Together with its own Diplomatic Security agents, the U.S. Department of State hires private security contractors to protect diplomats overseas, train foreign police forces, assist in drug eradication programs, and protect embassies and other U.S. installations abroad. The Office of Inspector General (DoS OIG) for the U.S. Department of State, an independent investigatory body, performs specialized security inspections and audits in support of the Department's mission to provide effective protection to U.S. personnel, facilities, and sensitive intelligence information. DoS OIG also investigates instances of contract fraud, waste, and mismanagement that may constitute either criminal wrongdoing or violation of Department regulations.
OIG reports may be redacted, and some are classified. To request a full copy without redactions or a report not listed here, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to U.S. Department of State. Unclassified summaries of all OIG reports are presented in the Inspector General's Semiannual Report to the Congress.
Audits, Inspections and Reviews
FY 2016 Audits
FY 2015 Audits
FY 2014 Audits
In this report, the Inspector General finds that property records for Iraq were inaccurate and incomplete for several reasons, including the fact that the Department and U.S. Mission Iraq lacked effective processes for ensuring inventories were updated and items were tracked. Also, it reports the presence of incomplete contractor-held property and government-furnished equipment records.
This report addresses the Department of State's process for requesting and prioritizing physical security-related activities at overseas posts. The report is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observation, and a review of applicable documents.
This report follows on previous audits of the experience, positioning, and oversight of Contracting Oversight Representatives (COR) and Government Technical Monitors (GTM) within four State Department Bureaus: the Bureau of African Affairs (AF), the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA), and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO). This audit found that AF was not meeting standards, forcing it to employ third-party contractors. OIG also states that COR workforce management and planning needs to be improved throughout the State Department.
This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the office, post, or function under review. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observation, and a review of applicable documents. The recommendations have been developed and discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation.
FY 2013 Audits
In this report, the Inspector General evaluates the performance of the companies providing guards to the U.S. embassy and consulates in Pakistan. OIG determined that G4S, the contractor, failed to find provide guards during a labor strike or enroll employees in a required pension plan.
The State Department's Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted an audit of contract closeout procedures in Iraq. In examining a sample of 115 contracts, OIG found that the responsible officials did not consistently follow federal and departmental requirements.
This audit by the Inspector General examines the Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) contract by the Department of State. The WPS contract provides movement security, ermergency services, and guard services to DoS. In Iraq, this contract was awarded to Triple Canopy services. In general the IG found that State had too many contractors for the security needs of the embassy.
A joint product of Department of Defense, Department of State, USAID and the Special Inspector for Afghanistan Reconstruction, this report defines a 13 point plan for the future of reconstruction in Afghanistan. Of note is Issue 13, which discusses the plans for improving contractor oversight and efficiency in Afghanistan. The report also briefly discusses the contractors overseeing the Afghan police and military training.
This inspection of the Embassy in Nigeria examines the security constraints, contractor performance, and makes recommendations to improve the embassy operations.
FY 2012 Audits
The Department of State Office of Inspector General brought in an outside contractor to audit the work of State Contracting Officers (COs). There had been concern that COs awarding overseas contracts were overstepping their authority for the amount of the awards. The investigation found that the vast majority of COs were complying with the limits, while in 3 cases awards were made without the proper authority, sometimes overstepping the limits by $900,000. As a result, the report recommends some strengthening of internal controls for contracts.
The Inspector General determined in this report that best value contracting for local guard services would be more expensive than lower priced contracts. The OIG conducted a comparison of the Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan where contracts are awarded on best value to all other overseas posts which awards contracts for lowest price. However, the report finds that though more expensive, best value contracts need less oversight and improved contract performance.
FY 2011 Audits
Through a task order under the civilian police training contract, DynCorp provides operations and maintenance support for Camp Falcon. The team evaluated the quality of the services provided by DynCorp to determine whether the contractor fulfilled contract requirements for electric power generation, sanitation and sewage systems, pest control, and a static guard force. Among other findings, the report states that DynCorps static guard force worked every day of 2-week pay periods without a break for many as 24 consecutive pay periods, which is not in compliance with the task order.
The DoS OIG conducted this audit to determine whether the Department of States process to award the Worldwide Protective Services Contract and Kabul Embassy security task force order included required procedures to assess contractor responsibility, including past performance and technical merit. The report found that the Department did comply with Federal Acquisition Regulations, Department guidance and the WPPS solicitation, and technical and past performance evaluations were conducted.
In 2005, PAE was awarded a contract to operations and maintenance contract for the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. This review found that the Department of States oversight of PAEs performance has been affected by the contracting officers lack of on-site management and a lack of continuity in contracting officers representatives. For example, PAE may be double dipping for labor charges and was paid to provide escort services for individuals without security clearances but did not do so for at least one year.
In 2004, the Department of State awarded a contract to PAE to provide operations and maintenance support at two compounds used by specialized units within the Afghan counternarcotics police force which conduct sensitive investigations of major narcotics production and distribution networks. In this audit, OIG evaluated the quality of the services provided by PAE to determine whether they met contract specifications. It found that PAEs ability to provide adequate support at the compounds has been negatively affected by weaknesses in State Department oversight of the contracts.
The aim of this review was to evaluate Embassy Baghdad and Department of State plans and activities associated with U.S. military downsizing in Iraq. According to the report, the Department faces many challenges in transitioning to a civilian-led effort in Iraq, including: transfer of police training from DOD to the Department; providing protective security for contractor personnel working for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL); and establishment of an Office of Security Cooperation (OSC).
In November 2007, under a civilian police contract managed by the Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), DynCorp was awarded a task order focused on training and logistical support for the PASF in the West Bank. Since that time, INL, has obligated $98 million and expended approximately $72 million for PASF training and non-lethal equipment through the DynCorp task order. OIGs evaluation revealed weaknesses in INLs management and oversight of DynCorps performance. INL has not evaluated DynCorps performance in training or provision of U.S. Government-purchased and donated equipment against targets and goals because of a lack of performance measures.
The DoS OIG initiated this evaluation to determine: (1) whether Department-funded contractors or subcontractors are engaged, knowingly or unknowingly, in acts related to trafficking in persons (TIP); and (2) whether U.S. embassies are following federal guidelines to effectively monitor Department-funded contractors and subcontractors and ascertain whether they are engaged in TIP-related acts. m. OIG found no evidence that contractors were engaged in sex trafficking or illicit activities related to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery as defined by U.S. law.
FY 2010 Audits
This audit reviewed the status of Afghanistan Security Forces funds that DOD provided to the Department of State (DOS) for the training of the Afghan National Police (ANP), the contract management activities, and the ability of the ANP training program to address the security needs for Afghanistan. The audit found that the DOS Civilian Police Program contract does not meet DODs needs in developing the ANP to provide security in countering the growing insurgency in Afghanistan.
In July 2005, Triple Canopy, a private security company, was awarded the Department of States Baghdad Embassy Security Force (BESF) contract. Due to concerns about the Departments exercise of control over the performance of security contractors, this review was conducted to determine, in part: (1) the requirements and provisions of the contract; (2) how well the Department has administered the contract to provide proper oversight of Triple Canopys performance in Baghdad, Iraq; and (3) the sufficiency of Triple Canopys training, qualification, and personnel records for security guards.
In June 2004, the Department of State signed a memorandum of agreement with the Department of Defense under which the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract, through the contractor Kellogg Brown & Root, would provide logistical services to support embassy operations within Baghdads International Zone. The objective of this review was to determine whether the Department of State effectively managed the LOGCAP contract in Iraq. Findings revealed that a lack of detailed data has hindered the ability of the Department to determine whether contractor staffing levels are commensurate with the workload and to detect instances of waste or fraud.
According to this audit, although the Department of State has spent over $120 million since 2003 for mine action in areas controlled by the Iraqi Government in Baghdad, it has resulted in little clearance of the estimated 20 million mines or other unexploded ordnance. Among other findings, it found that security concerns and limited personnel resources have severely limited oversight of contractors and grantees. This is particularly serious given concerns about the appearance of bleed-over between contractors Department-funded activities and other business pursuits.
Under the WPPS II contract, private firms have provided personal security and movement protection for diplomats, as well as static guard forces at U.S. overseas posts. The DoS OIG conducted a series of performance audits of the WPPS II contracts, finding U.S. Government direct-hire staffing problems, as well as issues associated with accounting for contractor personnel. These issues weakened management and oversight of the WPPS II contract and task orders. Further, while the security contractors generally carried out their protective duties satisfactorily, OIG found issues with personal security specialist training, the ability to fill some contractor positions, inventory and storage of U.S. Government property.
The Kabul Embassy Security Force (KESF), provided through a contract with Armor Group of North America (AGNA), has ensured the safety of chief of mission personnel in Kabul. Among other findings, this audit revealed that AGNA has not been able to recruit, train, or manage the KESF at the staffing level or the quality required by its contract with the Department of State; AGNA has employed Nepalese guards without veriﬁable experience, training, or background investigations in violation of its contract; AGNA cannot account for U.S. Government-furnished weapons; and AGNA does not adequately maintain training records.
FY 2009 Audits
This evaluation was conducted in response to concerns about the State Departments exercise of control over the performance of private security firms in Iraq. DynCorp was contracted to provide personal protection to officials who fall under chief of mission authority in northern Iraq. The review found that DynCorps personal protection was effective in ensuring the safety of chief of mission personnel in northern Iraq, though Department of State oversight was lacking.
This report covers the time period from December 2008 to June 2009 and assesses the Embassy Baghdad and other Department plans and activities associated with U.S. military downsizing in Iraq. Among other findings, the audit revealed that the Embassy Baghdad needs to (1) develop a plan to provide effective management and oversight of contractors and ensure the timely completion of projects; and (2) determine what Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) services will be required and ensure adequate, qualified contract management personnel are available to manage and oversee the LOGCAP contract.
Among other findings, this review revealed that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security does not have a strong control environment to ensure the Worldwide Personal Protective Services (WPPS) contract is effectively managed, assets are safeguarded, and laws and regulations are in compliance. Moreover, the Embassy Baghdads use of contractors to manage and control government-furnished equipment may violate Federal Acquisition Regulation policy that contractors shall not be used for the performance of inherently governmental function
According to this evaluation, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security generally manages the U.S. Training Center contract well. However, with an increased number of personal protective service operations in Afghanistan, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security may require a dedicated Contracting Officers Representative to provide proper oversight of activities and private security contractors.
In October 2007, the Secretary of States Panel on Personal Protective Services in Iraq (The Panel), composed of outside experts, was assembled to review the Departments security practices in Iraq following the Nisoor Square incident and to provide recommendations to strengthen the coordination, oversight, and accountability of Embassy Baghdads security practices. This report examines the status of The Panels recommendations and whether changes in operations enhanced the protection of U.S. mission personnel and furthered U.S. foreign policy objectives.
This review of regional offices in Iraq found that total U.S. Government staffing for the Regional Embassy Office in Basra, the Regional Reconstruction Team in Erbil, and the Regional Embassy Office in Hillah was 265. A total of 1027 contractors provided life support and personal protective services. These numbers resulted in a ratio of nearly four life support and personal security contractors to every one U.S. Government staff member at these Regional Embassy Offices and Regional Reconstruction Team.
According to this report, the Department of State spends more than $75 million annually, and employs nearly 700 people to secure, operate and maintain the Regional Embassy Office in Hillah. The Embassy Baghdad calculates an annual security cost of $55 million to support approximately 300 Blackwater personal security specialists and a perimeter guard force. KBR is the primary contractor for life support services, operations and maintenance, provided at an estimated cost of $20 million each year. This report recommends closing the Hillah Office, which could result in a huge cost savings to the U.S. government.
The Department of States Bureau of Diplomatic Security contracts with three private companies for personal protective services around the world, including in Jerusalem, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The DoS IG was set to audit these companies and their work, though as this memo explains there was insufficient evidence to conduct a performance evaluation.
Triple Canopy protects U.S. Government personnel carrying out official business in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and the West Bank. This evaluation found that Triple Canopys personal protective services have effectively ensured the safety of chief of mission personnel. Triple Canopy has recruited an experienced pool of personal security specialists and established a satisfactory continuing professional education program focused on a number of training topics. However, the Department of States oversight of this contract needs some improvement.
This performance evaluation found that Triple Canopys personal protection operation has been highly effective in ensuring the safety of chief of mission personnel. However, Embassy Baghdad has had significant problems managing and monitoring Triple Canopys performance due to frequent staff turnover and gaps in coverage, inadequate contract monitoring training, failure to maintain contract files, and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security special agents focus on the protection and safety of personnel, making contractor oversight a secondary responsibility.
The Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security is responsible for protecting personnel, facilities, and informationboth domestic and abroad. In mid-2004, the Department negotiated sole-source letter contracts with Blackwater Security Consulting for personal security services in Iraq. In June 2005, the Department awarded its second Worldwide Personal Protective Services contract to three companies, one being Blackwater. This report focuses on these Blackwater contracts and identifies improvements needed in administering the contract and providing more stringent oversight of Blackwaters cost and performance in Iraq.
FY 2007 Audits
The Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this audit to determine whether the Department could account for the government-owned personal property and equipment furnished to and purchased by DynCorp International, LLC, and Blackwater USA under the Civilian Police, Weapons Removal and Abatement Program (WRAP), and Worldwide Personal Protective Services (WPPS) contracts for programs in Afghanistan. OIG found that the Department could not account for all property furnished to and purchased by the contractors. Contractor property lists were incomplete and, therefore, unreliable.
The Department of State awarded DynCorp a contract to train the Iraqi police training, a cost of almost $2 billion. According to this review, poor contract administration resulted in millions of dollars at risk, and property that cannot be accounted for.
This audit was conducted in response to a Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) request to assess its process for reviewing and approving DynCorp International invoices related to the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC). Overall, OIG found that INL did not have an effective process in place. For example, INL approved payments without assurance that the work or services were completed satisfactorily.
FY 2005 Audits
The contract at issue in this audit is for Protective Security Services for the American Diplomatic Mission in Iraq and the American Ambassador to Iraq and his residence in Iraq. The audit disclosed that the contractor's current timekeeping procedures are deficient and that its current accounting system is not considered adequate to support billings for services rendered.
Semiannual Reports to Congress
2016 Semiannual Reports to Congress
2015 Semiannual Reports to Congress
2014 Semiannual Reports to Congress
In this report from the Office of the Inspector General, it assesses the Department of State's process for requesting, prioritizing, and funding physical-security-related activities at overseas posts and for selecting an outside contractor to prepare the Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for the Keystone XL pipeline project. It analyzes physical and information security, contract and grant management, and Department's closeout process for contracts supporting the U.S. Mission in Iraq.
2013 Semiannual Reports to Congress
In this report from the Office of the Inspector General, it determined that the contractor movement security staffing requirements for Baghdad, Iraq, exceeded actual staffing needs. It comments upon overstaffing due to the Department not adequately conducting a needs analysis for staffing requirements before it awarded the task order, and not not monitoring the actual number of security personnel being used during performance.
In this report, the Department of State's Office of Inspector General summarizes the audits, inspections, investigations, international broadcasting, and congressional testimony and briefings with regard to BBG programs and operations for the previous six months. In particular, OIG made recommendations for the Department to determine the full extent to which the contractor had complied with the contracts supplemental wage allowance provision and to instruct applicable contracting officers representatives to verify that the contractor pays the supplemental wage allowance to local guards.
2012 Semiannual Reports to Congress
In this report, the Inspector General remarks on the audits and findings of the Office of Inspector General through the previous 6 months. The report noted the good practices of awarding the Worldwide Protective Personnel Services contract, while also documenting a few cases of misconduct by contractors and U.S. personnel in Iraq. However, in comparison to previous semiannual reports there was relatively little fraud and abuse with private security or general contractors of the U.S. government.
In this report to Congress, the Department of State Inspector General summarizes the audits and inspections from the last year. The report highlights instances of private security contractor waste, notably one case in which an unnamed security contractor violated the U.S. Arms Export Control Act.
2011 Semiannual Reports to Congress
In this report from the Office of the Inspector General, the review identifies the system wide weakness of contractor PAE in fulfilling its Afghanistan contracts adequately. The report also investigates multiple contractors across countries for evidence of trafficking in persons. It finds that while contractors have not violated the law, they have increased the risk of trafficking through careless policies.
In this report from the Office of the Inspector General, the review examines the implementation and oversight of DOD contracts in the training of the Afghan National Police and finds several areas for improvement. In addition, the report outlines the major flaws of a security contractors in Afghanistan. The report also discusses the work of DynCorp in Palestine and at Camp Falcon in Kabul.
2010 Semiannual Reports to Congress
In this report from the Office of the Inspector General, the document reviews the Second Worldwide Personal Protective Services Contract (WPPS), and the involvement of security contractors in Jerusalem, Iraq and Afghanistan. The report also conducts a performance review of Armor Group in providing protection to U.S. Embassy Kabul. Cost overruns by DynCorp in its security sector transformation contract for South Sudan are also investigated in the report.
In this report, the Office of the Inspector General discusses the new embassy compound in Iraq, focusing on the deficiencies of First Kuwait Trading and Contracting in fulfilling the contract. The report also discusses DynCorp's implementation of the Air Wing in Afghanistan/Pakistan, as well as DynCorp's ordnance destruction program in Afghanistan. The report notes the poor living conditions of security contract personnel in Baghdad. Finally, the report recommends the increased use and better training of Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs) to oversee contracts.
2009 Semiannual Reports to Congress
In this report from the Office of the Inspector General, the office undertakes a detailed look into the use of private security contractors in Iraq and in particular by Embassy Baghdad. The report finds that while private contractors have been crucial to security, the proliferation of companies has reduced effective management. The OIG report also examines the procurement contracts for the building of the Embassy compound in Baghdad.
In this report, the Office of the Inspector General conducts an extensive performance review of Triple Canopy's contracts in Iraq and Jerusalem, DynCorp's contracts in Iraq, U.S. Training Center's facility in Afghanistan, and Blackwater's contracts in Iraq. Each of the private security companies was found to have good practices, but the report identified several failings. The report also covers the Bureau of African Affairs and their use of contracting, as well as that of Embassy Jakarta.
2008 Semiannual Reports to Congress
In this report from the Office of the Inspector General, the office recommends procedures to be taken to address the failures of Blackwater and DynCorp to document and use government property. The report recommends a better property control system, and outlines several steps in order to resolve the 2.9 million and 25.5 million disputed costs with the contractors.
In this report from the Office of the Inspector General, the report documents several investigations into individual mismanagement of contractors by State employees. The report also discusses the need to use the internal department Watchlist for identifying problem contractors, in order to avoid continued awarding of contracts to companies on the Watchlist.
2007 Semiannual Reports to Congress
In this report from the Inspector General, evaluations of U.S. State Department operations were conducted. The awarding of contracts by the BBG Middle East Broadcast Network were investigated for not following proper competitive procedures. In addition, the report finds that accounting standards for Iraqi police training contracts are lax, and discusses the work of a subcontractor in assessing the vulnerability of Agency IT networks.
In this report from the Inspector General, the office investigates extensively the activities of Blackwater and DynCorp in Afghanistan. The report finds that the two contractors significantly neglected in the reporting upon their use of government owned property and failed to account for many purchases and costs. The report also continues its investigation into DynCorp with the Jordanian Police Force.
2006 Semiannual Reports to Congress
In this report from the Inspector General, evaluations of U.S. State Department operations were conducted. The report investigates a contract termination settlement with Kellogg, Brown and Root, Inc and its subcontractor Morrison International Construction. In addition, the report contains reports from audits undertaken by contracted auditors of U.S. agencies and contractors such as the Choctaw Archiving Inc. The report notes the continued work into identifying contractors and best practices of Information Technology Services.
In this report from the Inspector General, evaluations of U.S. State Department operations were conducted. The OIG report finds that contractors in general have been receiving some materials that are unaccounted for. In addition, the contractor DECO, Inc. was found to be keeping inaccurate timekeeping and had double-billed the Department. The OIG report also follows up its previous reports into police training activities in Iraq, Jordan and Afghanistan, noting the substantial investment and use of contractors in the projects.
2005 Semiannual Reports to Congress
In this report from the Inspector General, evaluations of U.S. State Department operations are conducted. The OIG notes poor financial oversight of DynCorp in Afghanistan, as well as discrepancies in the DynCorp operation training Jordanian Police. In addition, the report discusses the need for contractors worldwide to enhance U.S. work, and highlights the large number of contractors working at the Iraqi Embassy.
In this report from the Inspector General, evaluations of U.S. State Department operations are conducted. The OIG report finds that a review of all the contractors associated with the oversight of Information Technology services should be conducted. The report also outlines the results of audits of several major contractors, including DynCorp and Kellogg, Brown and Root.
Trafficking in Persons Reports to Congress
In this summary upon Trafficking in Persons, the Office of Inspector General analyzes possible infractions at U.S. operations around the world. The report finds no significant issues by Triple Canopy in Iraq. The report also outlines the OIG plans for investigating trafficking in persons around the world, but especially in Middle East countries with little to no government laws to prevent trafficking.
In this Summary to the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Office of Inspector General reports that of the countries inspected- Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates no evidence of contractor violation of the trafficking in persons was found. The report identifies some practices which increase the risk of TIP. Other investigations were carried out in 10 departments, 3 contracts, and a 32 country survey. The results indicate that in general, TIP guidelines are being met, but can be improved.
In this summary of 2012 Trafficking in Persons report, the Office of Inspector General evaluated recommendations issued for the Embassies in the Middle East. It addresses the need for improving employment and living conditions for foreign contracted workers and for improving contract monitoring for potential trafficking in persons violations, and appends new recommendations for the relevant authorities.
In this 2014 Trafficking in Persons Report, it addresses the issue of unlawful recruitment and use of child soldiers. Although its primary concern is not private military and security companies, the report analyzes that many children are forcibly abducted to be used as combatants by government armed forces, paramilitary organizations, or rebel groups.
In this summary of evaluating activities and findings related to the 2011 Trafficking in Persons report, OIG found no direct evidence that contractors had violated the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 or Federal Acquisition Regulation clause 52.222-50, "Combating Trafficking in Persons." However, using the International Labor Organization indicators for trafficking, OIG found several contractor practices that increased the risk of TIP.
The 2013 Trafficking in Persons Report covers victims of human exploitation worldwide. Although the report does not directly discuss private security contractors, country narratives briefs on the human trafficking involving military personnel. For instance, the US Department of Defense reported five investigation that included human trafficking crimes involving military personnel.
The 2012 Trafficking in Persons Report covers abuse worldwide. However, the report discusses contractors and human trafficking only very briefly, and private security contractors are non-existent in the report. Perhaps the most relevant section is the report upon the United States, which details the new anti-trafficking laws of U.S. federal agencies and also addresses the media reports of trafficked individuals in the workforce of DoD subcontracters in Iraq and Afghanistan.