistical summary of security costs for major U.S. contractors in Iraq.

Two notable developments provide a backdrop for SIGIR’s work this quarter. First, total relief and reconstruction investment for Iraq from all sources—the United States, Iraq, and international donors—passed the $100 billion mark. And second, total attacks on Coalition forces and Iraqis dropped to their lowest levels in over a year. Despite improvements in security, SIGIR audits this quarter identified serious shortcomings in DynCorp’s $1.2 billion contract to support Iraq’s police training program the program, which is overseen by the Department of State.

While this report contains information on the general successes and failures of reconstruction contracts in Iraq, including those to improve the security sector, page 103 specifically addresses contracts, with a full list of current contract awards in Appendix E. 

According this report, reconstruction progress is occurring in an increasingly “lethal” security environment while budget constraints have limited the presence and effect of private security contractors. Nonetheless, PSCs are still used and are a concern, as evidenced by a SIGIR audit this quarter of the Iraq National Weapons Card Program (SIGIR-06-024) that was started to assure that PSC weapons were properly registered with the Iraqi government. Page 59 begins the report on security sector contracts and contractor performance. 

SIGIR completed two audits this quarter that were requested by the Senate Armed Services Committee: Iraqi Security Forces: Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities (SIGIR- 06-032) and Iraqi Security Forces: Weapons Provided by the U.S. Department of Defense Using the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (SIGIR-06-033). SIGIR also reported that in conjunction with the Department of State it is conducting a review of a contract supporting the Iraqi police training program. 

Section 2 of this Report contains an interesting explanation of SIGIR’s information system to captures comprehensive project, contract, and financial information about Iraq reconstruction. In Section 3, the report on audits, there is a summary of SIGIR’s audit of “Task Force Shield,” a program designed in September 2003 to build Iraq’s capacity to protect its oil and gas and electrical infrastructures.

As reported here, SIGIR’s most notable achievements during the quarter were the arrests of four U.S. citizens for bribery, fraud, and theft involving Iraq reconstruction contracts valued at more than $13 million. SIGIR’s audits and inspections focused oversight on the reconstruction gap, the cost to complete reconstruction projects, the sustainability of completed projects, the effort to fight corruption in Iraq, and the persistent need to develop an effective reconstruction project database.

This report contains then reports generated by SIGIR auditors, including the latest in a series of audits on the mismanagement of Development Fund for Iraq assets, and 12 detailed, eye-witness reports from reconstruction sites in Iraq. Also reported this Quarter SIGIR investigators into significant cases alleging fraud, bribery, and kickbacks involving U.S. citizens—both government and contractor—in Iraq.

This report documents SIGIR’s progress since the January 2005 Quarterly Report and updates the status of reconstruction efforts which grew during this reporting period.  This Report also provides summaries of four recently completed audits and brief descriptions of selected investigations. Two of the audits found a lack of controls and poor oversight in contract administration and deficiencies in the management of cash disbursements, resulting in a potential for fraud. 

• Appendices for this Quarterly Report, including a list of awarded contracts

This report contains information on the security situation in Iraq, reporting that as of December 31, 2004, claims have been filed for the deaths of 232 civilians working on U.S. contracts in Iraq (both military and reconstruction), and poor security is causing significant reconstruction delays. The report also contains summaries of SIGIR investigations and audits, including details of administrative investigations into security contractor misconduct and a summary of an audit into Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc.

During this reporting period SIGIR conducted audits and investigations to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in the programs and operations, and this report summarizes those findings. Also included is a summary of contractor deaths (page 75) and Defense Base Act claims.

This report includes summaries of audits and criminal investigations, mostly related to alleged fraud, waste, and abuse.  One highlight is the review of the accountability and control of materiel assets of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Kuwait which revealed that projected that the contractor in-charge could not account for property valued at more than $1.1 million.

This report provides a detailed overview of SIGIR’s work (at this time called the CPA-IG), summaries of audits and investigations, and a comprehensive update on Iraq reconstruction financial information. Investigations revealed problems with financial management, procurement practices, and operational controls. The report contains information on planned audits and investigations, including into the cost of private security for contractors. 

This is the first SIGIR report, and at the time the agency was named the Office of the Inspector General, Coalition Provisional Authority. This Report contains the mission, vision, planning, personnel, and reporting regimen of the agency and does not contain any audit, inspection, or investigative work originated by CPA-IG personnel.