



United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

February 23, 2012

Congressional Committees

Subject: Afghanistan Security: Department of Defense Effort to Train Afghan Police Relies on Contractor Personnel to Fill Skill and Resource Gaps

The U.S. strategy in Afghanistan depends in part on building that country's capacity to provide for its own security by training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces, which includes the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police (ANP).¹ Since 2002, the United States has allocated over \$43 billion to train, equip, and sustain the Afghan National Security Forces, which includes about \$14 billion to train, equip, and sustain the ANP. The ANP training program is intended to create and sustain a professionally-led police force that is accountable to the Afghan people and is capable of enforcing laws and maintaining civil order. Currently, U.S., coalition, and Department of Defense (DOD) civilian contractor personnel assist the Afghan Ministry of Interior in training the ANP at 23 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) training sites and in mentoring ANP units in the field.²

From 2002 through 2010, the Department of State (State) was involved in the ANP training program. During this time, State contracted with DynCorp International (DynCorp) to provide police mentors and trainers and to develop and execute the ANP training program. DOD became involved in ANP training in 2004, working in conjunction with State, DynCorp, and others. In 2009, DOD became the lead U.S. agency for helping Afghanistan reform the ANP and the Afghan Ministry of Interior, which oversees the ANP.³ In December 2010, DOD awarded DynCorp a new contract for ANP training, mentoring, maintenance, logistics, and security support. The contract has a potential value over \$1 billion, if all options are exercised.

In a June 2010 report, the Senate Committee on Armed Services expressed concern about problems with the ANP training program, including lapses in oversight and management of the contract that were identified by the DOD and State Inspectors General.⁴ In January 2011, Congress required that we report on the use of U.S. government (USG) personnel, rather than contractor personnel, to train the ANP.⁵ In response, this report describes (1) the roles and

¹For more information on the Afghan National Army, see GAO, *Afghanistan Security: Afghan Army Growing, but Additional Trainers Needed; Long-term Costs Not Determined*, [GAO-11-66](#) (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 27, 2011).

²The United States is a member of an international coalition that conducts security operations in Afghanistan. The coalition is led by NATO. The coalition includes non-NATO member countries, such as Sweden and Australia.

³DOD manages the ANP training program through the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A). NTM-A/CSTC-A is an integrated NATO and U.S. command, currently led by a U.S. Army Lieutenant General, with the mission of generating and developing the Afghan National Security Forces.

⁴S. Rep. 111-201, at p. 210, June 4, 2010.

⁵Pub. L. No. 111-383, §1235(b), Jan. 7, 2011.

responsibilities of USG and contractor personnel in the ANP training program; (2) the extent to which DOD has assessed (a) the advantages and disadvantages of using USG or contractor personnel for ANP training and (b) the potential impact of transferring responsibilities for ANP training from contractor to USG personnel; and (3) lessons learned from other DOD foreign police training programs that directly relate to the advantages and disadvantages of using USG personnel or contractors.

To describe the roles and responsibilities of USG and contractor personnel, we reviewed DOD and State documents and prior GAO work, as well as USG audit reports by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, the DOD Inspector General, and the State Inspector General. For the purposes of this report, “USG personnel” refers to DOD military and civilian personnel supporting the ANP training program, while “non-USG coalition personnel” refers to personnel from other coalition countries supporting the ANP training program. We interviewed DOD and State officials in Washington, D.C.; and Kabul, Khandahar, and Konduz, Afghanistan; and DynCorp officials in Falls Church, Virginia; and Khandahar and Konduz, Afghanistan.⁶ We also visited three ANP training sites in Afghanistan to further develop information found in documents and provided via interviews. We obtained data on the numbers of USG and non-USG coalition trainers and mentors, DOD contractor personnel operating under the December 2010 contract, and the location of USG and DOD contractor personnel at NATO ANP training sites. While we assessed the data's reliability and determined they were sufficient for our purposes, we did not independently verify this information.

To describe the extent to which DOD assessed (a) the advantages and disadvantages of using USG or contractor personnel for ANP training and (b) the potential impact of transferring responsibilities for ANP training from contractor personnel to USG personnel, we reviewed relevant contract documents, including DOD's acquisition plan and strategy, statement of work, and contract performance reports and obtained information from DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and in Kabul, Afghanistan.

To describe the lessons learned from the execution and oversight of other DOD foreign police training programs regarding the relative advantages and disadvantages of using USG or contractor personnel, we obtained information from DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and in Afghanistan. We also interviewed two retired USG officials with expertise in U.S. foreign police training efforts.⁷ In addition, we reviewed several reports on recent U.S. foreign police training efforts published by research organizations based in Washington, D.C., and by the Center for Army Lessons Learned in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2011 to February 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

⁶We also spoke with officials from the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice to obtain information on their roles and responsibilities in the ANP training program. These departments provide mentoring and training in counternarcotics, customs and border issues, weapons, procedures, crime scene protocols, investigations, crime scene management, and financial crime.

⁷We contacted these individuals based on our prior police training work. We used their views to assess the statements of current DOD officials. These officials may not be the only individuals with relevant information to offer.

Results in Brief

U.S. government (USG), non-USG coalition, and DOD contractor personnel perform various roles in the ANP training program. These roles include: (1) serving as advisors and mentors to build ministerial capacity in areas such as financial and human resource management at the Afghan Ministry of Interior; (2) serving as mentors and trainers to develop Afghan commanders' abilities to operate training sites and provide training to ANP recruits in areas such as criminal investigation, weapons, survival skills, and physical fitness; and (3) serving as embedded mentors to help deployed ANP units develop civilian policing skills. DOD contractor personnel also provide maintenance, logistics, and security support at training sites. As of November 2011, about 778 USG, non-USG coalition, and DOD contractor personnel provided ANP training and mentoring at 23 NATO-managed sites. Approximately 66 percent of these trainers and mentors were non-USG coalition personnel, 21 percent were USG personnel, and the remaining 13 percent were DOD contractor personnel. In addition, about 2,825 DOD contractor personnel provided maintenance, logistics, and security services at 12 NATO-managed training sites.

After assuming program responsibility from State in 2009, DOD did not assess the advantages or disadvantages of using USG or contractor personnel for the ANP training program and has not assessed the potential impact of transferring responsibilities to USG personnel for the ANP training program since awarding the contract to DynCorp in 2010. Prior to awarding the DynCorp contract, DOD officials considered the use of government personnel to perform the mission and found that the ANP training program did not include any inherently governmental functions.⁸ We did not find any additional information in the contract files underlying their decision. DOD policy officials told us that DOD had "implicitly" approved State's previous decision to use contractor personnel when DOD assumed responsibility. DOD officials told us they did not assess the impact of transferring ANP training responsibilities from contractors to USG personnel because USG agencies do not have sufficient personnel with the needed skills in civilian policing available to provide all the trainers and mentors needed by the ANP training program. DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and Afghanistan agreed that contractor personnel were used to fill skill and resource gaps. For that reason, these officials informed us, the ANP training program cannot fulfill its mission without using contractor personnel.


DOD officials reported that they were not aware of any lessons learned from other DOD-led foreign police training programs that directly address the advantages and disadvantages of using USG or contractor personnel to carry out the ANP training program. While we did not identify any such lessons, we reported in March 2009 that the United States lacked sufficient personnel to carry out the ANP training mission. We also identified several reports that focused on broader issues concerning the use of contractor personnel in a wartime environment. For instance, we reported in April 2011 that DOD faces a number of long-standing and systemic challenges that hinder its ability to achieve more successful acquisition outcomes. In addition, the bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan reported on deficiencies in several areas of wartime contracting, including competition, management, and enforcement.

⁸Activities are considered to be inherently governmental when they are so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance by federal government employees. 31 U.S.C. § 501 note. See 48 C.F.R. § 7.503(c) for examples of functions considered to be inherently governmental.

USG, Non-USG Coalition, and DOD Contractor Personnel Perform Various Roles in the ANP Training Program

USG, non-USG coalition, and DOD contractor personnel perform various roles in the ANP training program. These roles include: (1) serving as advisors and mentors to build ministerial capacity in areas such as financial and human resource management at the Afghan Ministry of Interior and ANP Training General Command Headquarters; (2) serving as mentors and trainers to develop Afghan commanders' abilities to operate training sites and provide training to ANP recruits in areas such as criminal investigation, weapons, survival skills, and physical fitness; and (3) serving as embedded mentors to help deployed ANP units develop civilian policing skills. According to NATO, the United States and 12 other NATO coalition countries provided 325 police mentoring and liaison teams (consisting of 15 to 20 personnel each) as of January 2012. In addition, over 3,400 DOD contractor personnel provided mentoring, training, maintenance, logistics, and security support to the ANP training program.

Figure 1: Roles of USG, Non-USG,^a and DOD Contractor Personnel within the Afghan National Police Training Program



Sources: GAO analysis of DOD data; GAO and NATO (photos).

^aNon-USG Personnel refers to personnel from coalition countries other than the United States.


USG, non-USG, and DOD contractor personnel advise and mentor Afghan officials at the Ministry of Interior and the ANP Training General Command Headquarters to build ministerial capacity in areas such as logistics, financial, and human resources management. According to DOD and contractor officials, about 166 of these advisors and mentors are USG personnel and 177 are DOD contractor personnel.

USG and non-USG coalition personnel manage 23 NATO-led ANP training sites.⁹ A designated NATO country manages each site and provides training site mentors for the

⁹According to DOD documents, as of October 2011, 37 training sites in Afghanistan provided police training. NATO coalition personnel operated 23 of these 37 sites. The Afghan Ministries of Interior and Justice and their bilateral partners, such as Germany and the Czech Republic, operated the remaining sites. Since these other sites are not NATO-led, we did not include them within the scope of our review.

Afghan training site commander, who oversees the administrative responsibilities for the training site.¹⁰ The United States manages 8 of the 23 NATO training sites. Figure 2 shows the sites managed by USG and non-USG coalition personnel.

Figure 2: Location of USG Personnel and DOD Contractor Personnel at NATO-Led^a ANP Training Sites



Sources: GAO based on DOD data; Map Resources (map).

^aNATO training sites include sites operated by NATO coalition partners, including Sweden and Australia.

^bRegional training site.

^cNational training site.


^dCentral training site.

At the 23 NATO-led ANP training sites, USG, non-USG coalition, and DOD contractor personnel serve as trainers and mentors. These trainers and mentors work with the Afghan site commanders and staff to develop their ability to (1) operate the training sites and (2) provide training to ANP recruits in areas such as criminal investigation, weapons, survival skills, and physical fitness. As of November 2011, USG personnel comprised about 21 percent of the 778 trainers and mentors at these training sites, non-USG coalition personnel

¹⁰Sweden and Australia are not NATO countries, but they are part of the NATO-led coalition in Afghanistan. For the purposes of this report, the 23 ANP training sites led by NATO include those led by Sweden and Australia. Sweden serves as the lead for the Shaheen training site and Australia is the lead for the Tarin Kowt training site. See enclosure I for more information.

comprised approximately 66 percent, and DOD contractor personnel comprised about 13 percent (see fig. 3). Of the 267 total USG and DOD contractor personnel involved in training and mentoring at the NATO-led sites, about 61 percent (163) were USG personnel, and about 39 percent (104) were DOD contractor personnel. USG personnel, DOD contractor personnel, or both provided training and mentoring at 19 of the 23 NATO-led sites (see encl. I for more details).¹¹

Figure 3: USG, Non-USG Coalition,^a and DOD Contractor Personnel Trainers and Mentors at 23 NATO ANP Training Sites



Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.


^aNon-USG coalition Personnel refers to personnel from coalition countries other than the United States.

Also at the training sites, approximately 2,825 DOD contractor personnel provided support services. These services included maintenance, logistics, and security. As a result, most DOD contractor personnel at the training sites—more than 80 percent—were not directly involved in the training and mentoring of ANP personnel. As of November 2011, DOD contractor personnel provided these support services at 12 of the 23 sites, according to DOD documents (see fig. 2 and encl. I for locations).

USG, non-USG, and DOD contract personnel serve as embedded mentors to deployed ANP units. According to DOD and contractor officials, 319 USG personnel and 329 DOD contractor personnel serve as embedded mentors that work directly with deployed ANP units to help develop civilian policing skills (see fig. 4).

¹¹DOD documents show that DOD contractor personnel were also involved in providing training and mentoring services at two additional non-NATO ANP training sites managed by the Ministry of Interior.

Figure 4: DOD Contractor Personnel Employed, by Type of Service Performed (as of November 2011)



Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Note: The figure's percentages do not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

DOD Did Not Assess the Advantages or Disadvantages of Using Contractor Personnel or the Impact of Transferring Responsibilities to USG Personnel for the ANP Training Program

DOD did not assess the advantages or disadvantages of using USG personnel rather than contractor personnel for the ANP training program after assuming responsibility for the program from State in 2009. DOD policy officials informed us that DOD had “implicitly” approved State’s previous decision to use contractor personnel when DOD assumed responsibility for the contract. In reviewing the contract file, we found that DOD officials in Afghanistan had considered the use of USG instead of contractor personnel in June 2010 but decided that the requirements for the contractor did not include inherently governmental functions.¹² Our review of the contract files and our discussions with DOD officials in Afghanistan did not provide any additional information or support for the decision. We also found that Army contracting officials had noted concerns in the acquisition strategy regarding the wartime environment in Afghanistan (including the regular rotations of USG personnel in and out of the country) in justifying the need for contractor personnel to train the ANP.

DOD officials also stated that they had not assessed the impact of transferring contractor responsibilities for the ANP program to USG personnel after DOD awarded the contract in 2010. DOD officials informed us that transferring contractor ANP training responsibilities is not

¹²The officials were required to prepare a request for services contract approval form under Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement Subpart 5107.503. The regulation does not require the officials who signed the form to include an assessment or analysis to support the request for contract services.

feasible because the U.S. government does not have sufficient personnel with the right skills available to fulfill the multiple requirements of the mission.¹³ DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and Afghanistan agreed that contractor personnel are used to fill skill and resource gaps. According to these officials, DOD needs contractor personnel to provide training and mentoring in civilian policing skills, as well as in more advanced areas of expertise such as criminal investigation, interrogation, and forensic crime scene analysis. DOD officials stated that the U.S. government lacks available personnel to train the ANP and perform all the support roles that DOD contractor personnel fill.¹⁴

None of the Lessons Learned from DOD Police Training Efforts Directly Address the Use of Contractor Personnel Instead of USG Personnel to Train ANP

DOD officials reported that they were not aware of any lessons learned from other DOD-led foreign police training programs that directly address the advantages and disadvantages of using USG or contractor personnel to implement the ANP training program. Additionally, we spoke with former USG officials with considerable foreign police training experience, specifically a retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General who was in charge of the police training mission in Iraq and a former Department of Justice official who led the department's international police training efforts. These retired officials also indicated that they were unaware of any specific lessons from Iraq or other DOD foreign police training missions that directly address the relative advantages and disadvantages of using USG or contractor personnel for the ANP training program.

While we did not identify any lessons learned that directly address the advantages and disadvantages of using USG rather than contractor personnel for the ANP training program, we reported in March 2009 that the United States lacked sufficient personnel to carry out the ANP training mission.¹⁵ We recommended that DOD and State provide more personnel to support the ANP training program, and the President responded by authorizing an additional 4,000 troops. Also, an August 2011 joint audit by the Inspectors General of DOD and State reported that additional personnel were needed for program management and contract oversight for the ANP training program.¹⁶ Other reports have focused on broader issues concerning the use of contractor personnel in a wartime environment. For instance, in February 2010, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction issued a report on applying lessons learned from Iraq that included a section on contract and acquisition management.¹⁷ We reported in April 2011 that DOD faces a number of long-standing and

¹³In 2009, GAO reported that the lack of personnel to serve on police mentor teams constrained expansion of the ANP training program. For additional information, see GAO, *Afghanistan Security: U.S. Programs to Further Reform the Ministry of Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation*, [GAO-09-280](#) (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2009).

¹⁴Similarly, DynCorp was contracted by State to provide police advisors and logistical support in Iraq. See Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, *Long-Standing Weakness in Department of State Oversight of DynCorp Contract for Support of the Iraqi Police Training Program* (Arlington, VA: January 2010).

¹⁵[GAO-09-280](#).

¹⁶Inspectors General of the Department of State and Department of Defense, *Afghan National Police Training Program: Lessons Learned During the Transition of Contract Administration*, Department of Defense Report No. D-2011-095, DOS Report No. AUD/CG-11-42 (Washington, D.C., and Arlington, VA: Aug. 15, 2011).

¹⁷Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, *Applying Iraq's Hard Lessons to the Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations* (Arlington, VA: February 2010).


systemic challenges that hinder its ability to achieve more successful acquisition outcomes in contingency operations like Iraq and Afghanistan.¹⁸ DOD generally agreed with our recommendations and has taken steps to implement them (see encl. II for a list of other related GAO reports). In August 2011, the bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan reported that (1) U.S. government agencies have not institutionalized acquisition as a core function for operations such as Afghanistan police training and that (2) contract competition, management, and enforcement are ineffective.¹⁹

We are not making any recommendations in this report.

We provided the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and State a draft of this report. DOD and State provided technical comments on our draft, which we have incorporated as appropriate. The Departments of Justice and Homeland Security had no comments. We provided DynCorp with portions of the draft report describing the roles of DOD contractor personnel. DynCorp had no comments on these portions.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and State. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at <http://www.gao.gov>.

If you or your staff members have questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in enclosure III.



Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.
Director, International Affairs and Trade

Enclosures – 3

¹⁸GAO, Contingency Contracting: Observations on Actions Needed to Address Systemic Challenges, [GAO-11-580](#) (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2011).

¹⁹Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, *Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks* (Washington, D.C.: August 2011).

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Enclosure I

Roles of USG Personnel and DOD Contractor Personnel at 23 NATO ANP Training Sites

Table 1 identifies the lead NATO coalition country that serves at each of NATO's 23 ANP training sites. It also shows where USG and DOD contractor personnel serve as trainers and mentors and where DOD contractor personnel provide maintenance, logistics, and security.

Table 1: Roles of USG Personnel and DOD Contractor Personnel at 23 NATO ANP Training Sites

Training site name (alphabetical)	Lead NATO coalition country	USG military trainers and mentors	DOD contractor trainers and mentors	DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security
ANP Academy	Germany			
Bamyan	United States	✓		✓
Gardez (Regional)	United States	✓		✓
Ghazni	Poland			
Herat (Regional)	Italy	✓	✓	✓
Kabul (Central)	Italy		✓	
Kandahar	United States	✓	✓	
Kandahar (Regional)	Romania		✓	✓
Khowst	United States	✓		✓
Konduz (Regional)	Germany	✓	✓	✓
Laghman (Regional)	United States	✓		
Lashkar Gah	United Kingdom		✓	✓
Mazar-e-Sharif (Regional)	France		✓	✓
Nangarhar (Regional)	United States	✓		✓
Pacheragram	United States	✓	✓	
Paktika	Poland			✓
Shaheen	Sweden ^a	✓		
Sherberghan	Turkey		✓	✓
Shouz	United States	✓	✓	✓
Spin Baldak	Romania		✓	
Staff College	Germany			
Tarin Kowt	Australia ^a	✓		
Wardak (National)	France		✓	
Total		12 sites	12 sites	12 sites

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

^aSweden and Australia are not NATO countries, but serve in the NATO-led coalition in Afghanistan. For the purposes of this report, the 23 ANP training sites led by NATO include those led by Sweden and Australia.

Enclosure II

Related GAO Products

Afghanistan Governance: Performance-Data Gaps Hinder Overall Assessment of U.S. Efforts to Build Financial Management Capacity. [GAO-11-907](#). Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2011.

Afghanistan: Actions Need to Improve Accountability of U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan Government. [GAO-11-710](#). Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2011.

Multiple U.S. Agencies Provided Billions of Dollars to Train and Equip Foreign Police Forces. [GAO-11-402R](#). Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2011.

Afghanistan Security: Afghan Army Growing, but Additional Trainers Needed; Long-term Costs Not Determined. [GAO-11-66](#). Washington, D.C.: January 27, 2011.

The Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan. [GAO-10-655R](#). Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2010.

Afghanistan's Security Environment. [GAO-10-613R](#). Washington, D.C.: May 5, 2010.

Afghanistan's Security Environment. [GAO-10-178R](#). Washington, D.C.: November 5, 2009.

Afghanistan Drug Control: Strategy Evolving and Progress Reported, but Interim Performance Targets and Evaluation of Justice Reform Efforts Needed. [GAO-10-291](#). Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2010.

Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight. [GAO-09-473SP](#). Washington, D.C.: April 21, 2009.

Afghanistan Security: U.S. Programs to Further Reform Ministry of Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation. [GAO-09-280](#). Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2009.

Afghanistan Security: U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges and Need a Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability. [GAO-08-883T](#). Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008.

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces. [GAO-08-661](#). Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008.

Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight. [GAO-07-801SP](#). Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2007.

Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined. [GAO-05-575](#). Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005.

Enclosure III

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. at 202-512-7331, or johnsoncm@gao.gov

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual above, Pierre Toureille, Assistant Director; Timothy J. DiNapoli; Hynek Kalkus; Rhonda M. Horried; Christopher Mulkins; Angie Nichols-Friedman; David Schneider; Jennifer Zakarian; Ashley Alley; Melissa Hermes; David Dayton; Cindy Gilbert; and Etana Finkler made key contributions to this report.

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