UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 7, 2009

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

54-355 PDF WASHINGTON : 2010

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800
Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001
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UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 1, 2009

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:27 a.m. in room SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.


Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; John H. Quirk V, professional staff member; Russell L. Shaffer, counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; Richard H. Fontaine, Jr., deputy Republican staff director; Paul C. Hutton IV, professional staff member; Michael V. Kostiw, professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel; and Dana W. White, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Jessica L. Kingston, Brian F. Sebold, and Breon N. Wells.

Committee members’ assistants present: Jay Maroney, assistant to Senator Kennedy; James Tuite, assistant to Senator Byrd; Vance Serchuk, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen C. Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Adam G. Brake, assistant to Senator Graham; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez; Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator
Burr; and Rob Epplin and Chip Kennett, assistants to Senator Collins.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. The committee receives testimony this morning on the new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan announced by President Obama last Friday. Our witnesses this morning each have contributed to developing that strategy. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michèle Flournoy, who will be with us in a few minutes, was one of three administration officials who led the interagency panel that examined U.S. policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan. Their review drew on and benefited from a number of earlier policy reviews, including one by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) led by Commander General David Petraeus, who also joins us this morning. We have with us Admiral Eric Olson, Commander, Special Operations Command (SOCOM).

Ms. Flournoy, General Petraeus, and Admiral Olson will play a central role in implementing the President’s new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our thanks go to each of them for their service and for their being with us this morning. On behalf of the committee, please thank the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines serving in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). America owes them a debt of gratitude for their willingness to serve in harm’s way and for the sacrifices which they and their families make on a daily basis. General and Admiral, I hope that you will pass along that appreciation to the troops.

The President’s strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan is on the right track. The American people recognize that Afghanistan is the place where al Qaeda laid the plans for the attacks of September 11 on our homeland and where the training took place for those attacks. We must do all we can to make sure that this region never again provides a safe haven or a training ground for extremists plotting the next attack.

In formulating this new strategy, the administration has consulted closely with our Afghanistan and Pakistan partners. Pakistan President Zardari has called the administration’s new approach a positive change. Afghan President Karzai has welcomed the administration’s plans, saying it is “what the Afghan people were hoping for.” This support and buy-in is important because ultimately it will be the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan who will be the ones who decide to reject and defeat the hopeless future that al Qaeda and the Taliban offer them and the world.

I very much support the President’s commitment to greatly accelerate the expansion of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police. It is important to build up the Afghan security forces far more quickly than has been the case up to now so Afghanistan can provide for its own security.

As Afghan Defense Minister Wardak told me, Afghan soldiers want to provide for their country’s security, and our commanders say that Afghan soldiers have the will to fight and are respected throughout Afghanistan and the Afghan army has the recruits to build their forces.
For too long, as Admiral Mullen said some months ago, in Iraq we do what we must, while in Afghanistan we only do what we can. With the new strategy, this will no longer be the case.

This committee has heard from witnesses over the last few weeks that the expansion of the Afghan army has been slowed by a lack of training teams to work with Afghan units and delays in getting the basic equipment that Afghan units need to train and to fight. The President’s decision to deploy an additional brigade of 4,000 soldiers with the almost exclusive mission of training the Afghan security forces is a major step in the right direction to moving more quickly to building up the Afghan army. By helping the Afghan forces as they take the lead in the fight, we avoid the perception that we are occupiers. Instead, we’ll be supporting them in their struggle for a better future for their country.

I also welcome President Obama’s decision to match this increase in military forces with an increase in our civilian resources in Afghanistan. The fielding of up to 500 additional civilian experts from the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Agriculture, Justice, and other civilian government agencies will bring all instruments of U.S. power to the task of ensuring that Afghanistan doesn’t serve again as a safe haven for terrorists.

The large majority of these civilians will be posted at provincial reconstruction teams and elsewhere in the countryside to promote economic development and good governance at the provincial and district level. We need to support programs that empower Afghan communities to set their own priorities and to take ownership of local development projects.

I hope our witnesses will comment on the Afghan National Solidarity Program. The National Solidarity Program has funded thousands of small development projects in nearly every corner of Afghanistan by providing modest grants of money directly to locally elected community development councils which plan, implement, and oversee development projects that they decide are the most beneficial for their local communities.

The decision to establish benchmarks and metrics to assess progress towards meeting our objectives is a wise one. Some indicators of security, such as the number of violent incidents, roadside bombs, and suicide attacks, have gotten worse in 2008. At the same time, the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General recently told the Security Council that he is beginning to see positive trends emerging in Afghanistan in government competence, in police reform, private sector development, and counternarcotics. CENTCOM data on Defense Department-funded reconstruction efforts indicates that since October 2005 the Defense Department has constructed 96 schools and other education centers throughout Afghanistan and roughly 6.2 million students were enrolled last year, up from 800,000 students in 2001. Since January 2007, the Defense Department has completed almost 200 health care construction projects, funded almost 300 water and sanitation projects, and funded 115 electricity-related projects, including microhydro and other generators and solar lighting systems.

We need metrics and we need benchmarks to measure progress to report to the American people and, importantly, to hold people accountable. It’s about time the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) establishes some benchmarks for itself. Thus far NATO’s performance has been woefully inadequate, except for some very notable exceptions of some countries. It is long past time for our NATO allies, friends, and other stakeholders in the region to step up and do their part. Our NATO allies need to provide the troops, equipment, and trainers that they agreed to provide for the NATO mission in Afghanistan and eliminate national caveats on the use of these forces. Those who can’t provide military resources should contribute financially to Afghanistan’s economic development or to help build the Afghan security forces, for example through fully funding the NATO Afghan Army Trust Fund. So far, the commitment to provide a billion Euros to that fund has fallen short by 90 percent. In addition, countries can share their civilian expertise to promote good governance and the rule of law.

I welcome President Obama’s commitment to robustly fund the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, to prevent waste and fraud in reconstruction programs.

Relative to Pakistan, the United States should assist Pakistan in confronting terrorists within its borders and in building its democratic and economic institutions. Over the weekend, President Zardari stated that the conflict in the Afghan-Pakistan border region was Pakistan’s fight, not America’s. He said Pakistanis “are fighting militancy and extremism for our own sake.” I sincerely hope that that is the case.

Pakistani leaders at all levels should need no convincing from us that extremist groups pose the greatest threat to Pakistan’s survival. If Pakistan’s goals are attacking militants and extremists for the sake of their own stability and the benefit of the Pakistani people, then we can and should support their goals. But we can’t buy Pakistan’s support for our goals, rather than supporting their goals. If we are perceived as trying to do that, it will send the wrong message to the Pakistani people and to the extremists, who will use it against the Pakistan leadership and against our interests.

Finally, I do not agree with statements by some in the administration that we cannot make progress in Afghanistan without success on the Pakistan side of the border. We should not tie Afghanistan’s future totally to the success of efforts in Pakistan or to Pakistan’s governmental decisions. Obviously, progress in Afghanistan is impeded by the failure of Pakistan to stop the flow of violent extremists into Afghanistan. But I remain skeptical that Pakistan has either the will or the capability to secure their border, particularly between Baluchistan and southern Afghanistan.

U.S. Brigadier General John Nicholson in Regional Command South said that that stretch of border is “wide open” for Afghan Taliban fighters streaming across to attack U.S. and NATO forces. Pakistan leaders have failed to date to take on the Afghan Taliban in Baluchistan, whose leadership, or shura, meets openly in the city of Quetta and from there commands attacks into Afghanistan. News articles reported last week that operatives in one wing of Pakistan’s intelligence service have been providing direct support, in terms of money, military supplies, and strategic planning guidance, to the Taliban’s campaign in southern Afghanistan. I hope our witnesses will address those news reports.
But even though obviously far more difficult, unless Pakistan stops the flow of violent extremists coming across the border, an expanding Afghan army with our help can make progress in providing for Afghan security, including at the border.

The road ahead is going to be long and costly. I believe we now have the right strategy. We all look forward to hearing from our witnesses about the challenges that lie ahead in implementing the administration’s new approach.

Senator McCain is going to join us a little bit later and he will have an opening statement at that time. So let me start with our witnesses. We welcome you, Secretary Flournoy. We know that you were very necessarily detained, as a matter of fact, at another very important function, and you have your priorities exactly right. You might just spend a few moments, if you would, telling us why you’re late because I know you’re very proud of the fact.

**STATEMENT OF HON. MICHELE A. FLOURNOY, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY**

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, thank you very much for allowing me to do this. My husband is next door as the administration’s nominee to be Deputy Secretary of the Veterans Administration and I wanted to be there at least for his introduction to that committee and show my support for him. But I also didn’t want to let you all down and fail to appear here. So I appreciate you letting me be 15 minutes late so I could join you as well.

Chairman Levin. Well, we thank you for getting here. We know how proud you are of your husband.

Since a quorum is present, let me now interrupt the flow of the hearing to ask the committee to consider 3 civilian nominations and a list of 3,952 pending military nominations.

First, I ask the committee to consider the nomination of Ashton Carter to be Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Is there a motion to favorably report Dr. Carter’s nomination to the Senate?

Senator Lieberman. So moved.

Chairman Levin. Is there a second?

Senator Inhofe. Second.

Chairman Levin. All in favor say aye?

[A chorus of ayes.]

Opposed, nay.

[No response.]

The motion carries.

Second, I ask the committee to consider the nomination of Dr. James Miller, Jr., to be Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Is there a motion to favorably report Dr. Miller’s nomination?

Senator Lieberman. So moved.

Chairman Levin. Is there a second?

Senator Reed. Second.

Chairman Levin. All in favor say aye?

[A chorus of ayes.]

Opposed, nay.

[No response.]

The motion carries.
Next, I ask the committee to consider the nomination of Ambassador Alexander Vershbow to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Is there a motion to report?

Senator LIEBERMAN. So moved.

Chairman LEVIN. Is there a second?

Senator INHOFE. Second.

Chairman LEVIN. All in favor say aye?

[A chorus of ayes.]

Any nays?

[No response.]

The motion carries.

Finally, I ask the committee to consider a list of 3,952 pending military nominations. Of these nominations, 289 are 1 day short of our 7-day requirement. However, we’ve checked and there’s no objection that has been raised to these nominations because of that technical shortfall, and I recommend to the committee that we waive the 7-day rule in order to permit the confirmation of the nominations of these 289 officers prior to the coming recess.

Is there a motion to favorably report the 3,952 nominations?

Senator LIEBERMAN. So moved.

Chairman LEVIN. Is there a second?

Senator COLLINS. Second.

Chairman LEVIN. All in favor say aye?

[A chorus of ayes.]

Any nays?

[No response.]

The motion carries.

**Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee Which are Proposed for the Committee’s Consideration on April 1, 2009.**

1. In the Navy Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of captain (Scott D. Shiver) (Reference No. 55).
2. MG Michael C. Gould, USAF, to be lieutenant general and Superintendent, U.S. Air Force Academy (Reference No. 74).
3. BG Vincent K. Brooks, USA, to be major general (Reference No. 93).
4. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Kathy L. Ful lerton) (Reference No. 94).
5. In the Air Force, there are three appointments to the grade of colonel (begins with Emil B. Kabban) (Reference No. 95).
6. In the Air Force, there are 29 appointments to the grade of colonel (begins with Brian D. Anderson) (Reference No. 96).
7. In the Air Force, there are 21 appointments to the grade of colonel (begins with Mark T. Allison) (Reference No. 97).
8. In the Air Force, there are three appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (begins with Tina M. Barbermatthew) (Reference No. 98).
9. In the Air Force, there are 32 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (begins with James J. Ballock IV) (Reference No. 99).
10. In the Air Force, there are 67 appointments to the grade of major (begins with Lisa L. Adam) (Reference No. 100).
11. In the Air Force, there are 1,179 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (begins with Ariel O. Acebal) (Reference No. 101).
12. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Peter C. Gould) (Reference No. 102).
13. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Garrett S. Yee) (Reference No. 103).
14. In the Army Reserve, there are six appointments to the grade of colonel (begins with Roy L. Bourne) (Reference No. 104).
15. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander (begins with Steven A. Khalil) (Reference No. 107).
16. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of captain (Miguel Gonzalez) (Reference No. 108).
17. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of commander (David M. Dromsky) (Reference No. 109).
18. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander (list begins with Jed R. Espiritu) (Reference No. 110).
19. In the Navy, there are 27 appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander (list begins with Charles C. Adkisson) (Reference No. 111).
20. In the Marine Corps Reserve, there are five appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with David G. Antonik) (Reference No. 112).
21. In the Marine Corps, there are 132 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Kelly P. Alexander) (Reference No. 113).
22. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Jonathon V. Lammers) (Reference No. 118).
23. In the Air Force, there are two appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Gary A. Poskey) (Reference No. 119).
24. In the Air Force, there are seven appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Bryson D. Borg) (Reference No. 120).
25. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Frank Rodriguez, Jr.) (Reference No. 121).
26. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Edward E. Turski) (Reference No. 122).
27. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Joseph R. Krupa) (Reference No. 123).
28. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Kathleen P. Naiman) (Reference No. 124).
29. In the Army Reserve, there are two appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Juan G. Esteva) (Reference No. 125).
30. In the Army Reserve, there are two appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Robert F. Donnelly) (Reference No. 126).
31. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Richard H. Dahlman) (Reference No. 127).
32. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Julie S. Akiyama) (Reference No. 128).
33. In the Army, there are three appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Michael L. Nippert) (Reference No. 129).
34. In the Army Reserve, there are 14 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Martin L. Badegian) (Reference No. 130).
35. In the Army Reserve, there are five appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Debra H. Burton) (Reference No. 131).
36. In the Army Reserve, there are 10 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Paul P. Bryant) (Reference No. 132).
37. In the Army, there are 77 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Robert J. Abbott) (Reference No. 133).
38. In the Army, there are 22 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Vanessa A. Berry) (Reference No. 134).
39. In the Army, there are eight appointments to the grade of colonel and below (list begins with Efren E. Recto) (Reference No. 135).
40. In the Army Reserve, there are 14 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Suzanne D. Adkinson) (Reference No. 136).
41. In the Marine Corps, there are 773 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Derek M. Abbey) (Reference No. 137).
42. In the Marine Corps, there are 464 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Harald Aagaard) (Reference No. 138).
43. Col. Debra A. Scullary, USAFR, to be brigadier general (Reference No. 142).
44. In the Air Force Reserve, there are six appointments to the grade of major general (list begins with Roger A. Binder) (Reference No. 143).
45. In the Air Force Reserve, there are 14 appointments to the grade of brigadier general (list begins with William B. Binger) (Reference No. 144).
46. In the Marine Corps Reserve, there are two appointments to the grade of brigadier general (list begins with Paul W. Brier) (Reference No. 145).
47. In the Air Force, there are two appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with George B. Gosting) (Reference No. 155).
48. In the Army Reserve, there are seven appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Thomas M. Carden, Jr.) (Reference No. 156).
49. In the Air Force, there are 51 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Richard D. Baker) (Reference No. 158).
50. In the Air Force, there are 15 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Jeffrey L. Andrus) (Reference No. 159).

51. In the Air Force, there are 16 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Federico C. Aquino, Jr.) (Reference No. 160).

52. In the Air Force, there are 148 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Joselita M. Abeleda) (Reference No. 161).

53. In the Air Force, there are 40 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Thomas J. Bauer) (Reference No. 162).

54. In the Air Force, there are 286 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Amanda J. Adams) (Reference No. 163).

55. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander (list begins with Gregory G. Galyo) (Reference No. 164).

56. In the Air Force, there are three appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Xavier A. Nguyen) (Reference No. 192).

57. In the Air Force, there are three appointments to the grade of major (list begins with John M. Beene II) (Reference No. 193).

58. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Laura K. Lester) (Reference No. 194).

59. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Brigitte Belanger) (Reference No. 195).

60. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Mitzi A. Rivera) (Reference No. 196).

61. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Catherine B. Evans) (Reference No. 197).

62. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Victor G. Kelly) (Reference No. 198).

63. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Ryan T. Choate) (Reference No. 199).

64. In the Army, there are nine appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Rafael A. Cabrera) (Reference No. 200).

65. In the Army, there are 43 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Robert A. Borcherding) (Reference No. 201).

66. In the Army, there are two appointments to the grade of major general (list begins with James K. Gilman) (Reference No. 202).

67. In the Army, there are two appointments to the grade of brigadier general (list begins with William B. Gamble) (Reference No. 219).

68. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Ryan G. McPherson) (Reference No. 224).

69. In the Air Force Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Mark J. Ivey) (Reference No. 235).

70. In the Air Force, there are 37 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Christopher B. Bennett) (Reference No. 239).

71. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Victor J. Torres-Fernandez) (Reference No. 241).

72. In the Army, there are 86 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Joseph Angerer) (Reference No. 242).

73. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Ted R. Bates) (Reference No. 243).

74. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with John M. Dix) (Reference No. 244).

75. In the Army, there are two appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Luisa Santiago) (Reference No. 245).

76. In the Army, there are 124 appointments to the grade of colonel and below (list begins with Randall W. Cowell) (Reference No. 246).

77. In the Army Reserve, there are 16 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Albert J. Adkinson) (Reference No. 247).

78. In the Navy, there are 12 appointments to the grade of commander and below (list begins with Christopher G. Cunningham) (Reference No. 248).

79. In the Navy, there are three appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander (list begins with Janet L. Jackson) (Reference No. 249).

Total: 3,952.

Chairman LEVIN. Now we will start with you, Madam Secretary.

Ms. FLOURNOY. Thank you very much, sir, and thank you to the committee for taking the——

Chairman LEVIN. Let me interrupt you one more time.
Let me remind everybody, since we do have a good attendance here, that we will mark up the bill tomorrow which is a very significant bill, Senate Bill 454, which is the Acquisition Reform Act. We're going to be marking this bill up. We need good attendance for that. It'll be at 9 o'clock in this room.

Madam Secretary.

Ms. FLOURNOY. Let me add my word of thanks to you for taking the time to have those committee votes. I know that Secretary Gates is very much looking forward to having some of his team arrive to help him.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, members of the committee, thank you very much for asking me and giving me the opportunity to testify before you today on the Obama administration's new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. As the President stated last Friday, I think very eloquently, we have a very clear goal. This strategy really went back to first principles about our interests and our objectives, and we clarified our goal in this region as disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda and its extremist allies. To do so, we must eliminate their safe haven in Pakistan and ensure that such a safe haven does not return to Afghanistan.

Preventing future terrorist threats to the American people and on our allies is absolutely vital to our national interests. We have learned in the past, at too high a price, the danger of allowing al Qaeda and its extremist supporters to have safe havens and access to resources to plan their attacks. This is why we have troops in Afghanistan and why we are going to heavily engage and intensify our efforts in Pakistan.

To achieve our goals, we need a smarter and more comprehensive strategy, one that uses all the instruments of our national power and those of our allies. We need to devote the necessary resources to implement it. A critical aspect of this new strategy is the recognition that Afghanistan and Pakistan, while two countries, are a single theater for our diplomacy. Al Qaeda and its extremist allies have moved across the border into Pakistan, where they are planning attacks and supporting operations that undermine the stability of both countries.

Special Representative Holbrooke will lead a number of bilateral and trilateral and regional diplomatic efforts, and from the Defense side we will be working to build the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities of both countries, so that they can more effectively combat terrorists and insurgents.

Pakistan’s ability to dismantle the safe havens on its territory and defeat the terror and insurgent networks within its borders are absolutely critical to the security and stability of that nuclear-armed state. It is in America’s long-term interests to support Pakistan’s restored democracy by investing in its people and in their economic wellbeing. We seek a strategic partnership with Pakistan that will encourage and enable it to shift its focus from conventional war preparations to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism preparations.

So we will be urging Congress to support a forthcoming proposal such as the Kerry-Lugar legislation that will authorize civilian and economic assistance as well as the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund to develop a more effective military that can defeat
insurgent networks. This support, both military and economic, will be limited if we do not see improvements in Pakistani performance.

We must also develop a lasting partnership with Afghanistan. Like Pakistan, Afghanistan suffers from severe socioeconomic crises that exacerbate its own political situation. These are the root causes of the insurgency that al Qaeda and the Taliban are seeking to exploit. Building Afghan capacity to address these causes, while simultaneously taking the fight to the enemy, are important components of our efforts going forward.

So the U.S., along with our Afghan partners, and our international allies, is fully committed to resourcing an integrated counterinsurgency strategy. This strategy aims to do several things:

First, to reverse Taliban gains and secure the population, the heart of counterinsurgency, in the troubled south and east of the country;

Second, to build the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), both the army and the police, to be able eventually to take the lead in providing the security for the population in the country. Building the ANSF should enable us over time to transition from an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)-led effort to an Afghan-led counterinsurgency effort. To do so, we have to meet the requirements of our commanders on the ground, particularly for trainers, and the deployment that the President announced of an additional 4,000 troops focused as trainers will be the first time that this critical need has been addressed or fully met in several years.

But beyond a strengthened military mission, we will intensify our civilian assistance and our efforts to better integrate that assistance to promote more effective governance and development. Working with the U.N. and our allies, we will seek to improve coordination and coherence in these efforts in support of Afghan development priorities. Ensuring a free and fair and secure election will also be an immediate and consequential task.

We will also complement efforts at assistance at the national level focused on building capacities in the ministries with a much more bottom-up set of initiatives designed to build capacity at the district and provincial levels, where most Afghans have their direct experience with Afghan institutions and government. Combatting corruption will reinforce efforts to strengthen these institutions, and these methods will address, we hope, the root causes of the insurgency, build accountability, and ultimately give the Afghan people more reason to support their government.

Defeating the insurgency will also require breaking links with the narcotics industry. We will work very hard to build more effective Afghan law enforcement, develop alternative livelihoods to deny the insurgency lucrative sources of funding, and reform the agricultural sector on which so much of the Afghan population depends.

As we regain the initiative in Afghanistan, we will support an Afghan-led reconciliation process that's designed to essentially flip the foot soldiers, to bring low and mid-level leaders to the side of the government. If this process is successful, the senior leaders, the
irreconcilables, should be more easily isolated and we should be better able to target them.

Our men and women in uniform and our allies have fought bravely for several years now in Afghanistan. Nearly 700 of our soldiers and marines have made the ultimate sacrifice and over 2,500 have been wounded. We believe that the best way to honor them is to improve our strategy and to commit the necessary resources to bring this war to a successful conclusion. I would urge all of you on this key committee to provide your full support.

The strategy aims not to solve the problem with the U.S. and the international community alone, but, more importantly, to build a bridge to Afghan self-reliance. Even as our forces transition their responsibility to our Afghan partners, we will want to be continuing to help Afghanistan with security and economic assistance to build their nation over time. I would argue that our vital interests demand no less.

Although we have not finalized our budget requests for the 2009 supplemental or for the 2010 base budget, I can just tell you that we will be coming back to you to ask for your assistance in several areas, certainly funding our additional troop deployments, accelerating the growth of the ANSF, continuing to support counternarcotics funding, increasing the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding available to our commanders, and continuing humanitarian assistance support in Afghanistan.

In Pakistan, we will be coming to discuss with you in more detail the security development plan, which will include funding for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund, counternarcotics funding, continued coalition support funds, 1206, et cetera. So this is the beginning of our work together and, while I don't have budgetary details today, we will definitely be coming back to you to provide the necessary resources for this strategy. I would also encourage you to urge your counterparts on other committees to support the civilian aspects of this strategy, which will be critical to its success.

Let me just conclude by saying we understand that this cannot be an American-only effort. Defeating al Qaeda and its extremist allies is a goal and a responsibility for the international community. You will be seeing not only the President, but others in the administration, engaging our allies, as we already have been doing in The Hague, now in the coming days at the NATO summit, at future donors conferences, to make sure that our allies are alongside with us, putting on the table what they can provide to make this effort successful.

We believe that keeping the American homeland and the American people safe is the bottom line goal of this effort and this is a challenge that we all must meet together.

Thank you all very much for letting me have the opportunity to testify this morning.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Madam Secretary.

General Petraeus.
STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

General Petraeus. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of
the committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide an update
on the situation in the U.S. CENTCOM AOR and to discuss the
way ahead in Afghanistan and Pakistan together with Under Secre-
tery Flournoy and the Commander of the Special Operations
Forces that are so critical to all that we do in our AOR, Admiral
Eric Olson.

As Under Secretary Flournoy noted in her statement and as
President Obama explained this past Friday, the United States has
vital national interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan. These coun-
tries contain the most pressing trans-national extremist threats in
the world, and in view of that they pose the most urgent problem
set in the CENTCOM AOR.

Disrupting and ultimately defeating al Qaeda and the other ex-
tremist elements in Pakistan and Afghanistan and reversing the
downward security spiral seen in key parts of these countries will
require sustained, substantial commitment. The strategy described
last Friday constitutes such commitment.

Although the additional resources will be applied in different
ways on either side of the Durand Line, Afghanistan and Pakistan
comprise a single theater that requires comprehensive, whole of
governments approaches that are closely coordinated. To achieve
that level of coordination, Ambassador Holbrooke and I will work
closely with our ambassadors and our counterparts from other
countries and the host nations.

This morning I'll briefly discuss the military aspects of the new
strategy, noting, however, that while additional military forces
clearly are necessary in Afghanistan, they will not by themselves
be sufficient to achieve our objectives. It is important that the civil-
ian requirements for Afghanistan and Pakistan be fully met as
well. To that end, it is essential that the respective Departments,
State, and USAID foremost among them, be provided the resources
necessary to implement the strategy. I agree with you, Mr. Chair-
man, on the value of the Afghan National Solidarity Program as
well.

Achieving our objectives in Afghanistan requires a comprehen-
sive counterinsurgency approach and that is what General David
McKiernan and ISAF are endeavoring to execute with the addi-
tional resources being committed. The additional forces will provide
an increased capability to secure and serve the people, to pursue
the extremists, to support the development of host nation security
forces, to reduce the illegal narcotics industry, and to help develop
the Afghan capabilities needed to increase the legitimacy of na-
tional and local Afghan governance.

These forces will also, together with the additional NATO ele-
ments committed for the election security force, work with Afghan
elements to help secure the national elections in late August and
to help ensure that those elections are seen as free, fair, and legiti-
mate in the eyes of the Afghan people.

As was the case in Iraq, the additional forces will only be of
value if they are employed properly. It is vital that they be seen
as good guests and partners, not as would-be conquerors or superi-
ors, as formidable warriors who also do all possible to avoid civilian casualties in the course of combat operations. As additional elements deploy, it will also be essential that our commanders and elements strive for unity of effort at all levels and integrate our security efforts into the broader plans to promote Afghan political and economic development.

We recognize the sacrifices of the Afghan people over the past decades and we will continue working with our Afghan partners to help them earn the trust of the people and with security to provide them with new opportunities.

These concepts and others are captured in the counterinsurgency guidance recently issued by General McKiernan. I commend this guidance to the committee and have provided a copy for you.

[The information referred to follows:]
"There is no purely military solution to the situation in Afghanistan. Ultimately, the solution must be a political one which is Afghan led. In the meantime, the military must protect the people and provide the security space necessary for good governance, development and a successful political outcome." COMISAF

Our operational imperative is to protect the population while extending the legitimacy and effectiveness of GIRoA and decreasing the effectiveness of insurgent elements. Political power is the central issue in insurgencies and countering insurgencies (COIN); each side aims to influence the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate. We (ISAF, GIRoA, the Afghan people, and our international partners) will prevail in this conflict and succeed in securing and building a better Afghanistan. The principles below apply in all phases of the Shape, Create, Hold, and Build overarching framework and to all levels of the ISAF chain of command. To succeed in this campaign, we must:

**Be Population-Focused.** Demonstrate that our presence in Afghanistan is in support of the Afghan people. Defend and engage the population: be viewed as supporters of all the people. Population-centric operations influence the people should be the main effort with enemy-centric targeting operations in support. Increase interaction between security forces and the population. Move out of FOBs and spend more time with our partners in the ANP, ANA, and District and Provincial governments and be more visible in the communities they serve. In doing so, we legitimize ANSF by linking the provision of security services to GIRoA; assure the population by removing insurgent intimidation; marginalize insurgents by making their attacks on security and governance infrastructure an attack on the population, thus forcing the enemy to undermine its own support base.

**Follow an Integrated Approach to Achieve Comprehensive Effects.** Focus on governance, development, and security concurrently. Success in Afghanistan will not come from the sole pursuit of a security line of operation by military forces. Claims that ISAF only does security have no place in this campaign. These lines of operation are interdependent and are intended to be complementary and comprehensive; failure in one means mission failure on all. Work with all partners to form one team in support of the Integrated Approach. Drive this methodology at your level for planning, coordination, execution, assessment, and reporting. Maneuver units need to work with the Afghan government and community leaders, ANSF, the PRTs, PMTs, ETTs, OM, and civilians agencies to make the sum greater than its parts. Support capacity building and integration amongst our security partners to improve operations and accelerate development of ANSF. Provide direction to partnering and mentoring units to integrate ANA and ANP operations and, where practical, encourage the ANA to assist in the development of the ANP.

**Seize and Maintain the Initiative.** Adapt tactics and seize the initiative before the enemy does the same. Continuously incorporate lessons learned into operations in order to be more effective than the enemy. Proactively identify and plan for changes in the operational environment and anticipate change, instead of reacting to it. Force the enemy to respond to us and seize windows of opportunity to influence the population effectively. Plan all our operations in an **Action** (our task/intent), **Reaction** (enemy's), and **Counteraction** (what we do to adapt to the enemy) mindset.

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2. Working with and aiming to achieve unity of effort with key partners (LINKA, GIRoA, International Community representatives, etc) to ensure efforts are fully integrated from the outset. To achieve this we have to be proactive, identifying and seeking out the key stakeholders and developing the necessary relationships with them.
Gain Situational Understanding. Gain a nuanced understanding of the situation and dynamics at the local, district, and provincial levels. Share information, best practices, and intelligence across and between levels to gain a comprehensive understanding of the environment. Collaborate and share information with CF and ANSF partners to further increase their understanding of the human terrain. Identify the specific root causes of insecurity, criminality or support to the insurgency in your area of operations, gain understanding of what exactly "governance" means to local Afghans, and discern the influence of informal elements of power. Staffs should gather and deploy information and intelligence about the human terrain for use by operators at the local level to make lethal and non-lethal targeting and information operations more effective.

Be Present in Key Population Areas. Carry out smaller patrols, support smaller detachments and encourage ANSF counterparts to do the same. These actions free up larger numbers of similar ANSF units to achieve a disproportionately greater effect. In those areas where GIRQA officials and international aid donors find it difficult to generate the personnel and resources required to penetrate into the countryside, step into this vacuum and, at a minimum, set the conditions for their presence.

Be Persistent and Hold. Support GIRQA/ANSF efforts to be seen as more enduring than the insurgency, which offers no hope to the population. Do not clear an area unless GIRQA and the ANSF are able to hold it. Establish an environment in which the population feels they can resist insurgents, without fear of consequence or retribution. This will only happen if the population believes GIRQA will outlast the insurgents and, in the longer term, offer the population greater prospects for security and prosperity. We will stay as long as we are invited and needed... until the job is done.

Maintain the Trust and Respect of Afghans. Live our values and act above reproach. Insurgent groups take advantage of our failures and, because they are not constrained by the truth, sometimes our successes, too. Be first with the truth. Demonstrate respect and consideration for the Afghan people, their culture, customs, and religion. Avoid insults, inappropriate gestures, unnecessary brandishing of weapons, and aggressive driving that Afghans may perceive as offensive, threatening, or reckless. Whenever possible allow and encourage ANSF or NDS to search houses or fellow Afghans when it is required. While we will make mistakes, remember that your integrity is critical to this effort.

Pursue Relentlessly, but Protect Civilian Lives. Do not hesitate to pursue the enemy and act decisively against him; however, always employ good tactical judgment and proportionality in the application of firepower, consistent with the inherent right of self-defense and our Rules of Engagement. We are fighting an enemy that often hides among the civilian population or uses innocent civilians as a shield, both before and immediately after an attack, so the battle is often waged among civilians and their property; thus it is imperative that we always demonstrate proportionality, requisite restraint and the utmost discrimination during every action and engagement. Leadership at all levels and training, pre-deployment and reinforced in-theater, are the keys to minimizing the potential for civilian casualties.

Reinforce Afghan Accountability and Legitimacy. Encourage GIRQA to act in a transparent and accountable manner. Do this by setting an example. When GIRQA (and ISAF) is accountable to the populace, its legitimacy is strengthened. Facilitate solutions at the district and provincial level that reinforce the rule of law and GIRQA's legitimacy; take care not to strengthen local powerbrokers working outside governance structures. On the other hand, always support the community’s shura, whenever it truly represents the population.
Enable Afghan Solutions and Afghan Capacity. Foster Afghan (not western) solutions and help generate and retain human capacity. Develop and sustain an environment that enables individual mentoring/monitoring teams to perform their tasks in support of increasing GtRoA’s casualty, effectiveness, and legitimacy. Maneuver units, BKTs, and mentors must work together to ensure those with appropriate skills contribute to the identification and development of the right types of systemic investment and improvement in GtRoA infrastructure, processes, and staff performance.

Partner as Equals and Promote Afghan Credibility. Build institutional and personal relationships with your Afghan counterparts and work with them as a team. Working alongside GtRoA counterparts (from national to local level) presents us with opportunities to coach, teach, and mentor. Treat your partners as equals and work with the mentors who are teaching and coaching your partners. Promote the success and competence of your Afghan partners. Give them credit for joint efforts. Partnering and mentoring (see footnote1 for definitions) reinforces protection of the population and reenforces GtRoA legitimacy by providing the people of Afghanistan with a more proficient and effective government at the national, regional, provincial, and district levels. Be creative and diverse in your partnering efforts.

The ANA may be the most effective security apparatus in Afghanistan but its reach is limited across the country. By contrast, despite significant challenges, the ANP’s reach extends across Afghanistan and is often the only link to GtRoA for a majority of the population.

Win the Battle of Perceptions. Work with GtRoA, ANSF and local community leaders to inform and shape the perceptions, attitudes, understanding, and behavior of key population groups. Consistently find ways to win the battle of perception. Every insurgent action is designed to either influence the attitudes and perceptions of these population groups or to take advantage of local disaffection to meet their own ends. In the competition for influence, we must be more agile and effective than the enemy. Encourage moderates Afghan Islamic groups, militias, and citizens to challenge the legitimacy of the ideas and actions of extremist insurgent elements.

Enable the Tactical Fight. Appropriately authorize, resource, and integrate tactical efforts within the ISAF command structure. Actors at the local level are the key to achieving tactical effects which collectively will help shape the operational and strategic environments. Cumulative success at the tactical level will provide time and space — literally and figuratively — for the key stakeholders at the operational and strategic level to make the necessary institutional changes required to ensure long-term stability. That time and space will also allow the governance and development lines of operation to take effect. Provide direction but avoid putting unnecessary burden on those in the field.

Pass on Your Experience. Pass on your story, especially to those coming in behind you, to maintain continuity of mission. The insurgents have been here longer and the population will always be here; they will remember well after our rotations and the passage of time cause us to forget.

These principles apply in all phases of the Shape, Clear, Hold, and Build overarching framework and to all levels of the ISAF chain of command.

1 Partnering: a bilateral relationship between ANSF and ISAF units that must permeate all aspects of the life of an ANSF unit through mutual cooperation and responsibility for planning, preparation, execution, and post-operative assessments towards the achievement of joint operational effects.

Mentor, coach, and teach (MCT) units, promote the conduct for command and control, and when required, support the operational planning and employment of the (ANSF) unit to which they are aligned in order to support the development of a self-sufficient, competent and professional (ANSF).

General PETRAEUS. The situation in Pakistan is, of course, closely linked to that in Afghanistan. Although there has been progress
in some areas as Pakistan’s newly established democracy has evolved, significant security challenges have also emerged. The extremists that have established sanctuaries in the rugged border areas not only contribute to the deterioration of security in eastern and southern Afghanistan, they also pose an ever more serious threat to Pakistan’s very existence. In addition, they have carried out terrorist attacks in India and Afghanistan and in various other countries around the region, as well as in the United Kingdom, and they have continued efforts to carry out attacks in our homeland.

Suicide bombings and other attacks have increased in Pakistan over the past 3 years, killing thousands of innocent Pakistani civilians, security personnel, and government officials, including of course former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and damaging Pakistan’s infrastructure and economy as well.

To be sure, the extremists have sustained losses, and in response to the increased concern over extremist activity the Pakistan military has stepped up operations against militants in parts of the Tribal Areas. However, considerable further work is required. It is in Pakistan that al Qaeda senior leadership and other trans-national extremist elements are located. Thus operations there are imperative and we need to provide the support and assistance to the Pakistani military that can enable them to confront the extremists, who pose a truly existential threat to their country.

Given our relationship with Pakistan and its military over the years, it is important that the United States be seen as a reliable ally. The Pakistani military has been fighting a tough battle against extremists for more than 7 years. They have sacrificed much in this campaign and they need our continued support.

The U.S. military thus will focus on two main areas. First, we will expand our partnership with the Pakistani military and help build its counterinsurgency capabilities by providing training, equipment, and assistance. We will also expand our exchange programs to build stronger relationships with Pakistani leaders at all levels. Second, we will help promote closer cooperation across the Afghan-Pakistan border by providing, equipment, facilities, and intelligence capabilities, and by bringing together Afghan and Pakistani military officers to enable coordination between the forces on either side of the border. These efforts will support timely sharing of intelligence information and help to coordinate the operations of the two forces.

Within the counterinsurgency construct we have laid out for Afghanistan and Pakistan, we will of course continue to support the targeting, disruption, and pursuit of the leadership bases and support networks of al Qaeda and other transnational extremist groups operating in the region. We will also work with our partners to challenge the legitimacy of the terrorist methods, practices, and ideologies, helping our partners address legitimate grievances to win over reconcilable elements of the population and supporting promotion of the broadbased economic and governmental development that is a necessary part of such an effort.

As we increase our focus on and efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, we must not lose sight of other important missions in the CENTCOM AOR. There has, for example, been substantial progress in Iraq, but numerous challenges still confront its leaders
and its people. Although al Qaeda and other extremist elements in Iraq have been reduced significantly, they pose a continued threat to security and stability. Beyond that, lingering ethnic and sectarian mistrust, tensions between political parties, the return of displaced persons, large detainee releases, new budget challenges, the integration of the Sons of Iraq, and other issues indicate that the progress there is still fragile and reversible, though less so than when I left Iraq last fall, especially given the successful conduct of provincial elections earlier this year.

Despite the many challenges, the progress in Iraq, especially the steady development of the Iraqi security forces, has enabled the continued transition of security responsibilities to Iraqi elements, further reductions of coalition forces, and steady withdrawal of our units from urban areas. We are thus on track in implementing the security agreement with the Government of Iraq and in executing the strategy laid out by the President at Camp Lejeune.

A vital element in our effort in Iraq has been Congressional support for a variety of equipment and resource needs, and I want to take this opportunity to thank you for that. In particular, your support for the rapid fielding of Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles and various types of unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as for important individual equipment and the CERP has been of enormous importance to our troopers.

With respect to CERP, we have taken a number of steps to ensure proper expenditure and oversight of the funds allocated through this important program, including procedural guides, instruction of leaders, and an audit by the Army Audit Agency at my request when I was the Multinational Force Iraq commander in 2008.

Iran remains a major concern in the CENTCOM AOR. It continues to carry out destabilizing activities in the region, including the training, funding, and arming of militant proxies active in Lebanon, Gaza, and Iraq. It also continues its development of nuclear capabilities and missile systems that many assess are connected to the pursuit of nuclear weapons and delivery means.

In response, we are working with partner states in the region to build their capabilities and to strengthen cooperative security arrangements, especially in the areas of shared early warning, air and missile defense, and establishment of a common operational picture. Iran's actions and rhetoric have in fact prompted our partners in the Gulf to seek closer relationships with us than we have had with them in some decades.

We are also helping to bolster the capabilities of the security forces in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, the Gulf States, and the Central Asian states, to help them deal with threats to their security, which range from al Qaeda to robust militia and organized criminal elements. In addition, we are working with partner nations to counter piracy, combat illegal narcotics production and trafficking, and interdict arms smuggling, activities that threaten stability and the rule of law and often provide funding for extremists.

Much of this work is performed through an expanding network of bilateral and multilateral cooperative arrangements established to address common challenges and pursued shared objectives. As
we strengthen this network, we strive to provide our partners responsive security assistance, technical expertise, and resources for training, educating and equipping their forces and improving security facilities and infrastructure. We believe significant gains result from these activities and we appreciate your support for them as well.

Finally, in all of these endeavors we seek to foster comprehensive approaches by ensuring that military efforts are fully integrated with broader diplomatic, economic, and developmental efforts. We are working closely with former Senator Mitchell and Ambassador Ross as they undertake important responsibilities as special envoys, in the same way that we are working with Ambassador Holbrooke and the U.S. ambassadors in the region.

In conclusion, there will be nothing easy about the way ahead in Afghanistan or Pakistan, or in many of the other tasks in the CENTCOM area. Much hard work lies before us. But it is clear that achieving the objectives of these missions is vital, and it is equally clear that these endeavors will require a sustained, substantial commitment and unity of effort among all involved.

There are currently over 215,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen serving in the CENTCOM AOR. Together with our many civilian partners, they have been the central element in the progress we have made in Iraq and in several other areas, and they will be the key to achieving progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan and in the other locations where serious work is being done.

These wonderful Americans and their fellow troopers around the world constitute the most capable military in the history of our Nation. They have soldiered magnificently against tough enemies during challenging operations, in punishing terrain, and extreme weather. They and their families have made great sacrifices since September 11.

Nothing means more to these great Americans than the sense that those back home appreciate their service and sacrifice. In view of that, I want to conclude this morning by thanking the American people for their extraordinary support of our men and women and their families and by thanking the members of this committee for your unflagging support and abiding concern for our troopers and their families as well.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of General Petraeus follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the committee, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) is now in its eighth consecutive year of combat operations in an area of the world critical to the interests of the United States, its allies, and its partners. CENTCOM seeks to promote cooperation, to respond to crises, to deter aggression, and, when necessary, to defeat our adversaries in order to promote security, stability, and prosperity in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). Typically, achieving U.S. national goals and objectives in the CENTCOM AOR involves more than just the traditional application of military power. In many cases, a whole of government approach is required, one that integrates all tools available to international and interagency partners to secure host-nation populations, to conduct comprehensive counterinsurgency and security operations, to help reform, and in some cases build, governmental and institutional capacity, and to promote economic development.
These are challenging missions, and the conditions and dynamics shaping the region’s security environment are constantly evolving. Major changes in just this past year include: increased violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan; transition of authority to elected civilian leadership in Pakistan; progress against extremists in Iraq; expiration of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1790; damage to still resilient al Qaeda and other extremist elements; continued Iranian intransigence over its nuclear program and continued support to proxy extremist elements; increased piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia; and the global financial crisis and accompanying decline in oil prices. These developments, as well as recent events on the borders of our AOR, particularly in Gaza, India, and Somalia, demonstrate that the dynamics shaping regional security will continue to evolve, presenting both challenges and opportunities as we seek to address insecurity and extremism in the AOR.

Following conversations with our coalition partners and a recent comprehensive review of our AOR by members of CENTCOM, interagency partners, and academic experts, we have identified the following priority tasks for the coming year:

• Helping to reverse the downward cycles of violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan;
• Countering transnational terrorist and extremist organizations that threaten the security of the United States and our allies;
• Helping our Iraqi partners build on the progress in their country while reducing U.S. forces there but sustaining hard-won security gains;
• Countering malign Iranian activities and policies;
• Shoring up the capabilities of partner security forces in the region;
• Working with our partners to counter piracy, illegal narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling, and proliferation of the components of weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
• Working with the U.S. military Services to reduce the strain on our forces and the cost of our operations; and
• Supporting new policy initiatives, such as the establishment of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and efforts to reinvigorate the Middle East Peace Process.

The intent of the remainder of this posture statement is to address these priorities and the broader, long-term solutions they support by providing a more detailed overview of the AOR, assessments of the situation in each of its major sub-regions, brief descriptions of the approaches and techniques for improving security and preserving our national interests, and comments on the programs and systems needed to implement and to support these approaches.

OVERVIEW OF THE CENTCOM AOR

Nature of the AOR

The lands and waters of the CENTCOM AOR span several critical and distinct regions. Stretching across more than 4.6 million square miles and 20 countries, the AOR contains vital transportation and trade routes, including the Red Sea, the Northern Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Gulf, as well as strategic maritime choke points at the Suez Canal, the Bab el Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz. (With the establishment of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the realignment of the Unified Command Plan, on 1 October 2008, AFRICOM assumed responsibility for U.S. operations in the six countries of the Horn of Africa and the Seychelles, countries previously in the CENTCOM AOR.) The CENTCOM AOR encompasses the world’s most energy-rich region, with the Arabian Gulf region and Central Asia together accounting for at least 64 percent of the world’s petroleum reserves, 34 percent of its crude oil production, and 46 percent of its natural gas reserves.

Social, political, and economic conditions vary greatly throughout the region. The region is home to some of the world’s wealthiest and poorest states, with per capita incomes ranging from $800 to over $100,000. Despite scattered pockets of affluence, many of the more than 530 million people living in the AOR suffer from inadequate governance, underdeveloped civil institutions, unsettling corruption, and high unemployment.

As a result of this diversity, many people in the AOR struggle to balance modern influences with traditional social and cultural authorities and to manage change at a pace that reinforces stability rather than erodes it. For the past century, the sub-regions of the AOR have been torn by conflict as new states and old societies have struggled to erect a new order in the wake of the collapse of traditional empires. These conflicts have intensified in the past three decades with the emergence of extremist movements, nuclear weapons, and enormous wealth derived from oil. Today we see stability in the AOR threatened by interstate tensions, proliferation of bal-
listic missile and nuclear weapons expertise, ethno-sectarian violence, and insurgencies and substate militias, as well as horrific acts of terrorism and extremist violence.

Most Significant Threats to U.S. Interests

The most serious threats to the United States, its allies, and its interests in the CENTCOM AOR lie at the nexus of transnational extremists, hostile states, and WMD. Across the AOR, al Qaeda, and its extremist allies are fueling insurgency to reduce U.S. influence and to destabilize the existing political, social, and economic order. Meanwhile, some countries in the AOR play a dangerous game of allowing or accepting extremist networks and terrorist facilitators to operate from or through their territory, believing that their own people and governments will be immune from the threat. Efforts designed to develop or acquire WMD and delivery systems magnify the potential dangers of the marriage between some states and their extremist proxies. Indeed, the acquisition of WMD by hostile states or terrorist organizations would constitute a grave threat to the United States, our allies, and the countries of the region, and it likely would spark a destabilizing arms race. In the near term, the greatest potential for such a threat to arise is found in the instability in South Asia and the activities and policies of the Iranian regime.

- Instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan and Afghanistan pose the most urgent problem set in the CENTCOM AOR. Destabilization of the nuclear-armed Pakistani state would present an enormous challenge to the United States, its allies, and our interests. Pakistani state failure would provide transnational terrorist groups and other extremist organizations an opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons and a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks. The Pakistani state faces a rising—indeed, an existential—threat from Islamist extremists such as al Qaeda and other transnational terrorists organizations, which have developed in safe havens and support bases in ungoverned spaces in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions. Nevertheless, many Pakistani leaders remain focused on India as Pakistan’s principal threat, and some may even continue to regard Islamist extremist groups as a potential strategic asset against India. Meanwhile, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other insurgent groups operating from the border region are engaged in an increasingly violent campaign against Afghan and coalition forces and the developing Afghan state.

- Iranian Activities and Policies. Iranian activities and policies constitute the major state-based threat to regional stability. Despite U.N. Security Council resolutions, international sanctions, and diplomatic efforts through the P5+1, Iran is assessed by many to be continuing its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, which would destabilize the region and likely spur a regional arms race. Iran employs surrogates and violent proxies to weaken competitor states, perpetuate conflict with Israel, gain regional influence, and obstruct the Middle East Peace Process. Iran also uses some of these groups to train and equip militants in direct conflict with U.S. forces. Syria, Iran’s key ally, facilitates the Iranian regime’s reach into the Levant and the Arab world by serving as the key link in an Iran-Syria-Hizballah-Hamas alliance and allows extremists (albeit in smaller numbers than in the past) to operate in Damascus and to facilitate travel into Iraq. The situation in Iraq, lingering Arab-Israeli tensions, and arms smuggling and piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast also pose significant challenges to the interests of the United States, its allies, and partners.

- Iraq. The situation in Iraq has improved significantly since the peak of violence in mid-2007, but the gains there remain fragile and reversible, though less so than last fall. In Iraq, a number of factors continue to pose serious risks to U.S. interests and have the potential to undermine regional stability, international access to strategic resources, and efforts to deny terrorist safe havens and support bases. Internally, fundamental issues such as the distribution of political power and resources remain to be settled. The Iraqi state is still developing, and various issues pose serious impediments to development. Integration of the Sons of Iraq and the return of refugees and internally displaced Iraqis will strain governmental capacity. Externally, Iraq’s position with its neighbors is still in flux, with some playing a negative role in Iraq. Ethnic and sectarian tensions persist, and if large-scale communal conflict were to return to Iraq, violence could “spill over” into other states. Such violence could also enable terrorist and insurgent groups to reestablish control over portions of the country, which would destabilize Iraq and the surrounding region. To further complicate matters, the decline in oil prices and the resulting cut in the Iraqi budget are likely
to delay Iraqi security force modernization and security initiatives, programs for the revitalization of the oil and electricity sectors, and improvements in the provision of government services.

- The Arab-Israeli conflict. The enduring Arab-Israeli conflict presents distinct challenges to our ability to advance our interests in the AOR. Israeli-Palestinian tensions often flare into violence and large-scale armed confrontations. The conflict has created a deep reservoir of anti-American sentiment, based on the perception of U.S. favoritism for Israel. Arab anger over the Palestinian question limits the strength and depth of U.S. partnerships with governments and peoples in the AOR and threatens the continued viability of moderate regimes in the Arab world. Extremist groups exploit that anger to mobilize support. The conflict also gives Iran influence in the Arab world through its clients, Lebanese Hizballah and Hamas. The attention to this issue in recent months and the appointment of Senator Mitchell have generated positive reactions.

Other Challenges to Security and Stability

While this statement will describe in greater detail the dynamics and challenges in the subregions of the AOR, there are a number of crosscutting issues that serve as major drivers of instability, inter-state tensions, and conflicts. These factors can serve as root causes of instability or as obstacles to security.

- Extremist ideological movements and militant groups. The CENTCOM AOR is home, of course, to important transnational terrorist networks and violent extremist organizations that exploit local conflicts and foster instability through the use of terrorism and indiscriminate violence. The most significant of these is al Qaeda, which, along with its associated extremist groups, seeks to undermine regional governments, challenge U.S. and western influence in the region, foster instability, and impose extremist, oppressive practices on the people through indiscriminate violence and intimidation.
- Proliferation of WMD. The AOR contains states and terrorists organizations which actively seek WMD capabilities and have previously proliferated WMD technology outside established international monitoring regimes.
- Ungoverned, poorly governed, and alternatively governed spaces. Weak civil and security institutions and the inability of certain governments in the region to exert full control over their territories are conditions extremists exploit to create physical safe havens in which they can plan, train for, and launch terrorist operations or pursue narco-criminal activities. Increasingly we are seeing the development of what might be termed substates, particularly in Lebanon, Pakistan, and the Palestinian territories, which are part of an extremist strategy to “hold” territory and challenge the legitimacy and authority of the central government.
- Significant source of terrorist financing and facilitation. The AOR, particularly the Arabian Peninsula, remains a prime source of funding and facilitation for global terrorist organizations. This terrorist financing is transmitted through a variety of formal and informal networks throughout the region.
- Piracy. The state collapse of Somalia has enabled the emergence of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia. Since the August 2008 spike in piracy acts, we have worked in close cooperation with the international community to counter this trend by focusing on increasing international naval presence, assisting the shipping industry with improving defensive measures, and establishing a sound international legal framework for resolving piracy cases. With United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution authorities, over twenty countries have since deployed naval ships to conduct counter piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. In January 2009, we stood up a Combined Task Force (CTF–151) for the specific purpose of conducting and coordinating counter piracy operations.
- Ethnic, tribal, and sectarian rivalries. Within certain countries, the politicization of ethnicity, tribal affiliation, and religious sect serves to disrupt the development of national civil institutions and social cohesion, at times to the point of violence. Between countries in the region, such rivalries can heighten political tension and serve as catalysts for conflict and insurgency.
- Disputed borders and access to vital resources. Unresolved issues of border demarcation and disagreements over the sharing of vital resources,
such as water, serve as sources of tension and conflict between and within states in the region.

- Weapons and narcotics trafficking. The trafficking and smuggling of weapons and narcotics and associated criminal activities undermine security, spur corruption, and inhibit legitimate economic activity and good governance throughout the AOR.
- Uneven economic development and lack of employment opportunities. Despite substantial economic growth rates throughout much of the region over the past few years, significant segments of the population in the region remain economically disenfranchised, uneducated, and without sufficient opportunity. The recent economic downturn has heightened these problems. Without sustained, broad-based economic development, increased employment opportunities are unlikely given the growing proportions of young people relative to overall populations.
- Lack of regional and global economic integration. The AOR is characterized by low levels of trade and commerce between and among countries, which diminish prospects for long term economic growth, as well as opportunities to deepen interdependence through private sector, social, and political ties between countries.

MAJOR OPERATING CONCEPTS

Implementing Comprehensive Approaches and Strengthening Unity of Effort

Addressing the challenges and threats in the AOR requires a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach that fully integrates our military and nonmilitary efforts and those of our allies and partners. This approach puts a premium on unity of effort at all levels and with all participants. At the combatant command level, this means working with our interagency and international partners to develop joint action or campaign plans that establish appropriate missions and objectives for our subordinate elements, from major commands such as Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) to country-based offices of military cooperation. To effectively carry out these plans, the military elements must be coordinated carefully with the corresponding State Department envoy or ambassador.

CENTCOM also strives to help subordinate command efforts and to address areas and functions not assigned to subordinate units or that are crosscutting, such as combating the flow of foreign fighters.

Nesting Counterterrorism within a Counterinsurgency Approach

Success against the extremist networks in the CENTCOM AOR—whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Lebanon, or elsewhere—requires all forces and means at our disposal employed in a strategic approach grounded in the principles of counterinsurgency. Our counterterror efforts, which seek to dismantle the extremist networks and their leadership, often through the use of military force, are critical. However, it is also important to eliminate these networks’ sources of support. Often this support comes from sympathetic populations who provide financial support and physical safe haven or who simply turn a blind eye to extremist activities. At other times, support comes from populations directly subjected to extremist intimidation and extortion. Eroding this support, eliminating these safe havens, and ultimately preventing networks from reconstituting themselves requires protecting populations, delegitimizing the terrorists’ methods and ideologies, addressing legitimate grievances to win over reconcilable elements of the population, and promoting broad-based economic and governmental development. Defeating extremist groups thus requires the application of basic counterinsurgency concepts. We cannot be just “hard” or just “soft”—we must be both.

This does not imply, however, that U.S. forces must conduct counterinsurgency operations everywhere in the AOR where there are extremist groups. Rather, this demands an approach in which the U.S. primarily provides support to our partners in their own counterterror and counterinsurgency efforts. We should help nations develop their own capacity to secure their people and to govern fairly and effectively, and we should build effective partnerships and engage with the people, leaders, and security forces in the AOR. Whichever forces are involved, ours or our partners’, their actions and operations must adhere to basic counterinsurgency principles, with the specifics of the operations tailored to the circumstances on the ground.

Strengthening and Expanding the Regional Security Network

A new architecture for cooperative security is emerging in the region from what in the past has been a relatively loose collection of security relationships and bilateral programs. Conflicts in recent decades have demonstrated that previous security
paradigms and architectures for the region, those which focused on balancing regional blocs of power or solely on combating terrorism, have been insufficient to ensure regional stability and security in the globalized, post-Cold War environment. From these unsatisfactory paradigms, we are now seeing that a model characterized by a focus on common interests, inclusivity, and capacity-building can best advance security and stability in the region. This network of cooperation is both effective and sustainable because it creates synergies and, as it grows, strengthens relationships. Each cooperative endeavor is a link connecting countries in the region, and each adds to the collective strength of the network. The mechanisms put in place to coordinate efforts in one area, such as piracy, smuggling, or littoral security, can often be leveraged to generate action in other areas, such as a rapid response to a major oil spill in the Gulf or in the aftermath of a typhoon or earthquake. Moreover, progress made in generating cooperation in a set of issues can serve as an opening for engagement on other issues, thereby promoting greater interdependence. As a result, a growing network not only works to improve interoperability and overall effectiveness in providing security; it also builds trust and confidence among neighbors and partners.

The foundation of this network consists of a focus on common interests, an atmosphere of inclusivity, and efforts to build security capacity and infrastructure.

- **Common interests.** The security challenges we face together can be a unifying force for focusing regional attention and increasing cooperation. We all have an interest in preventing terrorism, reducing illegal drug production and trafficking, responding to environmental disasters, halting the proliferation of WMD and related technology, countering piracy, and deterring aggression. However, no nation can protect itself from these threats without cooperation from others. Collective action and comprehensive approaches are required to address these issues. Therefore, nations must work to build the trust and confidence required to pursue these common interests.

- **Inclusivity.** An atmosphere of broad inclusivity expands the pool of resources for security issues and allows partnerships to leverage each country’s comparative advantages, from expertise and facilities to information or even geography. The network is not an alliance or bloc, and countries link into this network to address issues as they desire. This suggests that there may be room for cooperation between countries inside and outside the region and even some who may have been seen as competitors. Security initiatives start out as bilateral partnerships and then expand to multilateral ones as cooperation improves. Ultimately, broad participation in the network is an important means to promote security and stability in the region.

- **Capacity building.** Improving the overall effectiveness of our security efforts requires strengthening each country’s ability to maintain security inside its own borders and to participate in joint endeavors. This capacity building includes collective and individual training programs, educational exchanges, and the development of security-related facilities and infrastructure, as well as equipment modernization efforts. These programs benefit from the talents and resources each partner brings to the network, and they can be tailored to the nature of each country’s participation. In addition to military programs, this also will require increasing the civilian capacity in the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

Already, there is great breadth and depth to the cooperative activity that is underway, and there is more design and coherence to this network than is commonly understood. In addition to our ongoing partnerships with the Iraqi security forces and the Afghan National Security Forces, numerous multilateral counterterrorism, maritime, and coastal security initiatives are ongoing in the region. Additionally, many countries participate in an extensive array of combined ground, maritime, aviation, and special operations exercises, each designed to respond to different types of threats. There are partnerships in the region for improving coordination and information sharing through, for example, air and missile defense initiatives with several Gulf countries and border cooperation programs with Afghanistan and Pakistan. Lastly, many countries are working together to fund or provide military equipment to underdeveloped security forces, with our own Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Funding (FMF) programs playing a large role in these efforts.

**CRITICAL SUBREGIONS IN THE CENTCOM AOR**

The complexity and uniqueness of local conditions in the CENTCOM AOR defy attempts to formulate an aggregated estimate of the situation that can address,
with complete satisfaction, all of the pertinent issues. The boundaries of the AOR are a U.S. organizational construct that does not encompass a cohesive social, cultural, political, and economic region. Thus, the best way to approach the challenges in the AOR is through a disaggregation of the problem sets into six sub-regions, described as follows:

- Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (though India is not within the boundaries of the CENTCOM AOR)
- Iran
- Iraq
- The Arabian Peninsula, comprised of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, Oman, and Yemen
- Egypt and the Levant, comprised of Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan (as well as Israel and the Palestinian territories which are not within the CENTCOM AOR)
- Central Asia, comprised of Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan

**Afghanistan and Pakistan**

The United States has a vital national security interest in the stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghanistan and Pakistan pose the most urgent problem set in the CENTCOM AOR. The Taliban and other insurgent groups are growing in strength and waging an increasingly violent campaign against coalition forces and the Afghan state.

Pakistan, too, faces an existential threat from Islamist extremist groups such as al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, which enjoy the benefit of safe havens and support bases in Pakistan, particularly in the rugged region along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Additionally, the possibility, however remote, of serious instability in a nuclear-armed Pakistan would pose a serious danger to the United States, its allies, and its interests.

Reversing the cycle of violence, defeating the extremist insurgencies in these countries, and eliminating safe havens for al Qaeda and other trans-national extremist organizations require a sustained, substantial commitment. Afghanistan and Pakistan have unique internal dynamics and problems, but the two are linked by tribal affiliations and a porous border that permits terrorists and insurgents to move relatively freely to and from their safe havens. Although our presence, activities, and rules of engagement differ on each side of the Durand Line, Afghanistan and Pakistan represent a single theater of operations that requires complementary and integrated civil-military, whole of government, approaches.

In accordance with the administration’s new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, we are substantially increasing our forces in Afghanistan. However it is important to note that military forces are necessary but, by themselves, are not sufficient to achieve our objectives. We will foster comprehensive approaches by ensuring our military efforts reinforce U.S. policy goals and are fully integrated with broader diplomatic and development efforts. In fact, it is critical that the complementary efforts of other departments and agencies receive the necessary support, manning, and other resources. The United States must have robust and substantial civilian capacity to effectively complement our military efforts.

**Afghanistan**

In parts of Afghanistan, the situation is deteriorating. The Afghan insurgency has expanded its strength and influence—particularly in the south and east—and the 2009 levels of violence are significantly higher than those of last year. The Taliban have been resilient, and their activities are fueled by revenues from narcotics-trafficking, the freedom of movement they enjoy in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the ineffective governance and services in parts of the country, as well as by contributions from groups outside the Afghanistan/Pakistan area. Indeed, insurgent successes correlate directly to the Afghan people’s growing disenchantment with their government due to its incapacity to serve the population and due to their doubts regarding the competence and honesty of public officials.

In order to address the situation in Afghanistan, we will implement a comprehensive counterinsurgency approach that works to defeat existing insurgent groups, develops the institutions required to address the root causes of the conflict, maintains relentless pressure on terrorist organizations affiliated with the insurgency, dismantles illegal drug networks, and prevents the emergence of safe havens for those transnational extremist groups.

This campaign has several components, but first and foremost is a commitment to protecting and serving the people. We and our Afghan partners must focus on securing the Afghan people and building their trust. As part of this focus, we will
take a residential approach and, in a culturally acceptable way, live among the people, understand their neighborhoods, and invest in relationships. The recent commitment of additional forces by the President will allow us to implement this strategy more effectively, because we will be able to expand the security presence further into the provinces and villages. With these additional forces we will be better able to hold areas cleared of insurgent groups and to build a new level of Afghan governmental control. We recognize the sacrifices of the Afghan people over the past decades, and we will continue working to build the trust of the people and, with security, to provide them with new opportunities.

As a part of this approach, we will also invigorate efforts to develop the capabilities of the Afghanistan National Security Force, including the Afghan National Army, the Afghan Police, the Afghan National Civil Order Police, the Afghan Border Forces, specialized counter narcotics units, and other security forces. We recognize the fact that international forces must eventually transfer security responsibility to Afghan security forces. To do this we must significantly expand the size and capacity of these forces so they’re able to meet their country’s security needs. A properly sized, trained, and equipped Afghanistan National Security Force is a prerequisite for any eventual drawdown of international forces from Afghanistan.

In addition, we will bolster the capabilities and the legitimacy of the other elements of the Afghan Government—an effort in which, in much of Afghanistan, we will be building not rebuilding. We will do this through our support to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and through civil-military and ministerial capacity building efforts, empowering Afghans to solve Afghan problems and promoting local reconciliation where possible. Moreover, we will support the Afghan Government and help provide security for the Presidential elections later this year to ensure those elections are free, fair, and legitimate in the eyes of the Afghan people.

Another major component of our strategy is to disrupt narcotics trafficking, which has provided significant funding to the Taliban insurgency. This drug money has been the “oxygen in the air” that allows these groups to operate. With the recent extension of authority granted to U.S. forces to conduct counter narcotics operations, we are better able to work with the Afghan Government more closely to eradicate illicit crops, shut down drug labs, and disrupt trafficking networks. To complement these efforts, we will also promote viable agricultural alternatives, build Afghan law enforcement capacity, and develop the infrastructure to help Afghan farmers get their products to market.

Executing this strategy will require clear unity of effort at all levels and with all participants. Our senior commanders in Afghanistan will be closely linked with Ambassador Holbrooke, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, and the Afghan leadership. Our security efforts will be integrated into the broader plan to promote political and economic development, with our security activities supporting these other efforts. Additionally, we will continue to work with our coalition partners and allies to achieve progress, in part by refining our command and control structures to coordinate more effectively the actions of U.S. forces working for NATO ISAF and with Afghan forces. These cooperative relationships have proven extremely helpful, and we have benefitted from the Central Asian States’ recognition of the importance of international success in Afghanistan and their granting us overflight and transit rights to support our operations there.

Pakistan is facing its own insurgency from militants and extremists operating from the country’s tribal areas. As in Afghanistan, violent incidents in Pakistan, particularly bombings and suicide attacks, have increased over the past 3 years. Most of these have targeted security personnel and government officials, but some have intended a more public impact, as we saw with the tragic assassination of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and the more recent attacks in Mumbai. In response to this extremist activity, the Pakistani military has stepped up operations against militants in parts of the tribal areas, expanding a campaign that the Pakistani military has been prosecuting against extremists for more than 7 years. The Pakistani military has sacrificed much during this campaign, and we will support their efforts in two ways.

First, we will expand our partnership with the Pakistani military and Frontier Corps. We will provide increased U.S. military assistance for helicopters to provide air mobility, night vision equipment, and training and equipment—specifically for Pakistani Special Operations Forces and their Frontier Corps to make them a more effective counterinsurgency force. We will also expand our outreach and exchange programs to build stronger relationships with the Pakistani leadership.

Second, we will help promote cooperation across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border by providing training, equipment, facilities, and intelligence. These efforts will pro-
mote sharing of timely intelligence information, help to deconflict and coordinate security operations on both sides of the border, and limit the flow of extremists between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Within the counterinsurgency construct we have laid out for Afghanistan and Pakistan, we will of course continue to target, disrupt, and pursue the leadership, bases, and support networks of al Qaeda and other transnational extremist groups operating in the region. We will do this aggressively and relentlessly. We will also help our partners work to prevent networks from reconstituting themselves, assisting them with delegitimizing the terrorists’ methods and their ideology, addressing legitimate grievances to win over reconcilable elements of the population, and promoting broadbased economic and governmental development.

Iran

The Iranian regime pursues its foreign policies in ways that contribute to insecurity and frustrate U.S. goals in the CENTCOM AOR. It continues to insert itself into the Israeli-Palestinian situation by providing material, financial, and political support to Hamas and Hizballah; it remains in violation of three U.N. Security Council Resolutions regarding its nuclear program; and it still provides arms and training to militias and insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Iran continues to use Hizballah as a proxy to assert its influence in the region and to undermine the prospects for peace in the Levant. Despite Hizballah’s participation in the government, the group continues to undermine the Lebanese state’s authority and remains a threat to Israel. Hizballah’s military support from Iran moves mainly through Syria, and thus is dependent on a continuation of the Syria-Iran alliance.

Iran’s nuclear program is widely believed to be a part of the regime’s broader effort to expand its influence in the region. Although the regime has stated that the purpose of its nuclear program is for peaceful, civilian use, Iranian officials have consistently failed to provide the assurances and transparency necessary for international acceptance and for the verification required by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, to which Iran is a signatory. The regime’s obstinacy and obfuscation have forced Iran’s neighbors and the international community to conclude the worst about the regime’s intentions. As a result, other regional powers have announced their intentions to develop nuclear programs. This poses a clear challenge to international non-proliferation interests, in particular due to the potential threat of such technologies being transferred to extremist groups. Moreover, the Israeli Government may ultimately see itself so threatened by the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon that it would take preemptive military action to derail or delay it.

The Iranian regime has also attempted to thwart U.S. and international efforts to bring stability to Iraq and Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, Iran appears to have hedged its longstanding public support for the Karzai Government by providing opportunistic support to the Taliban. In Iraq, however, the Iranian regime has experienced a recent setback. Iraqi and coalition forces have succeeded in degrading Iranian proxies operating in southern Iraq, and, during January’s provincial elections, the Iraqi people voiced a broad rejection of Iranian influence in Iraqi politics.

Pursuing our longstanding regional goals and improving key relationships within and outside the AOR help to limit the negative impact of Iran’s policies. A credible U.S. effort on Arab-Israeli issues that provides regional governments and populations a way to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the disputes would undercut the idea of militant “resistance,” which the Iranian regime and extremists organizations have been free to exploit. Additionally, progress on the Syrian track of the peace process could disrupt Iran’s lines of support to Hamas and Hizballah. Moreover, our cooperative efforts with the Arab Gulf states, which include hardening and protecting their critical infrastructure and developing a regional network of air and missile defense systems, can help dissuade aggressive Iranian behavior. In all of these initiatives, our military activities will support our broader diplomatic efforts.

Iraq

The situation in Iraq has improved dramatically in the past year. Where security incidents once averaged well over 1,500 per week in the early summer of 2007 when sectarian violence raged at its peak, there have been less than 150 incidents per week for the past 5 months, including criminal violence. These improvements in security and the increasing capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces have allowed for a drawdown to 14 Brigade Combat Teams, with 2 more to be reduced this year along with thousands of “enabler” forces. We remain on track to end our combat mission in Iraq by the end of August 2010.

After almost 6 years of war, the fundamental causes of instability and violence have diminished, and they are now kept largely in check by a number of factors.
The security effort in Iraq has put an end to large-scale violence, while increasingly capable and trusted Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have taken on an expanded role. The Iraqi Government’s moves toward reconciliation have helped lessen some of the tensions in Iraq’s communal struggle for power and resources, as formerly warring groups have turned increasingly to political participation rather than violence as a means of achieving their goals. Moreover, the results of the January 2009 provincial elections indicate a rejection of the Islamist parties seen as the most under the influence of Iran.

Though the trends in Iraq have been largely positive, progress has been uneven, and the situation still remains fragile and reversible. A return to violence remains an option for those who have set aside their arms. Enemy organizations, especially al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Iranian-backed Shi’a extremist groups, remain committed to narrow sectarian agendas and the expulsion of U.S. influence from Iraq. These enemy organizations will undoubtedly attempt to disrupt or derail several key events during the next year, including the national elections scheduled for December. However, the most difficult and potentially violent problem may be the Arab-Kurd-Turkmen competition in disputed Iraqi territories. Beginning this spring, Iraqis will take up the long-deferred, contentious question of Iraq’s internal boundaries, which has fundamental implications for the role of the Kurds in the future Iraqi state and for the likelihood of Sunni Arab and Turkmen insurgent groups returning to large-scale violence.

The central questions for the United States as these events develop are how to help the Iraqis preserve hard-won security gains as U.S. forces withdraw and how to further develop U.S.-Iraq relations that best enable regional stability. The fact that the 2009 provincial elections were conducted successfully showed that the checks and balances of the Iraqi constitution and professionalism of the ISF act as a brake upon any party’s ambitions to control the Iraqi state. However, the Iraqi Government has much work to do to develop the essential services the Iraqi people expect and to perform the functions necessary to achieve full support over time. The Iraqi Government in 2009–2010 will be under great popular pressure as the Iraqi electorate’s expectations will be high after electing new provincial and national governments.

U.S. forces and Provincial Reconstruction Teams are still an element that helps hold the security, governance, and development effort together. In some areas, U.S. military and civilian officials are still important mediators in local conflicts or disputes and key interlocutors between local communities and higher levels of the Iraqi Government. Prior to disengaging from those roles, U.S. forces and civilian officials must ensure certain conditions prevail, including:

- A security force capable of coping with current and intensified enemy action;
- An Iraqi Government capable of meeting basic needs and expectations and delivering services on a nonsectarian, non-ethnic basis; and
- Adequate rule of law and sufficiently stable civil institutions.

The Arabian Peninsula

The Arabian Peninsula commands significant U.S. attention and focus because of its importance to our interests and the potential for insecurity. These Arab states on the Peninsula are the nations of the AOR most politically and commercially connected to the U.S. and Europe. They are more developed economically and collectively wield defense forces far larger than any of their neighbors, and they are major providers of the world’s energy resources. However, many Gulf Arabs suffer from degrees of disenfranchisement and economic inequity, and some areas of the Peninsula contain extremist sentiment and proselytizing. As a result, the Peninsula has been a significant source of funding and manpower for extremist groups and foreign fighters. These internal troubles are often aggravated and intensified by external factors, such as the Iranian regime’s destabilizing behavior, instability in the Palestinian territories and southern Lebanon, the conflict in Iraq, and weapons proliferation.

Because of the Peninsula’s importance and its numerous common security challenges, the countries of the Arabian Peninsula are key partners in the developing regional security network described above. CENTCOM ground, air, maritime, and Special Operations Forces participate in numerous operations and training events, bilateral and multilateral, with our partners from the Peninsula. We help develop indigenous capabilities for counterterrorism; border, maritime, and critical infrastructure security; and deterring Iranian aggression. As a part of all this, our FMS and FMF programs are helping to improve the capabilities and interoperability of our partners’ forces. We are also working toward an integrated air and missile defense network for the Gulf. All of these cooperative efforts are facilitated by the crit-
ical base and port facilities that Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and others provide for U.S. forces.

Yemen stands out from its neighbors on the Peninsula. The inability of the Yemeni Government to secure and exercise control over all of its territory offers terrorist and insurgent groups in the region, particularly al Qaeda, a safe haven in which to plan, organize, and support terrorist operations. It is important that this problem be addressed, and CENTCOM is working to do that. Were extremist cells in Yemen to grow, Yemen's strategic location would facilitate terrorist freedom of movement in the region and allow terrorist organizations to threaten Yemen's neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States. In view of this, we are expanding our security cooperation efforts with Yemen to help build the Nation's security, counterinsurgency, and counterterror capabilities.

**Egypt and the Levant**

The Levant and Egypt subregion is the traditional political, social, and intellectual heart of the Arab world and has historically been the primary battleground between rival ideologies. The dynamics of this subregion, particularly with regard to Israel and extremist organizations, have a significant impact on the internal and external politics of states outside the region as well. In addition, U.S. policy and actions in the Levant affect the strength of our relationships with partners in the AOR. As such, progress toward resolving the political disputes in the Levant, not to mention the prevention of conflict, is a major concern for CENTCOM.

Egypt remains a leading Arab state, a stabilizing influence in the Middle East, and a key actor in the Middle East Peace Process. In recent years, the Egyptian Government has had to deal with serious economic challenges and an internal extremist threat; as such, U.S. foreign aid has been a critical reinforcement to the Egyptian Government. At the same time, Egypt has played a pivotal role in the international effort to address worsening instability in Gaza. CENTCOM continues to work closely with the Egyptian security forces to interdict illicit arms shipments to extremists in Gaza and to prevent the spread of Gaza's instability into Egypt and beyond.

In Lebanon, Lebanese Hizballah continues to undermine security throughout the Levant by undermining the authority of the Lebanese Government, threatening Israel, and providing training and support to extremist groups outside Lebanon. Syria and Iran continue to violate U.N. Security Council resolutions and provide support to Hizballah—support which allowed Hizballah to instigate and wage a war against Israel in 2006 and reconstitute its armaments afterward. Stabilizing Lebanon requires ending Syria and Iran's illegal support to Hizballah, building the capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces, and assisting the Lebanese Government in developing a comprehensive national defense strategy through which the government can exercise its sovereignty, free of interventions from Hizballah, Syria, and Iran.

The al-Asad regime in Syria continues to play the dangerous game of allowing or accepting extremist networks and terrorist facilitators to operate from and through Syrian territory, believing incorrectly that their people and government will be immune from the threat. Whether hosting Hamas leadership, supporting the shipment of armaments to Hizballah, or cooperating with AQI operatives, the al-Asad regime has used its support for its neighbors' opposition movements as strategic leverage. However, unlike Iran, Syria's motives probably stem from short-sighted calculations rather than ideology. It is possible that over time Syria could emerge as a partner in promoting security in the Levant and in the region.

Jordan continues to be a key partner and to play a positive role in the region. Jordan participates in many regional security initiatives and has placed itself at the forefront of police and military training for regional security forces. In addition to its regular participation in multi-lateral training exercises, Jordan promotes regional cooperation and builds partner security capacity through its King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center, Peace Operations Training Center, International Police Training Center, and Cooperative Management Center. These efforts will likely prove critical in the continued development of legitimate security forces in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories and, as a consequence, in the long-term viability of the peace process.

Through capacity building programs, joint and combined training exercises, information sharing, and other engagement opportunities, we will work with our partners in Egypt and the Levant to build the capabilities of legitimate security forces, defeat extremist networks and substate militant groups, and disrupt illicit arms smuggling. In addition, we will work to develop the mechanisms of security and confidence building to support the Middle East Peace Process.
Central Asia

Though Central Asia has received relatively less attention than other subregions in the AOR, the U.S. maintains a strong interest in establishing long-term, cooperative relationships with the Central Asian countries and other major regional powers to create a positive security environment. Central Asia constitutes a pivotal location on the Eurasian continent between Russia, China, and South Asia; it thus serves as a major transit route for regional and international commerce and for supplies supporting Coalition efforts in Afghanistan. Ensuring stability in Central Asia requires abandoning the outdated, zero-sum paradigms of international politics associated with the so-called “Great Game,” as well as the adoption of cooperative approaches to combat the common enemies of extremism and illegal narcotics trafficking. The United States, Russia, and China need not court or coerce the Central Asian Governments at the expense of one another. Instead, there are numerous opportunities for cooperation to advance the interests of all parties involved.

However, public and civic institutions in Central Asia are still developing after decades of Soviet rule, and they present challenges to efforts to promote security, development, and cooperation. Although there is interdependence across a broad range of social, economic, and security matters, these nations have not yet established a productive regional modus vivendi. Overcoming these challenges requires gradual, incremental approaches that focus on the alleviation of near-term needs, better governance, the integration of markets for energy and other commercial activity, and grassroots economic development.

As a part of a broader U.S. effort to promote development and build partnerships in Central Asia, CENTCOM works to build the capabilities of indigenous security forces as well as the mechanisms for regional cooperation. Besides providing training, equipment, and facilities for various Army, National Guard, and border security forces through our Building Partnership Capacity programs, we also work with the national level organizations to facilitate dialogue on security and emergency response issues. For example, in February 2008 and again this past March, CENTCOM hosted Conferences for the Chiefs of Defense from the Central Asian States to discuss regional security issues. CENTCOM also co-hosts the annual Regional Cooperation Exercise, which is designed to improve regional coordination on issues such as counter-terrorism and security and humanitarian crisis response.

CENTCOM is also working to ensure continued access to Afghanistan through Central Asia. With great support from the U.S. Transportation Command, we have established a Northern Distribution Network through several Central Asian States to help reduce costs of transporting non-military supplies to support NATO, U.S., and Afghan security operations, while decreasing our exposure to risks associated with our supply lines running through Pakistan. On a related note, we are also pursuing alternatives to the use of Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan. A decision by the Kyrgyz Government to restrict U.S. and Allied access to the base would be disappointing but would not constitute a serious impediment to coalition operations in Afghanistan.

CRITICAL MISSION ENABLERS

Success in our ongoing missions and maintaining a credible, responsive contingency capacity in the AOR require the support of several key mission enablers. The impacts of these capabilities range from the tactical to the strategic, and CENTCOM fully supports their continuation, expansion, and improvement.

Building Partnership Capacity (BPC)

Our security cooperation and security assistance efforts are critical to improving security and stability in the region. They help strengthen our relationships and build the security capabilities of our partners in the AOR. Increases to global train and equip resources, coalition support funds, and the State Department’s foreign military sales (FMS) and counternarcotics security assistance and reimbursements programs are essential in generating comprehensive and cooperative solutions to defeat insurgent and extremist groups. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and FMS remain our mainstay security assistance tools and are reasonably successful in meeting needs in a peacetime environment. The International Military Education and Training program is also an important contributor to developing partner nation capabilities and enduring ties. However, in the face of enduring, persistent irregular warfare, we look to expanded special authorities and multi-year appropriations to quickly meet the emerging needs of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and Foreign Internal Defense operations. Multi-year programs of record that provide training, equipment, and infrastructure for our partner security forces enabled our suc-
cesses in Iraq and are of prime importance if we are to achieve comparable progress in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Yemen.

**Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)**

CERP continues to be a vital counterinsurgency tool for our commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq. Small CERP projects can be the most efficient and effective means to address a local community’s needs, and where security is lacking, it is often the only immediate means for addressing those needs. CERP spending is not intended to replace USAID-sponsored projects but rather to complement and potentially serve as a catalyst for these projects. For this reason, CENTCOM fully supports expanded CERP authorities for its use in other parts of the CENTCOM AOR. CENTCOM has established control mechanisms that exceed those mandated by Congress, to include having the Army Audit Agency review programs in Iraq and a command review to ensure CERP funds projects that advance U.S. goals and are of the most benefit to the targeted populations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We will continue to seek innovative mechanisms and authorities to create similar counterinsurgency tools for use by coalition and host nation partners. These tools should allow for a variety of funding sources, to include contributions from nongovernmental organizations, international government organizations, and partner governments.

**Adaptable Command, Control, and Communications Systems**

Continued operations across a dispersed AOR call for a robust, interoperable, high-volume Theater Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Infrastructure. CENTCOM currently utilizes available bandwidth to capacity, and theater fiber networks are vulnerable to single points of failure in the global information grid. Military Satellite Communications capabilities are critical to theater operations, and the acceleration of transformational upgrades to these systems would reduce our reliance on commercial providers.

We aggressively pursue means to extend Joint Theater Expeditionary Command, Control, and Communications support and services to disadvantaged users throughout the AOR. Some of these include Radio over Internet Protocol Routed Network, which provides critical radio retransmission services to remote users on the move; the Joint Airborne Communications System, which provides a flexible aerial platform-based radio retransmission solution that can be shifted to extend services to disadvantaged users; and the Distributed Tactical Communications System, which leverages new technologies to deliver reliable, critical communications capabilities to the most remote users. Overall, we require a fully integrated space and terrestrial communications network and infrastructure that support all Joint and potential partner nation users.

**Intelligence and ISR**

We continue to refine our techniques, procedures, and systems to optimize our Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) efforts and to improve our battle space awareness, seeking greater specificity, detail, and timeliness of intelligence whenever possible. We aggressively seek out ways to execute the entire Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate intelligence cycle. However, this requires improved imagery intelligence, wide area coverage, sensor integration, signals intelligence, moving target indicators, layered ISR architecture and management tools, biometrics, counterintelligence, and human collectors. In particular, the acceleration of ISR Unmanned Aerial Systems procurement is crucial to our success. There is also a requirement for greater sea-based ISR. CENTCOM also supports DOD’s planned growth in intelligence specialists, interrogators, counterintelligence, and human intelligence personnel capabilities. Moreover, we have learned the critical importance of a host of other specialized capabilities that have been developed outside traditional military specialties, such as terrorist threat finance analysts, human terrain teams, and document exploitation specialists.

**Joint and Multinational Logistics**

The primary focus of our logistics efforts is the timely deployment, equipping, and sustainment of units engaged in combat operations. Working with our multinational partners, we have instituted an efficient and effective logistics architecture that supports our forces and operations, while constantly reducing costs. Our logistics posture consists of prepositioned inventories, strategic air and sealift capabilities, and access to bases with critical infrastructure, all of which are key logistics components that support operational flexibility. Our logistics processes center on the Global Combat Support System-Joint portal, which provides a theater level logistics common operational picture and supports theater-wide logistics unity of effort.
A significant asset recently added to CENTCOM’s logistics capabilities has been the Joint Contracting Command for Iraq and Afghanistan, which supports CENTCOM, MNF-I, and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan by providing responsive contracting of supplies, services, and construction, and which also builds capacity within Iraqi and Afghan Ministries. The Joint Contracting Command recently established the infrastructure to transition from a manual to an automated contract writing system and to a Standard Procurement System across Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, in fiscal year 2008, the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan was able to execute over 41,000 contract actions and obligate a total of $7.5 billion, and over 45 percent of this funding went to Iraqi and Afghan firms. The Joint Contracting Command also teams with Task Force Business Stability Operations (TFBSO) and provides contracting support executing Congressional resources to revitalize Iraqi State Owned Enterprises. We estimate that TFBSO’s $100 million total in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 revitalization efforts generated employment for 24,500 Iraqis.

Our logisticians are also focusing on other key initiatives supporting our forces and operations, while minimizing costs. We are now moving an increasing amount of non-military supplies into Afghanistan via a Northern Distribution Network across the Central Asian States, with the cooperation of Russia and other European participants. As mentioned above, these new lines of communication (LOCs) will help reduce costs while decreasing our exposure to risks associated with our supply lines running through Pakistan. Reliance on these LOCs will be further reduced by our Afghan first initiative, which increases our use of Afghan producers and vendors for products such as bottled water.

**Force Protection and Countering Improvised Explosive Devices**

Initiatives focused on countering the threat of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) are of paramount importance to our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. IEDs continue to be the number-one threat to ground forces, and efforts to expedite the fielding of personal protective equipment, IED jammers, route clearance vehicles and equipment, and most recently, the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle have saved countless lives. Because of the MRAP’s importance, we have more than tripled our MRAP fielding capacity and more than doubled the number of MRAPs in Afghanistan over the past 8 months. Because we expect IEDs to remain a key weapon in the arsenals of terrorists and insurgents for years to come, CENTCOM urges continued support for the Joint IED Defeat Organization; the Services’ baseline sustainment for MRAPs, base defense initiatives, and C–IED efforts; and Research, Development, Test, and Experimentation funding and procurement to counter IED tactics and networks.

**Overseas Basing and Theater Posture**

CENTCOM’s overseas basing strategy and its associated overseas military construction projects at the Office of the Secretary of Defense-approved Forward Operating Sites and Cooperative Security Locations are developing the infrastructure necessary for global access, projection, sustainment, and protection of our combined forces in the AOR. Fully functional sites are essential to our ability to conduct the full spectrum of military operations, engage with and enable partner nations, and act promptly and decisively. Prepositioned stocks and reset equipment provide critical support to this strategy but require reconstitution and modernization after having been partially expended to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Even with global war-on-terror budgets, military construction timelines are too long to respond to changes in a combat environment. Major events such as the approval of the Strategic Partnership Agreement with Iraq and the recent decision to send additional forces to Afghanistan show how rapidly basing requirements can change. Expanded Contingency Construction Authorities made available across the entire CENTCOM AOR can serve as partial, interim solutions because they push construction decisionmaking authority to our engaged commanders in the field. Increasing the Operations and Maintenance construction threshold for minor construction in support of combat operations across the AOR would also increase the ability of our commanders to quickly meet mission requirements and fully support and protect our deployed forces.

**Adaptive Requirements, Acquisition, and Technology Processes**

The Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) has proven important to addressing non-counter-IED rapid acquisition needs for our operations, and we will continue to use the Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUON) process to support our warfighters. However, because the JUON process requires execution year reprogramming by the Services, we found in the past that the Rapid Acquisition Fund (RAF) was a useful JRAC tool for supporting immediate needs. When the authority existed, the JRAC
used the RAF to field capabilities such as radio systems used for Afghanistan-Pakistan cross-border communications, which were procured in less than 4 months from the initial identification of the need. The JRAC has also used RAF funding to initiate the fielding of critical biometrics equipment until the JUON process could fund the other source of the program, significantly reducing the time required to deploying the technology. Reinstating RAF funding and using it as a complement to the JUON process would allow CENTCOM to more quickly resolve warfighter needs. In addition to the JUON process, CENTCOM leverages Department of Defense programs like Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTD) to rapidly field capability for the warfighter. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, intelligence collection and analysis tools, and limited collateral damage weapons are examples of recent JCTD successes.

Additionally, DOD currently has authority to spend up to $500,000 in Operations and Maintenance funds for procurement investment line items to meet the operational requirements of a Combatant Command engaged in contingency operations overseas. Our immediate mission requirements frequently call for equipment which exceeds this cost threshold, such as water filtration equipment, generators, information technology/fusion systems, and heavy lift equipment. An increase of this threshold and a delegation of authority down to at least the theater level would allow commanders to address critical equipment shortfalls using commercially available systems, which in many cases are essential for mission accomplishment.

**Personnel**

Having sufficient and appropriate personnel for our commands and Joint Task Forces is critical to accomplishing our assigned missions and achieving our theater objectives. This is true at both the operational and strategic levels. Our headquarters require permanent, rather than augmentation, manpower for our enduring missions, as well as mechanisms for quickly generating temporary manpower for contingency operations. At the unit level, there continue to be shortfalls in many skill categories and enabling force structures that are low density and high demand. Intelligence specialists, counterintelligence and human intelligence collectors, interrogators, document exploitation specialists, detainee operations specialists, engineers, and military police are just a few of the enablers needed in greater number for current and future operations. As operations continue in Afghanistan, we also see critical need for Public Affairs and Information Operations personnel to improve our Strategic Communications capabilities. Similarly, as we draw down combat forces from Iraq, we will need enablers beyond the typical high-density/low-demand organizations, including such elements as leaders to augment advisory assistance brigades, counterterrorist threat finance cells, and critical logistics units. At the same time, I would also request that Congress recognize the vital importance of increasing civilian capacity, particularly in the Department of State and the USAID.

Quality of life, family support, and retention programs remain vital to our operations in the AOR. The Rest and Recuperation program continues to be a success, having served more than 135,000 troopers in 2008 and over 710,000 since its inception in September 2003. We also depend heavily on entitlement programs such as Combat Zone Tax Relief, Imminent Danger Pay, and Special Leave Accrual for deployed servicemembers.

**CONCLUSION**

There are currently over 215,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and Coast Guardsmen serving in the CENTCOM region. Together with our many civilian partners, they have been the central element in the progress we have made in Iraq and several other areas, and they will be the key to achieving progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the other locations where serious work is being done. These wonderful Americans and their fellow troopers around the world constitute the most capable military in the history of our Nation. They have soldiered magnificently against tough enemies during challenging operations in punishing terrain and extreme weather. They and their families have made great sacrifices since September 11.

Nothing means more to these great Americans than the sense that those back home appreciate their service and sacrifice.

In view of that, I want to conclude by thanking the American people for their extraordinary support of our military men and women and their families—and by thanking the members of this committee for your unflagging support and abiding concern for our troopers and their families as well.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General. Thank you again for your tremendous leadership.
Admiral Olson.

STATEMENT OF ADM ERIC T. OLSON, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Admiral Olson. Good morning, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the invitation to appear before this committee and to represent the United States SOCOM. I'll focus on the roles of our headquarters and joint special operations forces in addressing the current and potential threats posed by extremists and their allies and networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I'm pleased to join Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus here this morning.

The situation in this region is increasingly dire. Al Qaeda's surviving leaders have proven adept at hiding, communicating, and inspiring. Operating in and from remote sites in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, al Qaeda remains a draw for local and foreign fighters who subscribe to its extremist ideology and criminality.

The Taliban, although not militarily strong, is pervasive and brutal. Operating in the guise of both nationalists and keepers of the faith, but behaving in the manner of street gangs and mafias, they have forced and intimidated a mostly benign populace to bend to their will. Their methods run the relatively narrow range from malicious to evil.

The President's strategy announced last week is one we fully support. We have contributed to the review of the past several months and are pleased to see that the strategy includes a clear focus on al Qaeda as the enemy and that a whole-of-government approach is directed.

We know well that progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan will be neither quick nor easy. We as a Nation and the international community must be prepared for an extended campaign, a campaign that must go well beyond traditional military activities. Increasing the presence and capacity of civilian agencies and international organizations, to include sufficient funding and training, is essential to help develop and implement the basic functions of credible government in Afghanistan and to assist Pakistan's efforts to dismantle safe havens and displace extremists in its border provinces.

Also essential is robust support to the military, law enforcement, border security, and intelligence organizations of Afghanistan and Pakistan themselves, as it is ultimately they who must succeed in their lands.

United States SOCOM has a major role as a force provider and the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps forces it trains, equips, deploys, and supports have key roles and missions in this campaign. With a long history of counterterror, counterinsurgency, and unconventional warfare operations in many of the Earth's crisis and tension spots, the capabilities, culture, and ethos of Special Operations Forces are well suited to many of the more demanding aspects of our mission in Afghanistan and to our increasing interaction with Pakistan's military and Frontier Corps forces.

Right now in Afghanistan, as for the last 7 years, special operations activities range from high-tech manhunting to providing veterinary services for tribal livestock. The direct action missions are urgent and necessary as they provide the time and space needed
for the more indirect counterinsurgency operations to have their decisive effects. Undertaken in proper balance, these actions address immediate security threats while also engaging the underlying instability in the region.

In Pakistan, we continue to work with security forces at the scale and pace set by them, and we are prepared to do more. With our Pakistani partners, Special Operations Forces are currently helping to train Pakistani trainers in order to enhance their counterinsurgency operations. While we share much with them, our forces are in turn learning much about our common adversaries and the social complexities of the region. We stand ready to continue to work with Pakistani forces and to stand by Pakistani forces for the long term.

While certain units of the Special Operations Force are leading high-tech, high-end efforts to find and capture or kill the top terrorist and extremist targets in Afghanistan, fundamental to most of the deployed Special Operations Force is our enduring partnership with our Afghan counterparts. Under a program that began over 3 years ago, United States Special Forces at the 12-man team level have trained Afghan commandos in the classrooms and on the firing ranges and then moved with them to their assigned regions across the country. Living remotely with them on small camps, continuing the training and mentoring, and integrating with them on day and night combat operations has had great effect. Supporting their local development and assistance efforts has had perhaps even a more powerful impact.

This program was recently expanded to formally partner United States Special Operations Forces with noncommando Afghan battalions, a program that will consume most of the additional Special Operations Force that will be deployed as part of the 21,000 troop increase.

The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps component commands of United States SOCOM use authorities and a budget granted by legislation to the United States SOCOM Commander to organize, equip, train, and provide their forces to support operational commanders globally. When outside the United States, all Special Operations Forces are under the operational control of the appropriate geographic combatant commander.

United States SOCOM’s budget, which is historically slightly under 2 percent of the total defense budget, is intended to fund materials, services, equipment, research, training, and operations that are peculiar to the Special Operations Force. It primarily enables modification of service common equipment and procurement of specialized items for the conduct of missions that are specifically and appropriately Special Operations Force’s to perform. In general, this has been robust enough to provide for rapid response to a broad set of crises. But we rely on each of the services to provide for our long-term sustainment in wartime environments and to develop and sustain the enabling capabilities, and we rely on operational commanders to assign these capabilities to their special operations task forces.

We can serve in both supported and supporting roles at the operational level and special operations effects are actually core elements around which key parts of a strategy can be based.
While more than 10,000 members of our Special Operations Forces are now under the command of General Petraeus in the CENTCOM AOR and around 100 more are working in Afghanistan under NATO's ISAF command structure, about 2,000 others are in 65 countries on an average day. Their activities, fully approved and coordinated, cover the broad spectrum of traditional military activities, well beyond the stereotypical one-dimensional gunslinger, to encompass the three-dimensional warrior, adept at defense, development, and diplomacy. Special Operations Forces bring soft power with a hard edge.

The employment of Special Operations Forces will actually not change much as a result of a revised overall strategy. Our units have been conducting both counterterrorism and counterinsurgency for several years.

We will continue to provide our broad capabilities to our fullest capacity in order to meet the needs of our elected and appointed civilian leaders and our military operational commanders.

Our strategy in Afghanistan must secure the primary urban areas and main routes so that life and legitimate business can begin a return to normalcy. But Afghanistan is not Iraq. Most of the population is not urban. Security must be felt in the hinterland, provided by Afghan forces supported by small teams of U.S. and NATO troops, and enhanced by civilian agencies in a manner that improves local life by local standards. I am encouraged by the prioritization of this approach in the new strategy.

Inherent to our success and to the defeat of our enemies is the realization that this is a real fight as long as al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated extremists want it to be. Civilian casualties are mostly the result of their tactics, not ours. The operational commanders I hear from are doing all they can to minimize the number of noncombatant deaths because they both abhor the reality of civilian casualties and they understand the negative strategic impact of such deaths. They know that as long as our enemies force noncombatant women, children, and others to support their operations or remain on targeted facilities after warnings have been issued, some will die. They also know that the conditions, numbers, and severity of the casualties will be highly exaggerated and quickly communicated. We must acknowledge the seriousness of this challenge and find ways to mitigate its effects, especially as we increase our troop presence in the coming months.

I will conclude with a simple statement of pride in the Special Operations Force that I am honored to command. Created by a proactive Congress and nurtured by your strong support over the last 22 years, United States SOCOM headquarters has brought together units from all four Services to develop and sustain a truly magnificent joint capability. Special operations forces are contributing globally, well beyond what their percentage of the total force would indicate, and in Afghanistan and Pakistan under General Petraeus's operational command they are well known for their effectiveness.

I stand ready for your questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Olson follows:]
GOOD MORNING. CHAIRMAN LEVIN, SENATOR MCCAIN, DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE.

THANK YOU FOR THE INVITATION TO APPEAR BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE TO REPRESENT THE UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND. I WILL FOCUS ON THE ROLES OF OUR HEADQUARTERS AND JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN ADDRESSING THE CURRENT AND POTENTIAL THREATS POSED BY EXTREMISTS AND THEIR ALLIES AND NETWORKS IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN.

THE SITUATION IN THIS REGION IS INCREASINGLY DIRE. AL QAEDA'S SURVIVING LEADERS HAVE PROVEN ADEPT AT HIDING, COMMUNICATING AND INSPIRING. OPERATING IN AND FROM REMOTE SITES IN BOTH AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, AL QAEDA REMAINS A DRAW FOR LOCAL AND FOREIGN FIGHTERS WHO SUBSCRIBE TO ITS EXTREMIST IDEOLOGY AND CRIMINALITY.

THE TALIBAN, ALTHOUGH NOT MILITARILY STRONG, IS PERVERSIVE AND BRUTAL. OPERATING IN THE GUISE OF BOTH NATIONALISTS AND KEEPERS OF THE FAITH, BUT BEHAVING IN THE MANNER OF STREET GANGS AND MAFIAS, THEY HAVE FORCED AND INTIMIDATED A MOSTLY BENIGN POPULATION TO BEND TO THEIR WILL. THEIR METHODS RUN THE RELATIVELY NARROW RANGE FROM MALICIOUS TO EVIL.

THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGY ANNOUNCED LAST WEEK IS ONE WE FULLY SUPPORT. WE HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE REVIEW OF THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS AND ARE PLEASED TO SEE THAT THE STRATEGY INCLUDES A CLEAR FOCUS ON AL QAEDA AS THE ENEMY AND THAT A WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH IS DIRECTED.

WE KNOW WELL THAT PROGRESS IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN WILL BE NEITHER QUICK NOR EASY. WE, AS A NATION AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, MUST BE PREPARED FOR AN EXTENDED CAMPAIGN—A CAMPAIGN THAT MUST GO WELL BEYOND TRADITIONAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES. INCREASING THE PRESENCE AND CAPACITY OF CIVILIAN AGENCIES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, TO INCLUDE SUFFICIENT FUNDING AND TRAINING, ARE ESSENTIAL TO HELP DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT THE BASIC FUNCTIONS OF CREDIBLE GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN, AND TO ASSIST PAKISTAN'S EFFORTS TO DISMANTLE SAFE HAVENS AND DISPLACE EXTREMISTS IN ITS BORDER PROVINCES. ALSO ESSENTIAL IS ROBUST SUPPORT TO THE MILITARY, LAW ENFORCEMENT, BORDER SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS OF AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN THEMSELVES—AS IT IS ULTIMATELY THEY WHO MUST SUCCEED IN THEIR LANDS.

UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND THE ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE, MARINE CORPS FORCES IT TRAINS, EQUIPS, DE deploys and supports have key roles and missions within this campaign. WITH A LONG HISTORY OF COUNTERTERROR, COUNTERINSURGENCY, AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONS IN MANY OF EARTH'S CRISIS AND TENSION SPOTS, THE CULTURE AND ETHOS OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES ARE WELL SUITED TO MANY OF THE MORE DEMANDING ASPECTS OF OUR MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN AND TO OUR INCREASING INTERACTION WITH PAKISTAN'S MILITARY AND FRONTIER CORPS FORCES.

RIGHT NOW IN AFGHANISTAN, AS FOR THE LAST 7 YEARS, SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES RANGE FROM HIGHTECH MAN-HUNTING TO PROVIDING VETERINARY SERVICES FOR TRIBAL LIVESTOCK. THE DIRECT ACTION MISSIONS ARE URGENT AND NECESSARY, AS THEY PROVIDE THE TIME AND SPACE NEEDED FOR THE MORE INDIRECT COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS TO HAVE THEIR DECISIVE EFFECT. UNDERTAKEN IN PROPER BALANCE, THESE ACTIONS ADDRESS IMMEDIATE SECURITY THREATS WHILE ALSO ENGAGING THE UNDERLYING INSTABILITY IN THE REGION.

IN PAKISTAN, WE CONTINUE TO WORK WITH SECURITY FORCES AT THE SCALE AND PACE SET BY THEM, AND WE ARE PREPARED TO DO MORE. WITH OUR PAKISTANI PARTNERS, SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES ARE CURRENTLY HELPING TRAIN PAKISTANI TRAINERS IN THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE IN ORDER TO ENHANCE THEIR COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS. WHILE WE SHARE MUCH WITH THEM, OUR FORCES ARE IN TURN LEARNING MUCH ABOUT OUR COMMON ADVERSARIES AND THE SOCIAL COMPLEXITIES OF THE REGION. WE STAND READY TO CONTINUE TO WORK WITH PAKISTANI FORCES, AND TO STAND BY THEM FOR THE LONG TERM.

WHILE CERTAIN UNITS OF THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE ARE LEADING HIGHTECH, HIGH-END EFFORTS TO FIND AND CAPTURE OR KILL THE TOP TERRORIST AND EXTREMIST TARGETS IN AFGHANISTAN, FUNDAMENTAL TO MOST OF THE DEPLOYED SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE IS OUR ENDURING PARTNERSHIP WITH OUR AFGHAN Counterparts. UNDER A PROGRAM THAT BEGAN OVER 3 YEARS AGO, U.S. SPECIAL FORCES, AT THE 12-MAN TEAM LEVEL, HAVE Trained AfgHAN COMMANDOS IN THE CLASSROOMS AND ON THE FIRING RANGES, AND THEN MOVED WITH THEM TO THEIR ASSIGNED REGIONS ACROSS THE COUNTRY. LIVING REMOTELY WITH THEM ON SMALL CAMPS, CONTINUING THE TRAINING AND MENTORING, AND INTEGRATING WITH THEM ON DAY AND NIGHT COMBAT OPERATIONS HAS HAD GREAT EFFECT. SUPPORTING THEIR LOCAL DEVELOPMENT AND ASSISTANCE EFFORTS HAS HAD PERHAPS EVEN A MORE POWERFUL IMPACT. THIS PROGRAM WAS RECENTLY EXPANDED TO FORMALY PARTNER U.S. SPECIAL FORCES WITH NON-COMMANDO AFGHAN BATTALIONS—A PROGRAM THAT WILL CONSUME MOST OF THE ADDITIONAL SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE THAT WILL BE DEPLOYED AS PART OF THE 17,000 TROOP INCREASE.

THE ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE, AND MARINE CORPS COMPONENT COMMANDS OF UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (USSOCOM) USE AUTHORITIES AND A BUDGET GRANTED BY LEGISLATION TO ME AS THE USSOCOM COMMANDER TO ORGANIZE, EQUIP, TRAIN, AND Sustain OUR FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN.
and provide their forces to support operational commanders globally. When outside
the United States, all Special Operations Forces are under the operational control
of the appropriate Geographic Combatant Commander.

USSOCOM’s budget, which is historically slightly under 2 percent of the total De-
defense budget, is intended to fund materials, services, equipment, research, training,
and operations that are peculiar to Special Operations Forces. It primarily enables
modification of Service-common equipment and procurement of specialized items for
the conduct of missions that are specifically and appropriately Special Operations
Forces’ missions to perform.

In general, the SOCOM budget has been robust enough to provide for rapid re-
sponse to a broad set of crises. We rely on each of the Services to provide for our
long-term sustainment in wartime environments and to develop and sustain the en-
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key parts of a strategy can be based.

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the command of General Petraeus in the Central Command area of responsibility
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sustain a truly magnificent joint capability. Special Operations Forces are contrib-
uting globally well beyond what its percentage of the total force would indicate, and
in Afghanistan and Pakistan they are well known for their effectiveness.

I stand ready for your questions.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Admiral.

We’ll try a 6-minute round for our first round.

First, as I indicated in my opening statement, I’m concerned
about statements by some administration officials that success in
Afghanistan is not possible, to use the word of Admiral Blair, un-
less we solve the challenges in western Pakistan. Now, there’s obvi-
ously a link between the failure of the Pakistan Government to
take on religious extremists, particularly those that are crossing
the border into Afghanistan, and the situation in Afghanistan.
one denies that link. The problem that I have is that to make the kind of statement that Ambassador Holbrooke made over the weekend that “You can’t succeed in Afghanistan if you don’t solve the problem of western Pakistan” puts the future of Afghanistan too much in the hands of events in Pakistan and decisions in Pakistan.

Let me start with you perhaps, General. I’m wondering whether or not you would agree that you can make some progress in Afghanistan even though Pakistan does not succeed in addressing their religious extremist problem; it’s much more difficult, but that you can make progress and the Afghans can make progress?

General PETRAEUS. I do agree with that, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. The Afghan-Pakistan strategy did not include a new target end strength for the ANA. It remained at 134,000, and that’s even though Defense Minister Wardak of Afghanistan has recommended that the Afghan army go to somewhere between 200,000 and 250,000. I’m just wondering why we did not change that end strength goal for the Afghan army, Secretary Flournoy?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, we certainly wanted to start by going after the near-term goal of accelerating the growth of the ANSF by bringing the target dates forward to 2011. We also left open the notion of assessing whether we need a larger ANSF. We did not feel that the analysis had been done to really arrive at a number of what that larger force should look like. So we wanted to take some time to look at this with the commanders on the ground, with the Afghans, in greater detail. But the door is definitely open to the idea of a larger force over time.

Chairman LEVIN. The long poles in the tent to get a larger Afghan Army faster have been identified as the following. One is lack of trainers. We’re sending namely 4,000 additional trainers. That should address that problem or that challenge. Second is the lack of equipment, and I would think that we ought to make a crash effort to get some additional equipment to Afghanistan. Perhaps for the record, because of the time shortage here, you could identify, either one of you, what we’re doing in that regard.

[The information referred to follows:]

We are providing equipment quickly to Afghanistan to help accelerate Afghan National Army growth to 134,000 soldiers by December 2011. Multiple communications avenues keep all stakeholders engaged in the dynamic support of the Afghan forces. For example, the biannual top to bottom program management reviews hosted by general officers and senior executive service representatives from the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and the United States Army Security Assistance Command ensure all commands are inline with current Afghan fielding priorities. Also, Security cooperation community members meet weekly via secure video teleconference and unsecure teleconference. In addition, an Office of the Secretary of Defense-led tiger team is applying Lean-Six Sigma principles to the program to streamline equipment acquisition and delivery to the Afghan National Army. These are just a few of the examples of the proactive engagement all levels are applying to this critical arena. This has enabled us to project shipment of all critical rolling stock by December 2010. Other initiatives such as the transfer of M1151 Uparmored Highly Mobile Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles displaced by U.S. forces receiving Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles in January 2010 to the Afghans will ensure the Afghan Army has the right equipment to fight the insurgency.

I believe, General, that you have indicated to me personally that developing the Afghan leadership among officers and noncommis-
sioned officers is also a major challenge in accelerating the expansion of the Afghan army. Could you just briefly comment on that?

General PETRAEUS. In fact, we had a session here this past Saturday, Mr. Chairman, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mullen, General McKiernan, General Craddock, the Supreme Allied Commander, NATO Commander, and myself, with some staff officers, and walked through again what are the critical paths, if you will, to accelerating the growth of the ANA in particular.

In fact, the critical factor in General McKiernan’s mind is the development of those leaders. We can train recruits. They have even now have not just the Afghan version of West Point, but the Afghan version of Sandhurst or Officer Candidate School. Even young leaders they can produce. The challenge is finding and developing those company commanders, battalion commanders, and brigade commanders, and their staffs to support them, and those are very challenging to find.

Frankly, this is the same experience that we had in Iraq, as you’ll recall, and some of this just flat takes time. I agree with General McKiernan very much on that, that that is the big limiting factor.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, General Petraeus’s prepared statement and his oral testimony here said that “Iranian activities and policies constitute the major state-based threat to regional security.” I don’t know of too many people would disagree with that. I surely fully agree with that. You indicated also that pursuing our long-standing regional goals and improving key relationships within and outside the AOR helped to limit the impact of Iran’s policies.

Let me ask both of you whether or not, if we could work with Russia on missile defense against an Iranian missile threat, whether or not that cooperation between the United States and Russia could contribute to our security? Madam Secretary, let me start with you.

Ms. FLOURNOY. Absolutely, Senator. I think this is one of the topics that President Obama will be engaging with his Russian counterpart on, actually today.

Chairman LEVIN. He’ll be exploring that possibility?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes, absolutely.

Chairman LEVIN. That’s good.

General, do you agree with that?

General PETRAEUS. Mr. Chairman, I do think that’s worth exploring. There are a number of areas in which, if there were Russian cooperation with respect to the Central Asian states and Afghanistan and the effort there, with respect to activities surrounding Iran, and even others, where Russian cooperation could make the situation much more doable, if you will, and would help enormously.

Chairman LEVIN. On the economic side, the National Solidarity Program inside of Afghanistan has established community development councils in about 21,000 villages throughout every province. I have spoken to both of you—and I don’t know, Admiral, if I’ve ever asked you about this, but I’ve spoken to both Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus about the National Solidarity Program and you both have expressed to me your belief that it is one of the real success stories in the economic development inside of Af-
ghistan. I want to ask a question about that, but I don’t want to misstate anything. Is that true, that you both feel that that is a success story?

Ms. FLOURNOY. I do. I think it’s one of the examples of the kind of bottom-up approach that we need to be doing more of in the Afghan context.

General PETRAEUS. It is, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Then my question, General, is to you. It has to do with the wonderful capability that’s provided to us with these CERP funds. I agree with you very much in terms of what you said about those funds, those commanders’ funds that are basically in the authority of commanders to spend, but with great flexibility and speed, a lot of them being for economic development purposes.

Could and should that funding be coordinated, at least, with these community development councils, so that they at least have a voice, suggestion perhaps, as to where these CERP funds are used for economic development, as to what would be the most effective use? I’m not giving them a veto. I’m not suggesting they control. Obviously, these are going to be commander-controlled. But would it be worthwhile to have an input from those councils?

General PETRAEUS. Our experience, Mr. Chairman, has always been that the more that you can get locals involved in the decision-making process within reason—and there are limits, but within reason—that that is absolutely what we want to do. What of course we’re trying to do is build their capacity and capability, and that is one way of doing that.

We did, in fact, do that extensively over time in Iraq as we were able to transition from us funding programs over time to Iraqis funding programs.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, and I’ll now call on Senator McCain.

[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Mr. Chairman, thank you and I join you in welcoming our witnesses here today. Last week, I welcomed the President’s announcement of a long overdue change of course in Afghanistan. The war in Afghanistan is one that we can win and that we must win, but for years now we have been fighting without a clear strategy and with insufficient resources.

The approach outlined by the President last week has the potential to be the first step on the right path in what will be a difficult and costly effort in Afghanistan. The broad components of this new strategy—including an emphasis on counter-insurgency and population security, a significant increase in our military and civilian resources, and an acknowledgement that we must view the complex nature of the mission in Afghanistan through a regional context appear sound.

It is, however, only one step. The announcement of the new strategy must be quickly followed by the development of an integrated civil-military campaign plan for all of Afghanistan, which does not exist today. I hope that we will hear from our witnesses today that the administration is committed to write just such a detailed campaign plan, and the timeframe they envision for its development. We will also be interested in learning how the administration intends to mobilize greater support from the non-military departments and agencies of the Federal government.

A critical component of this new strategy is to increase the target end strength of the Afghan National Army and accelerate progress toward that goal. While the target currently remains 134,000, I believe that we should significantly increase our goal to approximately 250,000 and accelerate progress toward that goal. The deployment of approximately 4,000 U.S. troops to train Afghan security forces is a welcome step, as is the commitment to ensure that every American unit in Afghanistan partners with an Afghan unit. The committee will want to know, however, if the
witnesses believe this commitment is sufficient, if we will request additional train-
ers from our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in order to ensure
that every Afghan unit has a coalition partner unit, and whether plans and proc-
esses to provide equipment to the Afghan security forces are adequate. In addition,
while we train the military, we must not do so at the expense of the police, which
remain poorly paid and trained. There is a desperate and immediate need to employ
more police trainers in Afghanistan.
The members of this committee should know that the additional troop deploy-
ments announced by the President thus far are unlikely to be the last. General
McKierman, the ground commander, has already requested three additional bri-
gades, or approximately 10,000 troops, that would deploy to Afghanistan in 2010.
I believe the President should have used the opportunity last week to commit to the
commander’s request. We cannot fail in Afghanistan due to a lack of troops. The
American people need to understand the scale of our required commitment. The
committee will want to know how and when this request will be evaluated by the
Department of Defense, as well as any plans for periodic reviews of the strategy as
a whole, and of how well matched our troop levels are to the mission.
The mission in Afghanistan is a crucial test for NATO and the international com-
menity. For several years, our Government has made a significant effort to gain
greater contributions from our allies. Our efforts to build a shared understanding
among our allies and the international community of what is at stake in Afghan-
istan have had only mixed success. I encourage the witnesses to speak about how
the administration’s new strategy intends to address the need to mobilize greater
international support for our objectives in Afghanistan, including support to train-
ing and other non-combat areas.
I share the President’s conviction that the war in Afghanistan is one we can and
must win. I also believe that the President and other political leaders must tell the
American people, today and in the future, that the path to success will be long and
arduous, that the violence is likely to worsen before it improves, and that this war
will entail greater expenditures of American blood and treasure. The stakes are
enormous, and we must do everything we can to ensure that the public stands firmly
behind the courageous efforts of our fighting men and women.
Mr. Chairman, thank you and I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses
today.

Senator McCain. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the
witnesses. I’d like to repeat again, I believe that the strategy that
the President and his team have developed for addressing the enor-
mous challenge of Afghanistan is a good one and I think it has
every chance of success, and I’m very pleased with the leadership
that we have, like General Petraeus and General McKiernan and
others.

General Petraeus, just for a second, are you worried about the
continuing level of violence in Diyallah Province in Iraq?

General PETRAEUS. Certainly there are concerns in Diyallah
Province and in Ninewah Province as well, Senator McCain. There
are other concerns. Frankly, there are latent capabilities. We see
some activity by Iran to continue to develop again proxies, now
called Khataib Hezbollah, Asaib-al-haq, Promise Day Brigade. We
have to keep a very close eye——

Senator McCain. So the Iranians continue to try to meddle and
interfere and harm our efforts in Iraq, including taking American
lives?

General PETRAEUS. They do, and there is a continued residual
Sunni extremist element as well. Certainly al Qaeda worldwide if
they could would try to provide additional reinforcements to that.

Having said that, the level of violence is significantly lower,
somewhere between 10 and 15 attacks per day compared with say
180 attacks per day back in the late spring of 2007.

Senator McCain. Thank you.

Secretary Flournoy, as I said, I support the strategy. I think it
would be far, far better to announce that we will have the addi-
tional 10,000 dispatched. They will clearly be needed. It is obvious that the Afghan army would have to be around 250,000. It’s a big country. We know that that was a vital element to our success in Iraq, and to dribble out these decisions I think can create the impression of incrementalism.

We all know what’s needed. I would have made these announcements at the time.

General Petraeus, we’ve seen now in Mumbai and now in the attack on the police academy a change in tactics on the part of al Qaeda or Taliban in this case. Instead of just walking into a place with a suicide vest on, they have teams of well-trained, professional, well-armed people who go in and kill a hell of a lot of people before they either surrender or kill themselves.

Two questions. One is, isn’t that basically true in this change in tactics that they’re employing? Is it of great concern, should it be of great concern to us, that the Taliban’s reach has now extended to the police academy in Pakistan?

General Petraeus. It is of big concern. It underscores the fact that the extremist threat inside Pakistan is indeed the existential threat, the most important existential threat to that country, we believe more than the traditional enemy of Pakistan, India. There appears to be a growing attraction among the extremist elements for Mumbai-like attacks. They saw the impact that that had. They saw the degree of coverage, the sensational aspects to that.

There is some positive aspect to the attack in Lahore in that indeed the Pakistani security forces did respond and over time did kill or capture what appear to be a substantial number of those that carried out the attack on the police academy.

Senator McCain. It took a heck of a long time as you well know.

General Petraeus. It did.

Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, Pakistan obviously is very critical. I don’t think it’s the determinant, but we can discuss that at a later time. Pakistan concluded an agreement with some Taliban elements in the Swat Valley that allowed for full adoption of sharia law. Do you believe that this arrangement supports our objectives in the region?

Ms. Flournoy. I do not, sir.

Senator McCain. Do you think that the government—and this is the conundrum of Pakistan—and the military are so closely tied to ISI that it prevents us from having the degree of effectiveness and cooperation from the Pakistani Government that we need?

Ms. Flournoy. Sir, I think parts of ISI are certainly a problem to be dealt with. But I think we have a new democratic government and I think you have strong parts of the military who see the extremist threat, who want to deal with that extremist threat. Part of our policy challenge is to empower them to be more effective in doing that.

Senator McCain. So you see progress in trying to reduce the cooperation that exists between the Pakistani military and the ISI, which has been significant and deep?

Ms. Flournoy. Sir, I don’t see adequate progress at this point. But I think one of the things we’re trying to do with the strategy is provide additional incentives for that progress to take place.
Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, an individual who is I understand a young Taliban leader named Mahsoud—is that the——

General PETRAEUS. Baitullah Mahsud, a Pakistani Taliban leader.

Senator MCCAIN. He said that he would orchestrate, or arrange an attack on Washington, DC. How seriously do you take that threat?

General PETRAEUS. Well, I think any time there is any threat that could be against the homeland I think you have to take it seriously. We are doing what the intelligence circles call a deep dive to determine the possibility of that, if you will. There are some questions about capacity of that organization in terms of trans-national activities, but I can assure you—and I just talked to a senior member of the National Security Council staff this morning about that, and obviously everyone is quite riveted on analyzing that and seeing what further we can find out about that.

Senator MCCAIN. Well, we certainly wouldn’t want to call it a global war on terror.

I thank you. I thank the witnesses.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Thanks to the three of you for your service and for the service of all those who work under your leadership. It’s really quite extraordinary.

I appreciated very much the President’s announcement of policy with regard to Afghanistan and Pakistan on Friday. I think particularly our effort in Afghanistan has really been under-resourced for too long, and the commitment of additional resources, both military and civilian, is very significant to our success there. Just as importantly, I think, was the President’s unambiguous political commitment to defeat the Islamist extremists of South Asia and to relate that to our security.

Secretary Flournoy, I wanted to ask you first, as the representative of the civilian side of the Pentagon and the administration, to answer a question about South Asia that was once asked not so long ago about Iraq, and that I suspect some Americans are asking now and maybe more will ask as we send more of our troops there, our best, and they suffer more casualties, which is: What is the relationship between what is happening in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the security of the American people, the security of the United States of America?

In other words, is it necessary to succeed in Afghanistan for America to remain safe in the world and here at home?

Ms. FLOURNOY. The short answer is yes. But I believe the link is that in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region you have continued safe haven for al Qaeda and other extremists who we know are actively plotting against American interests, American allies, and the American homeland. So this is a matter of vital national interest. It is something that we must deal with effectively. It’s going to take time. As General Petraeus said, it’s not going to be easy. But I think part of the strategy review was refocusing on that objective and on the core interests that are at stake in this campaign.
Senator LIEBERMAN. General Petraeus, is it fair to say that we're focused clearly on al Qaeda, but that the success or failure of allied groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, such as the Taliban and the Mehsud group and others, Haqqani, is also relevant to our security in the world and the stability of the region on which we depend?

General PETRAEUS. It is, Senator. In fact, I think a good way to describe the extremists is a term that General McKiernan uses. He calls them “the syndicate.” It’s al Qaeda and the syndicate of elements, plus of course the Afghan Taliban. All of them together represent a threat, not just in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but certainly a regional extremist threat, and in certain cases a truly global extremist threat.

Senator LIEBERMAN. One of my impressions on both visits to the region and talking to people from Afghanistan and Pakistan here is that there is an unsettling perception in Afghanistan and Pakistan that the U.S. is not in this for the long haul, that we are making a temporary commitment to them. Unfortunately this is based on some history not so long ago—that we will leave before the job is done. No one wants to stay there forever, but the question is will we leave before the job is done.

That perception has really counterproductive effects and a lot of hedging behavior in both countries, the worst being the excuse given—that being given as an excuse for ISI-terrorist linkages.

So I want to know if you agree with that concern and whether you feel that we’re turning it around now, most significantly by the announcement by President Obama last Friday of our new commitment?

General PETRAEUS. I strongly agree with that, Senator. In fact, that’s why I’ve repeatedly used the term “sustained substantial commitment.” In fact, it’s important in both countries. There is history there. Pakistan will quote that history to you in the first paragraph of any conversation. There is a 12-year period where Pakistani officers, for example, did not come to the United States. There are some understandable reasons for this, but the fact is that there’s a lost generation and the entire military remembers the very much up and down relationship that we have had over the years.

If I could, the Kerry-Lugar bill that is I think being considered by the Senate represents the kind of sustained substantial commitment that we’re talking about—I think it’s 5 years, $1.5 billion—as do some of the DOD requests that will be coming up with the budget.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me ask you a different kind of question, about the command structure in Afghanistan. In Iraq it seemed to me that you helped to put together and we had a superb command structure, with yourself as the four-star in strategic command in Multi-National Forces-Iraq, and then a three-star operational commander, previously General Odierno under you—now he’s obviously a four-star—and General Austin doing an extraordinary job, both of them as three-star. I think that worked and I assume you agree, and continues to work.

In Afghanistan, we have the four-star in General McKiernan, but no three-star operational commander. It sure looks to me anyway from here that underneath General McKiernan we have an unfor-
fortunately balkanized structure, with regional commanders and not the kind of line of authority that we’d like.

I will tell you that we had some witnesses before this committee in the last couple of months who made clear that as we increase our resources in Afghanistan it would be a mistake not to tighten up the command structure and add a three-star operational commander. I wanted to ask you what you think about that idea and my assessment of where we are currently?

General PETRAEUS. Well, the first step, frankly, to achieve greater unity of effort and a cleaner command structure, if you will, was the step that we took a few months ago to dual-hat General McKiernan as the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, as well as the NATO ISAF commander. That was very important.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I agree.

General PETRAEUS. We have then begun the process of building a pretty substantial U.S. Forces Afghanistan staff to support him and to take the burden off what currently is the Combined Joint Task Force 101, that’s typically the division that has been in Regional Command East, which has also had a command line that used to go directly from CENTCOM to them directly to CSTC–A, directly to the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force and some other elements. We have now cleaned that up. It all now goes through General McKiernan, supported by this growing U.S. Forces Afghanistan staff, which is also a place that we can build up the strategic communications, information operations task force, and a host of other activities that can support him in a way not quite like the operational headquarters certainly in operational terms, but in some of, if you will, the important additional enabler duties.

We talked about in this past Saturday’s session that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs hosted here with General McKiernan, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and myself, we talked about the wisdom of an operational headquarters. For the time being, that is not something that we’re going to recommend or go forward with, but it’s something that we’ll certainly continue to assess as we go along.

There are other areas as well, Senator, if I could, in which we need to make some additional changes. We think we need to achieve greater unity of effort in the special operations arena, and in fact Admiral Olson provided us a brigadier general on the U.S. side that we think over time perhaps could be joined together with the NATO SOF. That would also help. There’s a thought of making CSTC–A also perhaps a NATO element, and there are some other measures in the counter-improvised explosive device (IED) world and others that we can clean this up and improve it over time, and we’re intent on doing that.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I thank you very much for that answer.

My time is up. I just want to read one sentence from your statement that I think we all should think about, which is: “Iran’s actions and rhetoric have in fact prompted our partners in the Gulf to seek closer relationships than we have had with some of these nations in some decades.” So threats often strengthen alliances and in that sense can help us strengthen our own security, and I thank you for pointing that out.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.

Senator Inhofe.

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Sometimes in these hearings we get bogged down in a lot of details that are very, very significant and we need to get into them. But I know when I go back to Oklahoma and other places the first question always is: Why is it we're not as successful as we should be in getting NATO to come up? I notice this morning in the Early Bird, and I think this came out of today's New York Times, it makes an issue of the fact that France will send 150 paramilitary police officers to Afghanistan as a part of—and it goes on and on—and then some of these other NATO countries that are talking about this, as if that's a great contribution.

Well, first of all, anything further that you haven't already stated in terms of what we might do on this side of the dais or what you might do to encourage more of an involvement of NATO over there?

Ms. Flournoy. Senator, I would just let you know, we spent a lot of time in the development of the strategy consulting with allies to try to create a sense of ownership on their part. One of the things we've done is to broaden the nature of our requests, not only for military troops and capabilities where they can provide them, but to things like police trainers, where a number of our European allies have national police forces—gendarmes, carabinieri, etcetera—who are actually quite good at police training. We don't have a national police force. That's not an area of particular strength for us. So we're asking them to step up on trainers for the army, trainers for the police, contributions to the ANA Trust Fund, the Law and Order Trust Fund, sending civilian advisers, civilian assistance, and so forth.

So we've tried to broaden the aperture, with the expectation that everyone will step up in some meaningful way to support a comprehensive approach.

General Petraeus. Senator, as part of the consultation phase of this, as the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy review was launched, I went to the Munich security conference, to NATO headquarters, EU, addressed all the EU delegates, and also went to London, Brussels, and Paris and talked with each of them. There have been and there will be some more contributions made. We'll see what happens at the summit in the coming days. There are some that still may be forthcoming that people are reticent to talk about right now.

I would stand very much with what Secretary Gates has noted about NATO contributions and his concerns about NATO being almost also a two-tier alliance in which some will fight and others may not. So this is a challenge for the alliance without question.

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, and I agree with all that.

Madam Secretary, I appreciate your phrase, “create a sense of ownership.” That seems to be what needs to be done.

Each one of you—General Petraeus, you mentioned the CERP program, and of course Secretary Flournoy mentioned the 1206. Of course, I always try to get on the record on these just briefly the value of the International Military and Education Training (IMET) program, the CERP program, the Combatant Commanders Initiative Fund (CCIF) program, and in your case, Admiral Olson, the
1208 program. Do you have any comments to make on those programs?

General PETRAEUS. With respect to CERP, again I think it’s of enormous importance. Actually, I would support very strongly 1206, 1207, and 1208. Again, I don’t want to get ahead of a budget submission, and with the next one there is something out there that you may hear—may have heard about, we’ve discussed with the chairman and Senator McCain, called the Pakistan Counter-insurgency Capability Fund. This will be coming along with this package. It is something that we believe in CENTCOM is of enormous importance, to be able to target assistance that will help them develop the capabilities for those who are truly conducting counterinsurgency operations.

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, I would just echo that. These tools are generally very important throughout the AOR and globally in many cases, but they are absolutely critical to the success of the strategy. If we don’t back up the troops we’re deploying with these additional authorities and funding streams, we can’t reach our goals. They’re absolutely critical to the success of the strategy.

Senator INHOFE. Admiral Olson, you would agree with that with 1208?

Admiral OLSON. Absolutely, sir. I have more responsibility for 1208, but the Special Operations Forces are also customers of 1206, IMET, and some others. I think we can point to many examples of progress that was enabled by those programs.

Senator INHOFE. Seeing Senator Ben Nelson here, I had the occasion to talk to some of the Nebraska Guard on what they’re doing up on the Pakistani border. They’re up there now and we had an opportunity to talk to them, and the value of that program, crop substitution and this type of thing, working with them. It happens the Oklahoma Guard will be going up to relieve them, I think in October some time. Would you make any comments about that program?

General PETRAEUS. I can’t say enough about that program. Actually, this is a case where the National Guard, individual States, have pulled together agriculture teams, and these are individuals of course that are serving in the National Guard, but either are farmers or farm experts, agriculture experts. They’ve even been doing the rotation system themselves. Frankly, the more of those that we could get the better at this stage, as we expand the areas in which our forces are operating, and we’ve conveyed that to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

Senator INHOFE. They seem to be getting good results.

General PETRAEUS. They get very good results. They have all the attributes of soldiers in terms of being able to secure themselves, communicate, move, shoot, and communicate; and yet they’re also experts in agriculture.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much. I was going to get into this, and there’s not time, but just very briefly on the fact that I didn’t learn until this morning that the solution has come from the supreme court over there in terms of Karzai’s term ending in May and then of course the elections in August. But I guess that’s resolved now by the supreme court, is my understanding, that he will remain there during this timeframe?
Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, we hope so. We’ve thought at many points that this was resolved before. But we’ll hope that this interim arrangement will stick. Our interest is having secure, free, fair elections. We’re not backing any one candidate.

Senator INHOFE. I understand.

Ms. FLOURNOY. We just want to make sure a peaceful and legitimate process moves forward.

Senator INHOFE. My time is up, but lastly, Admiral Olson, you mentioned just a few minutes ago that you represented 2 percent of the budget. I have read your background and some of the great heroic things that happened in Special Operations. I would just have to ask you, if this is the right forum to get a response, do you think that 2 percent is adequate?

Admiral OLSON. I obviously don’t want to get ahead of the budget discussions that are taking place now, but I do want to fully credit the investment that the Services each make in Special Operations capability.

Senator INHOFE. Yes.

Admiral OLSON. We depend heavily on them, and each of the Services carves out a portion of their budget to pile on top of that 2 percent that’s peculiar to the Special Operations.

Senator INHOFE. Well, you’re doing great work.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

Senator Bill Nelson.

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning. Admiral, the MRAP vehicle is not necessarily well adapted to the terrain in Afghanistan. What would you like for your special forces troops over there in developing a vehicle for that terrain?

Admiral OLSON. Sir, the laws of physics work against us in Afghanistan. Protection requires mass and mass doesn’t work well in the bridges and the roads and the terrain of especially the mountainous regions of Afghanistan. So I support the full range of vehicle development activities that are occurring across the services. We are tied into all of them, I believe, contributing our particular needs to the development process.

I don’t know what the outcome of that will be, but certainly a more agile protective vehicle is something that we all are striving for.

General PETRAEUS. Senator, if I could on that——

Senator Bill NELSON. Please.

General PETRAEUS. There is in fact a very urgent effort ongoing to let a contract for what’s called currently I think a light MRAP. In the mean time, what we have done is we have sent the lightest of the existing MRAPs to Afghanistan. We’ve diverted some, in fact, from the flow into Iraq and from Iraq. Those work much better on the roads, but they defy the laws of physics on some of these roads, as my swim buddy pointed out.

But there is an urgent effort in this light MRAP arena, and I think the contract is literally to be let within a month or so, was the latest that I saw on this. We appreciate—I believe that’s something that was very strongly supported up here, because it was again a very significant effort.
Senator Bill Nelson. Last week the President stated: “Going forward, we will not blindly stay the course. Instead, we will set clear metrics to measure progress and hold ourselves accountable.” He was talking about Afghanistan. So, General, what metrics do you want to see that we will use to evaluate our progress?

General Petraeus. Well, in fact there’s an effort, actually an interagency effort that even includes the intelligence agencies right now, and obviously those who are out in the field, in the embassy and the military forces, to develop those kinds of metrics. There are the existing metrics, frankly, right now that exist, that show attacks by region, by day, by type, that capture a host of the kind of data points that the chairman mentioned during his opening statement.

But over time we have to expand these more and more into the development of the—that capture the legitimacy of the government, the development of capability and capacity by Afghan authorities, and so forth.

Senator Bill Nelson. Are those metrics—you mentioned the Intelligence Community (IC). Are these metrics such that we’ll be able to discuss them in public?

Ms. Flournoy. Sir, I think we are in the process of developing them to complement the sort of tactical metrics the commanders on the ground are using, a strategic set of metrics that we can use in an ongoing assessment process. We do want to be able to make as many of those public as possible, and we’d like to actually have a conversation with you, getting your input on what meaningful metrics would look like.

There’s a real commitment to continue to reevaluate the situation, evolve the strategy, build on what’s working, correct when something’s not working. So it’s going to be a dynamic process going forward.

Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.

Senator Collins.

Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, let me follow up on the essential question that Senator Nelson just asked you. He’s really asking a fundamental question and that is: How will we assess whether the new strategy is working? How will we know if we’re winning?

It seems to me that prior to going forward with the commitment of additional troops, that the administration should have already established specific benchmarks that it’s going to use to measure whether or not the new strategy is successful. So I want to press you further on the question that Senator Nelson asked you: How will you know whether or not this new strategy is working? It seems to me that you need a set of clear benchmarks, clear metrics, going in and that we should not be committing additional troops until we have a means of measuring whether or not this strategy is successful.

Ms. Flournoy. Senator, I would just say that I think we have some very broad metrics on the Pakistani side looking at measures of their cooperation on the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency fight, as well as in terms of support for other common objectives. I think on the Afghan side there are a whole host—a much more
developed set of inherited metrics, given that we've been conducting these operations for a long time.

What we're trying to do is sort through those more carefully. Some of them are more input-related and what we're really trying to focus on is outcomes and actual impact. So we aren't starting with a blank sheet, but we are in the process of refining the metrics that have been being used in Afghanistan.

The decision to deploy the additional forces was driven—there was a sense of urgency by our commanders on the ground that, with the fighting season coming, the need to reverse momentum, the need to get in there and begin protecting the population and secure things for the elections, and not lose ground. There was a sense of urgency that we needed to go forward even as we were refining our metrics, and so forth.

But I can promise you we will in a very short amount of time be able to come back and talk to you in detail about metrics. I just don't want to get out ahead of my interagency colleagues and make sure that we're all willing to back the same—or sing off the same sheet of music, before I come back and talk to you.

Senator COLLINS. General, I testified this morning that it is in Pakistan that al Qaeda's senior leadership and other trans-national extremist elements are located. Similarly, Ambassador Holbrooke has said that western Pakistan and the Swat region is the chief concern, and I agree with both of those statements.

To address this threat, you've testified that the United States will provide additional intelligence capabilities to the Pakistanis. However, there have been numerous reports that the Pakistani military officers have very close and troubling ties with the Taliban both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. That's some military officers in Pakistan and the ISI.

Isn't there a considerable risk that if we provide increased intelligence capabilities to the Pakistan military that those capabilities will fall into the hands of the wrong individuals and end up actually helping the Taliban to avoid attacks?

General PETRAEUS. Well, again, the effort in Pakistan, Senator, absolutely has to be one that they take forward and one that we do everything we can to enable to assist, and indeed to provide intelligence capabilities as part of all of that. How we do that has to be done very carefully, and we will have to go through a process, I think, where we literally do build some of the trust, because there are both troubling events in the past and there are troubling accusations out there.

Some of these, frankly, when you dig into them are a bit more ambiguous than they seem to be on the surface, although some are not. It is difficult in some cases to sort out what is an intelligence agency contact that is trying to develop a source or on the other hand what is an intelligence agency contact that is warning them of an impending operation. There have been examples of the latter. Those are troubling. We have discussed those with the head of Pakistani intelligence, of the ISI, Lieutenant General Pasha. I have done that, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, others. Ambassador Holbrooke and I had a session with him together.

The Pakistani military, again we have had these same conversations with them. There is going to have to be a process of building
trust. This starts, frankly—all of this in Pakistan begins with them embracing the idea that the biggest threat to their country’s very existence is the internal extremist threat, rather than the threat to their east. That is a recognition that they have stated verbally. The chairman quoted it in his opening statement. We have heard it privately.

We now need to help them operationalize that, to watch them. Among, again, the metrics need to be measures of their commitment to truly go after this threat that could literally take down their state if it’s allowed to creep out and to grow, and certainly to cause bigger problems regionally and potentially globally.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Collins.

Let me now call on a Senator who’s had the foresight and persistence for many, many years of focusing on the importance of milestones and metrics, Senator Nelson.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you. I am encouraged by the suggestion, Madam Secretary, that you would be willing to work with Congress in establishing the benchmarks that could be transparent. I suspect that it’s true that there are some pieces of the mission that would require classification because of the very sensitive nature of the operation. But I would hope that most of the benchmarks could be public, transparent metrics to measure progress.

I assume that they could range from measuring our capabilities in intelligence-gathering on the ground. It could be how the country is doing economically. I would hope that we might have a metric, which might be difficult in some respects, but not certainly in the contributions to the trust fund, of how the NATO countries are doing in terms of their response.

I was saddened by how small the contributions were by comparison to what our expectations were recently, when some numbers were shown. I would hope that the effort that you’ve made, General, will result in perhaps the better response than we’d received at that time.

In establishing the benchmarks, what it truly enables us to do, and the American people, is to gauge how we are doing in our efforts. In the past it’s been somebody from one party, the same party, somebody saying we’re willing, others saying we’re losing, and anecdotal responses of that type are not particularly helpful. As a matter of fact, they’re confusing to the American public. I think they confuse Congress as well if we’re not able to be on the same page with the same approach. We may question whether it’s 20 percent or 30 percent, but we wouldn’t be questioning whether it’s 0 or 100, I would hope.

I also want to thank my friend from Oklahoma for mentioning the Nebraska Guard and the efforts that they’re undertaking. We have the agribusiness development team, 52 members, stationed at Bagram. Probably it’s not surprising that there would be people from Nebraska that would understand agriculture, given the fact that we’re the Cornhusker State. But we’re very pleased and we’re very proud of this team that’s there and with the work that they’re doing, because overcoming narco-terrorism is critically important and probably not much better a way to start than directing away
from the production of poppies, poppy crops, to legitimate agriculture that can help feed and in some instances clothe and perhaps even ultimately power with biofuels their operation, improve their economy.

My question is: In looking at the ability of Pakistan to deal with the Swat, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that are under attack, I guess the basic question is: Is there a general willingness from the top to deal with the insurgents in that area?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, let me start, and I know that General Petraeus may want to weigh in on this as well. I think the leadership in Pakistan is not a monolith. I think there are some who do understand—many who understand the problem and who want to get after it. Pakistan has been a victim of terror and these extremists in many ways. Recent attacks attest to that. There are many who want to do the right thing.

I think part of the equation here is reassuring them that they have a strategic partner, they have someone who’s trying to reduce other threats that they’re concerned about. They have a partner that will help them gain capability to be more effective when they do take on these extremists and so forth.

So I think we need to lean forward and try to provide that reassurance and those capability enhancements, but then we also need to expect performance, and we need to measure performance and we need to follow up on that, to see if they are doing their part of this important work.

Senator BEN NELSON. In that regard, former Ambassador and former National Security Adviser to the Pakistan Government, Mr. Durrani, told me some time ago, on at least one occasion, that the difficulty that they had in being able to deal with the largely unregulated and ungoverned area is that they didn't have the equipment. They had gotten money from us, but they didn’t have the equipment to do the kind of job that they wanted to do.

So, General Petraeus, I know I’ve communicated that to Admiral Mullen and I wondered if we’re not going to turn over all of our best equipment and our trade secrets and what have you to somebody else, but are we in a position and have we begun to give them the kind of equipment that we would expect them to use to be successful in that area?

General PETRAEUS. We have begun that, Senator. But this is why the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund is so important. Their military operations at the end of the day come down to will and skill. In the will category, the will is growing, but the will is also helped enormously by a sense that we are going to be with them, because if they don’t sense that they will cut another deal. They’ll have a short-term perspective that says, let’s get no car bombs for a few months and that’s worth another deal, but then the deal allows the insurgents to expand their area of control.

When it comes to skill or capability, there is some, certainly, resident. Admiral Olson’s special operators are doing a terrific job, but in small numbers. As he noted, we are doing as much as they in a sense will allow us or facilitate us in doing. That is gradually growing and in truth it is growing based on trust at small units going all the way up to the level of the Frontier Corps and the 11th
Corps out in western Pakistan. Again, this is where that resource provision is so important.

Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.

Senator Graham.

Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all for your service, particularly Admiral Olson and General Petraeus. All those under your command have done a great job, and I do appreciate what the administration’s trying to do in Afghanistan. I think you’re generally on target and want to give you all the support I can to continue to win this fight.

Admiral Olson, the likelihood of fighting going up in Afghanistan this summer and spring is great, is that correct? There’ll be more fighting?

Admiral Olson. Yes, sir.

Senator Graham. The likelihood of foreign fighters coming to Afghanistan, is that going to increase also?

Admiral Olson. There is potential for that, yes, sir.

Senator Graham. Okay. Would you consider someone captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan an enemy combatant to be held by our forces, if we capture somebody involved in the insurgency?

Admiral Olson. Sir, it depends on who that is and what he was doing in Afghanistan.

Senator Graham. Well, he’s over there trying to kill us.

Admiral Olson. Yes, sir. If he’s a lawful combatant and a declared hostile person, then certainly, yes.

Senator Graham. General Petraeus, we have foreign fighters in detention now in Afghanistan, is that correct?

General Petraeus. It is.

Senator Graham. What are we going to do with these people?

General Petraeus. I am not sure about that right now. I’d like some policy guidance here, if I may.

Senator Graham. Madam Secretary. Is that still a work in progress, I take it?

Ms. Flournoy. Yes, Senator. I think the record has been that many of these we have to turn over within a certain period of time to the Afghans. Some of those are further detained, some of them are prosecuted, some of them have been released.

General Petraeus. Well, and we have also returned some to their home country, when you’re talking about international fighters.

Ms. Flournoy. I’m sorry, I thought you were talking about Afghans.

General Petraeus. But the challenge is what to do about those who——

Senator Graham. Who are not going to be turned over, right.

General Petraeus. Well, or who we can’t return to a foreign country because the country doesn’t treat them humanely.

Senator Graham. Right.

Ms. Flournoy. With the closure or the planned closure of Guantanamo Bay, I think the administration’s in the process of figuring out exactly what do we need to do with those who are too dangerous——
Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, I think that this committee could be helpful. We need to get ahead of this problem. There are some that will not be repatriated to their country. There are some that we’re not going to turn over to the Afghan legal system because that would be a disaster, and we need to find out as a Nation what to do with these folks because I think they’re very dangerous just to let them go.

From the 30,000 foot level here, General Petraeus, due to the success in Iraq would you now consider Afghanistan the central front in the war on terror?

General PETRAEUS. I think you’d have to take Afghanistan and Pakistan together.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay, those two together.

General PETRAEUS. But as a problem set, those two together, yes, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Would you consider that now the central front?

General PETRAEUS. In fact, our focus is truly shifting to that front.

Senator GRAHAM. The Kerry-Lugar legislation, how empowering would that be to our efforts in Pakistan if Congress would pass that?

General PETRAEUS. It will be of enormous importance, not just because of the tangible resources that it provides to Pakistan, but also because of the sense of commitment that stands behind it as well and the sustained nature of it.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you believe we should pass that as soon as possible?

General PETRAEUS. I hate to intrude in your affairs, sir, but——

Senator GRAHAM. Well, I ask you to.

General PETRAEUS. If you’re asking my best professional military advice——

Senator GRAHAM. Yes, I am, I am.

General PETRAEUS. Yes, that’s correct.

Senator GRAHAM. But it would help the effort?

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with that, Madam Secretary?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Absolutely.

Senator GRAHAM. This idea of repatriating or absorbing some Taliban members back into the Afghan society, do you support that generally as a policy, General Petraeus?

General PETRAEUS. I do. Again, it’s one that has to be applied—in fact, as you recall in the Munich security speech, it is something that has to be applied with a very nuanced, thorough understanding of local situations. This is the case of trying to identify and separate from the population those who truly are irreconcilable, who have to be killed or captured or run off, and then allowing those who are reconcilable to rejoin society, if you will, and to become part of the solution instead of a continuing part of the problem.

Senator GRAHAM. In a recent poll, 42 percent of Americans surveyed on that particular day said it was a mistake for the United States to have gone into Afghanistan. What would you say to those Americans who believe that, General Petraeus?
General Petraeus. Well, I think it’s very important to remember where all of this started, and it started with al Qaeda, trans-national extremists who were based in Afghanistan, and of course who carried out the September 11 attacks.

Senator Graham. Do you believe it’s in our national interest not only to defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but to make sure that the Taliban do not come back in Afghanistan?

General Petraeus. Absolutely, Senator. The Taliban were in power when al Qaeda was allowed and invited in to establish the sanctuaries in Afghanistan from which the September 11 attacks were launched.

Senator Graham. When it comes to Iran, what role are they playing, if any, regarding our efforts in Afghanistan? Are they supporting the Taliban insurgency, al Qaeda elements?

General Petraeus. There is a very small level of support that has been provided over the years by Iran to the Taliban that we have seen. There was a period a couple of years ago where they provided some explosively formed projectiles and others. We think there’s a case recently where they provided a small amount of arms, ammunition, and explosives as well, but it has not been a significant or a strategic factor in Afghanistan.

They are also working to increase their influence, some of that understandably, in Afghanistan, to establish relationships with the leadership of the Afghan Government, and also of course locally out in Herat in the western portions of the country as well.

Senator Graham. One final question. Is it fair to say, General Petraeus, that the American public can expect casualties to go up this year in Afghanistan, that there will be more fighting? Madam Secretary, can American taxpayers expect that the expense of operations in Afghanistan will dramatically increase in terms of dollars to be appropriated? To both of you, is it worth the cost of injured American military members, lives lost, and money spent?

General Petraeus. Senator, I think that Vice President Biden had it exactly right when, after his last trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan, he said that this is going to get harder before it gets easier. That is correct. That is our assessment, and it is worth seeing this through to conclusion.

Ms. Flournoy. Senator, I would say there will be higher human costs and higher financial costs to this effort. Those facts were considered very carefully before the President made his decision, and we’re going forward with the strategy because we believe that it’s vital to the safety and security of the American people.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.

Senator Udall.

Senator Udall. Good morning, General. Good morning, Madam Secretary. Good morning, Admiral.

General, I read with real interest that David Kilcullen has written a book about his experiences and insights, and he draws a number of conclusions I think would be useful to us as we move forward. One comment that he makes is that we should be careful about lecturing Islamic countries and countries in other spheres about terrorism and about the dangers of it. It piqued my interest and curiosity.
In that spirit, I heard you and I think Madam Secretary say that you believe the Pakistani Government now does really see the Taliban as their enemy. I also hear you say that we need to give them a clear sense that we will stay until the job is done. Furthermore, in that spirit—and I wonder what Rudyard Kipling would write in this era, probably much of what he wrote over 100 years ago—much of Pakistan's focus is to the east and to Kashmir. Is there any discussion about urging India and Pakistan to continue finding a way forward on Kashmir? Perhaps all three of you might comment.

General PETRAEUS. If I could just start with that, Senator. Together with my great diplomatic wingman Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, this effort actually has started. I met together with him with the Indian national security adviser, for example, at Munich. We had what we thought was a very good talk. That was followed up when the foreign minister of India came to Washington recently. When Ambassador Holbrooke went out on his maiden trip through the area, my deputy went with him and they were joined by the Pacific Command deputy for a swing into India as well, after having been in Pakistan.

It would be of enormous importance were the tensions to be reduced sufficiently between the two countries to where intellectually as well as physically Pakistan could focus more on what we again see as a much more important existential threat to Pakistan in the internal extremists than continuing to have that massive face-off against India to their east.

One of the many tragedies of the Mumbai attacks, which of course were a September 11 moment not just for India, but even for Pakistan, I would argue, was that the Pakistani military once again focused on India for a period, and that continues to some degree. There has been again a diminution of the tension between the two countries over time, but it literally took their eye off the ball, one that they were really starting to focus on with the operations in the FATA and Bajaur and Mohmand and others developing, and even actually shifted forces. Only about 6,000 or so, not hugely significant in their number, but it was almost the intellectual shift of focus that was as concerning to many of us as was the physical shift.

Senator UDALL. Madam Secretary?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, I think you put your finger on a really critical matter. This is the issue, one of the issues that really drives a more regional approach in our strategy, that part of helping Pakistan to shift its attention and its resources and its efforts is reducing the tensions it has with India. If you look historically about why Pakistan helped to fund some of these militant groups who have now become extremists or terrorists in their orientation, part of it was to try to drive the Soviets out of their neighborhood, but part of it was also as a hedge against India.

So I think to the extent we can reduce those tensions, we will help shift their attention and resources towards the really urgent threat, which is the extremist threat from within.

Senator UDALL. Admiral, do you care to comment?

Admiral OLSON. Sir, I think I would just agree that it's very important to recognize the impact of India on the Pakistani psyche.
It’s important to recognize that the capabilities of the Pakistani military were built to address the threat they felt from India. That’s primarily a conventional army focused to the east. In order to reorient that army to a more counterinsurgency army focused to the west, any reduction of the tensions on the Indian border would be very helpful.

Senator Udall. There are certainly parallels between the shift we’ve had to make and other militaries have had to make. The preparations we made for the Fulda Gap scenario, of course, we’ve had to now set aside and actually face the 21st century as it presents itself to us.

General, you talked about the greater military-to-military contacts between the Pakistani and Afghani militaries. Do you see a similar dynamic emerging—and this would also be directed to the Secretary—between the civilian leadership in those two countries? Because of course you have to mirror those contacts for them to be effective overall.

General Petraeus. In fact, as President Zardari assumed office there was really an unprecedented number of backs and forths between the heads of government and some of their ministers. As you may know, Senator, we hosted here in Washington 3 weeks ago it was, now I think perhaps 4 weeks, what was called the Tripartite. It was delegations from Afghanistan and Pakistan led by their foreign ministers, with other ministers present as well, and then very high level on this side as well with the Secretary of State in the lead.

There will be further tripartite meetings like that, so that will continue to foster the growing relationships between those two countries. Candidly, we have to do a great deal of work in the intelligence arena. The relationship between the intelligence services of Afghanistan and Pakistan is—it would be an understatement to say that it is not cooperative. There is an enormous amount of suspicion and really outright enmity that’s built up over the years.

So we have a lot of work to do there. The efforts to build the joint coordination center at Torkum Gate at the western edge of the Khyber Pass are among a variety of different initiatives that are being taken at the military level, as well as again there’s a military tripartite group that meets also.

Senator Udall. Madam Secretary, I see my time’s run out, but if you could answer shortly that would be good.

Ms. Flournoy. I would just add, the trilaterals will continue. One of the most important byproducts that we’ve seen from that process is that it’s encouraged a host of interim bilateral meetings between the Afghans and the Pakistanis and their various counterparts that are ongoing between the trilateral meetings. So I think the level of dialogue and constructive interaction is increasing.

Senator Udall. Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.

Senator Chambliss, to be followed by Senator Webb.

Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me thank all of our witnesses again for your great service, be it military or public service. We appreciate you very much.

General Petraeus, there has been some comments coming out of the administration over the last several days with respect to the
so-called new strategy in Afghanistan that have been a little bit troubling to me. The statements concern the fact that it’s being said that we have been operating in Afghanistan on the cheap. Obviously, it’s of concern to all of us as policymakers that we provide our military with whatever they ask for. Now, I understand you obviously were the commander in the Iraqi theater and you’ve only been at CENTCOM now for a few months. But are you aware of anything that has been asked for by either CENTCOM or by General McNeil or General Eikenberry or anybody else in Afghanistan that has not been given to them in the way of resources or commitments on the part of the Pentagon to that theater?

General PETRAEUS. Throughout 2008, all the way out through 2009, the requests that were made by General McKiernan that I supported and sent forward have all been approved. There are requests that are still out there and, frankly, we think it’s prudent to do some assessments, see how this moves forward. There’s certainly no need for decisions on that right now.

Senator CHAMBLISS. I understand going forward, but I’m talking about previous requests that may have come from former commanders in theater or commanders at CENTCOM that weren’t positively addressed.

General PETRAEUS. I can only talk about the period in which I've been in command since October 31 of last year, I’m afraid, Senator.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Okay. Secretary Flournoy, do you have any comment on that?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, I do believe that there have been some requests that have not been fulfilled, and the one that we looked at very closely in the review was the one for trainers. We were over I think 1,300 short for trainers for the ANA, over a thousand short for trainers for the police. That’s one of the reasons why the President agreed to deploy the additional brigade, and that request for forces had not been fulfilled for quite some time. As we put greater emphasis on building the Afghan forces, we felt it was very important to fully resource that request, which had been on the books for a while.

So I think there are some examples that we found, looking at it from an historical perspective.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Secretary Flournoy, General Petraeus made a statement, and I want to make sure I’m quoting you right, General, so if I say anything incorrect please correct me. But in talking about what’s going on in Iraq in response to Senator McCain, you said that the Iranians are still aiding our enemies in Iraq with respect to providing munitions or whatever to those who are attacking American soldiers. They are still part of the process that’s being addressed in Iraq today.

What concerns me, Secretary Flournoy, is that we have the Iranians, who we know have provided munitions to our enemy in Iraq and who have—that enemy has sought to do harm to American soldiers on a daily basis, and yet beginning yesterday at The Hague we have invited the Iranians to sit down at the table and discuss Afghanistan and the way forward in Afghanistan.

So what’s puzzling to me and what concerns me is, are we engaging the Iranians with respect to just Afghanistan or are we going to talk to them about Iraq and try to move the peace process for-
ward in that respect? Or is this just with relation to Afghanistan this discussion is taking place right now?

Ms. FLOURNOY. The meeting at The Hague was really to bring them into the discussion of Afghanistan, because they have been part of the problem in Afghanistan and we believe that they actually have interest in Afghanistan becoming stable over time and we want them to change their behavior and become more a part of the solution by ceasing some of the more troublesome activities they’ve exhibited there.

I do think that over time we want to make clear to Iran the full range of behaviors that we find problematic, that we would like to see change. I know that in Iraq in the mean time we’ve continued to put military pressure on them where possible to try to prevent them from continuing those unhelpful activities.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Picking up again on Senator Graham’s question with relation to the prisoners in Afghanistan that are there today and ones that may be taken over the next several weeks or months or whatever period of time we may be there, General Petraeus, is it the intention now to keep those prisoners in Afghanistan for some indefinite period of time or is that part of the policy decision that is outside your realm that you mentioned?

General PETRAEUS. That is part of the review that’s ongoing, sir.

Senator CHAMBLISS. If we should pick up a high-value target in Afghanistan, what would happen to that high-value target? Where would they go?

General PETRAEUS. They would go to the theater internment facility at Bagram.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Secretary Flournoy, is there any potential for any of those prisoners to be transferred to U.S. soil? Is that under contemplation?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, I know this is a policy that is under review and I am not aware of the details of where this is coming out, but I can get back to you on that.

[The information referred to follows:]

In accordance with the January 22, 2009 Executive orders, the Department of Defense is working with departments and agencies across the U.S. Government to conduct a comprehensive review of our detention policy. The Attorney General heads these efforts, which are currently ongoing, and is considering all relevant courses of action. At this time, no formal decisions have been made, but the Department will keep Congress informed of developments.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.

Senator Webb.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Flournoy, let me start by asking you a question. First I would say that I appreciate what the President was saying when he talked about focusing this strategy more directly toward countering insurgency and eliminating the presence of the Taliban. At the same time, I’m a little concerned with how we’re going to pull this off with respect to cooperation of Pakistan, whether there really is a true incentive at the right levels in the Pakistani Government and military to strongly cooperate with NATO in this effort.

I think Arnaud de Borchgrave is probably the most comprehensive, does the most comprehensive reporting in terms of the situa-
tion in Pakistan. He has a piece actually this morning on this, pointing out that Pakistani intelligence inspired and nurtured the Taliban movement with a view of taking over Afghanistan in the wake of the Soviet defeat in 1989; that there are currently, according to Mr. de Borchgrave, Pakistani intelligence agents operating in Afghanistan to support the Taliban.

How are we going to address that situation?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, I think it is an open question. I think we need to test the proposition. I think one of the things that is changing in the Pakistan context is the degree to which the threat is manifesting itself within Pakistan at a level that is really affecting public attitudes, that is affecting leadership attitudes, et cetera. So I think we need to test the proposition—and the way we do that is to put a substantial offer of assistance and a substantial commitment to work with them to take this on, to reduce tensions elsewhere in the region so they can refocus and take this on.

I think we need to test the proposition, but I also think this is where the metrics become very important. We need to monitor their performance, their actual track record in implementing the necessary steps. I think that's the point where we are and that's what the strategy recommends going forward.

Senator WEBB. I would also submit that there should be ways to try to measure the true incentive, not simply from the current top leadership in Pakistan, but from other elements that have considerable power in Pakistan. This is a situation that we have been monitoring for some time at a committee level rather than at an operational level, but there’s been considerable reporting that, for instance, the Pakistani military operating in these tribal areas has had a fairly soft hand when it comes to the Taliban, as opposed to al Qaeda, the apprehensions that they’ve made and the operations that they’ve conducted.

So I think this clearly should be on our radar screen in terms of truly measuring the incentives and the intentions in Pakistan.

How are we going to know when our national task is finished? I would ask Secretary Flournoy to answer that and then, General or Admiral, if you’d like to add. How are we going to know? What is the end point? Actually, I think General Petraeus is kind of famous for having asked this question at the very beginning of the Iraq war to a reporter: How are we going to know when this is over? How does this end?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, I’ll give you my answer and then let the person who asked the question try to give his. I think that a key point of defining success is when both the Afghans and the Pakistanis have both the capability and the will to deal with the remaining threat themselves; that the period of extraordinary intervention and assistance comes to a transition point and we go to a more long-term, normal development assistance relationship with both countries.

To me, it is when we have reduced the threat and built that capacity locally to the point where they can be much more self-reliant in managing this problem. General, that puts us sort of at the mercy of their policies. General, can you give me a more practical response—or maybe more mechanical? Basically, how are we going to know?
General PETRAEUS. Well, I think again, frankly, in Iraq we have known when we were able to transition responsibilities to not just the Iraqi security forces, but to other institutions of the Iraqi Government. Now, Afghanistan's a very different country. It does not have some of the blessings certainly that Iraq has when it comes to oil and revenue. But nonetheless, the task will be for them to shoulder the responsibilities of their own security and other responsibilities of governance.

Senator WEBB. When is the last time that Afghanistan had an actual functioning national army that could clearly be said to be in control of operations inside its own country?

General PETRAEUS. Probably more than 30 years ago, I think, Senator.

Senator WEBB. At least, if then.

General PETRAEUS. In the 1970s, in that period, and certainly it was a combination of security arrangements. But I think that, as a student of history as well, that you would agree that between the period most recently, for example, of say 1900 and again in the 1970s, that there was in Afghanistan, there was a conception of a nation state and that there was the exercise of governance within an Afghan model that did exist. Of course, it's been the intervening more than 3 decades of war that have done so much to damage all that.

Senator WEBB. I would say perhaps a brief period more than 30 years ago, for about 30 years, you could say that there was some sort of a functioning national army in Afghanistan, not previous to that and not since. It's a little bit different in terms of the challenge even that we were facing in Iraq.

My time is up, but I would like to ask one other question that goes along with this. When you're talking about this policy of living among the people, holding areas that have been cleared, who do we anticipate are actually going to hold these areas?

General PETRAEUS. Well, it will literally vary from location to location. The options of course are local police, their version of national police, the national civil order police can assist with that, and then the ANA, as well as now the Afghan public protection force, which is a pilot program just concluded the first iteration of this. About 240 or so members graduated. They'll be partnered with special forces. We'll learn undoubtedly some hard lessons from this effort and apply them as we carry out subsequent of these.

This is not quite a Sons of Iraq. In fact, it's actually a more institutionalized and frankly more rigorous Sons of Iraq program, because it included weeks of training, specific equipping, and then a specific partner force. But that is how we would see that.

If I could also, Senator, there is also a difference in the way we literally live with the people in Afghanistan. As in Iraq, where we plunked ourselves down, as you know and your son did, that is not as likely here, given the much greater rural population than urban population. It will be probably even more likely that, in coordination with tribal elders and the local mullahs, that we'll actually occupy on the edge of a community, not literally right in the center of it.

Senator WEBB. So it largely will depend on the competence and the willpower of the local Afghans?
General PETRAEUS. Exactly.
Senator WEBB. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Sessions.
Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, I asked Secretary Gates about what kind of unease he had about moving this additional troop level there in light of his strong comment that we wanted an Afghan face on the situation. Would you just share with us the tension between greater American involvement, greater activity, and the need to have the Afghan army and police and government be the force that saves that country?

General PETRAEUS. Senator, the concern there is that, taking into account Afghanistan's history and a people who have never looked kindly on those who are seen as invaders or would-be conquerors, that the additional forces have to be seen by them to be there for them, to help secure them, to serve them, to be good guests, good neighbors, good partners. That's why I mentioned that piece in my statement and pointed out the counterinsurgency guidance that General McKiernan has published that gets at the heart of this as well.

The additional forces can't be seen as coming in and taking over a country that has never accepted that kind of activity. It has to be seen as a force that is coming in to be their partners and to help them against a common threat.

Senator SESSIONS. You're satisfied that's given enough attention in your plans?

General PETRAEUS. I am. It is something we will need to continue to work on, as with civilian casualties, as with a number of other activities.

Senator SESSIONS. We do have this shortage of trainers still, do we not, to reach the level of training the Afghan army that we'd like it to reach?

General PETRAEUS. We do, and I actually made a note that I want to see what that will be when we project out with the addition of the 4th Brigade of the 82nd, the elements that will provide the additional trainers and advisers. I should point out that there really has been a shift, that General McKiernan has asked that all of the additional forces that are provided—and it actually started with the marines that went into the Regional Command South area—that they be dual-capable or dual-missioned, if you will; that they could partner with Afghan forces and provide advisory and assistance tasks in that regard, even as they are also conducting their own operations.

This is a shift that we're also going to make in Iraq over time as we move away from combat brigades and to advisory and assistance brigades. That's the concept. This will be the biggest force that we have sent in by far that will have that capability, but we've already been experimenting with this with the initial elements of the marines, and the other marine units that go in will have this same kind of capability and preparation. Again, we'll keep learning about this as we do it.
Senator Sessions. We learn as we go. I think the reason we have to learn and change is because the enemy does not desire to be defeated, captured, or killed, and they change. As soon as you confront one of their tactics, they will develop another one. Wouldn’t you suggest that for all of us and the American people to understand that when tactics change it’s because often the enemies’ agenda has changed?

General Petraeus. Absolutely, Senator. You’ll recall in the counterinsurgency guidance that you read that we had in Iraq that the final bullet on there was: Learn and adapt. The enemy does change. This is a thinking, intelligent enemy, and we must adapt. Ideally, you try to get ahead of the enemy, of course, in what it is we’re doing.

But what works today won’t necessarily work tomorrow and what works today in one place won’t work necessarily in the other.

Senator Sessions. Secretary Flournoy, I won’t repeat questions about the Pakistan situation, but Pakistan has been a long-time ally of the United States. This is a very important nation. It has a history of democratic leadership. It waffles back and forth over time, but we can hope it would continue to maintain its democratic traditions. I just believe we need to be respectful of them, not lecture them, and see if we can’t find common interests that represent their interests and to acknowledge some of the difficulties they may be facing internally on some of these issues.

Ms. Flournoy. I couldn’t agree more, Senator.

Senator Sessions. Sometimes I hear our talking heads and our politicians talk about Pakistan like we can order them around. This is a sovereign nation and an important nation and I hope that we can all remember that.

I would share that I think Senator Webb’s comments about the difficulty of creating a fully functional government in Afghanistan are correct. This is a long time and they’ve never really had that to any sophisticated degree, and we don’t need to be too optimistic in our abilities.

Admiral Olson, the Special Operating Forces were the key to the fall of the Taliban originally. How many forces did we have in Afghanistan when the Taliban collapsed, when we partnered with the Northern Alliance, and how many of those were Special Operations Forces?

Admiral Olson. Sir, I’ll ask those who have a better knowledge of the total count to weigh in if they disagree. But I believe the total number of U.S. forces the day that the Taliban abandoned Kabul was on the order of 8 to 10,000. About 2,000 of those had been provided by United States SOCOM. It was essentially a Special Forces group of operational detachments of Green Berets that was the core of that.

Senator Sessions. Well, they did a fabulous job. 2,000 are not able to run the whole country of Afghanistan or help it be secure. But I do hope that your budget is sufficient to meet the needs for the future of the Special Operating Forces within the entire military defense establishment that we have. Are you comfortable you have enough there?

Admiral Olson. Sir, again I’m not going to get ahead of the budget discussions in this forum quite yet. But as I said earlier, we
are robust enough to meet the requirement to respond to crises, but we depend heavily on the services, on each of the armed services.

Senator SESSIONS. Do you feel that your people are stressed to a level that they can't sustain now? Of course, one would hope there was some reduction in deployments, but what is your basic feeling to us today about the stress level of your fabulous troops?

Admiral OLSON. Sir, I think we're operating at a pace that we can sustain. There is unmet demand for special operations capability around the world, but we are settled into a sustainable pace at this point with the force we have.

Senator SESSIONS. That's good.

General Petraeus, I would just say thank you to your soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines. I know that I remember so vividly when President Bush had to ask them to extend their tour. Some of them had already reached Germany and they said “Yes, sir,” and they went back and served their country. Things were dark in those days, and it's improved so much. I just think we need to thank the men and women in uniform who made that happen. They are the key people.

General PETRAEUS. I agree, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions.

Senator McCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Petraeus or Secretary Flournoy, either one, can you give me an estimate of how many contracting personnel you're going to expect in Afghanistan?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, I can assure you Secretary Gates has asked the same question. He wants to understand what the contractor support footprint is going to look like for this larger force.

I think the other thing that we're looking at is not only the numbers and the costs, but also the composition. Can we place an emphasis on indigenous contractors, so that when we do have to rely on contractors, we're actually contributing to the Afghan economy and creating job possibilities for Afghans? So there's at least an additional benefit there when we do have to rely on contractors.

I do think that historically that has been more the case in Afghanistan. There has been a higher percentage of the contractors that we have used that have been indigenous.

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Senator McCASKILL. Is there an operational plan for the new strategy?

General PETRAEUS. There is an existing military campaign plan, Senator, that incorporates already these forces, because these re-
quests were made and have been approved over time. So that strategy exists. We are obviously working very hard to establish the infrastructure in terms of bases, logistical support systems, command and control structures, communications, and all of the rest. That is ongoing.

A substantial amount of that work certainly is being done by contractors. The creation a few years back of the Joint Contracting Command for Iraq and Afghanistan has improved, we believe very strongly, the conduct of these different contracts and so forth.

I should also add that we have certainly all tried to learn lessons from the findings of the Special Inspector General in Iraq and the establishment of former General Fields as Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction is a very good move in our view, as are the other oversight mechanisms that the Secretary and the President mentioned.

Senator McCaskill. I would like to deprive him of as much work as possible.

General Petraeus. So would we.

Senator McCaskill. I would like us not to have 400 or 500 different reports on how badly we have handled contracting in Afghanistan, like we do, candidly, with what happened in Iraq. I just want to emphasize that the time to deal with this is now, the time to get on this and have a very good view, because here's what our military does so well, better than anybody on the planet, and that is going after the mission. With honor, integrity, and leadership, we go after the mission, and contracting has been an afterthought, and we can't afford it.

I don't want to cut you off, Secretary Flournoy, but I do want to get to one other area, and then we can come back to what you wanted to say. That is how we're transitioning out of Iraq with contracting personnel. I do have a very clear organizational chart now, General, about the contracting command in Afghanistan and Iraq. The most recent report from the Government Accountability Office says that there is no unified structure that exists to coordinate the teams and units engaged in efforts to manage and execute the return of material and equipment from Iraq. We're talking about 170,000 pieces of equipment, worth $16.5 billion, and of that $3.5 billion is within the control of our contractors.

I am worried that we are not paying enough attention on that front as we transition out of Iraq and into Afghanistan, and that there's not any unified effort coordinating these two entities as to all this equipment and material and contractors. Are they just disbanding? Are we drawing contracts to a close?

We know the men and women are moving out in some kind of timetable for that. But we don't really know much about the contractors.

General Petraeus. Well, first of all, we actually have a plan that is to bring down the numbers of contractors, and I can share that slide with you, in fact, because we've put a great deal of emphasis

[The information referred to follows:] Central Command and Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) are developing plans for the drawdown of forces which includes the reduction of contractors. In fact, since December 2008, the contractor footprint decreased by approximately 19,000 contrac-
tors. The current ratio of contractors to military in Iraq is approximately 1:1. Until approval of the force reduction plan, MNF-I’s target is a 5 percent monthly reduction of contractors. This is represented by the trend line on the slide below. The planning guidance is to reduce the number of U.S. and Third Country National contractors, while increasing the reliance on Iraqi contractors—Local Nationals.

Senator McCaskill. That would be terrific.

General Petraeus. Also, to a point that the Secretary made, we have had an effort ongoing for some time to give Iraqis a shot at the contracts. There was a period, frankly, where we lacked trust in our own ability to vet and so forth, so we used a very large number of third country nationals in addition to the smaller number of U.S. contractors. So the Iraqi First effort has gone quite well, actually, and so with the Iraqi transportation network and a whole host of other initiatives.

But those numbers literally are coming down. As that does happen, there is a process to account for the equipment that contractors have that was purchased for tasks they’re performing on our behalf or on behalf of other U.S. Government agencies there, to get a handle on that and then to bring that out with us as well or to dispose of it in some other manner that is legal and appropriate.

But also, our logisticians are doing a tremendous amount of work, not just to build up the infrastructure and so forth for an effort that more than doubles what we’re doing in Afghanistan. The surge in Iraq logistically was a miracle of modern military activities, but it was a surge that was only 30,000-plus on top of what was already 133 or something thousand, in a country that had a great deal of infrastructure. In Afghanistan we’re pushing over 30,000 in, more than doubling, in a country that does not have the infrastructure. So the absorption is a big challenge, and that is one
reason that we have to space this out and we have to build this up.

But your points are very well taken about getting a grip on that. In fact, the Joint Contracting Command Iraq and Afghanistan has helped a great deal. So also has Congress' and the Department's focus on increasing literally the number of contractors that we had in uniform. There was a period where the Army had no general officers in the contracting ranks whatsoever.

Senator McCaskill. Right.

General Petraeus. I think there are now going to be five, but I don't want to speak for the Army on that. But again, all of these efforts are hugely important, given the reliance on contractors that we have had, we think in general for good reasons, although there are also going to be some initiatives I think coming out of the Department in this area. But I don't want to get ahead of the Secretary on that.

Senator McCaskill. Secretary Flournoy?

Ms. Flournoy. I think actually General Petraeus covered a lot of the ground I was just going to add. But the one thing I will say on the issue of revising the operational plan or the campaign plan, if we are successful in really plussing up the civilian side of the effort I think the President will be asking the ambassador, the new ambassador and General McKiernan to put their staffs together, to come up with a civil-military, sort of whole-of-government campaign plan, and to work that very closely with the U.N. and with other international partners, to really get more synergy in our civil-military efforts.

General Petraeus. If I could add to that, Senator. In fact, there is an existing military campaign plan, but the piece that very much needs to be added now is a much more robust and complete joint campaign plan along the lines of what Ambassador Crocker and I were able to do there in Iraq. That is the full intention. In fact, Ambassador Holbrooke has some instructions for that as the new team goes into the embassy in addition.

For what it's worth, in a few weeks from now he and I are going to host an onsite, actually in Washington on a Saturday, to bring together civil and military and to talk about the kinds of policy guidance that is needed to help that effort move forward.

Senator McCaskill. Well, in the contracting area particularly, we had a little bit of this always going on.

USAID said, “well, they aren’t letting us do enough,” and State said, “well, the military took it away, and the military said, “well, we have to have more CERP funds.” Then meanwhile we had the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) going to heights that no one ever anticipated that LOGCAP would go to in terms of the amount of money the American taxpayer spent.

So cautionary warning that some of us are paying very close attention to how we do contracting in Afghanistan to see if we've learned any lessons.

Thank you all very much for your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Welcome, Admiral Olson, Secretary, and General Petraeus. I wanted to thank you for hosting me on Monday at CENTCOM.

General Petraeus. Great to have you, sir.

Senator Martinez. General Hood and General Allen were very kind and we had a very good briefing, and I appreciate that very much. We continue to be very proud to have CENTCOM in the State of Florida.

General Petraeus. Proud to be there, Senator.

Senator Martinez. Glad to have you, sir.

I know that some of this has perhaps been asked, but I wanted to just go a little bit more into the area of fully resourcing the effort in Afghanistan and whether or not, in addition to those I guess 17 plus 4, 21,000 troops that are moving into the theater or have begun to move into the theater, the additional 10,000 I guess which have been talked about by General McKiernan—and I realize that those might not be immediately needed.

I wanted to ask, when will we know where we are in the fully resourcing of that additional 10,000?

Ms. Flournoy. Sir, the way this was presented to the President was sort of on a time line of when decisions would have to be made in order for troops to deploy to meet the requirement. My understanding is that the remaining brigade decision and the headquarters decision are for troop arrivals in 2010. So those decisions will have to be made some time in the fall.

At the same time, because we are redoubling our effort in Afghanistan and we expect to be making progress throughout this year, we also expect the commander to be reassessing his needs over time, and we expect that new or different requests may be put on the table over time. So that's part of this commitment to continuing to measure progress, continuing to evaluate how we're doing to see that.

But I think that the President made every decision that he needed to make at this point in time, and I think those other decisions will be made at the appropriate time when the commander needs to know.

Senator Martinez. I guess what I'm trying to understand is the level of commitment. If the troops were needed, would they be sent?

Ms. Flournoy. I think this President has demonstrated with not only the troops you mentioned—there are also some additional enablers. We've gone from a posture of about 38,000 to now projected 68,000. I would never have used the phrase "incrementalism" to describe this. This is a very strong commitment on the military side and on the civilian side and the economic side by this President to try to make this mission successful.

Senator Martinez. I don't underestimate the importance of the civilian and economic side, which I think are tremendously important in this effort, as they have been in Iraq as well, here even more so because, as I think is very clear, we're not talking about a rebuilding effort in many instances. It's building in the first instance, which I think is very dramatically different.

With regards to our NATO partners, the words of Secretary Gates continue to haunt me about the two-tier alliance, those that might fight and those that might not, and the continuing caveats
with the NATO partners. How and when will we be approaching NATO? Do we continue to be committed to their participation in the fight, as opposed to just civilian and support participation?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, we have been in consultation with NATO and with many of our NATO allies bilaterally in the development of the strategy. I will be going, on behalf of Secretary Gates, to the summit along with the President on Friday and Saturday to really try to secure those commitments, and then following on in April we will have donors, further donors conferences, one for Pakistan, and we're hoping to schedule one for Afghanistan, to try to actually nail down exactly.

But I think many of our allies have been waiting to be able to come to the summit with their commitment as a deliverable for what they've promised to do. So I expect by next week we should have a much better sense of who is going to step up with what type of contribution.

Senator MARTINEZ. That's great. Good luck on that, and I appreciate your efforts in that regard.

General Petraeus, I was going to ask you regarding Iran. There seem to have been some statements as recent as the last day by Iran indicating some willingness to combat drug trafficking and developing and some reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan. Do you perceive that there's opportunity for Iran to become a more helpful partner in the Afghanistan effort, understanding that they share a long border and that the issues of drugs as well as refugees are of internal interest to them?

General PETRAEUS. Well, there certainly are some shared concerns, Senator. In the beginning they did play a part in the process. They also do not want to see the Taliban return to control Afghanistan. As a Shia nation, the last thing they want to see is a Sunni ultra-fundamentalist group that allows extremists to have sanctuaries on their soil.

So there are some very good reasons why they should want to see the effort in Afghanistan succeed. But there are times when it appears that they are conflicted in their views of Afghanistan because there's a sense at times that they don't want an enterprise that we're part of to succeed. So you have that dynamic.

Of course, you also have overshadowing that some pretty serious differences over other issues as we look to the other side of the CENTCOM AOR, into some of their activities in the nuclear realm.

Senator MARTINEZ. Right, understand.

I suppose we don't have a really clear indication. It's always difficult to read where they may be coming from, and I guess that continues to be part of the haze that we have that relates to Iran and their intentions.

One last question in the moment I have left. Madam Secretary, China's participation. I'm intrigued as to how we're approaching China as perhaps of some help in the Afghani theater, their economic participation in the country, and how do you view the potential for that to develop over the months ahead?

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think it's a very important development that we're engaging them, we're bringing them to the table. They have a longstanding historical relationship with Pakistan. They have
longstanding interests in the region. I think they are coming to the table sort of open to exploring ways that they can be helpful.

Obviously, they're going to do it in ways that try to safeguard their interests, but I think where we can find common interests we should explore that as fully as possible.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just in closing, General Petraeus, say a word of thanks to you and your leadership, as well as your troops for the tremendous success, I know fragile and I know reversible. But I continue to believe that it is hopefully a lasting success in the Iraqi situation, and you deserve great credit and congratulations on that. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator MARTINEZ. I guess, Admiral Olson, I shouldn't overlook the very great contribution of the special forces to this effort as well.

Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Martinez.

Senator Begich.

Senator BEGICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I echo those comments that the Senator just said and I really appreciate the work you all have done.

It's been actually an interesting couple hours here listening to all the questions. The good news is most of my questions were answered, so you're lucky about that. But I do have some very specific ones, and I want to kind of rapid fire if I can.

First, General, in regards to Iraq. As we start to draw down and turn efforts over to the Iraqi Government, are there any one or two things that really stand out that could become show-stoppers or issues that we just have to keep our eye on as this process starts?

General PETRAEUS. Actually, there are several, Senator. The residual capacity that, as I mentioned, Iran does continue to provide in terms of what essentially are proxy extremist elements. We still see those. By the way, the Iraqi Government is watching that very carefully and in fact their security forces will go after them when they have the intelligence to do that. I should note that our Special Operations Forces have trained those individuals and still do provide a variety of support and assistance, although the Iraqi forces take the lead against the former militia and the other elements that used to be called the special groups.

There are residual al Qaeda, and it's more than residual. It's still a force to be reckoned with. It is the al Qaeda and other extremist allies that continue to carry out the suicide attacks that we have seen periodically. Touch wood, those have generally been spaced out farther, but we have seen some very tough ones in recent weeks nonetheless. Again, Iraqi forces very much going after those as well, but they do require continued assistance in certain areas, as we discussed, Diyallah and Ninewah Province in particular and certain parts of Baghdad.

Of big concern is the bundle of issues that is wrapped up in what's called the disputed boundaries issues. Some of these are Arab-Kurdish issues. Some are Sunni-Shia issues. They are potentially very dangerous and we're quite worried about the developments in some of these areas, although the United Nations element
there is about to make an announcement we hope that will start
the ball moving forward in resolving, at least for the near term,
some of these different issues.

Then you have a host of other issues wrapped up in politics. In-
terestingly, the constitution as it has played out has an enormous
amount of safeguards. You actually see the council of representa-
tives, their congress, executing its prerogatives and checks and bal-
ances on the power of the executive branch. You see this play back
and forth, efforts by one to centralize, by others to hold that in
check. But some of that can result in actual security challenges and
that’s something else that we have to keep an eye on.

Finally, the budget pressures because of the reduction in the
price of oil have dramatically reduced the size of the budget that
they have available to them, the revenues available for them for
this year. That has caused some very painful decisions for them.
They’re working their way through that. A related one of those is
the integration of the Sons of Iraq. It truly is an oversight. We do
believe that that money was moved and then came off the plate.
It’s back on the plate, and they keep finding short-term solutions
to what could be a long-term problem if not resolved properly over
time. But the vast majority of the Sons of Iraq are now being paid
by the Government of Iraq, although each monthly payroll has cer-
tain degrees of emotion and tension connected with them.

Senator BEGICH. Thank you very much.

I have another quick one, a follow-up to Senator McCaskill’s
question regarding the contractors and the equipment they main-
tain and handle and how that gets transferred to you. Do you feel
confident that you are resourced enough to handle that process?
When I mean “resource,” dollars supporting your staff and other
activities to make sure that that process goes forward in a way
that has limited missing equipment and other types of things.

General PETRAEUS. I believe that we are. We have learned some
tough lessons in this arena, and in other accountability arenas,
frankly, over the years. We believe that we have implemented safe-
guards and properly resourced. I do believe that there is still
progress required in terms of increasing our capability broadly in
the field of contracting in general. That process has begun, and it’s
a little bit like training leaders or developing leaders for the ANSF.
You just don’t have those to pull off the bench and throw in at
more senior levels.

But the momentum has shifted in that regard and I think that’s
a positive direction.

Senator BEGICH. Thank you very much.

I’m going to shift now if I can to Afghanistan, and I’d like toward
any one of you, but I’ll start with you, General. I’m going to read
a comment. We did some analysis, but according to the Field Man-
ual 3–24, which I know you had some involvement in developing
and authoring that, it talks about the density that you need to
have and the ratio of 20 to 25 per thousand. When you look at Iraq,
which again I want to echo the comments throughout the day here
that have talked about the work that you have done there and the
success that we have had there, the ratio when you look at that
is 28 to 1,000 based on our troops, coalition, Iraqi security forces,
the army. With all those pieces all added in, it’s about 28 to 1,000.
When you look at Afghanistan and where we are today and where we will be in 2011 based on the numbers, as well as again the same kind of analysis, apples to apples, today we’re about 7 to 1,000 and in 2011 we’ll be at 9 to 1,000—dramatically—it’s half of what the manual talks about.

So I’d be interested in your comment. This is one area of concern to me. I recognize that we may reevaluate in 2011, but in 2011 we’re still at 9 to 1,000, based on all the training that we do for their troops and other activities.

General Petraeus. It is a concern, Senator. For what it’s worth, not only did I obviously oversee the production of that manual and actually got into some serious editing, I personally made the decision to put that ratio in there, because there was a dispute about whether it should go in and so forth. I have heard about it at almost every hearing that I’ve had since then. But I stand by that because I think intellectually it was absolutely the right thing to do in terms of integrity that we require that.

Now, one area where, believe it or not, we actually have to get some more work by the IC is literally how large is Afghanistan, because there is a dispute right now as to whether it is 30 million or perhaps even as low as 23 or 25 million, and the IC is working on that. That affects, of course, the ratio.

But the bottom line is your point is exactly right, that even at the end of the additional coalition forces, the accelerated development of the ANA and the other ANSF, that certainly according to that ratio, if you assume that there’s an insurgency throughout the country, which is not necessarily the case, and that’s another important factor, that you need more forces.

Again, I think that’s something that as the assessment goes forward—and I’d defer to the Under Secretary on that.

Senator Begich. Madam Secretary?

Ms. Flournoy. Senator, this actually, there were several faithful students of General Petraeus’ Counterinsurgency manual involved in the strategy review.

General Petraeus. She was present at the very first seminar we had to develop that manual.

Ms. Flournoy. We actually had several discussions on this very issue, and what I will tell you is we asked the IC to give us their best assessment of where the sort of insurgency had its deepest roots, where it was really focused and concentrated geographically in the country. While there are pockets in the north and west that are important, the concentration really is in the south and up into the east.

So when we were looking at the troops required on our side, by our allies, the Afghan troops, Afghan police, Afghan local security forces, the sum total of all, we were trying to concentrate our efforts in that sort of insurgency belt in the south and the west, to try to get to those kinds of ratios in those geographic areas where the insurgency is strongest.

So we actually did take that into account, not so much in a countrywide fashion, but focused on the areas where the insurgency really has taken root.

Senator Begich. Thank you.
My time is up but let me ask you if I could if you could prepare or share at whatever level you can how those ratios look in those areas of concentration? As a former mayor, I always had my police department tell me what the ratio should be and then we had to manage based on situations throughout the city. So we always had a ratio. But I want to make sure that’s the one area—and to be very frank with you, I want to make sure you’re resourced properly here and be aggressive about it, so we’re not kind of three-quarters of the way in.

So let me end there. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to ask some questions.

[The information referred to follows:]

Consistent with historical experience, FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency, calls for a force density ratio of 20–25 counterinsurgents per 1,000 people, or 1:50. The necessary force density ratio, however, remains very dependent upon the situation on the ground (FM 3–24, paragraph 1–67).

Estimates of Afghanistan’s national population vary widely, ranging from about 24–32 million people. There are perhaps 10–14 million people in the Pashtun belt where the insurgency is most concentrated.

Current force-to-population ratios (Afghan national security forces (ANSF) plus International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)) in the Pashtun areas of Regional Command-East and Regional Command-South range from 1:150 to 1:110 (depending on the population estimate used).

If all additional planned ANSF (including ongoing increases in Army and police) and ISAFs go to these areas, the ratios could improve to a range of about 1:80 to 1:60 by 2011. This is much closer to the historically-derived ratio of 1:50. Whether this force ratio will be adequate will depend on a number of factors including the quality of ANSF training and the degree of progress in Pakistan as well as Afghanistan. Monitoring the situation and making necessary adjustments is a top priority for the Department.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Begich.

We’ll just have a 3- or 4-minute second round. There’s only a few of us here, so hopefully you’ll be able to get some lunch before your next appearance.

First on this 10,000 troop request, is there a pending request that is unfilled at this point for those 10,000 additional troops?

General Petraeus. There is a request for forces for those elements, Senator. It did move through me. My understanding is that it has not been sent beyond the Pentagon at this time.

Chairman Levin. I should look to you, Secretary Flournoy. Has that been sent by Secretary Gates? Has that request been made by Secretary Gates?

Ms. Flournoy. The request was laid out along with all of the others on a time line, and what the President was told is that that request is out there, but he doesn’t have to make it until——

Chairman Levin. Make the decision?

Ms. Flournoy. Make the decision, until the fall, so that the troops would arrive as planned in 2010. So that—I think the President was focused on making every request he needed to be made in the current timeframe, and I think he wanted to reassess where we are at the time the decision has to be made.

Chairman Levin. So that decision will be made in a timely way so that the troops, if the President so determines, can get there on the time line that General McKiernan has requested them; is that a fair statement?

Ms. Flournoy. Yes.

Chairman Levin. Do you agree with that, General Petraeus?
Ms. FLOURNOY. But they also may be changing.

General PETRAEUS. Well, again, that’s certainly our hope. Again, it’s up to them to make the decision, so to speak.

Chairman LEVIN. I said that. The President will decide whether or not to do it.

General PETRAEUS. Right.

Chairman LEVIN. If he decides in the fall to approve those 10,000, they would then arrive in a timely fashion, according to a timetable which General McKiernan, more importantly I guess you—you’re the Commander, CENTCOM—have approved?

General PETRAEUS. That’s correct, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. So it’s not like it’s rejected or deferred. It’s just that the decision will be made in a timely way one way or the other, and if it’s made in a positive way in the fall that would then respond positively to the current request for 10,000?

General PETRAEUS. That’s correct, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Just one, sort of a comment and a question on this aid for Pakistan, the money which has been or will be requested. I guess it’s called Kerry-Lugar money. My own feeling is that I’m willing to support that if I think it will be effective. Whether it’s going to be effective will depend on whether or not the Pakistanis have adopted the goals of dealing with the religious extremists in their midst and to do forcefully, where necessary. We have ambivalent evidence as to whether or not they’re committed to that goal.

So I need to, as far as this one vote is concerned, to believe that those goals not only are at the top, but have sufficiently permeated the down-below elements of the Pakistani Government and military so that the aid would be effective. Would you think that’s a fair position to take? Maybe that’s an unfair way to state it, but do you think that that is a fair view to take on my part?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, I think we’re all looking for those indications that the intent of the assistance would be met. What I can tell you in this intensive dialogue and trialogue we’ve been having in the development of the strategy is that the Red Mosque attack, the assassination of Bhutto, the attack on the cricket team, the attack on the police station, these are really starting to have an impact on both average Pakistanis, but also the leadership.

The problem is making itself very much felt. So I do think we are at a different moment of opportunity now.

General PETRAEUS. Senator, could I just note, by the way, that comments similar to that were in the newspaper, I think it was yesterday, the comments that you made. I shared those with—there’s a senior Pakistani officer here right now, in fact for a conference. In fact, the Under Secretary addressed all the Central and South Asian chiefs of defense staff and other senior officers. I will also share those with the Pakistani ambassador, who I’m meeting tomorrow night.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, finally, it’s a different aspect of the same problem. We cannot appear to be buying support for our policies. It has to be that we are supporting Pakistan policies, because if we appear to be buying something they otherwise would not pursue it is counterproductive in terms of the reaction of the Pakistan people, who want to believe that we’re supporting their goals, not that
we're buying something they otherwise wouldn't do, because that is a domineering kind of a position to take if we're buying something.

Money can be used for two different purposes. One, you go to the store and you buy something; or you can use money to support something, like something you believe in, like your family's goals. It's a subtle difference in a way because it's still money, but it's a critical difference. It may be too nuanced for public consumption, I don't know. But it's a critically important difference, I believe.

How then, if there is a difference, if you accept that difference, could we make it clear that it is our goal to support a Pakistan Government which has the goals of a stable Pakistan without religious extremists dominating or controlling things, without the downside possibility that it would look like we're trying to persuade them to do something they otherwise wouldn't do?

If you can follow that distinction, how would we pursue it?

General PETRAEUS. Mr. Chairman, in fact in all of the recent studies there has been a recognition of the importance of moving from what we have termed a transactional relationship with Pakistan to a partnership. I think that captures exactly what you are getting at.

But as you also rightly note, there is nothing easy about this. This is about relationships. It's about building of trust and confidence. It's about their recognition of the existential threat, that it's a threat to them, not just a threat to us and the rest of the world, and all the rest of that.

Admiral OLSON. Senator Levin, I think a point worth making is that as we strive for an increased and enhanced relationship, partnership with Pakistan, that we do recognize the sacrifices and contributions that they've made to date. They have been a strong ally and I think the forces that I provide feel that because they have been working one on one at a unit level in a training relationship with Pakistani forces, who have captured thousands, killed hundreds, and lost numerous lives in the border region, and they've fought—there was a serious fight in Bajaur before a successful outcome there, and there was a serious fight in Swat before an unsuccessful outcome there that they still hope to reverse.

So at the unit level and where I've been able to visit the Americans and the Pakistanis working together in a training relationship, there is a solid statement of partnership. I know we're looking for a much more overt demonstration of commitment by the Pakistani Government, but I would like to be on record as saying that the soldiers themselves, many of them have fought hard in the western regions of Pakistan.

General PETRAEUS. I would echo that, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thanks to all of you. I want to make two quick statements and ask one question. The first statement is to thank you for the exchange that you had with Senator Levin about that pending request for 10,000 additional troops and the answer that the door is essentially open and a decision has not been made at the highest levels of our Government.
I say that for the obvious reason, one of the lessons we learned painfully in Iraq is that numbers matter. It's not numbers alone of troops. As you always remind us, General Petraeus, it's how they're used; and also that military strength is a necessary but not sufficient basis for achieving our objectives.

But the lesson that I think should be with all of us from the time, the resources, the lives that were lost over a period of time when we inadequately resourced that war is that sometimes those short-range decisions really cost you in the long run. I appreciate the fact that the request is pending and that the administration has not made a decision on it and is open to it this fall.

Second, it may sound a little odd, but I want to say a word on behalf of the Afghan people. There were some questions raised that I think you've answered well, General Petraeus. This is a remarkable people, with a remarkable history. I'm not closing my eyes to any of the problems we have now, but they have survived a lot in their history. They have a real sense of nationhood. One might argue in fact that, though there are Pashtuns and Tajiks there, that the divisions between them are actually much less than we found in Iraq between the Shias and the Sunnis and the Kurds. The comparisons are not exact.

As we know and as you know greater than I—two things. One is their fighters are really committed, most of them. They've now held an election and the people have showed in great numbers that they want a better future. Some of the people—a lot of the people at the top of that government are really quite impressive.

They seem quite supportive, comparatively speaking, of our presence there and what we're trying to do for them.

So I understand all the problems, but I think not only do we have a security interest in how this comes out, ends in Afghanistan; the people want it to end well. Why wouldn't they? Look at, every time there's a poll there the Taliban comes out about at the bottom, lower even than numbers Congress had a short while ago. That's how bad the Taliban is doing in Afghanistan.

Okay, now to my question——

Chairman Levin. Your time is up. [Laughter.]

Senator Lieberman. My question is this. I thought the President spoke very eloquently on Friday about the fact that there hadn't been adequate civil-military cooperation, partnership, in Afghanistan, about the need to make that happen. So I wanted to—and of course, we know during a period of time, particularly when Ambassador Khalilzad and General Barno was there, it certainly seemed like their offices were together. They were working together. The model that you built in Iraq with Ambassador Crocker.

So what are we doing to try to create that here? I know some people laugh at plans, but is there a coordinated civil-military plan being written for the war in Afghanistan?

Ms. Flournoy. I would just say we're working it at multiple levels. At the sort of operational level, if you will, or the strategic operational level, General Petraeus and Ambassador Holbrooke are leading the effort that he mentioned. We will be tasking our current commander and the new ambassador to put together a campaign plan that's truly joint at their level.
But even more important or as important, we are engaged in discussions with Kai Eide, the U.N. representative, and our allies to try to ensure that we have an overarching sense of priorities and what we’re doing, but that we’ve really encouraged Mr. Eide to move the U.N. presence into a provincial presence, so that province by province we have a much more coordinated effort on the part of the international community working hand in hand with the ISAF forces.

So it’s complicated, but we’re trying to work the problem at multiple levels that are interconnected.

I don’t know if you want to add.

Senator LIEBERMAN. General?

General PETRAEUS. Well, in fact there was direction already given to Karl Eikenberry, General Eikenberry right now, who I think was reported out of committee yesterday. There is every intention to do just that. In fact, even the new DCM who goes in may start that process with General McKiernan. It was a topic that we talked about on Saturday as well.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Excellent, very encouraging. Thank you all.

I will tell you that the three of you, the testimony has been really excellent, and really the three of you operate at such a high level that it should give all of us confidence.

Admiral Olson, you were asked a few less questions, probably inherent in the nature of your covert special operations. You stayed relatively covert this morning. But I appreciated your opening statement. You said really quite directly that the enemy—the behavior of the enemy we’re facing in Afghanistan ranges from malicious to evil, and it’s because I agree with you that I’m so grateful that we have three people of your caliber leading the effort.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. I think you’ve heard here this morning a great deal of support for the President’s direction and strategy. It’s cohesive, it’s strong, it’s clear. Its goals are important goals. I hope you’re all reassured by what you’ve heard from this side, but we’re reassured from what we heard from you. Your testimony was very, very helpful. It was important for the American people that the kind of questions which were asked be asked. You gave answers which I consider to be highly reassuring, and we will now stand adjourned with our thanks.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

AFGHANISTAN STRATEGIES

1. Senator BYRD. Secretary Flournoy, in your testimony, you state, “our strategic goal is very clear: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its extremist allies. To do so, we must eliminate their safe haven in Pakistan and prevent their re-emergence in Afghanistan.” This statement is clear on the “what” that needs to be done, but very weak on the “how” of accomplishing this goal. This and other goals also seem to be predicated on very tenuous political, diplomatic, and economic strategies. Does the administration intend to develop tactics to achieve these strategies that are as rigorous and as urgent as those developed to achieve military goals?

Secretary FLOURNOY. Yes, our new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan recognizes the need to increase dramatically our civilian efforts in Afghanistan and facilitate efforts in Pakistan. As our strategy stated:

“By increasing civilian capacity we will strengthen the relationship between the Afghan people and their government. A dramatic increase in Af-
ghan civilian expertise is needed to facilitate the development of systems and institutions particularly at the provincial and local levels, provide basic infrastructure, and create economic alternatives to the insurgency at all levels of Afghan society, particularly in agriculture. The United States should play an important part in providing that expertise, but responding effectively to Afghanistan’s needs will require that allies, partners, the U.N. and other international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations significantly increase their involvement in Afghanistan.

Although the Department of Defense (DOD) is not the lead for these efforts, we strongly support the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other U.S. departments and agencies in their political, diplomatic, and economic development programs within our means and capabilities. Currently, the administration is examining options to increase the number of civilians in Afghanistan, as part of our whole-of-government approach to stabilizing and securing Afghanistan. The DOD will coordinate closely with other U.S. departments and agencies to support these efforts.

PAKISTAN STRATEGIES

2. Senator Byrd. Secretary Flournoy, the United States cannot currently commit U.S. forces in Afghanistan to attack “al Qaeda and its extremist allies” in their safe havens in Pakistan, where they plan terrorist attacks and support operations that unnerve the stability of both countries. What is the likelihood of being able to negotiate access or to get Pakistan to address this threat?

Secretary Flournoy. Pakistan is a sovereign nation that already is committing more than 100,000 military and paramilitary forces to its western border regions where they are conducting operations against al Qaeda and its extremist allies. We are working closely with the Government of Pakistan to enhance the capability of its security forces in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. The U.S. Government is engaging with the Government of Pakistan at the highest levels regarding the existential threat that extremist and insurgent networks pose to Pakistan. Many of Pakistan’s leaders recognize this threat, but addressing it effectively will require greater Pakistani will and capability, as well as support from the U.S. and international partners.

3. Senator Byrd. Secretary Flournoy, what is the status of negotiations?

Secretary Flournoy. The United States is working closely with the Government of Pakistan to assist it to combat extremists in its territory. These efforts include train-and-equip programs with the Pakistani military to enhance its capacity to conduct counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations.

4. Senator Byrd. Secretary Flournoy, do Pakistani Government and security forces view the presence of al Qaeda and the Taliban as a serious threat to their national security?

Secretary Flournoy. Pakistan’s efforts and sacrifices to engage extremist groups—including more than 3,000 security forces killed or wounded in action since 2001—demonstrate a willingness to engage extremist groups that pose a threat to Pakistan. Nevertheless, the Pakistan military continues to view India as its most significant enemy. The United States is engaging with the Government of Pakistan to convey our sense of the dire threat Pakistan faces, and is working with Pakistan’s security forces to strengthen their ability to face that threat.

5. Senator Byrd. Secretary Flournoy, according to your testimony, “Pakistan’s ability to dismantle the safe havens on its territory and defeat the terror and insurgent networks within its borders is critical to its own security and stability. Pakistan faces a severe socio-economic crisis that enables these extremist groups to flourish and pose a great threat to this nuclear armed state.” Describe your concerns regarding how the political situation in Pakistan might affect their view of the threat and their willingness to take effective action against it.

Secretary Flournoy. The United States is committed to empowering civilian leaders in Pakistan to take effective action against extremist groups; however, political infighting and instability within Pakistan are distractions. Strong civilian leadership is needed to address the threat posed by militant groups and to support the military in taking decisive action. The United States is very concerned about recent peace agreements between the Government of Pakistan and militant groups in Swat and elsewhere, which are a by-product of political weakness.
6. Senator Byrd. Secretary Flournoy, you state that initiatives pursued in the context of a long-term strategic partnership with Pakistan should be limited if we do not see improvements in Pakistani performance. If the United States limits those initiatives, however, what is the impact to efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its extremist allies and avoid the further radicalizing of a nuclear-armed Pakistan?

Secretary Flournoy. It is critical that U.S. assistance to Pakistan be tied to measures of effectiveness, particularly with regard to transparency and accountability; however, these measures should be based on the President's strategy for the region, rather than on legislation. U.S. provision of additional assistance will require improved Pakistani performance in transparency and accountability. At the same time, the United States needs to move away from its past transactional relationship with Pakistan. We need to develop a relationship that is based on more than counterterrorism and instead focuses on the people of Pakistan by providing economic, developmental, and educational support. Pakistan's growing confidence in the long-term support of the United States is vital to providing an alternative to extremists and defeating extremist groups.

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY AND AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICY

7. Senator Byrd. Secretary Flournoy, efforts by the United States and its allies to build Afghanistan's economy dramatically lag behind efforts to train and field soldiers and police. Further, many European nations that have pledged contributions to donor funds have not satisfied those pledges. What, if anything, is being planned that has the potential of creating an economy in Afghanistan that is capable of sustaining the military, police, and civilian bureaucracies?

Secretary Flournoy. The United States is pursuing numerous initiatives to increase economic growth in Afghanistan within the framework of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). The ANDS was approved by the Afghan Government in June 2008. It lays out a long-term vision for the country and specific goals along key lines of operation (Security; Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights; and Economic and Social Development). With time and continued focus and effort on the part of the United States, the international community, and the Government of Afghanistan, the Afghan economy should reach the point where it can provide the domestic revenue to support the Afghan Government, including the security forces. In the meantime, it will be necessary for the United States and our international partners to continue our support to Afghanistan.

8. Senator Byrd. Secretary Flournoy, is there a unified international plan to accomplish this goal?

Secretary Flournoy. Yes, the United States and the international community pursue their economic reconstruction initiatives in Afghanistan under the framework provided in the ANDS.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

9. Senator Byrd. Secretary Flournoy, do the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (U.N.) share the same view and the same goals in the region?

Secretary Flournoy. We work in full partnership with NATO and the United Nations as well as regional stakeholders in both organizations. These partnerships are critical for success. It is important to distinguish the role of the U.N. in coordinating international civilian activities from NATO's military role. It is also important to highlight the need to improve collaboration between U.N. civilian and military efforts and NATO's efforts. Securing such collaboration among NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, and the Afghan Government in order to implement an “integrated approach” will improve the focus of collective efforts and also strengthen synchronized civilian and military efforts in the country.

10. Senator Byrd. Secretary Flournoy, how do their views differ from those of the United States?

Secretary Flournoy. As the NATO declaration at the April 2009 Summit attests, our Allies largely share our views and objectives with respect to Afghanistan. However, the United States and its Allies take on different roles and missions within the larger effort to achieve those shared objectives. Like the United States, many of our allies and partners (including the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands,
and Australia) have demonstrated their willingness and ability to take on combat missions. Other Allies and partners emphasize peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, and still others have focused resources on building Afghan capacity in the security sector and civilian government. The United States and its allies and partners agree that each of these areas is a necessary part of a comprehensive civilian-military strategy.

**BENCHMARKS**

11. Senator BYRD. Secretary Flournoy, as noted by the President in his speech on this matter, metrics or benchmarks are necessary to assess performance of efforts. After more than 7 years of committing “blood and treasure” in this region, U.S. taxpayers deserve to know what progress is being made in return for their investment. When can Congress expect to receive a set of performance metrics from the administration?

   Secretary FLOURNOY. The administration is working to define measures of effectiveness to monitor progress towards achieving the objectives of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. The administration will work with Congress to ensure that our measures of effectiveness are a useful tool for gauging our progress over time, and enable us to identify areas where policy and resource adjustments may be needed.

12. Senator BYRD. Secretary Flournoy, will Congress receive regular reports on progress being made in achieving these metrics?

   Secretary FLOURNOY. Yes, the Department provides Congress a report on progress in Afghanistan on a semiannual basis titled: Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. Once defined, the measures of effectiveness will be an integral part of this report.

**SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES**

13. Senator BYRD. Admiral Olson, you state that “...the situation in this region is increasingly dire. Al Qaeda’s surviving leaders have proven adept at hiding, communicating, and inspiring. The Taliban, although not militarily strong, is pervasive and brutal.” To what extent is Special Operations Command (SOCOM) limited in accomplishing the strategic goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda and its extremist allies in the Swat Valley and Baluchistan in Pakistan as a result of the inability to commit special operations forces in this area?

   Admiral OLSON. [Deleted.]

14. Senator BYRD. Admiral Olson, part of your mission in Afghanistan involves increasing interaction with Pakistan’s military and Frontier Corps forces. What is the nature of that mission?

   Admiral OLSON. Our enemy is an enemy that knows no boundaries, borders, and conducts operations in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Pakistan, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducts a variety of Foreign Internal Defense, Joint Combined Exchange Training events and counternarcotics training with Pakistan MIL and Pakistan SOF in support of counterinsurgency operations.

   U.S. SOF support is a component of the U.S./Pakistan Security Development Plan (SDP). SDP is a combined U.S. DOD/Pakistan MoD security plan coordinated with U.S. Government interagency efforts and programmed over 5 years. Its main effort is to enhance and expand the FC, Pakistan Army, and Special Service Group capabilities. U.S. SOF is the lead U.S. force in this effort.

   U.S. SOF overall efforts in Pakistan, especially those training opportunities with the FC, directly impact and support U.S./ISAF objectives in Afghanistan.

15. Senator BYRD. Admiral Olson, please provide some examples of successes.

   Admiral OLSON. [Deleted.]

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**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR LINDSEY GRAHAM**

**NEW STRATEGY**

16. Senator GRAHAM. Secretary Flournoy, the President announced, and you testified, that this new strategy is designed to defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Iraq. Given that definition, how does this strategy fit into the global strategy to defeat al Qaeda and who specifically is the lead for the global strategy to defeat al Qaeda?
Secretary FLOURNOY. Due to our efforts in Afghanistan, al Qaeda senior leaders have moved their safe havens into the tribal areas of Pakistan. The new strategy for the region emphasizes a single theater construct for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In Afghanistan, our counterinsurgency campaign emphasizes protecting the population while developing the Afghan National Security forces and building Afghan governance and economic capacity. These efforts, in full partnership with the Afghans and our coalition partners, are designed to defeat the insurgency and ensure al Qaeda leadership cannot re-establish a safe haven in that country.

In Pakistan, we must assist the Pakistani Government and security forces in dealing with the existential threat from al Qaeda and the insurgents they support or inspire. Strengthening Pakistani will and capability are central parts of our diplomacy and military assistance. The Pakistani Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund and initiatives such as the Kerry-Lugar legislation are designed to enable the Pakistanis to defeat al Qaeda in the tribal areas.

Within DOD, U.S. SOCOM has been designated as the military supported command to plan and synchronize operations to implement the global strategy to defeat al Qaeda, and the geographic combatant commands execute the strategy within their respective areas of responsibility.

At the interagency level, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is responsible for conducting strategic operational planning. The NCTC has developed the National Implementation Plan to combat terrorism, including plans to defeat al Qaeda.

CIVILIAN RESOURCES

17. Senator GRAHAM. Secretary Flournoy, you have been quoted in the press saying that the new Defense budget will include “a substantial request for resources on the civilian side” of the Federal Government. Can you elaborate on how you will resource Rule of Law efforts and to what extent that will be part of the civilian resources?

Secretary FLOURNOY. Assisting foreign governments with establishing, re-establishing, or strengthening the Rule of Law in their sovereign territory is often a key component of U.S. Government stability operations. It is DOD policy, however, that this component of stability operations is best implemented by other Departments and Agencies with core competencies and expertise in Rule of Law concepts and issues. As a result, DOD prefers to support, rather than lead, whole-of-government approaches to Rule of Law issues, which are considered part of stability operations and utilize the entire interagency team. If other Departments and Agencies are unable to lead these types of efforts, DOD will use its available assets and broad experience to support U.S. Government national security goals and objectives. To make the need for DOD to take a leading role less likely, DOD will continue to advocate for significantly increasing the capacity of other Departments and Agencies to lead and conduct these types of operations in an expeditionary environment. The Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI) under development by the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization shows promise to provide the whole-of-government stability operations capability that DOD supports. The CSI includes a Civilian Response Corps composed of personnel from eight different U.S. Government civilian departments and agencies and is designed to conduct stability operations in order to foster foreign nations’ self-governance, social and economic development, and security before, during, or after conflict. DOD will continue to support the CSI and encourages Congress to fund the effort fully. Finally, DOD is teamed with the Department of State and the USAID on mutual policy for Security Sector Reform (SSR). Although DOD’s SSR role is focused on supporting the reform, restructuring, or re-establishment of a foreign nation’s defense sector, this work is done in coordination with USAID’s role in supporting Rule of Law programs (along with other SSR programs) aimed at building civilian capacity to manage, oversee, and provide security and justice.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

FORCE SIZE

18. Senator CHAMBLISS. Secretary Flournoy, please provide details regarding what requests were made by U.S. commanders in Afghanistan for U.S. forces (number and type of forces) from 2002 to the present.
Secretary FLOURNOY. The decision to deploy U.S. military forces is a deliberative process, and internal to the DOD. The Department is unable to share such information in the level of detail requested.

The Secretary of Defense carefully considers the advice and recommendations of his military commanders, the Joint Staff, and the Military Departments and Services before making a decision to order the deployment of U.S. forces.

Most recently, the President and the Secretary approved the deployment of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), a Stryker Brigade Combat Team (BCT), a training BCT, special operations forces, and various enablers that were requested by General David McKiernan. The approval of these requests was consistent with General McKiernan’s timeline for when these forces were needed. Based on an assessment of progress in the coming months, the Department will review requirements for any additional military forces.

19. Senator CHAMBLISS. Secretary Flournoy, were these requests met? If not, why?

Secretary FLOURNOY. As stated previously, the Department is unable to share the details of all requests for forces from 2002 onward. The President and the Secretary recently approved the deployment of an MEB, a BCT, a training BCT, Special Operations Forces, and various enablers that were requested by General David McKiernan. The approval of these requests was consistent with General McKiernan’s timeline for when these forces were needed. Based on an assessment of progress in the coming months, the Department will review requirements for any additional military forces.

20. Senator CHAMBLISS. Secretary Flournoy, what requests currently exist from U.S. Commanders in Afghanistan for U.S. forces?

Secretary FLOURNOY. General McKiernan has requested additional forces for the mission in Afghanistan, including maneuver forces and headquarters personnel. This request is not for immediate deployment. The decision on whether or not to meet these requests will be taken at a later time. When appropriate, the Secretary of Defense will consider these requests, in consultation with military commanders, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Services.

21. Senator CHAMBLISS. Secretary Flournoy, have these requests been met? If not, why?

Secretary FLOURNOY. As stated previously, the request for maneuver forces and headquarters staff is not for immediate deployment and the decision on whether or not to meet the requests will be taken at a later time.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAVID VITTER

AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN ECONOMIC STRATEGY

22. Senator VITTER. General Petraeus, I want to first thank you for your tremendous leadership and service, and the United States is fortunate to have you serve in our military. I agree with your assessment that a contributing factor to insecurity in Pakistan and Afghanistan was the uneven economic development and lack of employment opportunities that contribute to the population remaining “economically disenfranchised, uneducated, and without sufficient opportunity.” With some success in Iraq in implementing economic development strategies to help quell the counterinsurgency, how optimistic are you that an economic strategy in Pakistan and Afghanistan can be successful?

General PETRAEUS. There is no question that a sole military solution does not exist for either Pakistan or Afghanistan; both require a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach.

Pakistan is still recovering from a November 2008 balance of payments crisis. Its economy is showing signs of progress as a result of timely assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF recently met with Pakistan officials and was pleased with their economic performance in meeting benchmarks. That effort won a vote of confidence from the World Bank. Even small increases of economic recovery can go a long way in offsetting the challenges that currently confront the Pakistani Government.

Afghanistan is in the process of making the transition from an economy dominated by illegal poppy to a legal and more diversified economy. Frankly, our eradication efforts have not been wholly effective. In the past year, however, we have seen farmers voluntarily switch to wheat cultivation based on the increased value of wheat (and a decline in poppy prices) and on initial alternative livelihood pro-
grams. I think this alternative livelihood program shows some promise and with the help of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) we can begin to expand it. Taking action with the USDA while wheat is profitable is an opportunity that doesn't come around often. There is no doubt that Afghanistan's economic strategy needs improvement. We are working closely with the Afghan Government to increase its revenue collection. Our goal is for Afghanistan's operating budget to be more fiscally sustainable and I believe we are making progress. Another top economic issue is privatizing the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The good news is we have strong support from the Afghan Central Bank and Finance Ministry to improve revenue collection and privatize the SOEs. The challenge will be in the sustained execution.

NARCOTICS

23. Senator Vitter. General Petraeus, considering that Afghanistan is one of the biggest narcotic states in the world, is it reasonable to think that viable agricultural alternatives, improved infrastructure, and better Afghan law enforcement will be able to realistically move past their narcotics trade that has been imbedded in their history?

General Petraeus. Prior to the nearly three decades of war and domestic turmoil, Afghanistan was widely known for its trade in fruits and nuts and for their rich mineral deposits. In the past 5 years, the resurgence of the Taliban has been accompanied by a fundamental increase in the scale of poppy cultivation and narcotics trafficking. Improving the quality of the Afghan people's lives through a return to viable, licit methods of earning a living coupled with access to better roads and new markets in a secure environment where the rule of law is uniformly enforced are essential elements for Afghanistan's success.

The United States Government's five-pillar counternarcotics strategy incorporates all these concepts. The five pillars are a public information campaign to inform and educate the population about the dangers of poppy cultivation and narcotics trafficking; an alternative development effort to establish economic alternatives to poppy cultivation; an elimination and eradication program to provide credible disincentives to growing poppy; an interdiction arm to help the Government of Afghanistan build its capacity to disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking operations; and reform Afghan law enforcement and justice institutions. The United States Special Envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, has initiated a review of the current strategy to build on lessons learned and rebalance our efforts in these five strategic areas.

In those areas of Afghanistan where the Afghan Government provides security, rule of law, and has extended governance, this approach is working. In north and central Afghanistan where the Afghan Government is providing some level of security and governance, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime certified 18 poppy-free provinces in 2008. Their winter opium assessment report also indicates an additional four provinces in north and central Afghanistan could be poppy free in 2009.

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, there is a clear distinction in Afghanistan between those areas that do not grow poppy and those that do. Farmers have voluntarily given up poppy cultivation where effective governance and developmental assistance exists. Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is almost exclusively confined to seven provinces in the south and southwest. The provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Daykundi, Zabul, Farah, and Nimruz account for 98 percent of all poppy grown in Afghanistan. Not coincidentally, this is the area where the insurgency is strongest.

24. Senator Vitter. General Petraeus, what lessons from our efforts fighting FARC in Columbia do you feel will be useful in our shared interest of combating the drug trade in Afghanistan?

General Petraeus. The foremost lesson learned from Columbia is that success will take time and patience. Active since the early 1960s, the FARC began as a Marxist-Leninist terrorist group which transformed into one of the largest narco-terrorist organizations in the world. United States Southern Command's recent counterinsurgency conference in Bogota, Colombia, discussed the Colombian experience and what elements made it successful. The three elements ascribed as most critical to success are: counterinsurgency approach containing the elements of "Clear, Hold, Build"; strategic communications; and a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach.
A counterinsurgency strategy of “Clear, Hold, Build” was critical to Columbia gradually taking back territory and keeping it under government control. The U.S. and ISAF-Afghanistan forces employ this counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. It is imperative that when we push the insurgents and drug traffickers out of an area, we also bring in those elements of the Afghan Government and other coalition support to provide some meaningful level of services, security and rule of law. If this is not done, insurgents and drug traffickers will return when we leave.

Next, it is important to employ effective strategic communications to counter the lies and propaganda employed by the insurgents and drug trafficking organizations. Winning the contest of information and ideas is paramount to success while always maintaining our values and respect for the truth. The people must understand the objectives and activities of the Afghan Government, coalition, and U.S. and believe that these are in their best interests. The perceptions created by the insurgents and drug traffickers, if left unchecked, often become reality for the population. This is an area that must be proactive in and closely synchronized with ongoing activities as they relate to the U.S. Government’s counter narcotics strategy. As was done in Columbia, taking a comprehensive government approach to all activity in Afghanistan requires the United States Government to leverage best practices to improve agriculture and trade, stimulate economic development, engender reliable law enforcement, establish rule of law, develop financial regulation and expand education. The current U.S. Government’s counter narcotics strategy in Afghanistan is a comprehensive approach that leverages the best expertise from: Department of State for poppy elimination and strategic communications; USAID assistance with licit trade/livelihood alternatives for the Afghan people; Drug Enforcement Agency for illicit drug interdiction; Department of Justice to develop law enforcement and criminal justice systems; Department of Homeland Security for improved border security; and DOD assistance in the development of the Afghan security forces.

EUROPEAN ALLIES

25. Senator Vitter. General Petraeus, do you think that the European coalition will be more involved in Pakistan and Afghanistan both economically and militarily, and what specific, realistic European involvement should the United States expect from the Europeans?

General Petraeus. European nations have been, and will continue to be, heavily involved in supporting operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan 32 European nations currently contribute troops, equipment and/or financial aid to the ISAF and 6 European nations are in direct support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Of the five Regional Commands in Afghanistan, four are led by European nations.

Seven European nations committed assistance to Pakistan by pledging $618.4 million in fiscal donor aid at the recent Friends of Democratic Pakistan and Donors Conference held in Tokyo, Japan. Additionally, the European Commission pledged $320 million. The Donor's Conference pledged a total of $5.2 billion in aid over the next 2 years to Pakistan.

In addition to NATO-led efforts to counter violent extremism and rebuild the Nation of Afghanistan, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe initiated efforts last year to strengthen their support. European nations continue to make significant contributions to Afghanistan via ISAF and donor conferences. As of May 2009, 29 European nations had pledges of significant contributions for Afghanistan in many areas including personnel, aircraft, election funding, medical teams, construction teams and funding for the Afghanistan National Army. We fully expect these contributions to be fulfilled and/or maintained so Afghanistan's nation building may continue.

European nations were instrumental in assisting the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan develop the Afghan National Development Strategy which encompasses long range economic, social, and governmental development as well as critical reforms in these disciplines. This strategy will require U.S., European and international support in the foreseeable future. Afghanistan aid requests, such as personnel for governance and development programs, information technology experts, special operations forces and police trainers are being socialized with the Governments of European nations via our Department of State. To date, 35 European nations and the European Union itself have been requested to fill specific economic and military needs in Afghanistan via the “Asks List,” with 29 European nations having pledged contributions.
ISRAELI CONFLICT

26. Senator Vitter. General Petraeus, a longstanding battle cry for al Qaeda and other Islamic extremists is that the United States has not been a true neutral partner in the Arab and Israeli conflict. You mentioned during your testimony that the United States needs to be “credible” in this conflict. Could you please provide your definition of what “credible” means for the United States in the conflict?

General Petraeus. I would define credible as being perceived as a partner that can be trusted, a partner that is consistently fair and honest in all relationships with allies and partners. However, we will work with partners that have different views and function as a moderator or negotiator in brokering peace and stability in the region. A major obstacle is the perception of United States credibility in the region. A recent Saban Center survey of civilians in seven Middle East nations revealed that the United States is not perceived as a credible, neutral broker. The worst news out of this survey is that Hezbollah leadership is perceived more positively than any other leadership in the Middle East. The President’s recent address in Cairo, Egypt has been well-received, but there is an anticipation in the Middle East that it be followed up with sustained and substantial actions.

It should come as no surprise that Israel is a close friend and ally. The United States will remain committed to Israel’s security and simultaneously honor United Nations resolutions to this end. We will continue to advance the cause of peace and stability in the Middle East and to move the Israeli-Palestinian parties in the direction of a two-state solution. However, our adversaries in the region have successfully parried and marginalized the goodwill of the billions of dollars that Congress has authorized to support Palestinians needs and humanitarian requirements. The resulting perception has damaged our credibility within the Middle East communities. The bottom line is the United States remains committed to seeking a lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians and between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

[Whereupon, at 12:41 p.m., the committee adjourned.]