The Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD IG) is an independent agency within the U.S. Department of Defense that was created by the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. The DOD IG is dedicated to serving the military and the taxpayer by conducting audits, investigations, inspections, and assessments relating to programs and operations of the Department of Defense. DOD IG oversight prevents and detects fraud and abuse and results in improvements within the Department of Defense by identifying the need for corrective action. Many of the DOD IG audits and assessments concern Department of Defense contracting, ranging from acquisition, to oversight, to contractor performance.
services issued against the Warfighter Field Operations Customer Support contract in
DOD IG examines whether the Army's Redistribution Property Assistance Teams (RPAT) in Afghanistan have effective processing procedures in place and concludes that ineffective procedures have cost the Army $568.8 million between May 2012 and May 2013. RPATs are responsible for eliminating all excess Army property that units have in theater, redistributing equipment to fill shortages, and shipping excess equipment to the United States.
In this report, the DOD IG found that contract managers for USSOCOM did not adequately follow federal regulations for pricing, eliminating inherently governmental functions, personal services contracting, and clear, measurable outcomes. These contracts included intelligence support and operations support.
In this report, DoD IG identifies areas requiring management attention with respect to the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I). Specifically, it determines the following: 1) the disagreements on the OSC-I mission between the Departments of State and Defense existed; 2) the process used to direct OSC-I personnel reductions did not fully consider its mission priorities; 3) the OSC-I was not fully integrated into the U.S. Mission, to include insufficient standard operating procedures; 4) the OSC-I did not have sufficiently trained personnel, nor the required capability to transition sites back to the government of Iraq; and 5) joint doctrine insufficiently supported the post-contingency inter-departmental transition of responsibilities that was occurring in Iraq.
A joint product of Department of Defense, Department of State, USAID and the Special Inspector for Afghanistan Reconstruction, this report defines a 13 point plan for the future of reconstruction in Afghanistan. Of note is Issue 13, which discusses the plans for improving contractor oversight and efficiency in Afghanistan. The report also briefly discusses the contractors overseeing the Afghan police and military training.
The ALP made notable progress in these areas: Success operating in difficult areas; partnering with Afghan National Army Special Operations Forces; use of Afghan District Judges and Prosecutors; effectiveness of the COIN Advisory and Assistance Team; repeat rotations of U.S. Special Operations Forces Team. However, to establish an enduring program, better planning is needed. Also, communication and coordination between ISAF, CFSOCC-A and NTM-A/CSTC-A regarding implementation of the ALP program needs to be more effective.
The objective of this report is to provide Department of Defense (DoD) field commanders and contract managers with information on contracting problems related to contingency operations that the DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG) identified and reported from April 2, 2010, through March 31, 2010. According to this report, the effectiveness of contractor support of U.S. contingency operations could be compromised if DoD officials fail to apply lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan. DoD officials should review the identified problems and develop a framework to achieve better contracting performance for future contingency operations.
The DOD IG found in this report that the contract to develop the vocational skills of the Afghan National Security Forces was not adequately carried out. This was largely because of poor management by the government team overseeing the contract. The contract was awarded to ITT Systems Corporation, which was later instructed to carry out training on only 9 of 18 sites, contrary to the original goals of the contract.
This review was conducted to determine the validity of a complaint alleging that an audit team in the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) failed to provide effective audit services to Defense Contract Management Agency. The DCAA performs contract audits and provides accounting and financial advisory services in connection with the negotiation, administration and settlement of DOD contracts and subcontracts. The review found that two of the three complaints were substantiated.
DOD IG reviewed a sample of 267 Department of Defense contracts for compliance with the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, as amended. Operations in Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom were selected for this evaluation. As a result of site visits and interviews, DOD IG found that while 70 percent of the contracts sampled contained some form of a Combating Trafficking in Persons clause, only half had the current required Federal Acquisition Regulation clause.
The objectives of this assessment were to determine whether planning and operational implementation of efforts by U.S./Coalition Forces to develop an enduring logistics sustainability capability for the Afghan National Army (ANA) were effective and integrated across military departments. An entire section of the assessment is dedicated to contracting. It states that International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and its subordinate commands do not have an integrated planning and execution approach, in concert with DOD contracting authorities, that effectively links contract requirements and performance to the accomplishment of ISAF operational goals and objectives, while also ensuring effective contract oversight.
In an audit of the Detention Facility contract, the Inspector General found serious deficiencies in the construction of the facility. Despite the inadequate materials used for construction and absence of central infrastructure systems, the Army Corps of Engineers still accepted the contract as complete. The report concludes that these serious errors were due to a lack of oversight by U.S. Army.
The assessment found that the OSC-I is on track to meet its full operating capability target date of October 1, 2011, and to operate independently as an element of U.S. mission to Iraq by January 1, 2012. A few key areas regarding communication issues and standard operating issues required management attention.
According to this report, DOD contracting personnel did not consistently comply with statutory and DOD requirements for managing undefinitized contractual actions, resulting in the U.S. Government assuming additional risk in the award and negotiation process and possibly paying more profit than necessary.
DOD IG found that 95% of the contracts for construction and services within the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan included the Federal Acquisition Regulation Combating Trafficking in Persons Clause. However, there was a limited understanding on how to apply it locally.
DOD IG reviewed documentation on the timeliness of DOD suspension and debarment decisions to determine whether contracting officers referred poorly performing contractors to be suspended or debarred; whether contracting officers checked the system before making contract awards; and whether contractors received contract awards after being listed in the system.
To be able to continue supporting the development of the Iraq Security Forces after the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces by the end of 2011, DOD will transition all remaining training, equipping and mentoring activities from U.S. Forces-Iraq to the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq under Department of State and Chief of Mission authority. At the time of the assessment, detailed plans and guidance had been sufficiently developed and were operative for transitioning security assistance from DOD to DOS authority.
DOD IG reviewed a sample of 368 DOD contracts and reports covering the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, specifically Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain. DOD IG found that while DOD and other federal law enforcement organizations were developing procedures to identify trafficking in persons incidents in criminal investigative databases, DOD contracting offices lack an effective process for obtaining information pertaining to trafficking in persons violations within the DOD. Further, while three quarters of the contracts sampled contained a combating trafficking in persons clause, only little more than half had the required Federal Acquisition Regulation clause.
DOD IG and DOS OIG conducted this joint audit to determine whether government and contractor plans to transfer administration for the Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police training program contracts were complete and feasible. In addition, this report addresses whether DOD was prepared to provide effective management and oversight. The audit identified that DOD and DOS officials did not conduct sufficient planning and instead, relied on independently developed contractor transition plans, some of which were not feasible.
DOD IG and DOS OIG conducted this joint audit to determine whether the Department of State properly obligated DOD funds in support of the Afghan National Police training program. The audit revealed that DOS officials improperly obligated $76.65 million of Afghanistan Security Forces fund appropriations that DOD provided to support the ANP training program. Specifically, DOS officials obligated the funds for three DOS programs and for personal services contracts contrary to either Economy Act or reimbursable agreement limitations.
In this audit the DOD IG found that the International Security Assistance Force has taken the initiative to close the Afghan National Police (ANP) logistics capability gap, implementing a logistics infrastructure development plan that is building supply depots across the regional commands, down to provincial level, that are closer to forward deployed police units. However and despite the use of contractors, there are not sufficient institutional trainers to keep pace with ANP expansion.
DOD IG reviewed Army efforts to procure the interrogation arm that is used on route clearance vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan to determine whether the acquisition initiative was contracted and managed in accordance with federal and defense acquisition regulations. The DOD IG found that it was not, and that Army contracting and program officials inappropriately restricted competition in their award of four sole-source contracts valued at $82.1 million to one source.
DOD IG reviewed the management and administration of the Army Logistics Civil Augmentation Program support contract, valued at approximately $117 million. According to DOD IG findings, Army contracting officials did not properly manage this contract, instructed the contractor to perform work outside the scope of the contract, and did not provide adequate oversight and surveillance.
DOD IG determined whether DOD protected its information in the possession of non-DOD entities who have been awarded weapon systems contracts. DOD IG reviewed 20 contracts for requirements intended to protect controlled unclassified information for the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force and the Missile Defense Agency and found that the DOD did not consistently ensure contractors protected controlled and unclassified information for weapon systems contracts. The report is For Official Use Only. To request a copy, file a Freedom of Information Act request.
This audit found that DLA Energy contracting officers did not perform an adequate proposal analysis for three of four contracts valued at approximately $2.7 billion that were awarded to the company to supply fuel to U.S. troops in Iraq.
Prime vendor is a concept of support whereby a single commercial distributor serves as the major provider of products to various federal customers within a geographical region or zone. This audit found that the subsistence prime vendor for Afghanistan provided the food products required by the contract. However, subsistence contracting officials did not provide sufficient oversight of contract costs and performance.
DOD IG reviewed Army award and administration of the Joint Logistics Integrator contracts, finding that Army officials inadequately planned for the follow-on contract award and did not effectively administer the contract. The officials inappropriately allowed the contractor to perform inherently governmental functions, such as disciplining DOD employees, and to have organizational conflicts of interest, such as helping prepare requirements for the follow-on contract that the contractor bid on and won.
DOD IG issued the second report on the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance program. The program contract with Northrop Grumman, valued at $1.8 billion, was in the third year of a 7-year contract and is part of a major acquisition program worth more than $19 billion. Among other deficiencies, the audit revealed that government contracting officials did not review 39 contractor bills or validate whether the contractor was entitled to $329.3 million in payments.
DOD IG and DOS OIG conducted a joint audit in response to a requirement in the FY 2011 National Defense Authorization Act to determine whether the Department of State properly obligated DOD funds to support the Afghan National Police training program and appropriately approved contractor invoices. The audit revealed that the DOD and DOS needed improved processes and procedures to better manage the approximately $1.26 billion of DOD funds provided for the program.
DOD IG, in conjunction with DoS OIG, conducted this audit in response to a congressional request. The objective was to review the status of Afghanistan Security Forces funds that DOD provided to DoS for the training of the Afghan National Police (ANP), the contract management activities, and the ability of the ANP training program to address the security needs for Afghanistan. DOD IG found that the DoS Civilian Police Program contract does not meet DODs needs in developing the ANP to provide security in countering the growing insurgency in Afghanistan.
DOD IG determined that the Defense Logistics Agency did not use effective contracting procedures to provide customers with critical application M2 machine gun parts related to contract quality assurance, product quality deficiency report processing, spare part kit assembly, and oversight contractor deliveries.
This audit report addresses the accountability and disposition of LOGCAP government furnished property in Iraq. As of September 30, 2009, there were 572,928 GFP items in the LOGCAP property book in Iraq, worth about $2.9 billion. DOD IG estimated that the LOGCAP contractor could generally account for the GFP items in its property book; however, at some of the locations DOD IG visited, DOD IG identified accountability issues that needed attention.
DOD IG determined that the director of Operational Test and Evaluation used the company Science Applications International Corporation as its primary commercial contractor for advisory and assistance services since 1999 even though SAIC and The Boeing Company serve as lead system integrators for system development and demonstration of the U.S. Army Future Combat System.
DOD IG reviewed Army time-and-materials contracts and task orders for Southwest Asia to determine if they were awarded and administered in accordance with acquisition regulations. The audit revealed that Army contracting and DOD program officials did not properly award and administer the 18 contracts and task orders for work performed in Southwest Asia.
The overall objective of this audit was to determine whether award fees paid by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Transatlantic Programs Center to contractors in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were justified. The DOD IG found that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers contracting and award fee officials did not properly manage and oversee the award fee process for the 15 cost plus award fee task orders reviewed, valued at $116.4 million.
The overall objective of this audit was to determine whether contracts providing ship repairs and maintenance to the Army operations in Kuwait and Navy operations in Bahrain and United Arab Emirates were properly managed and administered.
DOD IG evaluated a sample of contracts covering areas of heightened risk for trafficking in persons and selected the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the Territory of Guam for the evaluation. DOD IG found that the DOD and other federal law enforcement criminal activity databases had no effective mechanism to track trafficking in persons incidents, but a federal law enforcement advisory policy group is considering this issue. Further, half of the contracts sampled either did not contain the Combating Trafficking in Persons clause, or were modified to include the clause just prior to DOD IG site visits.
In this audit, the DOD IG determined that the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) could not determine its resource requirements for contractor oversight and contract administration in Southwest Asia because the DCMA is reactive rather than proactive in assuming its role to provide contractor oversight and contract administration and DCMA Southwest Asia personnel did not have the proper training and certification for contingency contracting positions in Southwest Asia.
This summary project identified important areas for improving DOD wartime contracting. Ten systemic challenges related to deficiencies in the contract management process during contingency operations were identified. Also presented was a roadmap of essential contracting and oversight actions that should be taken on future contracts to avoid past problems and contract more efficiently and effectively.
DOD IG performed a review in response to a Senate Armed Services Committee request and found that two commanding generals postponed the withholding of funds on the LOGCAP contract, in noncompliance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation. The decision was influenced by contractor claims that withholding funds might adversely affect vital support services provided to the troops.
DOD IG review of DODs contracting for tactical vehicle field maintenance at Joint Base Balad, Iraq, disclosed that the yearly utilization rate of the contractor ranges from a low of 3.97 percent to a high of 9.65 percent when the Army utilization requirements were at least 85 percent. The Army was not providing the appropriate oversight to determine why the contractor utilization rate was so low. As a result, about $4.6 million of the $5 million in costs incurred by DOD for tactical vehicle field maintenance services were not required.
Section 847 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 requires a selected category of senior DOD acquisition officials to seek post-DOD employment ethics opinion letters before accepting compensation from DOD contractors. DOD is required to issue the written opinion letters within 30 days after receiving the request and to maintain copies of these opinion letters in a centralized database or repository. This audit found that the DOD Standards of Conduct Office in the DOD Office of General Counsel has initiated but not completed development and implementation of a central DOD repository to record requests for written opinions and to store copies of opinion letters issued.
At the request of five members of Congress, DOD IG reviewed contracts that support Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom for language in clauses that address the prevention of sexual assault or harassment of or by contractor personnel. DOD IG also determined whether DOD and/or DOD contractors provided sexual assault/harassment prevention and response training to contractor employees prior to deployment. Of the 10 DOD contractors reviewed, eight did not have policies or training requirements for sexual assault prevention and response. In addition, sexual assault prevention and response policy was not applied to contractors, and contractors were not required to complete such training as part of theater-specific individual requirements training.
DOD IG reviewed the Combat Services Support Contract - Kuwait (CSSC-K) to identify potential weaknesses related to the management of the contractors security program and security clearances for contractor employees. The audit revealed that CSSC-K contractor employees worked in sensitive positions without the required security clearance. The contractor officials also allowed contractor employees to remain in sensitive positions without a security clearance even after they were informed they were in violation of the contract.
In this audit, the DOD IG determined whether DOD officials awarded and administered six time and-materials contracts valued at $120.8 million for work in Southwest Asia in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation. The DOD IG found that officials at the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment did not adequately monitor the contractors working in Southwest Asia and did not adequately review invoices.
The U.S. Army Contracting Command, Southwest Asia-Kuwait did not develop appropriate surveillance methods to assess contractors compliance to performance objectives, approve contractors quality control plans at the time of award, or perform timely legal reviews and key contracting documents were not always available.
On 4 of 15 contracts reviewed, U.S. Special Operations Command contracting officials did not perform or document the price reasonableness determination in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation. In total, USSOCOM did not adequately document $721 million in negotiated prices on the four contracts.
The DOD IG sought to determine whether the Mine Resilient Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle program office effectively procured armored vehicles in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation and DOD requirements. The DOD IG found that Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC) officials did not properly determine that contract prices were fair and reasonable when they awarded nine contracts in January 2007 for MRAP vehicles. The contracting officials' acceptance of offered prices without attempting to obtain appropriate volume discounts may have resulted in potential lost savings of $45.6 million.
In this audit the DOD IG identified weaknesses in the management, surveillance, and billing processes of the contracting officials and the Counter Narcoterrorism Technology Program Office. The DOD IG found that the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command contracting officials and contracting officers representatives did not perform proper contract management for the 35 task orders reviewed, valued at $98.8 million.
The DOD IG sought to determine whether DOD obligated $1.3 billion from the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund in accordance with legal provisions for assisting the Afghan Security Forces and with appropriations law. The audit found that six DOD commands obligated the $1.3 billion primarily using contracts with commercial vendors or military interdepartmental purchase requests that complied with appropriations law.
Although the LOGCAP office planned for the transfer of 11 task orders to new performance contractors, the DOD IG identified weaknesses in planning, controlling costs, and overseeing property and contractors.
While controls over the Nontactical Vehicles (NTV) acquisition process have improved, the DOD IG found that more can be accomplished to improve the management of recurring NTV requirements. The DOD IG estimated that 68 percent of NTV contract files did not contain adequate justification for the NTVs and 85 percent did not contain documentation to how contracting officers appointed contracting officers representatives to oversee contracts.
The audit found problems with the oversight and leasing of non-tactical vehicles. From March 2006 until January 2008, the number of leased non-tactical vehicles at Bagram Air Field Afghanistan increased from 102 to 1,548. But the acquisition did not comply with provisions of the DOD Regulation 4500.36-R and the documentation for the justification of the leases of non-tactical vehicles ranged from providing specific purposes to citing the words vehicle lease, or a justification was not provided.
U.S. Air Forces Central officials did not effectively manage or administer the war reserve material contract in accordance with federal or DOD policies or provide sufficient oversight of contract administration actions and decisions. The DOD IG found that the contracting officer could not provide basic, general information and documentation on the contract; did not effectively monitor or track $161.1 million in costs incurred on the contract and frequently failed to document key decisions; and improperly obligated funds for projects.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division did not effectively administer the task order for transportation services because it did not establish or implement processes for invoice and inventory reconciliation and discrepancy resolution. In addition, it did not establish standard policies for justification and utilization of nontactical vehicles.
The objective of this audit was to determine whether controls over Common Access Cards (CACs) provided to contractors to gain access to DOD resources, installations, and sensitive information were in place and worked as intended. Under the Geneva Conventions, the CAC also serves as an ID card for civilians and contractors who accompany the Armed Forces during a conflict. The audit revealed that additional controls over contractor CACs are needed and existing controls need improvement. Some contractors received CACs without undergoing background checks or receiving appropriate Government approval. Nearly half of revoked CACs were not recovered.
The overall objective was to determine whether the controls over the distribution of conventional military arms, ammunition, and explosives provided to the security forces of Afghanistan were adequate. Most of the responsibilities reviewed by this assessment were contracted to private companies. The report also examined the organizational structure and processes used to execute security assistance programs during wartime operations using pseudo Foreign Military Sales cases for Afghanistan.
In October 2007, the DOD IG evaluated the control and accountability of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives in Iraq and Afghanistan. The results of that assessment were published in a classified report, DOD IG Report No. SPO-2008-001. The report issued here was a follow-up to determine the status of corrective actions that were to be implemented. The team evaluated the status of issues on accountability and control of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives, the responsiveness of Foreign Military Sales support to the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) and the development of logistics sustainment capability for the ISF; most of these services had been contracted to private companies.
This audit discusses DIA compliance with laws and regulations over intragovernmental procurements. DOD uses a Military Interagency Purchase Request (MIPR) for intragovernmental procurements within and outside of DOD. Other Federal agencies requesting intragovernmental support for goods or services from DOD may use a memorandum or other format. Congress became concerned about the interagency procurement practices used by Federal agencies. The committee recommended that the DOD Inspector General determine whether the policies, procedures, and internal controls are adequate to ensure compliance with Defense procurement laws and regulations.
This audit included 86 contract actions on 42 DOD contracts for commercial items issued during FYs 2003 and 2004. The value of these actions was approximately $4.4 billion and each action reviewed was awarded for $15 million or more. Contracting officials did not adequately justify the commercial nature of 35 of 42 (83 percent) commercial contracts for defense systems and subsystems awarded in FYs 2003 and 2004. As a result, contracting officials inappropriately awarded contracting actions that did not achieve the benefits of buying truly commercial products and relinquished price and other oversight protections under the Truth in Negotiations Act that would have allowed better visibility to establish fair and reasonable prices.
This audit is a review of the 60K Tunner logistics support contract. On April 1, 2004, the Air Force awarded a sole source contract to Systems & Electronics, Inc. for logistics support of the 60K Tunner cargo loader. Air Force personnel use the 60K Tunner to load cargo onto large aircraft. The contract required Systems & Electronics, Inc. to provide all of the logistics support needed for the cargo loader for eight years at an estimated total cost of $158 million. On February 11, 2005, the Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) requested that the DOD Office of Inspector General review the influence and decisions made by Darleen Druyun, the then Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition and Management, on the 60K Tunner logistics support contract.
This report is the second and last report of audits performed in response to a request from Senator Pete V. Domenici and allegations made to the Defense Hotline from one complainant. The first report addressed allegations relating to the Army Modular Causeway System. This report addresses 12 allegations relating to the Improved Navy Lighterage System. The allegations stated that the Navy based a key Improved Navy Lighterage System component, the side connector, on a faulty, unreliable, and unsafe design. In addition, the allegations stated that the procuring activity, the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, cultivated an uncompetitive contracting process, and the Defense Contract Management Agency failed to manage the Improved Navy Lighterage System contracts.
This audit is a review of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers project to build Afghan Army facilities. The U.S. Central Command was responsible for conducting military and humanitarian operations in Afghanistan and requested that the Transatlantic Programs Center, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Winchester, Virginia, develop contracts to design and build facilities in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, including Afghanistan. In December 2002 and January 2003, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers awarded two design and build contracts for construction projects in Afghanistan, including facilities to house and support the Afghan National Army. The audit focused on these contracts.
This audit was initiated because of the increasing significance of contracts for services in DOD. Office of Federal Procurement Policy Letter No. 93-1, Management Oversight of Service Contracting, May 18, 1994, encourages Inspectors General to conduct vulnerability assessments of service contracting. This report represents the sixth DOD audit of service contracts, but is the first to look exclusively at surveillance of service contracts, an area identified as problematic in previous reports. This report evaluates whether DOD provided sufficient oversight for service contracts to ensure that contractors performed in accordance with contract specifications.
This report is the second in a series of reports concerning allegations made to the Defense Hotline on the Defense Contract Management Agencys oversight of the contractors performance on the C-130, F-22, and C-5 aircraft. The Defense Contract Management Agency, an independent combat support agency responsible for assessing contractors manufacturing, production, and quality assurance processes. This report addresses allegations related to the pricing of spare parts under the C-5 Program Depot Maintenance contract (C-5 letter contract), payments made to Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems Company for delivered C-5 spare parts, management of the Risk Assessment and Management Program, and rotation of administrative contracting officers within Defense Contract Management Agency.
This audit was performed in response to a request from Senator John McCain. The Senator asked that the DOD IG review issues raised by a number of employees at L-3 Communications. After the Air Force issued the contract to The Boeing Company for acquisition and support of the F-15 training device, L-3 Communications employees claimed that the contract was awarded based on an improper evaluation. Specifically, the employees claimed that the Air Force disregarded past performance and cost/price as selection criteria and, instead, issued the task order based solely on an inaccurate assessment of the technical/management criteria.
This audit examines the alleged misappropriation of U.S. foreign military assistance funds to Egypt. Since 1989, Congress has appropriated $1.3 billion annually in nonrepayable Foreign Military Financing grants to Egypt. Between 1994 and 1998, the Egyptian government purchased six frigates from the U.S. Government under the Foreign Military Sales program using Foreign Military Financing funds. The U.S. Navy hired a contractor to provide technical support for the transferred ships and tasked contract employees to perform additional work on the Egyptian presidential yacht in 1999. The audit was performed in response to a complaint made to the Defense Hotline. The complainant alleged mismanagement of the Foreign Military Financing funds used for the Egyptian Navy Frigate program.
This report is one in a series of reports that discusses allegations made to the Defense Hotline concerning management oversight of the contractors performance on the C-130, F-22, and C-5 aircraft was Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Systems the prime contractor for the aircraft. The allegation states that the Defense Contract Management Agencys administration of contracts for the aircraft was inadequate. Specifically, the complainant alleges that agency officials did not issue a Level III Corrective Action Request to address problems with Lockheed Martins oversight of its subcontractor and its inability to identify and resolve problems associated with the Electronic Flight Instruments.
This audit examines the validity of information in the Central Contractor Registration Database. It was designed as a means of reforming payment processes, as the single point of entry for vendors that want to do business with DOD. Because DOD is the largest purchaser of goods and services in the world, there was a cost savings to be realized by streamlining these administrative processes. The Central Contractor Registration database was created to be the single repository of vendor data for the entire DOD to avoid this administrative duplication and allow contractors to take responsibility for the accuracy of their own important business information by supplying it directly to the Government through a single registration.
This audit was performed in response to a February 5, 2002, request from the Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, to examine DynCorp Internationals suitability and capability to perform and its procedures for selecting and screening personnel. The request to conduct this audit was based on allegations made in a February 4, 2002, Insight magazine article entitled DynCorp Disgrace. The article questioned the moral integrity and technical skills of certain DynCorp employees working in Bosnia.
The Defense Criminal Investigative Service and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command requested an audit of maintenance and repair type contracts at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Europe, Wiesbaden, Germany. The Defense Criminal Investigative Service and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command performed a joint investigation and believed an audit would be beneficial to improve management controls.
This audit was performed in response to allegations made to the Defense Hotline concerning the contract for modernization of the Defense Logistics Agency Contract Action Reporting System. The complainant alleged that the Defense Logistics Agency did not properly plan, execute, or manage the contract to re-host the Contract Action Reporting System from a mainframe computer to a mid-tier computer. The complainant also alleged that the contractor did not fulfill the performance obligations in accordance with the contract requirements.
In this report, DoD IG investigates a prime DoD contractor for falsely claiming to be a service-disabled veteran owned small business. It also assesses US and coalition efforts to improve health care conditions and develop sustainable Afghan National Security Forces medical logistics in Kabul, Afghanistan.
In this report, the DOD Inspector General focuses upon its current investigations and the transition of contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Among these were the closing of offices in Iraq as DOD withdraws from Iraq, and the monitoring of the Afghan security forces contracts.
The DOD Inspector General examines the current efforts to improve contingency contracting across the agency. The Inspector General reviewed 38 case reports from IG personnel and their recommendations, and summarizes the common problems and suggestions that the DOD should use for future improvements.
In this report, the DOD Inspector General focuses upon its current investigations and the state of security forces in Afghanistan. The IG audits focused on equipment, construction and contractor work in Afghanistan aimed at improving the Afghan armed forces. The report also provides a brief summary on all audits undertaken by DOD during the period.
This report from the Office of the Inspector General highlights current audits, oversight and investigations of the office. The report covers U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, healthcare programs, as well as domestic DoD operations and the individual military services. Foreign support contracts examined include a logistics contractor providing fuel to U.S. military in Iraq.
This report from the Office of the Inspector General highlights current audits, oversight and investigations of the office. The report covers U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, healthcare programs, as well as domestic DoD operations and the individual military services. The Inspector General also comments on the increasing number of contractors being used, with contractor numbers exceeding U.S. government personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. The report seeks to improve contracting programs for greater oversight and effectiveness.
In this report from the Office of Inspector General, the IG highlights current audits, oversight and investigations of the office. The report focuses upon the drawdown in Iraq, the training of Afghan security forces, and the base realignment to Guam. Military contractors procuring equipment domestically and services abroad are also covered in the report, such as Kuwaiti contractors operating in sensitive areas without security clearances.
The Office of Inspector General semiannual report of 2009-2010 focuses upon the audits and oversight of the OIG domestically and abroad. In particular, the report extensively covers DoD operations in Southwest Asia, a U.S. Marine base move to Guam, and the success of DoD programs worldwide. The report examines military contractors domestic procurement as well as operations in the field, such as contractor work in providing dining facilities.
In this report, the OIG covers critical areas of oversight for fuel theft and corruption, financial transactions, and munitions accountability. The report also highlights oversight of Iraq and Afghanistan operations, DoD programs as a whole, and the oversight work done by the individual military services. The report examines military contractors' domestic procurements as well as operations in the field, such as the contract for the Heavy Lift VI program in Kuwait.
This report from the Office of Inspector General summarizes OIG work on the global war on terror, current investigations and audits, and oversight of the U.S. military services. The report includes specific audits upon functions of battlefield contractors in Iraq and support operations for Iraq and Afghanistan operations.
This report from the Office of Inspector General summarizes OIG work on the global war on terror, Hurricane Katrina, current investigations and audits, and oversight of the U.S. military services. The report notes that some DoD agencies did not have proper methods for adequate surveillance methods for monitoring contracts.
In this report, the Office of Inspector General summarizes their work auditing the global war on terror, current investigations and audits, and oversight of the U.S. military services. The OIG also summarized reports from special inspectors in Qatar, Kuwait, Iraq and Afghanistan. This report also discusses construction contractor roles in the electrocution of a U.S. soldier, and the accountability of contractors on the battlefield
This report from the Office of the Inspector General documents current investigations into contract irregularities and individual fraud. The report focuses on the war on terror, Hurricane Katrina, financial management of DoD branches, and the management of contracts by the OIG.
This report from the Office of the Inspector General documents current investigations and accomplishments of the OIG. The report focuses upon the global war on terror and the work of the OIG in combating fraud and contract mismanagement. A list of audits and ongoing investigations into contractor activity is also summarized in the report.
This report from the Office of the Inspector General documents current investigations into contract irregularities and individual fraud. The report focuses upon Hurricane Katrina and the global war on terror. The OIG also is auditing the quality of water provided by contractors in Iraq and the inclusion of contractors into the new National Security Personnel System.
In this report from the Office of the Inspector General, the OIG reports upon its current investigations into contractor irregularities. Most investigations are related to individual fraud within contractors or defense contractor non-compliance. Specific reports for contractors abroad include an evaluation of the maintenance of Stryker vehicles in Iraq, and an audit of information operation activities in Southwest Asia.
In this report, the Inspector General summarizes the current investigations by the OIG into DoD finances. The report largely discusses contractor non-compliance and individual fraud among DoD contractors and employees.
In this report, the Inspector General describes the current investigations into contractor fraud and DoD auditing procedures. The report summarizes investigations and finds that most are related to individual fraud or contractor non-compliance.
In this report from the Office of the Inspector General, the OIG reports upon its current investigations into contractor irregularities. Most investigations are related to individual fraud within contractors or defense contractor non-compliance. The contractors in the report are primarily U.S. based equipment providers for the DoD.
In this report, the Inspector General comments upon the auditing process for the logistics infrastructure of the DoD, including the several thousand contractors involved. The report also briefly discusses trafficking in persons, as related to DoD organizations and contractors abroad. Other investigations included a charge card fraud in South Korea that included local South Korean contractors.
In this report, the Inspector General describes the current investigations of the OIG and discusses the auditing of the charge card system for DoD. Most contractors for DoD were investigated for engaging in kickbacks, environmental degradation, and product irregularities. Credit card fraud was carried out on an individual basis.
This report from the Inspector General describes contractor irregularities discovered and currently under investigation / prosecution by the OIG. Most investigations are related to individual fraud or defense contractor non-compliance. The contractors in the report are primarily domestic equipment providers for the DoD.