

# THE AGE OF OUTSOURCING: THE UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

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## ABSTRACT

In the last two decades, a more noticeable involvement of Private Security and Military Companies (PMSCs) in conflict management has been observable. Governments, enterprises and humanitarian organizations have called upon PMSCs to assure a range of defense and security services like military formation, data gathering, or logistic support among others. However, such trend is not only concerning those operations conducted by States in the so-called *coalitions of the willing* but also States taking part in peacekeeping operations sponsored by the United Nations and other international multilateral bodies. In fact, the use of PMSCs by the UN has been legitimized by the Security Council in its 6675<sup>th</sup> meeting becoming an accepted tool by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Under the umbrella of the mainstream debate risen by New Public Management and epitomized in the concepts of effectiveness, efficiency and economy, the range of goods provided by the private sector are related to the type of services that the UN requires. This chapter analyses the costs and benefits of outsourcing peacekeeping services by the UN. Through the case of the MONUSCO/MONUC in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), we address the potential challenges faced by the International Community regarding this privatization of peacekeeping operations in the International System. We discuss the effects of the UN outsourcing policy: the field of security (i.e. disarmament, or security sector reform); the field of logistics (i.e. running airports) and the field of frontline troops (i.e. example training peacekeeping troops). In DRC, the MONUSCO has worked through Saracen Uganda Corporate in the field of security, and Pacific Architects and Engineers managing the field of logistics and frontline troops. The Mission is also an example of what is called the Somalia Syndrome based on the unwillingness to provide ground troops by Western countries and especially by the US in African soil and an example of *ad extram legitimacy* deficit due to the alliances built between Peacekeeping operatives and rebel groups.

**Keywords:** Peacekeeping, outsourcing, legitimacy, security companies

## INTRODUCTION

In the late 1970s, privatization, outsourcing, and public private partnerships became the new black. In almost all areas previously dominated by public provision, new actors and institutions were now involved. Neoliberal modes of governance promoted a form of networked governance. As for the security sector concerns, it resisted its entrance, until the last decades where their immunity to these pressures started to crumble, shifting, and transforming the governance of security. It is in the past decades, when we started to observe how private security companies, which were focused on cost-efficiency and managing by results, started to manage police bodies in many countries (e.g. United Kingdom).

Having become lodged within key institutions and practice of competitive states, the private logics have also become lodged within a range of international organizations that act to promote and defend globalization and privatization (Abrahamsen and Williams

2011). Since 1990, there has not been a single peacekeeping operations without the involvement of Private Security and Military Companies (PMSCs). For instance, the North-American Private Military Company (PMC), Military Professional Resources Incorporated, carried out operations including a US government contract in 1994 for 45 border monitors in Serbia. It was also the case of the South African PMC, Executive Outcomes, which carried out operations during the Sierra Leone civil war (Bures 2005:537). In words of Susan Rice -Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs of the US State Department- ‘within a few weeks Executive Outcomes pushed back Revolutionary United Front forces into its base camps and restores to most of Sierra Leone’ (Rice 1999). It was during the Rwandan Genocide that PMC were settle in the UN peacekeeping agenda. This time Executive Outcomes decided not to address a national government but to reach out the international security and peace institution. They approached the DPKO chief - Kofi Annan- offering help to contain the spreading violence, aid which he refused arguing that the world was not ready to privatize peace (United Nations 1998). Nevertheless he recognized that he considered ‘the possibility of engaging a private firm [...] to separate fighters from refugees in the Rwanda refugee camps in Goma’(United Nations 1998) .

Governments, private companies, and humanitarian organizations have called upon those PMSCs to assure a range of military and security services like military formation, data gathering, or logistic support, among others. Bearing in mind that PMSCs can be involved in two kinds of peacekeeping operations (1) PMSCs hired by a member state with the UN approval; and (2) PMSCs directly hired by the UN, we address in this chapter the latter: the debate and challenges faced by the International Community regarding the privatization of peacekeeping operations in the International System. Owing to the special nature and sensitivity of those services and the international obligations towards Human and Humanitarian Law, these procurement processes become contested and within blurred legal lines.

In the following section, I will lay out the role of peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in the post-Cold War era. Hence, I will address and summarize the debates regarding the advantages and disadvantages of using private PMSCs in PKOs while addressing the internalization of PMSCs by the UN. The second section will analyze a case-of-study that study the privatization process of PKOs. The study addresses the peacekeeping operation *Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République*

*Démocratique du Congo*- MONUSCO, which was previously known as MONUC (from 1999 to 2010) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). I will analyze the roots and causes that lead to the privatization of this UN peace operation mandate.

### **PKOS IN THE POST-COLD WAR: A TREND OF PRIVATIZATION OF SECURITY**

Aiming to settle the framework of the United Nations Emergency Force - created in response to the Suez crisis in 1956- the UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, and UN General Assembly President Lester Pearson defined the basic principles of peacekeeping operations. They gave birth to chapter ‘six-and-a-half’, operating somewhere between Chapter VI (peaceful settlement of disputes) and Chapter VII (enforcement). According to Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2011) peacekeeping operations are appropriate at three points on the escalation scale: (1) containing violence and preventing from escalating to war; (2) limiting the intensity, geographical spread and duration of war once it has broken out; and (3) consolidating a ceasefire while creating space for reconstruction after the end of the war. Even if the Charter does not entail any provision with respect to their usage or legality, UN peacekeeping operations are accepted as a legal instrument. In that sense, the International Court of Justice has grounded the legal basis for peacekeeping operations in the UN Charter (Linti 2015).

In parallel to their blurred legality, UN peacekeeping operations have evolved as the International System was becoming a more nuanced and complex environment. We can identify three generations of peacekeeping. The first and second generation lasted from 1956 to 1995. The first generation was embedded in what is called ‘the essence of UN peacekeeping’ (i.e. consent of the conflict parties, political neutrality, impartiality, the non-use of force except in self-defense, and legitimacy that is sanctioned by the UN Security Council (UNSC) advised by the Secretary General). After the end of the Cold War, the mounting challenges made peacekeeping evolved into more diverse and complex operations. They involved a wider variety of sources such as military, civilian, police, and diplomatic. Becoming multilateral, multidimensional, and multinational, the second-generation introduced within the conflict cycle the concepts of peacebuilding, conflict-prevention, peace-enforcement and peacebuilding. Having failed in establishing a framework of protection of civilians in both Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995), and in implementing a humanitarian operation in Somalia (1993), the UN peacekeeping operations entered a face of declining confidence. Two UN reports called for a process of

reflection to clarify and improve the UN capacity to respond to various forms of conflict while addressing the mistakes of peacekeeping, as they considered that the role of UN peacekeeping was inadequate regarding the neutral, impartial, and mediating role of the operations (United Nations 1999a; United Nations 1999b).

Being conceived by the Brahimi report, the third-generation relied on the Capstone Doctrine. Aiming to clarify its principles and guidelines, the DPKO modified the ‘holy trinity’ (i.e. principles of consent, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense). Much of the changes were lost in the final version as certain member states resisted to accept the new framework, which has led to an absence of authoritative guidance addressing peacekeeping operations (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008). In these shades of grey, is where the UN, and more concretely the DPKO have resorted to using PMSCs. The reason not only was built upon the absence of an accepted guidelines but also as laid out by the former Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon ‘[on] insufficient supply of troops, we [are facing] mounting difficulties in getting enough troops, the right equipment’s, and adequate logistical support (UN Secretary General 2009)’. On the other hand, explaining why the UN decided to make use of armed security personnel providing a visible deterrent effect to potential attackers, the Secretary General emphasized that ‘respect for the UN system personnel, including those carrying out humanitarian mandates, has eroded among opportunistic groups, rival militias, and violent extremist entities (UN Secretary General 2012)’

Coining the use of PMSCs by the UN as a norm, we can state that it has completed all stages of the norm-cycle (i.e. emergence, acceptance, and internalization). Despite that resolution 55/232 of the General Assembly bans the outsourcing of any tasks that affect the security of personnel, delegations, or visitors, it is not banning PMSCs *per se* (United Nations General Assembly 2001). The UN Department of Safety and Security released two documents (i.e. UN Guidelines on the Use of Armed Security Services from Private Security Companies, and the Security Policy Manual) stating that the security of UN personnel is in first place the host state’s responsibility, but in cases where neither the host state nor any other member state is capable to provide security, a private security company might be hired (UN Department of Safety and Security 2012a; UN Department of Safety and Security 2012b). Both documents mentioned the Montreux Document as well as the need to be member of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers (ICoC). The final legitimation and acceptance occurred during the Security

Council 6075<sup>th</sup> meeting, which addressed the future of peacekeeping. The Security Council made general references to the use of private sector in the context of PKO, even though no mention regarding its involvement and scope was done (UN Security Council 2009). But, by changing the object of study they spoke about, the Council accepted the use of PMSC by UN peacekeeping operations (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Finally, the Lieutenant Colonel Eugene B. Smith stated in the journal *Parameters*, ‘Peace operations represent an area of extensive activities in which PM[S]Cs could be used with maximum benefit’ (Smith 2002). In short, what can be learnt from the Lieutenant Colonel Smith statement is that a window of opportunities for neoliberal policies regarding PKOs was opened. The internalization in the UN bureaucratic administration was finally achieved as exemplified in the interview published by the United Nations in the Year Review of the UN Peace Operations, where the Under-Secretary-General and head of the Department of Field Support, Susana Malcorra acknowledged that the “[Department of Peace Keeping Operations is] working on agreements with the private sector that will allow [DPKO] to have certain services on standby, such as contractors to build up camps with a much faster turn-around. But we need to do it in a way that is not very expensive, and we need to make sure we can find contractors in all regions of the world”(Peace and Security Section of the United Nations 2010:9). In 2012 as a final move to exemplify the operationalization of the new norm the UN introduced guidelines for the use of PMSCs.

### **PMSCs in PKO: economic approach**

Studying the economics of the PMSCs within peacekeeping operations, we can identify two predominant points related to their usage. The first, is dealing with the cost and inefficiency of the UN missions. This point sustains its arguments on the fact of historic failures of these missions. For instance, the UNPROFOR<sup>1</sup> in Bosnia-Herzegovina or the UNAMIR<sup>2</sup> in Rwanda (Mbadlanyana 2010). Secondly, including PMSCs, which *raison d’être* relies on its effectiveness, would supposedly lead to reducing the cost of the entire mission compared to traditional UN peacekeeping operations. We are moving from a way of doing based on the execution of norms in order to guarantee an organizational behavior willing to respect the pre-established norms, to a novel approach focusing on the assumption of responsibilities rather than results to guarantee and secure that such

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<sup>1</sup> UNPROFOR is the United Nations Protection Force

<sup>2</sup> UNAMIR is the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

organization will achieve the demanded goals (Hughes 2003). We are not administrating, but managing. In that sense and as stated by Malcorra the ‘[DPKO is currently] working on agreements with the private sector faster turn-around not very expensive’, which clearly entailed the commitment of the organization to the principles of effectiveness, efficiency and economy (Dunleavy and Hood 1994).

### **PMSCs in PKO: military approach**

Since early 1990s, PMSCs have been taking on an ever-increasing number of roles traditionally performed by the regular military. Comparing table 1 and 2, we can identify overlapping areas between the functions performed by UN peacekeeping operations, and the ones performed by PMCs.

**Table 1. Functions performed by UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s**

Military	Political/Economic	Humanitarian
Ceasefire observation and monitoring	Upholding law and order	Protecting aid convoys
Maintaining buffer zones/boundary demarcation assistance	Helping to establish viable government	Protecting relief/delivery workers
Disarming warring factions	Helping to maintain independent status	Providing humanitarian aid
Regulating the disposition of forces	Natural resources administration monitoring	Assisting in refugee repatriation
Cleaning mines	Exercising temporary administrative authority	Verifying human rights agreements
Training and reforming military units	Training and restructuring police forces	Logistical support for humanitarian projects
Preventing infiltration and civil wars	Confidence-building measures and reconciliation	
	Management and arbitration of local disputes	

Source: adapted from Bures (2005:537)

For instance, training functions and/or reforming national military units, providing security of vital infrastructure, protecting aid convoys as well as providing the security of relief workers, assist with demining among others supplied services are provided by both, UN Peacekeeping and PMCs (Bures 2005). Following Buchan, Jones and White (2011) categorization we can identify three main goods categories supplied by PMSCs in UN peacekeeping operations. The first one addresses the field of security (e.g .disarmament,

or security sector reform); the second one is tackling the field of logistics (e.g running airports); and the third and last one is related to the field of frontline troops (e.g training peacekeeping troops).

**Table 2. Functions performed by PMCs in the 1990s**

Combat support	Logistics, procurement, training, miscellaneous	Security services
Military engineering	War material and arms equipment procurement	Personal protection and VIP escort services
Artillery support	Force development and training	Security for key installations and personnel
Aviation services	Strategic planning	Security for humanitarian aid delivery
Military advice and planning	Research and threat analysis	Surveillance services
Counter-insurgency operations	Logistical support and maintenance facilities	Crisis management advice
Military intelligence and analysis	Staff security training	Signal interception
Force multipliers	Risk analysis	Computer cracking
Operation and maintenance of sophisticated weaponry		

Source: adapted from Bures (2005:536)

### **PMSCs in PKO: political approach**

The UN has traditionally relied on member states as troops suppliers (Brayton 2002), which meant States were willing to contribute troops to an operation under the UN command and control. A recent reluctance of certain member states -the vast majority are western countries - together with the incapacity of implementing article 43<sup>3</sup> of the UN Charter, lead the UN to start contracting out/outsourcing peacekeeping responsibilities. According to Ghebali (2006), this new way of doing became the everyday modus operandi. This model has set in the agenda two debates related to *who is responsible* and *who is accountable* by the acts of the PMSCs in UN peacekeeping operations. This way of doing has created tensions between contributing States and the UN (White 2014). Addressing the former question of whose responsible for the acts of PMSCs, the answer has focused on two different understandings. On the one hand, we have those who

<sup>3</sup> Article 43 of the UN Charter authorizes the UN to build an international peacekeeping force that would either be standing or on-call form the various Member States.

consider that the State authority should be responsible of the acts of PMSCs. On the other hand, those who consider that International Organizations should be responsible of the acts committed by the PMSCs. Tackling the State responsibility approach, their endorsers are considering that the effective control mechanism where the State - as an actor- is responsible, are based on the International Court Justice *Nicaragua vs. United States* sentence. Similarly, supporters of the second approach, through the overall authority approach are grounding their argumentation on the overall control exerted by International Organizations, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (Buchan, Jones, and White 2011:292-303). Regarding the latter, violations caused by PMSCs may concern matters regulated by international humanitarian law or by international standards of human rights protection. Nevertheless, PMSCs could remain in a grey accountability zone when the state within which they operate does not want or cannot held them accountable, or when the state hosting these Private Military and Security companies eludes to take part in the accountability process (White 2014; Pingeot 2014). Because of existing legislative gaps, states have habitually no control over the operative and operations of PMSCs. In that sense, the UN willing to improve, and solve parts of this grey accountability zone, started to address the issue by adopting a series of guidelines and polices on armed security contractors exemplified in the Montreux Document (United Nations Security Council and United Nations General Assembly 2008).

The 2012 guidelines on the use of PMSCs have clarified decision-making process, and the criteria of selection and contracting out, increasing transparency and accountability of this practice. To be contracted security and military companies would need to fulfil the following criteria's: be a member of the ICoC, having a five-year history of providing armed security services, having current licenses to provide PSCs in the company's home and territorial state, and registered the UN Procurement Division vendor (UN Department of Safety and Security 2012a). But as pointed by Pingeot (2014), the guidelines are reliant on self-regulation, relying on self-reporting from hired PMSCs and adopt a hands-off approach to screening and training. They only require PMSCs to confirm in writing that they have conducted screening, and to certify that personnel undergoes training according to the guidelines standards. It focuses only on the record of individual employees but not on the past conduct, and organizational history of the company (Pingeot 2014). Similarly, they do not provide any channels to make PMSCs

accountable for human rights abuses as spelt out in the Montreux Document, or to provide third parties complaining channels against contractors. A regulatory framework is of urgent necessity. Due to the mounting resort to PMSCs by UN peacekeeping operations, which in turn could make of UN peacekeeping operations the largest market for that kind of companies in the years to come. In the new governance, the UN as a power capable of enforcing regulation would need to cleanse, communalize, and civilize the market (Loader and White 2015). Therefore, the UN would need to purge the market of deviant sellers as serving the public good as well as equalizing access to the market for security. Doing so, the UN would incentivize desirable practices making them profitable and accessible (McFate 2014). This capacity of civilizing the market will drive the market to produce good behaviors, or at least acceptable behavior.

## **PRIVATE PKOS IN THE EVERYDAY SECURITY: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO**

### **Previous background**

A UN peacekeeping operation was created by the UNSC in November by UNSC Resolution 1291 acting under the chapter six-and-a-half, as in 1999 the Congolese Peace Treaty was broken (Vircoulon 2005; Bayo 2012). The UN mission was implemented aiming to ensure the enforcement and adherence by all parties with the terms of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement; monitoring -through appropriate channels- any violation of the agreements; facilitating the process of disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration (DDR) of armed militants; and smoothing the transitional process and the organization of credible elections in the country. In 2002 the MONUC saw its mandate broadened. They were responsible of holding of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue which role was negotiate a transitional power-sharing arrangement among the belligerent forces, the unarmed opposition, and civil society. By that, the MONUC moved to a Chapter VII mandate. In a last stage, in 2010 MONUC was renamed MONUSCO. The reason explaining the core and scope change is founded on the unilateral announcement by the DRC government in September 2009 that MONUC will withdraw from the DRC in 2011. During a negotiation phase in May 2010, the UNSC and the DRC government reached an agreement on the future of the MONUC. They decided that from now on, the MONUC would be re-branded as United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo -MONUSCO. At the same time the UNSC authorized

the withdrawal of up to 2000 UN military personnel by June 2010 from areas where the security situation allowed it. In essence, the UN mission acquired a new dimension in the conflict (Neethling 2011), but became the largest and most costly peacekeeping mission of the UN counting more than 20.000 personnel coming from 60 countries.

### **The presence of PMSCs in the DRC**

#### ***MONUSCO and outsourcing***

The current number of military forces, policers and civil participants in the PKO of the UN have reached an unknown level. So far, the UN has employed unarmed security personnel in 11 peacekeeping operations and in one support mission (i.e. UNMIL, UNMISS, UNISFA, MONUSCO, UNOCI, MINUSMA, UNIFIL, MINURSO, UNAMA, UNMIK, MINUSTAH, UNMOGIP). In two missions, the UN hired armed security personnel (i.e. MINUSTAH, UNAMA) (Linti 2015). In this vein, the UN signed a three-years contract in 2013 with the PMCs Selex on the use of drones, which included personnel for their maintenance and control (Sossai 2014) During the MONUSCO, the UN used reconnaissance drones for a better assessment of the complex situation, the protection of the civilian population, the protection of peacekeepers, the monitoring of arms embargoes and the monitoring of streams of refugees. In a similar vein, the PMSC ‘Pacific Architects and Engineers’ was hired for the management of airfields. They oversaw essential parts of the mission, drove UN vehicles, were recognized as peacekeepers by the local population, became targets of acts of violence and organized the evacuation of UN personnel (Østensen 2013). As the situation in the field got perilous, peacekeepers were withdrawn. The PMSC personnel stayed in the field to fulfil their contractual commitment. Moreover, during the MONUC mission a consortium of PMSCs made an offer concerning high-tech aerial surveillance, rapid police reaction and rapid humanitarian rescue capabilities. The UN rejected such an offer, as they considered to be unacceptable, in particular because of their reputation (Cameron and Chetail 2013; White 2014).

#### ***Legitimacy and pathology in the UN***

Multilateral institutions suffer from a profound legitimacy crisis. On the words of Keohane this legitimacy crisis is built around two concepts, *ad intram*, and *ad extram* legitimacy. The former, also known as input legitimacy, is based on procedurals

requirements like transparency in decision-making or accountability. The latter (output legitimacy) is grounded on the results obtained or the capacity of the institution to act in the agreed mandate (Keohane 2006). The MONUSCO is facing raising difficulties to be accepted as a legitimate actor in the field. The mission suffers from *ad extram* legitimacy due to social rejection coming from the top and the bottom. At the top we have the foreign aid works whose definition of MONUSCO is associated with three words ‘useless’, ‘cowardly’, and a ‘waste of money’ (The Economist 2009). At the bottom, we have the locals’ rejections. The UN peacekeepers have colluded with Congo's army in helping various rebel groups when its mission was supposed to help to knock down these rebels’ groups. In fact, peacekeepers jointly with the Congolese army got cash and access to Congo's vast mineral wealth from the rebels groups (The Economist 2009). As stated with Barnett and Finnemore regarding humanitarian UN missions ‘these two norms of neutrality and humanitarian assistance, and the parts of the bureaucracy most devoted to them, come into direct conflict in those situations where providing humanitarian relief might jeopardize the UN’s vaunted principle of neutrality’ (Barnett and Finnemore 1999:724-25). Then, a question arises, how to evaluate the UN as a multilateral institution? On the one hand, we can identify the functional criteria based on acting in accordance with pre-established principles, such as neutrality. On the other hand, we find the sociological criteria (accepted action, considered appropriated, and therefore respected and obeyed). This defined pathology together with the mounting problem of *ad extram legitimacy* are two of the factors that lead to the presence of PMSCs in the Congolese territory as a part of the MONUSCO mission. As a consequence, there is been an *in crescendo* presence and use of PMSC in this UN’s peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. One example is the composition of the United Nation Police of MONUSCO made of more than 12 distinct Private Security Companies (Mybe 2015). As showed by table 3, the MONUC/MONUSCO mission has increased its budget for hiring PMSCs, from \$US 1.051.527 M (2006) to \$US 6.028.710 M (2011), which means that the budget has increase a 573.33% in the period.

**Table 3. Field Mission’s use of Security Services 2006-2011 (\$US M)**

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
MONUC/MONUSCO	1.051.527	622.182	2.385.665	870.870	1.450.751	6.028.710

Source: adapted from Pingeot (2012:47)

The table also presents some outliers, 2007 and 2009. The reasons explaining the differences between 2007 and 2008, and between 2009-2016 is due to the following. (1) The UNSC authorized the deployment of the EUFOR in DRC to assist the Congolese authorities in organizing, preparing and conducting presidential and local elections, and (2) New mandate of the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo incorporating a broad mandate entailing services to be provided to tackle the new phase of the conflict.

### ***MONUSCO and the economic approach***

Another element leading to the use of PMSC in the Democratic Republic of Congo is grounded on the economic approach. In 2003, the international trade body representing the private security industry, known as the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA), endorsed the need to support the MONUC mandate with PMSC (The International Peace Operations Association 2003). The consortium claimed that PMSCs would have been deployed within 30–90 days, providing services and specializations that are normally not available in the troop-contributing states, including high-tech aerial surveillance, rapid police reaction and humanitarian rescue capabilities. The IPOA estimated that the costs would not exceed 20% of the annual total cost of the UN mission, and proposed that the US could cover these as part of its normal 27% contributions for MONUC.

### ***MONUSCO and the military approach***

Private contractors have been supplying goods to the UN peace operations in three main categories: security, logistics and frontline troops. In the MONUSCO case on the category of security, we identify the company ArmouGroup, which is part of one of the world's leading private contractor G4S (Committee on Foreign Affairs 2002), and Saracen Uganda that provided support personnel at the MONUSCO logistics base in Entebbe, and its liaison office in Kampala (United Nations 2012). In terms of security, Mechem was responsible of demining the Kisangani, Kindu and Manono airfields, as well as part, along with more than 12 distinct PSCs, of the MONUSCO United Nations Police.

Logistics and transport are other services frequently procured directly by the UN Secretariat. Pacific Architects and Engineers is normally hired to provide vital support to UN peacekeeping operations. The company was responsible for running six airports in

the Democratic Republic of Congo as part of the UN mission, a service that in 2004 included evacuating UN personnel when the UN came under riot attacks.

The last category regarding the privatization of PKO is linked to the field of frontline troops. Hence, PMSCs have acquired a key role within the military training segment, where they have trained forces for UN peace operations. By the same token, programs such as the US Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) where the US Department of State has awarded to Northrop Grummon Corp. and Pacific Architects and Engineers contracts (the last one a new five-year contract in 2010) aims to continue training to enhance the capacity of several of African countries to participate in multinational PKO. By that I mean that programs such as the GPOI are granting to PMSCs a somewhat ostensible but significant role in UN peacekeeping operations.

### ***MONUSCO and the Somalia Syndrome***

The turning point that changed forever the way how western countries saw UN mission in Africa occurred in the early 1990s. Under the UNAMIR took place the incident of 1992, also known as Black Hawk Down, where US military personnel were killed. The mission failure paved the way to the use of private contractors in the African soil, as from that moment Western countries were unwilling to provide peacekeeping operations with military support. By limiting their military involvement Western countries and particularly the US gave birth to the Somalia Syndrome (Reid 2011). One example of this approach was identified in a 2000 speech delivered by the South African minister of Defense, Mosioua Lekota. He stated that '[His]country's troops would not participate in DRC peacekeeping if there were any chance they might be involved in combat' (Brooks 2013). This unwillingness to provide with peacekeeping troops to the UN peace operations has led countries to do not engage directly in the conflict. For instance, the US as the quintessential example of the Somalia Syndrome, has developed the GPOI as a security assistance program intended to boost international capacity to effectively conduct United Nations and regional peace support operations (PSOs) by building partner countries capabilities to train and sustain peacekeeping proficiencies (US Department of State 2015).

## CONCLUSION

As we have seen, PMSCs will not fade away. They have successfully achieved every step of the norm-cycle inferring the need of changing the way of doing of UN peacekeeping operations. The use of PMSCs by the UN was legitimized by the UNSC in the meeting 6675, and became internalized by the UN bureaucracy as was exemplified by the Peacekeeping Operations Departments discourse. However, we need to bear in mind that some common misunderstandings proliferate concerning PMSC involvement in UN peace operations. The goods provided by the private sector are often related to the type of services that the UN buys in accordance with the UN outsourcing policy, which respect the principles established by New Public Management of effectiveness, efficiency and economy. Additionally, this chapter has proved that these companies are not expected in the upcoming years to replace UN missions (Østensen 2013). At the beginning, the UN mainly hired local, unarmed companies for the protection of their personnel, followed by the employment of armed PMSCs in more complex environments where the host states were not capable to provide security for the peacekeepers. Nowadays, Private Military and Security companies' involvement in UN peacekeeping operations is based on three areas (i.e. security, logistic, and frontline troops). It is unquestionable that the exponential usage of PMSCs in several UN peacekeeping operations has set into the agenda two liberal principles regarding whose responsibility, and who is accountable of their actions. The UN has attempted to clarify both, but the UN guidelines even if representing a step forward in PMSCs regulation has failed as they are reliant on self-regulation, on self-reporting from hired PMSCs, and adopt a hands-off approach to screening and training.

Furthermore, the case of study of the UN peacekeeping 'MONUSCO' in the Democratic Republic of Congo has proved the extent of the presence the New Public Management debate as it is exemplified by the IPOA proposal, and the three main categories of supplied services hired by the UN as it is the case of Saracen Uganda on the field of security, by PAE on the field of logistics of PAE too on the field of frontline troops. But, there are specificities unique to every single UN mission leading to the privatization of PKO and this case of study is not an exception. For instance, in the MONUSCO mission we can identify what is called the Somalia Syndrome based on the unwillingness to provide ground troops by the Western countries where the US is the main actor in the African soil or the problem of *ad extram legitimacy* that PKO troops in the Democratic Republic of Congo rose by making alliances with the rebel groups.

That is why PMSCs can play an essential role in peacekeeping missions and contribute to the organization of the mission, and their usage does not contravene any principle or fundamental rule of international law. The use of PMSCs can be described as a necessary and effective tool to maintain international peace and security and therefore to promote one of the major purposes of the United Nations. Nevertheless, the general operational capability of PMSCs does not exclude that the application of international humanitarian law and human rights law may lead to a different result on a case-to-case basis. Therefore, a regulatory framework is of urgent necessity. The reason relies on the mounting resort to PMSCs by UN peacekeeping operations, which in turn could make of UN peacekeeping operations the largest market for that kind of companies in the years to come. In the new governance, the UN as a power capable of enforcing regulation would need to cleanse, communalize, and civilize the market (Loader and White 2015). Therefore, the UN would need to purge the market of deviant sellers as serving the public good as well as equalizing access to the market for security. Doing so, the UN would incentivize desirable practices making them profitable and accessible (McFate 2014). This capacity of civilizing the market will drive the market to produce good behaviors, or at least acceptable behavior.

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