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United States Department of State
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors
Office of Inspector General

Middle East Regional Office

Performance Evaluation of the U.S. Training Center Contract for Personal Protective Services in Afghanistan

Report Number MERO-A-09-08, August 2009

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PREFACE

This report was prepared by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, as amended. It is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports prepared by OIG periodically as part of its responsibility to promote effective management, accountability and positive change in the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the office, post, or function under review. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observation, and a review of applicable documents.

The recommendations therein have been developed on the basis of the best knowledge available to the OIG and, as appropriate, have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope that these recommendations will result in more effective, efficient, and/or economical operations.

I express my appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "H. W. Geisel".

Harold W. Geisel
Acting Inspector General

TABLE OF CONTENTS

KEY FINDINGS 1

INTRODUCTION 3

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5

 Results 5

 Recommendations 6

 Management Comments and OIG Response 7

BACKGROUND 9

 Protection Area of Responsibility 11

BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY’S MANAGEMENT OF THE
U.S. TRAINING CENTER CONTRACT 15

 Overall Performance 15

 Qualifications and Training 16

 Property Management 18

 Explosive Detection Canines 19

 Vehicles 20

THE FUTURE OF U.S. TRAINING CENTER SERVICES IN AFGHANISTAN 23

 Expansion of Services 23

 Integration of Afghan Nationals into Personal Protective Services 24

ABBREVIATIONS 25

APPENDIX I – PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY 27

KEY FINDINGS

- U.S. Training Center's personal protective services have been effective in ensuring the safety of chief of mission personnel in Afghanistan's volatile and ever-changing security environment. No one under U.S. Training Center's protection has been injured or killed, and there have been no incidents involving the use of deadly force.
- The Bureau of Diplomatic Security generally manages the U.S. Training Center contract well. However, with an increased number of personal protective service operations in Afghanistan, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security may require a dedicated Contracting Officer's Representative to provide proper oversight of activities. Additionally, neither of the two current Assistant Regional Security Officers who act as the Contracting Officer's Representatives, verify the accuracy of personnel rosters (muster sheets) before they are submitted for invoicing to ensure that the contractor's labor charges are accurate.
- U.S. Training Center's personal security specialists are experienced and are trained in-country through an adequate continuing professional education program focused on a number of appropriate topics. However, OIG noted that U.S. Training Center personnel lacked a specific type of security training unique to operating in Afghanistan's environment. This deficiency surfaced during the review and OIG detailed its findings to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and U.S. Training Center. For security reasons, and as requested by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, details have been omitted from this report but will be provided to the bureau under separate cover. In addition, personal security specialists received Iraq cultural awareness training, rather than training for Afghanistan.
- U.S. Training Center has instituted reliable controls for its inventory of government-furnished equipment, including weapons, radios, and tracking equipment. Physical security procedures are in place to effectively protect all of this equipment.
- There are several weaknesses in U.S. Training Center's explosive testing program for canines. U.S. Training Center does not test canines for all scents required by its contract with the Department of State. In addition,

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old materials are used to train and test the canines, although fresh materials are required. Finally, the way in which these materials are stored may lead to cross-contamination.

- Embassy Kabul has had issues with the aluminum rims on fully armored vehicles used by U.S. Training Center for protection missions. U.S. Training Center personnel noted that the tires on the armored vehicles in Afghanistan frequently blow out, and substituting steel rims may lead to fewer flat tires.
- U.S. Training Center's personal protective services are adjusting to the changing environment of Afghanistan. For example, the number of U.S. Training Center personnel is increasing to accommodate more personal protection missions. However, proposals for increases have not been based on needs analyses performed by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and may include misallocations of resources. Embassy Kabul is also seeking to integrate Afghan nationals into personal protective services.

INTRODUCTION

In June 2005, U.S. Training Center (USTC) – then known as Blackwater Lodge and Training, a private security company – was awarded a base contract with four option years under the Department of State’s second Worldwide Personal Protective Services contract. Subsequently, in February 2006, USTC was awarded Task Order 4 to provide personal protection to officials under the authority of chiefs of mission in Afghanistan. From the start of the task order in February of 2006 until April of 2009, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) has obligated to USTC a total of \$137 million. Over that period, USTC had a total of 119 personal protective service employees in Afghanistan.

The Middle East Regional Office (MERO) of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated this work under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended,¹ due to concerns about the Department’s exercise of control over the performance of security contractors. The objectives of this review were to determine: (1) the requirements and provisions of the contract and task orders; (2) the costs and funding sources of the contract and task orders; (3) how well the Department is administering the contract and task orders to provide proper oversight of the contractor’s performance in Afghanistan; and (4) how the contractor performs its personal protective service tasks in Afghanistan. This performance review combined the objectives of two originally announced reviews.

This report is the sixth in a series on the Department’s management of the personal protective services program.² In developing this assessment, OIG met with officials from DS, the Bureau of Administration’s Office of Acquisition Management, the American Embassy in Kabul, and with USTC’s management and security professionals contracted to the Department for personal protective services. OIG also traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan where USTC provides movement protection and personal security for U.S. mission personnel.

¹ 5 USC App. 3

² See *Status of the Secretary of State’s Panel on Personal Protective Services in Iraq Report Recommendations*, MERO-IQO-09-01, December 2008; *Review of Diplomatic Security’s Management of Personal Protective Services in Iraq*, MERO-IQO-09-02, January 2009; *Performance Evaluation of the Triple Canopy Contract for Personal Protective Services in Iraq*, MERO-IQO-09-03, March 2009; *Performance Evaluation of the Triple Canopy Contract for Personal Protective Services in Jerusalem*, MERO-IQO-09-05, May 2009; and *Performance Evaluation of the DynCorp Contract for Personal Protective Services in Iraq*, MERO-IQO-09-06, June 2009

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

RESULTS

There is a continuing volatile and unstable security environment in Afghanistan that requires well-coordinated protection operations to allow U.S. Government representatives to carry out their mission objectives. The Department's contract for personal protective services with USTC is generally well-managed by DS. In the United States, DS and the contractor coordinate and communicate on pre-employment screening and training. They also participate in regular briefings, meetings, and program management reviews to maintain a good working relationship.

Despite its overall satisfactory contract management, DS could improve its performance in two areas, both of which have been mentioned in previous OIG reports. First, two Assistant Regional Security Officers at Embassy Kabul are currently acting as Contracting Officer's Representatives (COR). These officers' many other duties may prevent them from providing adequate oversight of the USTC contract, particularly as personal protective service needs increase in Afghanistan. Second, the current acting CORs do not review or verify the personnel rosters (muster sheets) before they are sent to USTC and then DS in Washington, DC.

USTC has met the security goals under its contract with the Department. U.S. Government employees report that USTC personal security specialists are both professional and respectful. In addition, OIG found that the specialists, most with military and law enforcement backgrounds, have adequate experience. USTC conducts proper continuing in-country training for its employees, but training was inappropriate in two areas. First, before arriving in the country, personal security specialists did not receive a specific type of security training unique to operating in the Afghanistan environment. Second, rather than taking courses in cultural awareness for Afghanistan, the specialists had been trained in Iraq cultural awareness. When these insufficiencies were pointed out by OIG, DS began correcting both issues.

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OIG examined three other areas of contractor performance. USTC maintains proper inventory control and protection for its government-furnished equipment. OIG found weaknesses in USTC's training of explosive detection canines, as well as in its storage methods for explosives, both of which led to questions regarding the effectiveness of this testing. In addition, USTC has experienced problems with the aluminum rims on its fully armored protection vehicles, and reported to OIG that steel rims may be better suited to Afghanistan's rough terrain and lead to fewer tire blowouts.

OIG learned that USTC has included 16 shift leaders in its planned addition of 54 staff members, resulting in a disproportionate number of leaders to team members. USTC has also proposed adding 67 personnel to each of the two proposed U.S. Consulates in Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat, although chief of mission personnel may not require such a level of security. Finally, the Regional Security Officer (RSO) in Kabul also reported to OIG that the Department is considering integrating Afghan nationals into its protective services.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1*: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should assign a dedicated Contracting Officer's Representative to Embassy Kabul to provide proper oversight of contractor activities under the second Worldwide Personal Protective Services contract with U.S. Training Center. (Action: Bureau of Diplomatic Security)

Recommendation 2*: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should review and verify the accuracy of muster sheets prepared by U.S. Training Center before they are submitted to U.S. Training Center program management and subsequently to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security in the United States. (Action: Bureau of Diplomatic Security)

Recommendation 3: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should ensure that personal security specialists receive the appropriate training for operations in Afghanistan and in Afghanistan cultural awareness. (Action: Bureau of Diplomatic Security)

Recommendation 4: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should ensure that U.S. Training Center (a) tests its canines with scents from all six explosives required by its contract with the Department of State; (b) replaces its canine explosive testing material with fresh material prior to annual testing; and (c) stores its TNT, dynamite,

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and other testing materials in three new separate storage facilities to avoid cross-contamination. (Action: Bureau of Diplomatic Security)

Recommendation 5: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should implement a fully armored vehicle tire package specifically tailored to the requirements of protection missions in geographically challenging terrain. (Action: Bureau of Diplomatic Security and Defensive Equipment and Armored Vehicles Division)

Recommendation 6: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should perform a detailed analysis of protection needs in Afghanistan to determine the appropriate level and allocation of security personnel under its contract with U.S. Training Center. This analysis should include a feasibility study involving the integration of Afghan nationals into personal protective services. (Action: Bureau of Diplomatic Security)

*Recommendations to resolve similar issues are included in “Review of Diplomatic Security’s Management of Personal Protective Services in Iraq” (MERO-IQO-09-02), and therefore OIG is not requiring a formal response from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to these recommendations.

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS AND OIG RESPONSE

As a result of comments on the draft report, certain sensitive information has been removed for security reasons from the final report. OIG has modified the text as appropriate. Detailed information will be provided to DS under separate cover.

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BACKGROUND

In March 2000, DS developed and awarded the first Worldwide Personal Protective Services (WPPS) contract to DynCorp International to provide protective security services in the former Yugoslavia, Palestinian Territories, and Afghanistan.

On June 7, 2005, the Department of State awarded the second WPPS (WPPS II) contract to Blackwater Lodge and Training Center, now known as U.S. Training Center (USTC). On February 8, 2006, USTC was granted Task Order 2005-004 under the WPPS II contract. Under this task order, USTC provides personal protective services in Afghanistan to the U.S. Ambassador, Embassy Kabul Foreign Service Officers performing official duties, visiting government and non-government personnel on U.S. Government business, and individuals or groups directly supporting development or reconstruction work related to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). This task order covered a base period of one year and four option years, and stated that while such services would primarily be needed in Kabul, the contractor should also be prepared to perform protective services outside of Kabul.

The original task order value for the five-year program was \$174 million to fund 119 personnel.

USTC was consistently staffed by the originally planned 119 employees in all task order performance years through option year 2. A modification to the task order in early 2009 led to an expansion of 54 personnel, with the possibility of further increases. Since the task order began in 2006, DS has obligated a total of \$137 million and expended a total of \$110 million. Table 1 shows USTC staffing and funding under Task Order 2005-004.

Table 1: U.S. Training Center Staffing and Funding (in millions)

	Base Year (2/8/06 – 2/7/07)	Option Year 1 (2/8/07 – 2/7/08)	Option Year 2 (2/8/08 – 2/7/09)	Option Year 3* (2/8/09 – 2/7/10)	Option Year 4 (2/8/10 – 2/7/11)
Total Staff	119	119	119	119/173	173
Total Obligated	\$38.1	\$35.1	\$32.5	\$30.9	—
Total Expended	\$35.1	\$33.3	\$34.6	\$7.4	—

*Option Year 3 total obligated and total expended as of April 10, 2009
Source: OIG analysis of Office of Acquisition Management data

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USTC staff consists of a project manager, personal security specialists, administrative and support employees, and interpreters, as well as local guards who are third-country nationals. As of April 2009, there was one project manager, 75 personal security specialists, 18 administrative and support personnel, 20 local guard force personnel, and five interpreters (94 Americans, 20 Columbians, and five Afghan interpreters). Table 2 shows the current USTC staff composition as of April 8, 2009.

Table 2: U.S. Training Center's Staff Composition

Positions	2006-2009*
Project Manager	1
Personal Security Specialists	
Detail Leader	1
Deputy Detail Leader	1
Shift Leaders	5
Personal Security Specialists (General)	47
Emergency Medical Technicians	11
Designated Defense Marksmen	10
Subtotal	<u>75</u>
Support Personnel	
Kennel Master	1
Explosive Detection Dog Handlers	3
Administrative and Logistics Specialists	2
Intelligence Analyst	3
Operations Chief	1
Operations Security Specialists	2
Firearms Instructors	2
Armorer	1
Vehicle Technicians	2
Field Security Technician	1
Physicians Assistant	1
Subtotal	<u>19</u>
Interpreters	5
Local Guard Force (Third-Country Nationals)	20
Total Staff	119

*As of April 8, 2009

Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security

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
USTC personnel are divided into five protection teams. Each team includes a shift leader and other specialized personnel. A canine team is designated as a sixth team. USTC staff is housed at Camp Grizzly, a 60-meter by 125-meter facility leased by USTC from another company, located near downtown Kabul and close to the Embassy and other annexes.

PROTECTION AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

Afghanistan has a land area of 647,500 square kilometers (slightly smaller than Texas) with a population of 33.6 million. Afghanistan's security environment is volatile and unpredictable. The Taliban is resurgent, and there is continued provincial instability, particularly in the south and the east of the country. Kabul in particular, has seen a rise in militant attacks, including rocket attacks, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (bombs), and suicide bombings. Foreigners throughout the country are targeted in violent attacks and kidnappings, whether motivated by terrorism or by criminals. Riots and civil disturbances occur often and without warning. Carjacking, robbery, and violent crime remain a problem.

USTC's personal protective services are primarily carried out in Kabul, although the contractor also provides these services outside of the capital. OIG analysis of daily movement reports showed that 13 percent of protective service missions have been conducted outside of Kabul, and USTC has conducted missions in 24 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces.

Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan



Source: CIA World Factbook

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The objectives of the U.S. Government's mission in Afghanistan are to: (1) strengthen security for the Afghan people from anti-government elements; (2) prevent Afghanistan from becoming a narco-state;³ (3) establish an effective, equitable, and transparent democratic government; and (4) restore judicial sector institutions as legitimate means for dispute resolution. To fulfill these mission objectives, U.S. Government representatives need to meet regularly with their Afghan counterparts. Regional security office staff stated to OIG that USTC is essential in ensuring such meetings take place.

The unstable security situation in Afghanistan adversely affects the ability of U.S. Government agencies to carry out their objectives. Currently, only mission-related travel is permitted outside of the embassy compound. Each requested trip requires approval from the deputy chief of mission at the Embassy, in consultation with the RSO. Approval is based on the essential nature of the travel, available security resources, and favorable security conditions; the level of protection provided is based on current security conditions. Travel may or may not require personal protective services, and sometimes travel is not allowed. Protection movements, when necessary, require significant resources and precise coordination of personnel, communications equipment, weapons, and vehicles. For each movement there is an initial planning session and pre-mission briefing for all personnel; the route, meeting location, and emergency egress routes are surveyed ahead of time. A tactical operations center monitors team movements and a Quick Reaction Force is positioned in case of an emergency. Finally, after the mission is conducted, all security personnel take part in a post-mission briefing.

³A narco-state has been defined as one that has been taken over and is controlled and corrupted by drug cartels, and where law enforcement is effectively non-existent.

BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY'S MANAGEMENT OF THE U.S. TRAINING CENTER CONTRACT

OIG observed that overall, DS effectively managed its contract with USTC for personal protective services in Afghanistan. DS and USTC coordinate their efforts and communicate through regular meetings and program management reviews. However, with an increased number of personal protective operations in Afghanistan, DS may require a dedicated COR at Embassy Kabul to provide proper oversight of contractor activities. Additionally, DS does not review or verify the accuracy of personnel rosters (muster sheets) prepared by USTC before they are submitted to USTC program management and subsequently to DS in the United States to ensure that contractor charges for labor are accurate.

DS and USTC program management work together in the United States to screen and train personal security specialists before deployment. Program managers from DS and USTC hold bi-weekly meetings in the United States to provide timely information on the security environment of Afghanistan and to help resolve issues with the protective services that may arise. DS representatives from Washington, DC, also conduct program management reviews of USTC in Afghanistan every six months.

DS, through two of its Assistant Regional Security Officers at the Embassy, manages oversight of the protective services program in Kabul. Currently, these two officers act as CORs to manage and maintain oversight of all aspects of USTC's personal protection operations. CORs are responsible for assuring, through liaison with the contractors, that the contractors accomplish the technical and financial aspects of the contract.⁴ The CORs in Kabul work directly with the USTC project manager, the chief of the tactical operations center, and team shift leaders to resolve technical issues. There are routine visits between the regional security office and USTC, as well as a weekly joint briefing in the regional security office.

⁴ 4 FAH-2H-111

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The two Assistant Regional Security Officers, however, have additional duties outside of their COR responsibilities. The officers also coordinate visits from high-ranking officials, track all protective detail movements, and are liaisons with the operations center. They accompany protective details, perform background checks, and act regularly as the embassy duty officer. The RSO stated that as protective service operations increase in Afghanistan, a separate dedicated COR may be necessary.

USTC's administrative staff completes personnel rosters (muster sheets) daily that support labor invoices and are the basis for the Department's payment to USTC. OIG observed that muster sheets are not reviewed or certified by a COR prior to submission each month to USTC in the United States. A COR only receives a courtesy copy of the submitted muster sheets and is not involved in the verification or certification of the monthly muster sheets.

During a follow-up meeting in Washington, DC, DS apprised OIG of its intent to implement the Joint Asset Management Movement System in the review and certification of muster sheets. This hand-scan system will collect personnel movement information and provide near real-time staffing data to DS in Washington, DC. DS also stated that as a backup measure, a COR in Kabul will continue to randomly monitor USTC personnel.

U.S. TRAINING CENTER'S PERFORMANCE


USTC personal protective services have been effective in ensuring the safety of chief of mission personnel in Afghanistan's volatile security environment. Additionally, OIG found USTC has effective control over government-furnished equipment. Nevertheless, OIG has identified several areas in which contractor performance could be improved. USTC's staff is experienced, but would benefit from specific security training focused on operating in Afghanistan as well as Afghanistan-focused cultural awareness training. OIG also found that the explosive detection ability of USTC's canines is unproven due to inadequate testing, as well as improper maintenance and storage of testing material. Finally, the use of steel rims instead of aluminum rims on fully armored vehicles may lead to fewer flat tires.

OVERALL PERFORMANCE

USTC has met each of DS's security goals, which are as follows: (1) prevent loss of life, injury to personnel, and damage of facilities or equipment; (2) ensure security and safety of personnel and facilities in fixed or mobile operations; (3) expedite the movement of personnel in the accomplishment of their missions; (4) secure the environment to enable personnel to conduct their business and complete their missions; and (5) protect personnel and the organizations they represent from harm or embarrassment.

In 2008, USTC conducted 2,730 personal protection missions in support of staff from the Department of State, including the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, USAID, and various Congressional delegations (see Table 3). In 2008, 257 (9.4 percent) of the missions were performed for USAID. During the entire time USTC has operated in Afghanistan, no one under USTC's protection has been injured or killed, and there have been no incidents involving the use of deadly force. OIG observed personal protection missions and interviewed various representatives from the Department of State and USAID who regularly use USTC's personal protective services. The representatives reported that USTC employees are professional, make them feel secure, and are respectful to both officials under chief of mission authority and their Afghan counterparts.

Table 3: USTC Missions Conducted



Source: U.S. Training Center

QUALIFICATIONS AND TRAINING

Overall, USTC personal security specialists are well-trained and highly professional, with significant military and/or law enforcement experience. OIG interviewed USTC personnel to gain information on their background, experience, and training in personal protection. Of the 94 USTC personnel in Afghanistan at the time of the team’s visit, excluding the local guard force and the five interpreters, 84 percent were military veterans. Many of these personal security specialists had been in special forces units of the military. Additionally, 37 percent had a civilian or federal law enforcement or security operations background. Some personal security specialists had both military and law enforcement experience. Finally, many of the personal security specialists had worked for USTC for several years, some in Iraq and others in Afghanistan, meaning there is continuity of experience.

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Through regular classroom training, USTC personnel participate in required continuing professional education including firearms and vehicle safety, security awareness, and emergency medical procedures. The Department's policy on use of force is emphasized first upon arrival in Afghanistan, when every USTC employee receives this policy and signs a statement of understanding. Employees are also briefed on use of force before every protection mission several times each week. When arriving in the country and quarterly thereafter, all USTC staff members re-qualify with their weapons to demonstrate proficiency.

OIG learned that prior to arrival in Kabul, USTC personnel did not receive all of the training needed for current protective detail operations in Afghanistan. A number of USTC staff members indicated concern about this training issue during their one-on-one interviews with the OIG team. OIG pointed out this concern to the RSO before leaving Afghanistan and in post-field work follow-up meetings with the Office of Acquisition Management and DS in Washington, DC. During a follow-up meeting, DS acknowledged the deficiency in training and informed OIG that it is adding this training to its program and that the USTC contract is being appropriately modified.

In April 2009, OIG's review of USTC documentation revealed that personnel in Afghanistan were attending cultural awareness training focused on Iraq. While such training is in compliance with the WPPS II contract,⁵ the courses should be about Afghanistan, rather than Iraq. OIG pointed out this deficiency while still in Afghanistan and in post-field work follow-up meetings, and DS has since developed an Afghanistan cultural awareness training module for USTC personnel who will be working in that country.

⁵In its report, *Status of the Secretary of State's Panel on Personal Protective Services in Iraq Report Recommendations* (MERO-IQO-09-01, December 2008), OIG recommended that training modules be added to the WPPS II contract to enhance assigned personnel's cultural awareness. The Department subsequently modified the contract and required all WPPS II personnel to complete Iraq cultural awareness training.

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PROPERTY MANAGEMENT

OIG found USTC has effective control over government-furnished equipment and met the requirements for inventory control as outlined in the base WPPS II contract. In Afghanistan, OIG physically inventoried the government-furnished weapons, radios, and tracking equipment used by USTC. OIG found that USTC had reliable inventory controls and protected all equipment with proper procedures for physical security. To verify the serial numbers and on-hand quantities of all handguns, rifles, automatic weapons, scopes, and related equipment, OIG conducted a 100 percent visual inspection of USTC's armory inventory. The team also verified the serial numbers for all on-hand quantities of radios and tracking equipment issued to USTC. No discrepancies were found in any of these inventories.

Figure 2: USTC's Armory



Source: Office of Inspector General

When not in use for protection missions or training, all weapons, radios and tracking equipment are safeguarded by storing them in locked cabinets located within their quarters or in the armory. The armory at Camp Grizzly is used exclusively by USTC for the storage of extra weapons and equipment and for the storage of weapons issued to personnel who are on leave. OIG's review of records revealed that quarterly inventories of all government-issued equipment are being conducted by both USTC and by the COR. This procedure fulfills a recommendation made in a previous MERO report.⁶

⁶*Review of Diplomatic Security's Management of Personal Protective Services in Iraq* (MERO-IQO-09-02, January 2009)

EXPLOSIVE DETECTION CANINES

USTC provides explosive detection canine services in support of protection missions. In 2008, according to USTC mission reports, canines were used on 362 missions and performed 3,714 searches of venues including open areas, perimeters, and vehicles. Additionally, USTC reported that canines participate in missions outside of Kabul and are included in high priority missions, with certain exceptions. However, OIG found weaknesses in canine test procedures that call into question the effectiveness of the explosive detection canines. USTC does not test canines for all scents required by its contract with the Department of State. In addition, old materials are used to train and test the canines, although fresh materials are required. Finally, the way in which these materials are stored may lead to cross-contamination.

To assess a canine's ability to recognize odors of explosives, canines undergo regular odor recognition testing. Canines must possess certification of training equal to that of the Department of Treasury's Odor Recognition Proficiency Standard for Explosive Detection Canines, under which a canine must be able to recognize six mandatory scents. The selection of these odors is based on statistical use and availability data. USTC stated that it follows the North American Police Work Dog Association (NAPWDA) standard for certification of the canines. The NAPWDA standard differs from Treasury's standard in that it does not require testing for one of Treasury's mandatory scents.

Figure 3: Photo on left depicts canine after finding hidden C4 in test; photo on right shows hidden C4.



Source: Office of Inspector General

According to USTC's certification records, USTC tests each of its canines to detect eleven different explosive scents. Five of the eleven scents fall within the Treasury standard's six mandatory scents. However, although required under its contract with the Department, USTC does not test its canines for Treasury's sixth mandatory scent.

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Both the Treasury and NAPWDA standards require that fresh explosives be obtained for each testing session and that testing be done on an annual basis. USTC reported to OIG that it uses testing material obtained over three years ago from the previous security contractor, DynCorp, and that the material has not been changed since that time. Neither DS nor USTC had documentation regarding the age of the testing material obtained from DynCorp. Thus, if DynCorp did not change the testing material, it may now be more than eight years old.

According to the Treasury standard and WPPS contract provisions, when storing explosive testing material, certain materials must be stored separately as they tend to readily cross-contaminate other explosives. However, USTC stores these particular materials with other explosives.

VEHICLES

The OIG team conducted a 100 percent physical inventory of all armored vehicles by verifying the vehicle identification numbers and installed equipment, including the radios. The USTC vehicle inventory records matched those of the embassy regional security office.

Figure 4: Fully armored vehicles used by USTC: A Chevrolet Suburban is pictured on the left, and a Lenco Bearcat is shown on the right.



Source: Office of Inspector General

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Based upon the OIG team's interviews with the regional security office in Kabul, USTC, and DS management in Washington, DC, OIG learned that USTC is having problems with the aluminum rims on the tires of the fully armored protection vehicles. On rough terrain, the tires on the vehicles frequently blow out.⁷ The RSO and USTC agree that that steel rims may lead to fewer blowouts than the aluminum rims currently used. Although the Defensive Equipment and Armored Vehicles Division initially approved an order of steel rims, subsequent requests by the RSO in Kabul have been denied. USTC reported that, on the Afghan terrain, the steel rims from this first order are a great improvement over the aluminum rims.

⁷In its report, *Performance Evaluation of the Triple Canopy Contract for Personal Protective Services in Iraq* (MERO-IQO-09-03, April 2009), OIG observed that DS faced similar issues in Iraq. Heavy armored vehicles experienced repeated tire blowouts due to geographically challenging terrain.

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THE FUTURE OF U.S. TRAINING CENTER SERVICES IN AFGHANISTAN

USTC's personal protective services are adjusting to the changing environment in Afghanistan. USTC's staff is expanding to accommodate an increase in personnel under the chief of mission in Afghanistan. According to the Embassy Kabul mission strategic plan for 2011, U.S. Government staff will increase from 335 to 714. However, a disproportionate number of USTC's new personnel are in leadership positions, and USTC proposals for future increases in personnel are largely outside of Kabul. Embassy Kabul also envisions the integration of Afghan nationals into personal protection teams.

EXPANSION OF SERVICES

A modification of Task Order 2005-004, which took effect in May 2009, led to an increase in USTC personnel from 119 to 173. Of the 54 additional USTC personnel, 16 are designated as shift leaders, resulting in a total of 21 shift leaders. However, there are an insufficient number of subordinate team members to lead. For example, there are now 21 shift leaders for only 14 additional specialized personnel.

The Department has decided to open consulates in the north of Afghanistan at Mazar-e-Sharif and in the west at Herat. According to Department cable 027341 of March 29, 2009, 14 Foreign Service Officers will be deployed to these locations in 2009. USTC has submitted a proposal to add 67 personnel to each location. The RSO in Kabul has reported that the security threat in Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat is considerably lower security than in Kabul.

⁶14 FAH-2H-111

⁷PMRs were not conducted in 2006 and in the second half of 2007.

INTEGRATION OF AFGHAN NATIONALS INTO PERSONAL PROTECTIVE SERVICES

Transitioning security responsibilities to Afghan nationals is a goal of Embassy Kabul's management. The Government of the United States is partnering with the Government of Afghanistan to train and mentor members of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. Over time, these Afghan national forces are taking an increased frontline role in operations.

The RSO in Kabul envisions that Afghan nationals would eventually also take responsibility for personal protective services. The RSO believes that using Afghan personal security specialists would enhance United States-Afghanistan cooperation, increase cultural awareness, and lead to significant cost savings. The RSO further noted that the D-10 unit of the Afghan National Directorate of Security could rotate within personal protective services; D-10 currently offers similar personal protection for high-ranking Afghan officials. The RSO has met with the Afghan Director of D-10, and follow-on meetings are scheduled for more in-depth discussion and to determine specific next steps for implementation. OIG commends the RSO for this innovative approach to personal protection and supports incremental roll-out and testing of joint Afghan-U.S. contractor security details.

ABBREVIATIONS

COR	Contracting Officer's Representative
Department	Department of State
DS	Bureau of Diplomatic Security
MERO	Middle East Regional Office (Office of Inspector General)
NAPWDA	North American Police Work Dog Association
OIG	Office of Inspector General
RSO	Regional Security Officer
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USTC	U.S. Training Center
WPPS	Worldwide Personal Protective Services

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APPENDIX I – PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

The Middle East Regional Office of OIG initiated this work under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, due to concerns about the Department's exercise of control over the performance of security contractors working under the WPPS II contract. The objectives of this review were to determine: (1) the requirements and provisions of the contract and task orders; (2) the costs and funding sources of the contract and task orders; (3) how well the Department is administering the contract and task orders to provide proper oversight of the contractor's performance in Afghanistan; and (4) how the contractor performs its personal protective service tasks in Afghanistan.

OIG analyzed the WPPS II contract and task orders against requirements within the Federal Acquisition Regulations and the Foreign Affairs Handbook. The team reviewed the Department's internal controls based upon requirements established in OMB Circular A-123 and standards set forth by the U.S. Government Accountability Office. OIG also reviewed the contract provisions, interviewed Contracting Officers, Contracting Officer's Representatives, and staffs in the United States (Washington, DC) and Afghanistan to determine USTC's level of performance compared to the base contract standards prescribed for: (1) qualification of personnel; (2) quality of training; (3) security clearances; (4) firearms qualification and re-qualification; (5) personnel work schedules; and (6) reporting on personal protective services in Afghanistan. OIG documented and analyzed the organization of DS, as well as its policies and procedures for contract oversight

In Washington, DC, OIG met with senior officials from DS and the Department's Bureau of Administration, and with corporate representatives from USTC. The team reviewed the procedures in place to evaluate contractor performance and contractor oversight policies in the WPPS II contract with DS. OIG met with officials from DS's International Programs Office of Overseas Protection Operations, High Threat Protection Division. OIG also met with several Contracting Officers and specialists from the Bureau of Administration's Office of Acquisition Management, as well as with former DS officials associated with the WPPS program.

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In Afghanistan, OIG focused primarily on USTC's performance, including the conduct of: (1) personal protective services; (2) continuing professional training; (3) firearms re-qualification; and (4) accountability, maintenance, and safeguarding of government-furnished equipment. OIG held discussions with senior embassy officials, including the RSO and the deputy principal officer, as well as with other embassy personnel to determine the contract performance, internal controls, and contract oversight.

OIG reviewed and observed several sources of evidence, documentation of internal controls, program operation, and results of USTC's performance against the legal, regulatory, and contractual requirements of WPPS II. OIG analyzed the personal protection movement data for 2008, monthly contractor performance reports, DS program management reviews, in-country training program reports, and the regional security office incident database to evaluate contractor performance, utilization, and the nature of protection missions. OIG also observed mission planning, execution, and post-protection movement de-briefings.

The OIG team conducted a physical inventory of government-furnished equipment—specifically, the weapons, radios, vehicles, and tracking equipment—provided to USTC under the WPPS II contract. OIG also reviewed the security procedures in place for safeguarding this equipment.

OIG conducted this evaluation from February 2009 through May 2009. OIG did not use computer-processed data to perform this evaluation. OIG conducted this performance evaluation in accordance with the quality standards for inspections and evaluations issued in January 2005 by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

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