Completed Audit Reports
SIGAR recommends for USAID for the organization to establish a policy that implements OMB Circular A-16 requirements in order to improve agency-wide standards for collecting, using, and sharing geospatial data.
SIGAR identified several weaknesses in DODs process for implementing Section 841 that prevent the department from having reasonable assurance that U.S. government contracting funds are not being provided to persons and entities supporting the insurgency and opposing U.S. and coalition forces. As a result, millions of contracting dollars could be diverted to forces seeking to harm U.S. military and civilian personnel in Afghanistan and derail the multi-billion dollar reconstruction effort.
This report discusses the results of SIGAR's audit of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Stability in Key Areas (SIKA) programs. SIGAR finds that contractors for the four regional SIKA programs alludes to the lack of an agreement with the Afghan government as the reason for significant delays in program implementation after identifying the sources of instability and potential solutions.
Responding to the upcoming transition in Afghanistan from external private security contractors to the internal Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), the Office of the Inspector General conducted an audit of USAID projects to forecast the potential cost implications of using the APPF. The report finds that costs for security will likely increase, and recommends to USAID to examine its contracts for their security costs, assess upcoming contracts, and take into account the potential problems of a transition to the unique and untested APPF.
A joint product of Department of Defense, Department of State, USAID and the Special Inspector for Afghanistan Reconstruction, this report defines a 13 point plan for the future of reconstruction in Afghanistan. Of note is Issue 13, which discusses the plans for improving contractor oversight and efficiency in Afghanistan. The report also briefly discusses the contractors overseeing the Afghan police and military training.
This report discusses the results of SIGAR's audit of the U.S. Agency for International Development's transfer of security functions for its reconstruction projects in Afghanistan from private security contractors to the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF). SIGAR finds that the average rate for armed local guard services increased as much as 47 percent for projects under the APPF despite the decrease in contracted security costs for the majority of projects.
SIGAR reviewed the costs associated with private security contractors used by USAIDs implementing partners in Afghanistan during fiscal years 2009-2011 and the extent to which implementing partners will transition security services to the for their offices, housing, and project sites, and for the movement of their personnel to the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), and whether the requirement that the APPF be used will result in project termination or money loss. This document includes the audit and USAID's response.
SIGAR inspected the Kunduz Ana Garrison in 2010 and again in 2012. Despite poor structural performance in 2010, SIGAR noted several of the same problems two years later. The report questions why the Army Corps of Engineers released DynCorp from its contract of 70.8 million dollars after their clearly deficient work in constructing the compound.
This report discusses the results of SIGARs audit to determine if the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) consistently applied its tools for evaluating the manning, training, and equipping capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), specifically the Commanders Unit Assessment Tool. It also discusses the steps ISAF is taking to plan for the continued collection, validation, analysis, and reporting of ANSF capacity assessments during the military drawdown and the transition of security responsibility to the Afghan government.
It includes one recommendation to the ISAF Commander to develop and implement a plan for collecting, validating, analyzing, and reporting ANSF capability assessments that details how ISAF will assess the ANSFs capability with fewer advisors to conduct the assessments and mitigate the challenges associated with the ANSF reporting on its own assessment results.
According to this report, more than half of all U.S. reconstruction dollars provided for Afghanistan since 2002 have gone into training, equipping, and deploying the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The training is conducted by private contractors. The Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A), in conjunction with the Afghan government and U.S. coalition partners, is responsible for the management of contracts to develop the ANSF. SIGARs review found that the CSTC-A does not have the capability to ensure that U.S. funds are managed effectively and spent wisely or to monitor contractor performance.
This report to Congress on the oversight of contractors and plans for reducing the reliance of the U.S. on private security contractors in Afghanistan was required by Section 1219 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2011. SIGAR (1) analyze the recommendations made to DOD, DoS, and USAID regarding contracting in Afghanistan from FY 2008 through March 2011, and (2) assessed the current situation regarding the use of PMSCs in Afghanistan, including the extent to which PMSCs have been responsible for Afghan civilian deaths. SIGAR found that U.S. agencies continue to rely heavily on PSCs to provide for site, convoy, and personnel security. This is discussed in relation to the transition of security services from PMSCs to Afghan forces. Additionally, SIGAR found that data on Afghan deaths caused by PSCs has not been systematically tracked and may not be complete.