Lessons Learned
SIGIR issued this report in 2006, and identifies and discusses four key components of effective human resource management: Policy Alignment, Workforce planning, Recruitment, and Continuity. Given the difficulty in the USG retaining quality personnel noted in other SIGIR reports, especially for contract management, this analysis provides a view on the overall challenge of maintaining effective reconstruction staff. In a review of the past 9 years of reconstruction and stabilization operations in Iraq, SIGIR reports on the lessons learned in preventing fraud and waste. The report provides case studies of which indicate methods through which future operations can reduce and eliminate the criminality that was widespread early in the Iraq conflict. SIGIR concludes that ensuring strong oversight in theater from the start of an SRO could stop many who might otherwise abuse the system; at the very least, it would increase the likelihood of catching those who do. In the final report on Iraq Reconstruction efforts, the Special Inspector General reviews the contracting successes and failures over the last decade in Iraq. The report details the flows of money over time, by sector, and by which project as the U.S. supported reconstruction efforts. Private security contractors and military/policy trainers are discussed in sections of the report. Hard Lessons, the first comprehensive account of the Iraq reconstruction effort, reviews in detail the United States' rebuilding program, shedding light on why certain programs worked while others fell short of goals. The report spends some time describing the role of private security companies as protectors of the civilian reconstruction teams, noting the number and cost of the contractors to U.S. and other firms operating in Iraq. In the second of SIGIR's special reports, the Inspector General analyzes the casualties related to reconstruction or stabilization activities in Iraq. The report documents casualties of the U.S. military, civilians, contractors, third country nationals, Iraqi civilians, and people of unknown nationality. In this report, SIGIR provides details on how it implemented Inspections programs and what lessons SIGIR derived from its assessment of projects in a war zone. The report also summarizes SIGIR's most significant and notable project assessments, and it describes the impact of SIGIR's work on the oversight of U.S.-funded reconstruction projects in Iraq. This paper addresses–and proposes an answer to– the question of who should be accountable for planning, managing, and executing stabilization and reconstruction operations (SROs). Since SRO responsibility is distributed among many agencies, the paper proposes to consolidate authority into a single office of contingency operations. In July 2008, SIGIR issued an audit report that identified key recurring systemic management issues. This Lessons Learned study builds on that report, documenting many lessons learned by SIGIR auditors from 2004-2012. It devotes an entire recommendation (recommendation number 8) to the vital task of effective accountability and oversight of private security contractors. This report focuses on program and project management during the U.S.–led reconstruction mission, and tracks the evolution of the three organizations responsible for providing the strategic oversight and tactical direction of the reconstruction effort: the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, the Coalition Provisional Authority, and the U.S. Mission-Iraq. This report examines contracting activity early in the Iraq program and traces its evolutionary development through the war’s succeeding phases. The report provides insight on the U.S. use of LOGCAP, the Restore Iraqi Oil Contracts, police training contracts, and private security contracts. The conclusion of the report outlines six recommendations to improve the U.S. contracting system. Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons Learned in Human Capital Management
Lessons Learned: From Investigations 2004-2012
Learning from Iraq: A Final Report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience
SIGIR Special Report No. 2: The Human Toll of Reconstruction or Stabilization during Iraqi Freedom
Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Inspections of U.S.-funded Stabilization and Reconstruction Projects
Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons to the Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations
Lessons from Auditing U.S. Funded Stabilization and Reconstruction Activities
Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons Learned in Program and Project Management
Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons Learned in Contracting and Procurement