

PAKISTAN AT THE CROSSROADS; AFGHANISTAN IN THE BALANCE

HEARING

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 12, 2007

Serial No. 110-173

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform



Available via the World Wide Web: <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html>
<http://www.oversight.house.gov>

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

50-110 PDF

WASHINGTON : 2009

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
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CONTENTS

	Page
Hearing held on July 12, 2007	1
Statement of:	
Boucher, Richard A., Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs	10
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:	
Boucher, Richard A., Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, prepared statement of	15
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of	9
Tierney, Hon. John F., a Representative in Congress from the State of Massachusetts, prepared statement of	4

PAKISTAN AT THE CROSSROADS; AFGHANISTAN IN THE BALANCE

THURSDAY, JULY 12, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John F. Tierney (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Tierney, Lynch, Higgins, Yarmuth, Braley, Cooper, Van Hollen, Hodes, Shays, Burton, Platts, Duncan, and Turner.

Staff present: Dave Turk, staff director; Andrew Su and Andy Wright, professional staff members; Davis Hake, clerk; A. Brooke Bennett, minority counsel; and Benjamin Chance, minority clerk.

Mr. TIERNEY. Good morning. As a quorum is present for our purposes here this morning, the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs hearing entitled, "Pakistan at the Crossroads; Afghanistan in the Balance," will come to order.

I ask unanimous consent that the chairman and ranking minority member of the subcommittee make opening statements. Without objection, that is so ordered.

Also, I ask unanimous consent that the hearing record be kept open for 5 business days so that all members of the subcommittee may be allowed to submit a written statement for the record. Without objection, so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that the following written statement and materials be placed in the hearing record: that of the Honorable Richard A. Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs. Without objection, so ordered.

For purposes of this hearing, I would like to just put some remarks on the record and then invite Mr. Shays to do the same, and then we would like to go directly to our witness who has been kind enough to join us here this morning.

Today we are continuing our sustained oversight of U.S. policy toward Pakistan. We do it for two fundamental reasons: first, that Pakistan has been and remains absolutely vital for the United States' national security. The 9/11 Commission stressed, "It is hard to overstate the importance of Pakistan in the struggle against Islamic terrorism." More recently, Fareed Zakaria, among others, has reiterated that Pakistan should be considered the "central front in the war on terror."

Second, Pakistan finds itself at the most important crossroads it has faced in years, and it is absolutely vital that we in the U.S. Government seize this opportunity to ask ourselves whether current U.S. policy needs to be reassessed in order to best ensure long-term U.S. national security interests.

Pakistan faces this crossroads as it rounds the bend into upcoming national elections. The crossroads is represented by two ongoing dramas: one, the full-blown judicial crisis precipitated by President Musharraf's suspension of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry; and two, the fallout from the bloody conclusion to the tense stand-off with extremists at Islamabad's Red Mosque.

Protests of President Musharraf's suspension of the Chief Justice are populated by lawyers and proponents of a robust civil society, judicial independence, and democratic rule of law, while those rising in support of the Red Mosque are populated by extremists and jihadis who wish to impose a repressive view of Islam on all Pakistanis.

This subcommittee's May hearing focused on the links between Pakistan's rising tide of extremism and its relation to a failing Pakistani education system. The Red Mosque is merely a stark symbol of the deeper, more pervasive problem in Pakistan, where there are far more jihadists, extremist madrassas, Al Qaeda operatives, Taliban safe havens, and international terrorist training camps than Pakistani government officials are willing to admit. In fact, just 2 months ago our own State Department concluded, "Pakistan remains a major source of Islamic extremism and a safe haven for some top terrorist leaders."

It is vitally clear that extremism in Pakistan is of immediate concern to the United States' interests, including its having fueled a resurgence of violence in Afghanistan. The 9/11 Public Disclosure Project warned that President Musharraf, "has not shut down extremist-linked madrassas or terrorist camps. Taliban forces still pass freely across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and operate in Pakistani tribal areas." And these border groups gained political legitimacy last year when General Musharraf signed a series of dubious peace deals with the Pakistani Taliban.

Pakistan's intensifying extremism also has consequences that reach far beyond Afghanistan. The July 7, 2005, London subway terrorist bombings and a later incident involving fertilizer bombs both involved terrorists who had attended Pakistani madrassas and training camps.

Due to President Musharraf's, some would say, tepid cooperation in controlling extremism and disrupting terror networks, along with signs that these crises have compromised his grip on power, there is a growing chorus calling for a significant reevaluation of U.S. policy toward Pakistan.

This past Monday, alone, critical editorials ran in both the Washington Post and the New York Times. The Times noted, "America needs to maintain friendly relations with Pakistan. This is exactly why Washington should hasten to disentangle itself from the sinking fortunes of General Pervez Musharraf, a blundering and increasingly unpopular military dictator and a halfhearted strategic ally of the United States."

The Washington Post editorial stressed their view of the administration's policy this way: "Pakistan's Pervez Musharraf is running out of supporters—except in Washington."

Today's hearing presents an opportunity to explore a whole slew of critical questions with the administration's point person on Pakistan.

For example, where does Pakistan's cooperation against international terrorism stand, especially in light of the spread of jihadi extremism in Pakistan, and what impact does this have on U.S. forces and efforts in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world?

Is our current aid package to Pakistan, one in which we are providing at least 10 times more for military aid than for basic education assistance, in the best long-term interests of United States' national security?

What should United States' policy be with respect to Pakistan's civil society, in light of the escalating crisis following President Musharraf's dismissal of the Chief Justice of Pakistan's Supreme Court?

And what is the United States doing to help ensure that the upcoming Pakistani national elections occur and are free and fair, from voter registration to vote tally? And what are the consequences for President Musharraf if they are not?

The people of Pakistan stand at a crossroads and U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and the world's success against international terrorism hang in the balance.

This Congressman feels that the United States needs to send a powerful message at this critical juncture that we stand shoulder-to-shoulder with our brothers and sisters in Pakistan in their pursuit of education for their children and democracy for their country.

It has often been said that Pakistan is a place of breathtaking complexity. It is in part because of this that our long-term national security interests are best served by forging bonds with the Pakistani people and not necessarily with any one particular leader.

I am pleased that our State Department's Pakistan point person is here with us today in order to present the administration's viewpoint and to engage in what I hope will be a robust discussion.

[The prepared statement of Hon. John F. Tierney follows:]



FROM THE OFFICE OF JOHN F. TIERNEY
Representing Massachusetts's 6th District

For Immediate Release
 July 12, 2007

Contact: Catherine Ribeiro
 (202) 225-8020

NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
"Pakistan at the Crossroads; Afghanistan in the Balance"

WASHINGTON, DC — Today, the National Security and Foreign Affairs Subcommittee held an oversight hearing to explore the Administration's policies toward Pakistan at a time of internal crisis with international ramifications. The hearing featured Assistant Secretary Richard A. Boucher, who serves as the Bush Administration's point person on Pakistan policy and just returned from his third diplomatic trip of the year to Pakistan.

A copy of Chairman Tierney's opening statement as prepared for delivery is below:

Statement of John F. Tierney
Chairman
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
Hearing on "Pakistan at the Crossroads; Afghanistan in the Balance"
As Prepared for Delivery
July 12, 2007

Good morning. Today the Subcommittee continues our sustained oversight of U.S. policy toward Pakistan.

We do so for two fundamental reasons. First, Pakistan has been and remains absolutely vital for U.S. national security. The 9/11 Commission stressed, and I quote: "[i]t is hard to overstate the importance of Pakistan in the struggle against Islamic terrorism." More recently, Fareed Zakaria, among others, has reiterated that Pakistan should be considered the "central front in the war on terror."

Secondly, Pakistan finds itself at the most important crossroads it has faced in years, and it is absolutely vital that we in the United States government seize this opportunity to ask ourselves whether current U.S. policy needs to be reassessed in order to best ensure long-term U.S. national security interests.

Pakistan faces this crossroads as it rounds the bend into upcoming national elections; a crossroads represented by two ongoing dramas: (1) the full-blown judicial crisis precipitated by President Musharraf's suspension of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and

(2) the fallout from the bloody conclusion to the tense standoff with extremists at Islamabad's Red Mosque.

Protests of President Musharraf's suspension of the Chief Justice are populated by lawyers and proponents of a robust civil society, judicial independence, and democratic rule of law, while those rising in support of the Red Mosque are populated by extremists and jihadis who wish to impose a repressive view of Islam on all Pakistanis.

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And it is vitally clear that extremism in Pakistan is of immediate concern to U.S. interests, including by having fueled a resurgence of violence in Afghanistan. The 9/11 Public Discourse Project warned that Musharraf, and I quote, "has not shut down extremist-linked madrassas or terrorist camps. Taliban forces still pass freely across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and operate in Pakistani tribal areas." And these border groups gained political legitimacy last year when Musharraf signed a series of dubious peace deals with the Pakistani Taliban.

Pakistan's intensifying extremism also has consequences that reach far beyond Afghanistan. The 7/7/2005 London subway terrorist bombings and a later incident involving fertilizer-bombs both involved terrorists who had attended Pakistani madrassas and training camps.

Due to President Musharraf's tepid cooperation in controlling extremism and disrupting terror networks – along with signs that these crises have compromised his grip on power – there is a growing chorus calling for a significant reevaluation of U.S. policy toward Pakistan.

This past Monday alone, critical editorials ran in both the Washington Post and the New York Times. The Times noted, and I quote, "America needs to maintain friendly relations with Pakistan. This is exactly why Washington should hasten to disentangle itself from the sinking fortunes of General Pervez Musharraf – a blundering and increasingly unpopular military dictator and a halfhearted strategic ally of the United States."

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Today's hearing presents an opportunity to explore a whole slew of critical questions with the Administration's point person on Pakistan.

- For example, where does Pakistan's cooperation against international terrorism stand, especially in light of the spread of jihadi extremism in Pakistan, and what impact does this have on U.S. forces and efforts in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world?
- Is our current aid package to Pakistan – one in which we are providing at least 10 times more for military aid than for basic education assistance – in the best long-term interests of U.S. national security?
- What should U.S. policy be with respect to Pakistan's civil society in light of the escalating crisis following President Musharraf's dismissal of the Chief Justice of Pakistan's Supreme Court?
- And what is the U.S. doing to help ensure that the upcoming Pakistani national elections occur and are free and fair – from voter registration to vote tally – and what are the consequences for President Musharraf if they are not?

The people of Pakistan stand at a crossroads, and U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and the world's success against international terrorism hang in the balance.

This Congressman feels that the United States needs to send a powerful message at this critical juncture that we stand shoulder-to-shoulder with our brothers and sisters in Pakistan in their pursuit of education for their children and democracy for their country.

It has often been said that Pakistan is a place of breathtaking complexity. It is in part because of this that our long-term national security interests are best served by forging bonds with the Pakistani people and not with any, one, particular leader.

I am pleased that our State Department's Pakistan point person is with us today in order to present the Administration's viewpoint and to engage in what I hope will be a robust discussion.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Today the subcommittee again discusses serious issues involving Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the broader region. Mr. Chairman, I congratulate you on holding such a timely hearing—timely in light of all eyes having turned toward Islamabad with last week's military action against nearly 2,000 extremists holed up in the Red Mosque.

These dynamic developments—and in Pakistan's capital city nonetheless—underscore our need to understand the forces threatening the peace and stability of our allies in the South Asia region and allies across the globe.

I look forward to today's hearing as an opportunity to discuss first the effects of extremism in Pakistan; second, the effects of U.S. aid to Pakistan; third, the prognosis for Pakistan's forthcoming elections, and; fourth, the implications for Pakistan's civil society and President Musharraf's attempted dismissal of the Pakistani Chief Justice.

Subcommittee staff recently met with a delegation of provincial leaders from the Afghan side of the Pakistan-Afghan border. These Afghani leaders expressed hope for a peaceful Afghanistan, but stated peace and development cannot be achieved without security. Security cannot be achieved without stricter border enforcement. And strict border enforcement cannot be achieved without cooperation from the Pakistani government and stronger action by President Musharraf. These are strong and insightful sentiments expressed by the Afghani leaders, especially as they are most directly affected by Pakistani action or inaction.

Some strongly question the will and inclination of President Musharraf to stand up to the challenges faced by Pakistan. We hear President Musharraf is thwarting the role of the judiciary. There are indications he is thwarting democracy by not allowing political candidates to return to Pakistan to stand for election.

President Musharraf may be turning a blind eye toward the growing ranks of Taliban and Al Qaeda in Pakistan, lacking the ability or will to crack down on terrorist training camps in western Pakistan, and stopping the proliferation of jihadists moving across the Pakistan-Afghan border, and attacks on Coalition forces and Afghan civilians. In fact, some say with confidence that Osama bin Laden is currently in a training camp near the Pakistani-Afghan border not far from Peshawar, in fact, yet somehow President Musharraf has not been able to find it.

So what of all of this is true? If any of it is true, how does the United States justify continuing its seemingly unconditional support for Musharraf's government? And how do we in Congress justify to the American people writing checks for billions of dollars to a regime that may not be the partner against terrorism the United States needs it to be but may actually be hurting national security interests of the United States and our allies? While many inside and outside Pakistan question President Musharraf's policies, Pakistan remains a strategic U.S. partner in the struggle against terrorism, and we should not forget Pakistan has been a strong supporter and ally to the United States.

That said, our support cannot be unconditional. We look forward to getting answers to some basic questions that go to the heart of

protecting the security of this Nation and her allies, the safety of the United States and Coalition forces serving in Afghanistan, and peace and stability around the world.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

HENRY A. WAXMAN, CALIFORNIA
CHAIRMAN

TOM DAVIS, VIRGINIA
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
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**House Oversight and Government Reform Committee
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs**

**Opening Statement by Ranking Members Christopher Shays
“Pakistan at the Crossroads; Afghanistan in the Balance”**

July 12, 2007

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These dramatic developments—and in Pakistan’s capital city nonetheless—underscore our need to understand the forces threatening the peace and stability of our allies in the South Asia region and our allies across the globe.

I look forward to today’s hearing as an opportunity to discuss: (1) the effects of extremism in Pakistan; (2) the effects of US aid to Pakistan; (3) the prognosis for Pakistan’s forthcoming elections; and, (4) the implications for Pakistani civil society of President Musharraf’s attempted dismissal of the Pakistani Chief Justice.

Subcommittee staff recently met with a delegation of provincial leaders from the Afghan side of the Pakistan-Afghan border. Those Afghani leaders expressed hope for a peaceful Afghanistan, but stated peace and development cannot be achieved without security.

Security cannot be achieved without strict border enforcement. And, strict border enforcement cannot be achieved without cooperation from the Pakistani government and stronger action by President Musharraf. These are strong and insightful sentiments expressed by the Afghani leaders, especially as they are most directly affected by Pakistani action—or inaction.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Shays.

We will now receive testimony from our witness that is with us here today. I want to begin by introducing the witness. I won't go into the long resume. I think most people are familiar with it, but it is a long and distinguished career as a public servant in Foreign Affairs, and I appreciate that, and we all do. I would like to welcome Ambassador Richard A. Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs.

Mr. Boucher, as you know, it is the policy of this subcommittee to swear you in before you testify, so I ask you to please stand and raise your right hand.

If any other person is going to be assisting you in testimony today, we would ask them also to stand.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. TIERNEY. I am going to suggest, Mr. Boucher, that you can recognize that your written remarks are already on the record and will be incorporated in there. Please feel free to either reiterate them or to speak in an abbreviated fashion. We have 5 minutes generally for the opening statement. We are going to be liberal with that because of the complexity of the topic, but with some mindfulness, allowing Members at some point to be able to get some questions in.

Thank you, sir.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD A. BOUCHER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Shays, other members of the subcommittee. It is a great pleasure to be here today, and I thank you for holding a hearing that is both topical and timely. I appreciate the effort that you all put into supporting and working with Pakistan and the travel that you have made out there to help further our policy goals.

I would like to give a sort of abbreviated introduction, because I am sure that with the breathtaking complexities that you referred to, that we will probably get to a lot of different things during the course of questions. But if I can, I would like to lay out sort of the basic framework of how we see Pakistan and what we are doing there.

As you noted, Pakistan is a vital ally to us in a very broad variety of ways. Our goal is to see that Pakistan succeeds as a democratic nation, a prosperous people, and a moderate Moslem society.

First of all, Pakistan is vital to the war on terror. We all need to do everything we can to prevent attacks that could come from this part of the world.

Second of all, Pakistan is vital to the fight in Afghanistan. We all know we won't have stability in Afghanistan unless Pakistan is stable, and vice versa. The militancy, the extremism can move both ways across the border, and that is something that leaders in both Pakistan and Afghanistan recognize.

Third, in a more long-term, strategic way, Pakistan is vital to opening up the flow of people, energy, ideas, and trade between South and Central Asia. That is a strategic change that can reverse

hundreds of years of history and open up opportunities for the countries of Central Asia, as well as South Asia.

We have and will have a long and very enduring strategic relationship with Pakistan, to work together for its success in all these areas, but achieving our goals in Pakistan is going to take time.

So how can we help Pakistan succeed politically, economically, and militarily? I talk about the four E's—education, economy, energy, and elections.

First, we are supporting the renewal of Pakistan's public education system. If you look at all the various money we put in through project assistance, through the Fulbright program, through their own budget, it is well over \$100 million a year that we put into the reform and expansion of education in Pakistan. That is a small part of their own efforts to reform and expand their education system. They have, I think, gone from \$1.3 billion a year on education from the Federal budget in 2003 to about \$2.3 billion a year spent in education from their own Federal budget. Our assistance helps support that.

Second is the reform and expansion of the economy. The economy is growing at 6, 7 percent a year, based on open investment climate, open economy, and that is doing quite well. We want to support and continue that.

The third is helping them support the diversification of their energy supplies. One of the problems that Pakistan faces, particularly this year, is called load shedding. It is basically brownouts, cutting in power to a lot of people. That is one of the things that you see a lot of comment on in the press and in politics. We are trying to work with the government, work with other nations to bring energy down from the north in the form of electricity from Tajikistan and other places, as well as to help them develop new sources of energy in coal or alternate energy systems.

The fourth E is elections. Pakistan is poised now for a peaceful transition this year from military rule to civilian government. We are doing everything we can to support a free and fair election. We put about \$20 million this year into supporting the Election Commission doing basic poll watcher training, political parties training, things like that, and we have been very active and outspoken in pushing for an open election and trying to help look at some of the areas where they can do better in terms of making sure that everybody has a choice, and that the choices of voters in Pakistan are respected.

We have also made clear we think this election is important for the body politic of Pakistan, not just for the choices the people have, but in order to form a more stable, moderate center to Pakistani politics. We have tried to encourage that, for the moderates to come together at the center so that they are better poised to fight extremist elements in this society.

That is the fifth E, which is the danger, and that is extremism that afflicts Pakistan. It is a threat to the people of Pakistan. It is a threat to the national goals of modernizing Pakistan. It has manifest itself in a number of ways, but let me start with the tribal areas.

Tribal areas of Pakistan have never been governed by the same arrangements as the rest of the country. Going back to British

days, these were covered under sort of hands-off arrangements, then during the modern period those arrangements were never changed. So the government doesn't have the full authority and writ in those places. They operate through agents and through tribes.

Nonetheless, the government is interested in trying to bring these places into the national system, into the national economy, one of the reasons being to give people alternate ways of earning a living than smuggling and picking up guns. So they have developed a very comprehensive development plan for the tribal areas. The Pakistan government is going to put \$100 million a year for 10 years into the development of these areas, and we have told them we will come up with \$150 million a year for the next 5 years to support the economic development of the tribal areas.

In addition, we are trying to open up some economic opportunity for the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and have said we are going to propose to the Congress reconstruction opportunity zones. We hope that there will be a legislative opportunity for that in the coming months, and we hope that Members will support that legislation when it appears, because it is, again, the idea that if you can have economic development in these regions you can use the economic development to bring people into the national economy and to get them to take up different occupations than the ones many of the young men there have been following.

The second big thing going on in the tribal areas has been the security efforts. Now, Pakistan, as I said, has been a strong ally in the fight against terrorism. They have captured more Al Qaeda than any country in the world, lost more people in doing that. They have been key to the efforts that have been made over the last 5 years.

You have also seen perhaps, over the last 6 to 9 months, more of the focus on the tribal areas of Pakistan, the border areas of Pakistan. And, indeed, they have had a number of successes. Several major Taliban leaders have been captured or killed this year so far, Molaz Mani in January and Mullah Obadullah, Muladu Dulalang. Some of these gentlemen were killed in Afghanistan, but these were all joint efforts with Pakistan that led to the elimination of some of the top Taliban leaders who have been operating from Pakistan to support the insurgency in Afghanistan.

The addition you saw earlier this year, the tribal leaders with some support from the government turned on what they call the Uzbeks, some of the foreign militants who have been in these areas associated with Al Qaeda, engaging in trade and engaging in bombing and engaging in fighting alongside the Taliban, and hundreds of those people were expelled from the tribal regions this year with the support of the government.

The government has now made clear to the tribes that all the foreign elements, the foreign militants, are a danger to—those areas are a danger to Pakistan and need to be expelled, and you have seen very strong warnings from President Musharraf about 2 weeks ago, from Governor Orakzai, the Governor of Northwest Region, in recent days warning the tribes that they need to expel the foreigners and not allow the Taliban to cross the border or to cross into the settled areas of Pakistan. That has been a big concern

throughout Pakistan, that the Taliban are somehow trying to expand their influence in the settled areas.

So you have seen steps that the government has taken in terms of moving troops into the region, putting up better checkpoints near the borders. They have built more border posts. They have equipped the people there better, and we have tried to support that and will try to support that as we go on.

And the other manifestation of extremism that we have seen the government deal with is the Red Mosque controversy. I looked it up on the internet. This Mosque was founded in 1965. It really grew over the last 20 years into a major center for extremist views, extremist ideologies, and has been accused over the last year to many attacks, abductions, forays against policemen or people in society, and really has led to, you might say, a popular backlash. A lot of Pakistanis see this activity, a lot of Pakistanis have seen the activity of the Taliban in some of the settled areas, have really risen up and said no, you know, we want video stores, we want barber shops, we want to have a normal, modern life.

The government tried to contain this problem for a long time, was very reticent about going after the Mosque or going into the Mosque because of the large numbers of women and children who were there, but they found in the last couple of weeks that they were not able to do that any more, and because the militants were coming out and attacking policemen and others and trying to seize weapons, so the government did react. They have spent the last 9 days, I think it is, in a military operation to clear the place out, and it looks like it is pretty much over today.

There was some loss of life. We don't yet know the final numbers on how many people might have been killed in the operation, some soldiers, some militants inside the Mosque, but I would say that, considering the difficulty of the operation, the scope of the operation, and the refusal of the people inside to negotiate and lay down their arms and come out peacefully, the government did act with relative restraint and care as they conducted this operation.

Let me say again, Mr. Chairman, these are all elements in stabilizing Pakistan. Everything from education and energy and elections to dealing with the problems of extremism, they are all part of helping Pakistani people achieve better lives in a more modern society.

This is the direction that President Musharraf is leading the nation, and we are proud to work with him. It is a fundamental direction that is important to us and important to him and important to the Pakistani people, and we work with the government, we work with the people, we work with people, civil society, political parties who want to lead Pakistan in this direction.

If they succeed, Pakistan can not only be a stable anchor for the region, prosperous nation for its people, but it can also be a model to others in the developing world, particularly in Moslem countries. So it is important that we help Pakistan succeed, especially in making the transition this year to civilian government and to a democratic government for its country.

As I said at the beginning, I am pleased to see the interest of Members of Congress and very happy to be able to work with Congress as we go forward in trying to achieve these goals, so thank

you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your time. I would be glad to take questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Boucher follows:]

**STATEMENT OF RICHARD A. BOUCHER
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOUTH AND
CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS**

**BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND
GOVERNMENT REFORM**

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

JULY 12, 2007

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to appear before the Committee. As you know, Mr. Chairman, Pakistan plays a key role in some of our most critical foreign policy goals, such as creating a regional environment inhospitable to Taliban extremism and terrorism and building a modern society. Pakistan is also critical to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Without Pakistani support and cooperation, we would face severe difficulties in supplying, reinforcing, and protecting our troops and those of our allies who are defending the democratically elected Afghan government. A successful Pakistan—a prosperous, moderate democracy—would also be a stable and stellar example throughout the Muslim world.

Helping Pakistan succeed in becoming a prosperous, moderate, and democratic nation is a critical part of all our policy goals for Pakistan. A stable, prosperous Pakistan is key to the stability and prosperity of the whole region. Pakistan links the landlocked, energy-laden nations of Central Asia to the dynamic markets of South Asia. Therefore, our goal is to forge a long-term strategic partnership between the United States and Pakistan that is strong, multi-dimensional, and enduring. Furthermore, a successful transformation of Pakistan would bring the benefits of prosperity, good governance, and justice to 160 million people, undercutting the appeal of violent extremism and helping to provide an important example of modernity and moderation in the Muslim world.

2007 is a vital year with fundamental tasks to achieve our long-term goals in Pakistan. This is the year that will help determine whether Pakistan makes a successful transformation into a prosperous and stable democracy, and we intend to assist President Musharraf to fulfill his commitment to this goal. Our assistance will help the Pakistani people enjoy the benefits of good governance and change the nature of the relationship between the people and their government in the least

governed and most vulnerable areas of Pakistan. We believe that Pakistan must make a full transition to democracy and civilian rule and we support the Pakistani government's efforts to bring about that transition. The challenge is to maintain the right balance and implement the plan quickly and effectively. Anne Patterson, our new ambassador to Pakistan, who was recently confirmed by the Senate, is fully committed to finding ways to more effectively deliver our message. Social and economic development programs as well as distinct roles for both the military and political forces can play an instrumental role in nurturing democracy.

The upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections will be critical benchmarks in Pakistan's progress towards full democracy. To help Pakistan's transition, we are helping strengthen the accountability and transparency of Pakistan's democratic and civic institutions. The U.S. Agency for International Development has numerous programs to support fair, free, and transparent elections. But we also know that democracy means more than just holding elections. We are working to strengthen a free and vibrant press, a fair and impartial criminal justice system, active civil society organizations, an independent judiciary, and broadly participative and responsive political parties and institutions.

U.S. development assistance in Pakistan is tailored to help build sustainable growth and improve living standards that will promote the conditions for good governance, responsible citizenship, and foreign investment. In 2006, the United States provided Pakistan \$69.3 million to improve primary and higher education along with other funds that support education through the national budget. The U.S. government has also provided \$200 million in budget support starting in Fiscal Year 2005, which has opened budget space for the government of Pakistan to spend additional resources on education, improving macroeconomic performance, and the quality and access to healthcare and education. This budget support is guided by the "Shared Objectives," which are negotiated every year with the Government of Pakistan to identify those sectors where U.S. budget support will be spent. In 2007, Pakistan agreed to spend \$56.25 million of the budget support toward education.

Thus, over \$100 million of our assistance goes toward education. As a result, Pakistan has increased its overall spending on education from \$1.3 billion in 2003 to \$2.3 billion in 2006. In Punjab, Pakistan's largest province, provision of free textbooks and stipends paid to female students have increased enrollment by more than two million students since 2001. In the Tribal Areas, enrollments have increased 38% since 2000, with female enrollment accounting for 27% of total

enrollments. National female literacy rates in Pakistan have increased from 32% in 1998 to 40% in 2005.

We are also working closely with our Pakistani and non-governmental partners on key issues such as furthering women's rights and legal protection for ethnic and religious minorities, and combating forced child labor and human trafficking. Women's health is a particular challenge in Pakistan, but we know that the rate of maternal mortality can be lowered significantly with properly trained rural health providers, and the U.S. Agency for International Development providing such training.

In the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the Afghan-Pakistani border regions, the government has developed a comprehensive strategy to combat terrorists and extremists by integrating these ungoverned spaces into the mainstream of Pakistan's economy and government. By boosting security and governance as well as political and economic development, the people of that region will have an opportunity to reject the violence and extremism and embrace peace and prosperity instead. When this choice has been made on a wide scale these areas currently being exploited as safehavens will be rendered permanently inhospitable to terrorism and violent extremism. The government has meanwhile expanded its political efforts by working to boost the capacity and will of local tribes to resist and expel violent extremists in their midst, achieving successes such as the expulsion of al Qaeda-affiliated Uzbeks by tribal forces in and around South Waziristan. It has also brought in additional troops, strengthened border posts and controls, and helped kill or capture major Taliban figures such as the chief field commander Dadullah, and other top leaders Osmani, and Obeidullah.

Of course, we are under no illusions about the difficulties faced by the Government of Pakistan in extending its writ into these territories or about Al Qaeda and Taliban activities in this area, and the level of commitment required to prevent them from finding safe-haven there. The Tribal Areas have the worst social indicators in all of Pakistan, such as only a 3 percent female literacy rate. The Government of Pakistan is committed to improving living conditions and expanding governance in the Tribal Areas, and we have requested additional funds in the Fiscal Year 2008 budget to assist Pakistan in this crucial endeavor.

President Bush has also announced his intention to create Reconstruction Opportunity Zones, which would further expand cooperation and official ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan. These zones are a critical part of our broader counterterrorism strategy in these areas, designed to connect isolated regions to the

global economy and create vital employment opportunities in territories prone to extremism. The zones will encourage investment and economic development by granting duty-free entry to the United States for certain goods produced in the zones, and create employment alternatives for the working-age population that may otherwise be drawn into terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and other illicit activities. This initiative includes input from across the spectrum of U.S. Government agencies—State, Commerce, U.S. Trade Representative, Treasury, Defense, Agriculture, Labor, Homeland Security, and others. We hope Congress will support this initiative with the necessary legislation so that we can utilize this important economic tool in our fight against terrorism.

Over the last eight years Pakistan has developed a judicial system worth defending, a civil society that wants to defend it and media capable of publicizing and commenting on their activities and successfully defends its own rights. It will be important for all political parties and all international observers, including ourselves, to allow the judicial proceedings to play out and to respect the final judgment of the court.

The majority of Pakistanis are concerned about the growing threat of extremism and radicalism in Pakistan's traditionally moderate society. The Red Mosque has posed a particularly difficult problem for the Pakistani government. Armed students and clerics at the mosque have openly defied authorities for several months in their campaign for Islamic Sharia law. The Pakistani government did not take action against the Mosque fearing it would endanger the lives of the many innocent woman and children used by Mosque leaders as a shield for their activities. The government stayed its hand, despite mounting public demands for action, until the threat to security became intolerable -- when those in the mosque compound fired upon and killed two Pakistani soldiers on July 3. We understand that a military operation against militants inside the compound began on July 10, shortly after negotiators failed to persuade them to choose a peaceful solution.

Our partnership with the Pakistanis gives us an opportunity to support Pakistan's own efforts to become a modern, open, prosperous, democratic state, and a moderate voice in the Islamic world. This is the vision for Pakistan that President Musharraf has articulated and demonstrated by reiterating his resolve to stop Talibanization in the frontier areas as well as extremism within urban areas such as the Red Mosque compound. It is strongly in the U.S. national interest that Pakistan succeeds in realizing this vision.

There has been a lot of discussion about what Pakistan can and should do against extremists, including the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Islamabad faces immense challenges on this front, but Pakistan's contribution has been significant. Since 2001, the Pakistani Government has arrested hundreds of terrorist suspects, turning over to the U.S. such senior al-Qaida figures as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi bin al Shibh, and Abu Zubaida. There are currently 85,000 Pakistani forces stationed on the rough terrain of the Afghanistan border region, and more than 450 members of Pakistan's security forces have sacrificed their lives in support of anti-terror efforts. Pakistani security operations in the tribal areas are disrupting terrorist activities in an area where terrorists previously felt secure. One unfortunate indicator of the insurgents' desperation to maintain their hold is the intimidation of the local population through targeting tribal leaders.

In many of its operations against militants, Pakistani troops are using equipment and training provided by the United States. This assistance has been crucial to bolstering Pakistan's anti-terrorism capabilities, and by extension, our own. The State Department remains committed to working closely with the Department of Defense, with our Pakistani counterparts, and with Congress to ensure that Pakistani security forces have the necessary training and equipment to conduct these operations appropriately and effectively. I am fully aware of the substantial amount of foreign assistance—both economic and security—that Congress has provided Pakistan, and assure you that we will work to ensure that these valuable resources the American people have entrusted to us to work with Pakistan are utilized efficiently and effectively.

We continue to actively pursue our public diplomacy efforts inside Pakistan to ensure that we reach out to Pakistani citizens to share our own message, and help others understand American policies, views and values. Americans continue to be generous in their willingness to help and reach out to Pakistanis as demonstrated after the devastating 2005 earthquake in Kashmir, where the immediate and overwhelming support of the U.S. military and the donations of private Americans saved many lives and garnered the goodwill of the Pakistani people. Nothing could have been more effective in demonstrating American values and disseminating a message of friendship between our peoples.

We have also made real progress in Afghanistan on a broad range of fronts. On the security side, we and our NATO and Afghan partners succeeded in blunting the Taliban's planned spring offensive and we are working together to consolidate and extend those gains. The Taliban have taken some very significant losses this year, including the death of Mullah Dadullah and other key leaders. Reconstruction and

development work remains on track in most of the country and the Afghan economy continues to grow at impressive rates, with licit GDP more than doubling since 2002. Millions of Afghan children are in school, girls and boys alike, and now for the first time in Afghan history there is a realistic prospect of a mostly literate population. Our support for democracy and governance initiatives in Afghanistan is also paying off, and the Afghan parliament is assuming its appropriate role as a deliberative body. Clearly, the Afghans still face enormous challenges in all these areas and on other fronts as well. The counternarcotics challenge is especially daunting, as is the broad challenge of promoting rule of law and building the judicial capacity of the Afghan government. But I am convinced that we are all moving in the right direction and that with sustained international support Afghanistan can look forward to a stable, democratic and more prosperous future.

We are working with the Pakistani and the Afghan governments to build stability in the areas along their rugged border. President Karzai and President Musharraf recognize that improving relations and stabilizing the border region are critical to both countries. The joint statement issued by President Musharraf and President Karzai in Ankara this spring illustrates their commitment. Pakistani and Afghan planners are now preparing for a landmark jirga that could build constituencies for stability in both countries and boost bilateral relations. We and our NATO allies are working to foster expanded Pakistan-Afghanistan bilateral dialogue, stronger economic and trade ties, and deeper cooperation between Pakistani and Afghan border security forces. With U.S. assistance, Pakistan is working to secure its border with Afghanistan to prevent the smuggling of arms, terrorists, and illegal drugs which are fueling the Taliban insurgency. Also, much less frequently mentioned is Pakistani cooperation in facilitating the logistical support of United States and NATO forces deployed in neighboring Afghanistan. Most of our support for Coalition forces in Afghanistan passes through Pakistan.

Pakistan's transformation into a moderate democracy and a prosperous and open nation where its people can thrive is vital to our own future and safety, as well as the future prosperity and regional stability of South and Central Asia. I look forward to working with Congress toward this goal.

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. We appreciate your comments and your willingness to have a dialog with us.

I am going to start. Mr. Shays and I were talking, and his suggestion, if there is no objection, we might do 10 minute rounds of questioning, unless anybody has a pressing engagement elsewhere. Sometimes, as you know, Ambassador, we have other committees going on at the same time.

Mr. BOUCHER. I do.

Mr. TIERNEY. I will take the liberty of starting, if I may.

Ambassador, do you think that we have sufficiently broad and deep enough ties to Pakistan to maintain a strategic relationship with that country if President Musharraf were to exit the scene? What are we doing specifically to facilitate ties directly with the Pakistani people, and what else should we be doing?

Mr. BOUCHER. Let me say I think we do have very broad ties in Pakistan to people throughout the society. We know people all over the country. We have consulates in Lahore, Kashower, Karachi. We have people who worked down in Quetta, largely in drug enforcement missions, but they work with local authorities down there. Whenever I travel there I meet with a wide variety of people, from the political parties of Pakistan—I have met with people from all the political parties of Pakistan, and these are, in fact, regular contacts of our embassy.

We certainly think the fundamental direction that President Musharraf has been leading Pakistan is one that is compatible with our goals and, frankly, compatible with the goals of the majority of the Pakistani people, but we have very broad outreach to all segments of society. We have been very involved with the development of civil society. We have close ties with women's groups, with academics, with legal people in the legal profession, some of whom are now protesting, and politicians of all stripe. So we do try to make sure that we have very broad contacts there.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. I want to give you a quote of the author Ahmed Rashid, who I think you are familiar with, "To spook the west into continuing to support him, Musharraf continues to grossly exaggerate the strength of the Islamic parties that he warns might take over his nuclear-armed country. In fact, the United States would be far safer if it pushed for a truly representative Pakistani government that could marginalize the jihadists rather than placing all its eggs in Musharraf's basket."

Do you agree with that statement? If not, why not?

Mr. BOUCHER. I think he is totally wrong. I think he is wrong in his characterizations. I think his policy prescription is exactly right, but I think that was the article that he mentioned my name in quite a few times, and, frankly, a half a dozen things in there are just flat out wrong.

We don't put all our eggs in one basket. We do support moderation and we don't—I have never heard Musharraf or anyone else exaggerate the strength of the Islamist parties. Most of the people that I have talked to in Pakistani politics, whether they are in government parties or other ones, think that because of the distortions of the 2002 elections the Islamist parties were able to actually gain more seats than they would get and will get in a free and fair election. We will ultimately see what the voters decide.

There have been some bi-elections, like the one up in Bajaur, where the Islamist parties didn't do that well.

So I think the contention is not made. The idea that we should push for a more centrist political orientation in Pakistan and work with the parties to try to encourage that is a correct observation, but, in fact, that is what we do, and that is what I said in my testimony we do.

Mr. TIERNEY. I am encouraged to hear you say things along that line. I happen to agree that if you have a legitimate elected government under free and fair elections, the legitimacy is going to better empower you to deal with extremism. I think that is why it is important.

Looking at the election situation, I want to ask you if you have reviewed the National Democratic Institute's USAID funded review of preliminary voters list. I assume that you have.

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. So what should we do regarding the finding? And I am going to go through basically a number of these. One finding that, based on a statistically significant sample size, up to 13 of 52 million entries of the voter polls' rolls may be duplicates or incorrect. What should we do about the fact that, using that same sample size, up to 16 million eligible voters are yet to be registered? What should we do with regard to the finding that the voter rolls contain vastly fewer numbers than previous elections on a scale suggesting that the reduction cannot be attributed to the de-duplication, alone?

These are serious issues. When I hear you speak about making sure that the votes are open and transparent, no disagreement there; but tallying the votes on election day is only one part of it. If we don't make sure that they have a list over there from which they are working that enables everybody to be registered that should be registered, that doesn't put up poll taxes or other barriers to get people, I think we are in for some difficulty there.

So on top of asking whether or not you read that poll and respond to that, let me also ask you if you have read former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's June letter in which she laid out, I think, about 10 different issues that were significant, and your reaction to that, as well.

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes, sir, I have looked at the National Democratic Institute report. I have seen Former Prime Minister Bhutto's letter. Her party also did a very detailed and extensive analysis of the 2002 election and a lot of the problems that they saw there, and we have looked at that. We have also looked at other reports on previous elections and what needed to be corrected. So, you know, there are things in there, basic things like transparent ballot boxes, that they said, you know, really were needed, and that is one of the things that we are paying for in Pakistan is to get them transparent ballot boxes, which are harder to stuff.

So we have tried to take to heart all those things. More important, I think, is we have tried to really encourage the Election Commission to take those things seriously and to look at all these specifics and deal with them.

When I was in Pakistan last time, I met again with the Election Commissioner to talk to him about these things. The voter rolls is,

indeed, an issue. First of all, everybody thinks there was a lot of duplication on the voter rolls, and, second of all, everybody thinks there are a lot of people left out. So at one point you have to reduce the duplication, but you have to register all the unregistered people.

There were issues over ID cards that seem to have been settled, but really the parties need to be able to go through these lists and make sure that they are accurate and check their voters, check their precinct voters, and check for duplications.

Mr. TIERNEY. But if I can interrupt, that is not being done. I mean, clearly as recently as yesterday, conversation with people over there that is not being done and there is still considerable concern about that.

Mr. BOUCHER. It is being done in some ways and not others. The voting lists are now published at election centers. There are display centers where the voter lists are on display in a particular precinct. I went in Quetta to one of those display centers at a school, and they have them there, and anybody can come in and look and make sure my name is on and make sure other names aren't on five times.

To do that in a nation of 50 to 70 million voters is pretty hard, and particularly when you are doing across places, and so we have pushed, encouraged the Election Commission to make these lists available in CD form and computerized form so the parties can go through them more thoroughly and use modern technology to try to identify lapses.

At this point, you know, they talk about it. They haven't done it. We keep pushing.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, I hope that you will continue to keep pushing—

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY [continuing]. Because I think those elections are not going to be able to be termed free and fair—

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY [continuing]. Unless we get that resolved and, given all the money that USAID and the United States is putting into the elections, we are going to be the ones that are going to be arguably—

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY [continuing]. Complicit, or at least people are going to say that we are complicit—

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY [continuing]. In not having made that happen.

Mr. BOUCHER. Can I add one more thing?

Mr. TIERNEY. Sure.

Mr. BOUCHER. There is a lot of discussion right now in Pakistan among the political parties about having all the parties get together and agree on basic code of conduct and rules, guidelines for the election. We think that would be a very good thing. We have tried to encourage that with all the parties.

Mr. TIERNEY. And I hope, which hasn't been done yet, encouraging the Election Commission to have those parties at the table and be able to work off of any complaints or suggestions that they have.

Mr. BOUCHER. Absolutely.

Mr. TIERNEY. Which is not happening, either.

Mr. BOUCHER. That is one of the first things I said in my first meeting with the Election Commissioner last year.

Mr. TIERNEY. Now, in your written testimony you said, "President Musharraf reiterated his resolve to stop Talibanization of the frontier areas." And you said, "The government of Pakistan has developed a comprehensive strategy to combat terrorist extremists by integrating these ungoverned spaces into the mainstream of Pakistan's economy and government."

I have to tell you that, you know, after having been there and witnesses here in other hearings, what went on in the Waziristan agreement clearly looks to be failed policy. Have you had that conversation with President Musharraf? Does he recognize and acknowledge that has been an extremely failed policy? And reiterated again just yesterday by our own individuals testifying in front of another committee telling us that there are worse conditions there than before the agreements, that not enough is being done.

Mr. BOUCHER. I think we all recognize that the agreement in North Waziristan hasn't worked. The basic framework, because the government doesn't have direct control, they thought they could go and sign an agreement with the tribal leaders that was based on three key premises: one is no foreigners, no foreign militancy; two is no cross-border activity; and three is no infiltration into settled areas.

That was a premise of the agreement that was signed in September. By November we and others realized it wasn't working. In fact, lifting the check points had led to probably more freedom of movement and something of an influx of Al Qaeda people into that area that was of serious concern to us.

President Musharraf recognizes that, as well, and has said so in public, as well as in meetings.

So what they have done since then is to try to call the tribes to account to make it work, and that was part of what they did in December and January before they moved against the Taliban and the Uzbeks in the area, and as part of what he has done again in his recent statements, and General Orakzai's recent statements to the tribes, that they need to expel all of the foreigners, including the Al Qaeda Arabs.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. My time is up and I am going to pass on to Mr. Shays.

I just want to say in the contest between the Uzbeks, we were there pretty much when that was happening, and we had some fairly good accounts from a number of different sources. There was more like one Taliban group fighting another Taliban group, and the government finally decided to weigh in. I would like to explore that a little bit more with you later on.

Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. If you would just go to Mr. Duncan, I might take some of his time.

Mr. TIERNEY. Certainly.

Mr. Duncan.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling this important hearing, and thank you Mr. Shays for coming to me first.

Mr. Secretary, like I am sure most Members, I have read a few thousand pages of articles, reports, news stories, excerpts from books about Iraq over the last 5 years. I have read far less about—and I have been to Iraq once, not like Mr. Shays, who has been there I think 15 or 16 times, but I have never been to Pakistan or Afghanistan and I know far less. I have come mainly to learn here today.

I know most of your testimony so far has been about Pakistan. The hearing is entitled, “Pakistan at the Crossroads; Afghanistan in the Balance.” I am wondering can you tell us what is the total U.S. presence in Pakistan and Afghanistan at this time, counting civilian government personnel, military personnel, and U.S. Government contractors? Do you have any rough guess?

Mr. BOUCHER. I think somewhere in a briefing book I have some exact numbers, but in Afghanistan the United States—

Mr. DUNCAN. I am asking about both countries.

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes.

Mr. DUNCAN. Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Mr. BOUCHER. So let me do it piece by piece, and then—

Mr. DUNCAN. Sure. Go ahead.

Mr. BOUCHER. And then we can try to add them up.

The U.S. forces in Afghanistan are now about 26,000. There are about 46,000 United States and NATO forces together. And, in fact, we not only have more NATO troops in Afghanistan than we did a couple of years ago, but we have more U.S. troops even than when NATO started to deploy, so some of the feeling over the last couple of years, maybe the United States was leaving and NATO was coming in, is just wrong. We have had an expansion of our forces and expansion of their area of operations, which has been very important.

I would have to get an exact number on the number of civilians that we have. We have, you know, several hundred at our embassy. We have people out in the PRTs. I think a couple dozen of the provincial reconstruction teams have Americans in them, including American staff. I can get you the exact numbers on that.

In Pakistan we have about I think 350 regular personnel assigned to our embassy and associated with our embassy. As I said, we have consulates in Mahor, Karachi, Peshawar. We have drug enforcement personnel and some others down in Quetta at the air wing down there. Some of those are contractors. And then at any given moment we have several hundred temporary duty people in Pakistan. So you probably have at any moment maybe 600 to 700 U.S. officials working in Pakistan, but, again, I would have to get you more exact numbers.

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, I would appreciate it if you would submit that information.

A similar and related question, you have mentioned that we have promised \$150 million over the next 5 years, for a total of \$750 million for economic development in the tribal areas. We are spending \$100 million a year on education. You mentioned \$20 million at another time. We have been given several articles. One article mentions that Vice President Cheney apparently expressed some concern that this Congress might cut military aid that we are giving to the Pakistani military.

Can you tell me how much military aid we are giving? And what I am wondering about, do you have any idea about how much we are spending on a yearly basis on everything put together—contractors, military, civilian—how much we are spending in Pakistan on a yearly basis total?

Mr. BOUCHER. We spend—

Mr. DUNCAN. Aid direct and indirect.

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes. We spent \$738 million this year on assistance programs; \$300 million of that goes to military assistance. The rest is economic assistance, including things like education, economic reform, some health programs, earthquake relief and reconstruction programs, you know, bit of emergency relief money we found after the cyclones hit Pakistan recently. So that is 738, the bulk of which, 60 percent of which is economic.

There is an addition. It is not assistance, it is reimbursements. We reimburse the Pakistani military through Coalition support funds for their costs in supporting the war on terror and stationing troops and moving them around and gasoline and bullets and training and other costs that they incur as part of the war on terror, and so that is in additional amounts that the Pentagon would have to get you, but that comes to probably in the range of \$100 million a month. It is a lot of money. But they have 85,000 troops stationed at the border areas and we pay for that support. But that is reimbursements.

Mr. DUNCAN. So we are paying all their troops for their work?

Mr. BOUCHER. I don't know if it comes to the whole amount of their expenses, but we support their expenses, yes.

Mr. DUNCAN. Is there any other country in the world that is coming anywhere close to doing what we are doing in Pakistan and Afghanistan?

Mr. BOUCHER. No. Other countries are more and more involved. The British have stepped up their aid program. The European Union has just come forward with some money, but in a smaller range than ours.

Mr. DUNCAN. We have been given a lot of articles from various publications. One article is entitled: Pakistan's Shaky Dictatorship. Do you think that most people in Pakistan regard us as a neutral power broker or peacemaker, or do you think that to most of them or many of them see us as propping up a shaky or corrupt dictatorship?

Mr. BOUCHER. I think most people see us as supporting a moderate, modernizing force in society, which includes President Musharraf, it includes some of the political parties who push in that direction, and it certainly includes all the people who look for a free and fair election and a free press, growth of civil society—all of those things that we have been helping with and working with over the years.

I do think that the majority in Pakistan is headed in a moderate and modern direction. They want the education. They want the free election. They want the open press.

You know, they have gone from one TV station 8 years ago to 42 or 44 now, so a lot of changes, positive changes in the economy and the society in Pakistan. I think most people want that to con-

tinue, and most people do associate us with those things that have happened and with the idea that progress needs to be continued.

Mr. DUNCAN. One last question. The State Department's polls over the last few years, except in the Kurdish areas in Iraq, have shown that two-thirds or three-fourths of the Iraqi people want us to leave or not occupy the country. I am wondering has the State Department taken polls in Pakistan or Afghanistan? And what percentage of the people would you estimate in those two countries see us or look at us in a favorable light? What would the polls show on that?

Mr. BOUCHER. I can't recall anything specific about Pakistan polling that I have seen. In Afghanistan I have seen polls that indicate that President Karzai continues to have very strong support in the 60 or 70 percent range, that people do support the government. They turned out to vote for it. They voted for a president and parliament and they liked that. So there is still very strong popular support there and support for the U.S. presence.

Naturally they have concerns. They have concerns about some of the operations and civilian casualties that have been associated with those. They have concerns the government is not delivering what they expect from government. And I think it is, you know, incumbent on all of us not just to take for granted what it may say in the polls, but look in the areas where we can do better, and that is something we do try to do.

Mr. DUNCAN. Of course, I know they certainly want our money. I yield back my time to Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. If I could take your last 30 seconds, Mr. Boucher, I am going to go speak on the House floor on the rule on Iraq.

Mr. BOUCHER. Certainly, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. I will be back. I think this is an extraordinarily important hearing, and I compliment my colleagues for participating and thank them all for being here.

I will be back.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Cooper, recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to thank you for this timely and topical hearing.

Our witness, Ambassador Boucher, is a diplomat, and he has done an excellent job of putting a positive spin on U.S.-Pakistani relationship. I worry, though, that the average American who occasionally reads the international section of the newspaper looks and sees a country they don't know much about that is on the other side of the world. They may have seen the Angelina Jolie movie, *A Mighty Heart*, but that might be the limit of their knowledge of Pakistan. But if they read the newspaper articles they see that they are probably harboring Osama bin Laden, who, according to our U.S. military, is still rated as about our No. 1 enemy in the world. They are probably harboring Mullah Amar, the Taliban. We know they are harboring A.Q. Khan, the world's leading nuclear proliferator.

I ask myself: is there anything else they could do to harbor an international bad guy? And yet they are still listed as a strong ally of our country and we are still, as my colleague from Tennessee pointed out, giving them extraordinary amounts of aid, both mili-

tary, domestic? And here you are, a perfectly nice, calm diplomat, talking about polling elections in Pakistan when also in your testimony you admit much of the country is ungoverned space, tribal areas the government doesn't even pretend to claim, and yet we are holding elections? The chairman just pointed out that, what, 12 million of the names on the rolls are duplicates or faulty?

I know you have to work with what you have, but there seems to be a disconnect here. How can you solve this problem of cognitive dissonance?

Mr. BOUCHER. Well, I mean, I solve it personally by reading all the newspapers and not just a couple, because in the end Mullah Amar is somewhere in that border region. If you have ever flown over it, you have seen, you know, vast deserts, a sort of hole-in-the-wall canyon where the people can hide out. You have seen enormous mountains where people can hide out. You have seen parts of the country, not large parts of the country, parts of the country where the government doesn't hold sway.

Mullah Amar is probably out there somewhere. Bin Laden is probably out there somewhere. But we are capturing the bad guys, if you read, have been reading the papers about Pakistan for years, you may remember that Ramsey Usef and Kalal Sheik Mohammed were picked up there, that they have consistently picked up Al Qaeda people, that they have lost people doing that. You may have seen that Mulla Obadullah was picked up in Pakistan, and Muladu Dulalang, a top leader of the Taliban from Quetta, was killed in Afghanistan, in part with the help Pakistanis provided us.

You may have seen press reports last week that indicated they picked up several more top Taliban people associated with Mullah Omar.

This is a constant effort. It is a constant effort. There is good stuff going on and there is bad stuff going on. There is a lot of turmoil. There is breathtaking complexity, and it is sometimes hard to sort out.

Mr. COOPER. I am still trying to decide whether you are being moderate and fair or whether you are just making excuses.

Mr. BOUCHER. I am trying to look at the whole picture.

Mr. COOPER. If they are able to harbor three of the world's international outlaws, how many more can they harbor and the State Department would still approve of their behavior? Is this an open invitation, a Motel 6 for terrorists in Pakistan?

Mr. BOUCHER. I don't think—

Mr. COOPER. That they can come and it is always OK and we are doing the best we can?

Mr. BOUCHER. No. You know, a few days after September 11th this administration put very blunt choices in front of the Pakistanis and said, Are you going to fight these guys or not? They said, Yes, we are going to fight those guys. And they have done that, and they have done that for 5 years now. They haven't gotten everybody, frankly nor have we gotten everybody on the Afghan side. So we are always working together, always talking to them. What's next? What do we need to do? Where can we go? How do we cooperate across the border?

That is a constant effort. That is what Vice President Cheney has been out there doing this year, Secretary Gates, Deputy Secretary Negroponte.

Mr. COOPER. Let me ask a different question. Are you confident that the State Department is even kept in the loop of what America is really doing in Pakistan?

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes.

Mr. COOPER. I know this is an open hearing, so we can't talk about current events, but let's talk about some history. The book, Charlie Wilson's War, a movie is coming out on that, and then maybe Americans will tune in to what happened. Were you aware at the time that Congressman Charlie Wilson from Texas was funnelling billions of dollars in aid to the Mujah Hadin?

Mr. BOUCHER. I wasn't working in this area at the time, so no, I probably wasn't.

Mr. COOPER. Were you aware that—

Mr. BOUCHER. I read a lot of accounts of it and I look forward to seeing the movie.

Mr. COOPER. Congressman Charlie Wilson was apparently made a general in the Pakistani army—

Mr. BOUCHER. I have heard things like that, yes.

Mr. COOPER [continuing]. Due to his money shipments to Pakistan?

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes.

Mr. COOPER. A Texas Congressman was made a general in the Pakistani army, given a uniform, and the only condition, according to the book, is that he was asked not to wear the uniform while he was in Pakistan. But apparently in any other country on earth he could parade around in a Pakistani general's uniform. Was the State Department aware of that?

Mr. BOUCHER. I don't know if we were aware at the time, sir. I just don't know. If you read Ghost Wars, that kind of stuff is talked about there. I am not sure if that particular incident is in the book. I know it is in other books. But a lot of that stuff has come out. I mean, let's remember, you know, we were all together from 1979 to 1989 fighting the soviets in Afghanistan, whether Mujah Hadin or the Pakistanis or the ISI or the Saudis. A lot of what we are dealing with now came out of that period. The question is not what did we all do back then; the question is what are we doing now.

Mr. COOPER. Well, let's talk about what are we doing now. I haven't heard much from Karen Hughes lately. Is she still the America's public face to the Islamic world?

Mr. BOUCHER. Well, she is organizing America's public face to the Islamic world. But yes, I talked to her just this morning about Pakistan.

Mr. COOPER. Are we producing results? Is American approval going up in the Muslim world?

Mr. BOUCHER. It is a hard question to answer, sir. In some places we do have very strong approval; in others we have very dismal approvals.

Mr. COOPER. Can you remind me of some places in the Muslim world where we have strong approval other than among the Kurds?

Mr. BOUCHER. Well, that isn't the Muslim world, but Afghanistan I think, you know, people are still very supportive of the U.S.

effort there. As I said, I haven't really seen polls in Pakistan, but I think a lot of people understand what we are doing and they are supportive of what we are doing there.

Mr. COOPER. You haven't seen polls in Pakistan, and this is your account?

Mr. BOUCHER. I am afraid it is not one of the things I look at on a regular basis. Maybe I should, but I have not tried to track things through polls. I have tried to keep in touch with a lot of people throughout society and try to understand their opinions.

Mr. COOPER. Can you remind me how many predecessors there were to Karen Hughes? Wasn't there a Charlotte Beers? Weren't there several folks who—

Mr. BOUCHER. A number of people have had the job.

Mr. COOPER. Can you recall how many in the last 6 years?

Mr. BOUCHER. I was acting at one point, so I don't know if you count that. There was Charlotte. There was Margaret Detwiler. I hate to do this, because I am probably leaving somebody out.

Mr. COOPER. That is four right there: Charlotte, you, Margaret, Karen.

Mr. BOUCHER. I was more nominal than effective, but anyway, yes.

Mr. COOPER. That is an interesting self-appraisal. What can America be doing to be more successful in this region?

Mr. BOUCHER. Sir, as you know, and I know why you are asking these questions, because I did spend a long time as spokesman for the State Department. I tried to grapple with these questions over the course of my career many times.

Frankly, I start with the premise that good policy makes good press. You have to do good things. You have to help people get safety and justice and economic opportunity and education for their kids, and the more of that you do, the more in the long run people will appreciate you.

You have places like India where we have enormously positive approval ratings. I think it is largely because we offer educational and economic opportunity to people and their children.

So that is the premise that I start with, and that is where my focus is now.

Mr. COOPER. It sounds like your theory is that American foreign aid makes us popular. The taxpayer has limited patience.

Mr. BOUCHER. I understand that, but I think also the taxpayer has a very strong interest in seeing these parts of the world stabilized, in taking away the ungoverned spaces and letting government gain control there, and in helping people whose frustrations lead them to horrible acts of violence.

Mr. COOPER. But the American taxpayer I think also wants results, and to see three of the world's most wanted international outlaws—we are still not even allowed to interview A.Q. Khan, right?

Mr. BOUCHER. He is under house arrest and—

Mr. COOPER. We are not allowed to—

Mr. BOUCHER. No, we don't have direct access, but we have gotten good cooperation on that. And, frankly, he is out of business. The network has been destroyed.

Mr. COOPER. But we don't know how many nations he sold the technology to?

Mr. BOUCHER. I think we have had good cooperation and they provided a lot of information to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Mr. COOPER. I see that my time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much.

Mr. Platts.

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your holding this very important hearing and very timely hearing.

Mr. Secretary, I don't want to be too repetitive and apologize for missing some of the early questions, coming in late. In looking back to the events of September 11, 2001, and President Bush's address to the Nation on September 20th from the House of Representatives, he spoke about the importance of countries making a choice. They are either on the side of good against Al Qaeda and the terrorist efforts or on the side of evil and siding with them, but they need to make a choice. And President Musharraf on behalf of his nation made a choice and said, We will no longer stand with the Taliban and recognize them, and we will now stand with the United States and other nations around the world against Taliban, Al Qaeda, and their efforts in having attacked us and seeking to do harm to others, as well.

In him making that choice, that certainly was an important one for his country and for us in having their assistance.

Given the current environment in the Federal overseeing tribal areas of western Pakistan, is the choice he made in the days after September 11th still valid in how it is impacting our national security, given the sanctuary that we now see occurring in western Pakistan?

Mr. BOUCHER. I think the choice is still there, the commitment is still there, the intention is still there. Is it fully effective? No, not yet. We work with him, we follow this closely. We follow the intelligence closely. They have been able to get at a lot of the top Al Qaeda figures who have been in and out in Pakistan over the years. They have had, as I said, some success in the tribal areas with Taliban leaders. They have had some success in the tribal areas against a few of the training camps and madrassas. But, unfortunately, these areas has been infested with extremists of all kinds, and they have gotten some of them but certainly not all.

Mr. PLATTS. It is my understanding from the recent threat assessment that has been done regarding Pakistan that Al Qaeda's efforts in Pakistan to kind of re-energize itself were not successful until recently and following the December 2006, agreement between President Musharraf and the tribal leaders that he would remove his military presence from those areas and rely on the tribal leaders and their colleagues to self-govern, to self-patrol, I guess, that region, and not allow it to become a safe haven.

Given that apparently is not working, what indications, if any, do we have from President Musharraf that he is going to take a different approach in that region? And if there is no different approach being discussed, is it something that we need to then look

at how to take action to ensure the security of our Nation because of his not maybe lack of commitment or interest in doing so, but inability to do so?

Mr. BOUCHER. I think it was mis-reported in the paper. The agreement was actually last September, and by about December 2006 they had realized—we had realized that the agreement wasn't working. The tribes were not effectively dealing with the foreigners and the Taliban that were in their midst. And so what we have seen over the early part of this year was an effort on the part of the tribes, supported by the government, to expel some of the Taliban, and with Pakistani help we were able to get some of the very top leaders of the Taliban who had operated out of Pakistan and to expel the Uzbeks, Chechins, and hundreds of others who have been in those areas.

President Musharraf made a speech about 2 weeks ago up in Peshawar to the tribes saying we have to get all of the foreign militaries, the Al Qaeda and the Arabs, as well, and we have to stop the Taliban, sort of what you want to call the Pakistani Taliban, the ones who are not only supporting the Taliban in cross border but also trying to infect the settled areas of Pakistan. So that seems to be the direction that he is headed now, and we keep in close touch with him about that.

Mr. PLATTS. Is his actions regarding the Red Mosque in just the past days a positive indication of him being more aggressive in going after the extremists in this country?

Mr. BOUCHER. I think it is a very positive indication that he is serious about dealing with the problem of extremism. I think he has popular support in trying to do that.

Mr. PLATTS. My hope is that the actions he has taken with the Red Mosque and your statements of renewed efforts of working with the tribal leaders resulting in efforts to capture key terrorist leaders is going to fulfill itself in a greater sense in the weeks and months ahead.

I know when Congressman Steve Lynch led our delegation to Afghanistan in April, one of our visits was down to one of our forward outposts on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and clearly in the briefings we received the threat coming in from Pakistan is a daily constant threat, and it seems a little illogical, I guess, to me that if we know where the enemy is and we have an ally that is, you know, the host country of that enemy, and they are not able to address the daily threat, that arbitrary border should not prevent our military from doing what it needs to do to not just protect themselves and go after the source of the daily attacks, but in the broader picture better secure our Nation's safety and citizens' safety.

If President Musharraf is going to follow through, obviously it is appropriate that we work with him; but if not, I think we need to rethink how we are dealing with that tribal area for the safety of our soldiers there and their courageous work in Afghanistan, and then ultimately our safety here.

I want to ask one other area, and that deals with, given reports of Taliban and Al Qaeda kind of re-emerging and strengthening in the western region of Pakistan, my understanding is that Britain, Denmark, Germany, a number of countries have a pretty free flow of their citizens between their countries and Pakistan. Those coun-

tries are also part of our visa waiver program. Is there a renewed look on how we are operating our visa waiver program with those countries, given their interactions with Pakistan?

Mr. BOUCHER. Sir, I think it is something that the appropriate people do look closely at, but I haven't been involved in those discussions, so I can't give you any more detail.

Mr. PLATTS. It is something that if, on behalf of the Department, you could followup with the committee—Mr. Chairman, if that would be OK to make the request on behalf of the committee to have the Secretary followup with us on that issue?

Mr. TIERNEY. Ambassador, is that something you are able to do?

Mr. BOUCHER. I would be glad to.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. PLATTS. In conclusion, Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for your efforts and don't want by my questions to imply that I don't appreciate your service to your country and your colleagues at the Department here State-side and in some very dangerous parts of the world in working on behalf of their fellow citizens. We certainly appreciate your patriotic and dedicated service, sir.

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you, sir.

Mr. PLATTS. Yes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. The gentleman yields back.

Mr. Higgins, you are recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I just have a couple of brief questions, really.

I am just trying to get my arms around this situation. What always amazes me about, you know, the Middle East is its relative youth, including Pakistan. I think the real fight against terrorism is a fight for the imagination of the youth of the Middle East, including areas like Pakistan, relative to giving them a better sense of what their future—not what they know it to be, but what it can be, dealing with the potential.

Is it safe to say that the basis for fundamental terrorism, Al Qaeda and Taliban, is located along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border?

Mr. BOUCHER. I think the answer is yes. I am sure others would be more precise on the wording, but there is considerable activity of the Taliban in those border areas of Pakistan. There is considerable Al Qaeda presence, including training, some of the command and control. But, as I said, I think they are under pressure. It is not the only place that they operate. Certainly Al Qaeda people have been picked up in Karachi and other parts of Pakistan. And it is not just in tribal areas, but it does cut down to Quetta, and the Baluchistan border area has been a center of activity, as well.

Mr. HIGGINS. Let me put it a different way. The Al Qaeda base that has emerged in Iraq, the origin of that, is it safe to conclude, is Pakistan, Afghanistan?

Mr. BOUCHER. I don't think that would be precisely accurate. I think you would have to ask the intelligence folks to do that in more detail.

Mr. HIGGINS. Where would be the origin of that Al Qaeda presence in Iraq then?

Mr. BOUCHER. I think they have come from a lot of places and gathered there, and to some extent the base comes from there. They do have some ties with Al Qaeda in other places, including Al Qaeda who are in Pakistan, and there is a significant presence still there.

Mr. HIGGINS. Does the United States' continued support for Musharraf hurt us in the eyes of the 165 million people that live in Pakistan? I mean, he is a military dictator. He is increasingly becoming more unpopular.

Mr. BOUCHER. I think people understand that we have a lot of interest in Pakistan. We have interest in fighting the war on terror, keeping our country safe and their country safe. We have interest in building the economy, in building the education system. We have interest in elections and seeing a free and fair election. We work with President Musharraf and his government on all those things. He is a military ruler, and that is the government that is there.

But we also have very close ties with all the people in the political parties. I think people, by and large, understand that our goal is a strategic one and a broader one, and I know people often say, well, the United States supports Musharraf. Well, yes, we do support Musharraf, but that is part of our overall support for Pakistan in the course that Pakistan has set upon.

Mr. HIGGINS. A final thought on this. The pronouncements of this administration relative to essentially what amounts to a zero tolerance policy concerning those who harbor terrorism, there seems to be a fundamental disconnect here that all the intelligence, including especially the most recent intelligence, conclude that a big problem for us, a big problem for the free world, is what is going on in these training camps.

Pakistan, despite Musharraf's tough talk, seems to be facilitating not only the growth but the strength of what threatens the United States primarily, and I think the free world generally.

How does the administration reconcile this? I mean, I know that there is a duplicitous nature in terms of foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East, but it seems to me that Pakistan has made some early commitments to the United States relative to our fight against terrorism, and yet concurrently seems to be, or if it is not intentional, very ineffective in suppressing the growth and the strength of the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

Mr. BOUCHER. I think, sir, we look at what they are trying to do and we look at how we can help them doing it more effectively. We look at the fact that they have picked up hundreds, hundreds of Al Qaeda over the last few years.

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes.

Mr. BOUCHER. We look at the fact that they have helped us capture or kill 3 out of the top 10 Taliban commanders in the last 6 months. We look at the fact that they just the other day, according to press reports, have picked up several more top Taliban commanders. We look at the fact that they have helped the tribes expel the Uzbeks, who were a source of great trouble, training, and fighters have been in that area. We look at the fact that they have attacked Madrassas. They have attacked training camps where these

foreign fighters are being trained. There has been a lot of activity up in that area.

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes, but you know—

Mr. BOUCHER. But there is a lot to do.

Mr. HIGGINS. The former Secretary of Defense, I always remember, had said that the measure of success in the war on terrorism is—and this was several years ago—are we capturing, are we detaining, are we stopping more terrorist activity every day than is being created. I think this most recent intelligence report is a repudiation of the effect of the strategies advanced by this administration, because there is one thing that sticks out in all of this, and that is that, again, intelligence reports are concluding that Al Qaeda, the Taliban, are at pre-9/11 strength levels, and to me it all adds up to the same conclusion, and that is that our fight has been highly ineffective. The pronouncements of the Secretary of Homeland Security this week about, you know, the heightened threat, you know, obviously I would disagree with any conclusion that we have been effective in our efforts to undermine the strength and growth of the terrorist threat.

Mr. BOUCHER. I haven't seen the report that the newspapers all seem to be talking about right now, so I can't give you the full intelligence assessment. My own view is that this is a difficult and long process. The chief threat to all of us has been ungoverned spaces. That is what Afghanistan was with the Taliban and Al Qaeda operating from there, place where no reasonable government had sway. And that is how we were attacked on 9/11.

And our job, whether it is militarily or diplomatically, is to get government cooperation, government control of the ungoverned spaces in the world. We have done that militarily in Iraq and Afghanistan, are doing that still militarily in Iraq and Afghanistan, also done it diplomatically with our work with, you know, Yemen and Sudan and Libya and a whole bunch of other places. But it is a constant and long-term effort. The government of Pakistan has never had full control over all its territory, and it is trying to extend its control. The government of Afghanistan is trying to extend its control, and we are a major part of that. But until we can help those governments provide good governance and the benefits of good governance, as well as the control of good governance to all its territory, there is still going to be a threat against us, and that is what we have to work very hard to get rid of.

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. The gentleman yields back.

Mr. Burton, you are recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think this is a very timely hearing.

I listened to my colleagues. Some of them are evidently very critical of what the administration is doing. I hope that they are aware that George Washington was criticized the same way and they wanted to remove him from leadership during the Revolutionary War. He was also criticized when the J Treaty was signed. Abraham Lincoln was going to be defeated without any question by McClellan because the war wasn't going well until Sherman took Atlanta. So in every war, I think almost without exception, there have been people who have been very critical of incumbent Presi-

dents when things weren't going well, and I think this is no exception because things haven't been going well.

I would like to say to my colleagues that Senator Lieberman, who is a Centrist Democrat, has been over to Iraq a number of times, as many of us have, and he has said very clearly that in Iraq, if we don't deal with the training camps in Iran, that we are going to see a continual problem over there, and that if we pull out of Iraq with all this going on, that there would be a vacuum created which would be filled by the radicals, and it will become a training ground not just in Iran but throughout Iraq for additional terrorism throughout the world.

Now, regarding Pakistan, I would like to ask Secretary Boucher what would happen if we didn't have an ally like President Musharraf over there, in your opinion?

Mr. BOUCHER. I think if Pakistan was not fighting terrorism, there would be no way we could succeed in Afghanistan or in terms of the security of our homeland.

Mr. BURTON. Well, Musharraf is a major part of our fight to stop the Taliban and terrorist training camps over there, is he not?

Mr. BOUCHER. Absolutely, and he has been a good partner in doing that.

Mr. BURTON. And there have been a number of Taliban leaders, as you said, that have been captured, killed, and just recently they were captured?

Mr. BOUCHER. Over the months and in recent weeks.

Mr. BURTON. And President Musharraf, because of this, in large part, has had a number of assassination attempts on him, has he not?

Mr. BOUCHER. And some of the militants in the mosque—you saw Al Zawah just yesterday was threatening Musharraf because he is fighting against extremists.

Mr. BURTON. Let me also ask you about Mr. Khan. This may be classified, and we will have to get it some other way. Has he been questioned by any of our intelligence people? And do we have any intelligence information on what technology and other nuclear information he may have given to Iran or other countries like Libya?

Mr. BOUCHER. I think we have said in public that we have not had direct access to Mr. Khan, but we have had good cooperation from Pakistani authorities. We have had a good flow of information to the international community, us, other countries, International Atomic Energy Agency, and that we are confident that, based on that information, we have been able to put the network out of business.

Mr. BURTON. I really appreciate you stressing that there is so much wild or vacant land there in the mountainous region that it is very difficult to take care of all the areas and get this thing completely solved in one fell swoop, and the same thing is true in Afghanistan with the Taliban, so I appreciate very much your pointing that out, and also that you pointed out, as I said before, that he has been very cooperative and they have captured a number of the terrorists and the training camps and the leaders over there.

So I appreciate your being here today.

I would just like to say to my colleagues that there is no perfection in war. In every single war that I have read about—and I have

been around quite a while—in every single war there has been tremendous disenchantment when things weren't going well. This is no exception.

In World War II—and I have talked about this before—because everybody was worried about appeasing Hitler and Mussolini and Tojo and all the others over there, we ended up seeing 62 million people die and about half a million American troops.

This is a very insidious war that we are fighting right now. Iran is trying to develop a nuclear capability. On my Web site a number of times it showed a mockup of a briefcase nuclear weapon that weighs about 40 pounds that, if it were placed within three blocks of here, would kill every one of us. It would destroy eight square blocks and the radioactive fallout would probably kill another 50,000 to 100,000 people.

So, you know, this is a very difficult time, and I think Senator Lieberman hits the nail on the head. He sees what is going to happen. If we start pulling in our horns and not supporting our allies, there will be a vacuum created, in my opinion, in Pakistan, in Iraq, and that is going to be filled by the radicals, and they will not be in any way convinced that they should stop their wild movement toward nuclear development, and it will imperil not just the Middle East, but the United States, as well.

So I think we should not be myopic. I think we should look at the big picture and realize, as Winston Churchill did in World War II, that they had to prepare for and deal with people like Hitler, and we have to deal with people like the president of Iran and the leaders in the Taliban and those tribal leaders over there. Otherwise, we are going to have a big problem down the road.

I appreciate very much, again, your being here, and I appreciate your forthrightness. I hope you will come back with further reports in the future.

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you, sir.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. The gentleman yields back.

Mr. Lynch, you are recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. LYNCH. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the ranking member, as well. I think it is great that you are having this hearing, and I appreciate all of the attention that you have given to this issue, and I want to thank the Secretary for coming before the committee and helping us with our work.

First of all, I just want to say I concede the complexity of the task here. I admit, having spent a little time down on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border with Mr. Platt and also the chairman and others who have gone down there, as well, it is a very complex situation. President Musharraf has a difficult balancing act between the Islamic radicals within his own country. However, I must admit I must say that I think your assessment of him, even though he may be the irreplaceable man at this point, I still think that your assessment of his performance objectively is a bit rosier than I would, you know, measure from my own judgment of him.

I just want to say that, having been on the border there, he actually has a policy in place where I was with Colonel Sweitzer of the 82nd Airborne and the Fourth Combat Team down there in the Parrot's Beak area just south of Torra Bora, where he has some

folks where the Taliban are coming across the border on a regular basis, and because of Musharraf we have a no-fire border on our troops. We can't fire into Pakistan in pursuit of Taliban and other forces coming out of that tribal area.

I know terrorists are coming from all over into Afghanistan, but that area over there, bin Laden has a longstanding history in that area, even when they were fighting the Soviets and war on Afghanistan. He has a long history in that area. He has had a longstanding friendship with Hakani and some others who operate in that border area, and that is a definite and central source of insurgency, Taliban, Al Qaeda, and others into Afghanistan. It is demanding great resources, not only of ourselves but the Afghani government, as well.

I also want to point out that the somewhat offhand comments that the Pakistanis don't have a lot of influence in those tribal areas is a choice that they have made. It is a choice that they have made. They made an agreement to create a safe haven there for whoever can dominate that area, whether it be the Taliban or Al Qaeda or other governments. I know the Saudis for a very long time were pumping money into those Madrassas, and, you know, we have 50 percent of the kids in Pakistan don't go to school between the ages of 5 and 9. The fact that these Madrassas are allowed to operate and are being funded provides the only option for a lot of those kids and a lot of those families.

You know, I noticed in our own budget we spend about \$10 billion a year in Pakistan. A little bit more than one-half of 1 percent of that goes to USAID for helping with education. I really think if we are going to get to the root of this we can't provide it directly, because I don't think we have the credibility in Pakistan, especially in those tribal areas, but we have to have some type of honest broker in there to provide a good, solid public education to those kids; otherwise, they will be the terrorists of the future, and we have to figure out a way of stopping this cycle where the Madrassas are creating jihadists in that area. And if we don't get to that, everything else we do will be secondary.

I would like to at some point hear your own opinions on what we can do about getting the shackles taken from our own troops in that tribal area to allow them to go after the Taliban and go after Al Qaeda and to provide a little bit more cooperation on that border area.

This idea that our troops—and I spoke to them personally. They cannot fire over the border, even though they know that the Taliban and Al Qaeda and those jihadists are just over the border and they have been given a safe haven area to launch attacks into Afghanistan.

You know, the great criticism of us after 9/11 was that we allowed training camps to operate in Afghanistan. We allowed the camps in Torra Bora. We allowed that to happen. We knew they were there and we didn't take action and 9/11 happened.

Well, I have to admit there is a little parallel here. We are recognized as a safe haven here and Waziristan. We know they are operating. We have some surveillance there. But we are not taking direct and deliberate action.

Again I go back to the complexity of this situation that Mr. Musharraf has. No doubt about it. But I think we can push him a little harder. We can demand that more positive and affirmative action be taken, you know, against the terrorists who are just growing their organization in that area. I just really believe that we are missing an opportunity here, and I would like to hear, you know, your own views about how we might reduce that threat in Waziristan and allow some of the moderate—and there is a lot of moderate influence in Pakistan. Allow some of that moderate influence to predominate and to shape the future of that country in a way differently than it is right now.

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you, sir. I don't disagree with very much of what you just said. I think we all have to be aware of the fact that the Taliban and Al Qaeda operate from these areas, operate in these areas. They are a threat to our troops in Afghanistan. They are a threat to the Nation of Afghanistan and what we are trying to achieve there. They are a threat to the Nation of Pakistan and to all of us, even in our homeland. And it is one of the critical threats that we have to deal with today. The question is how we are going to deal with it.

In the end, what we are trying to do is to help the Pakistani government exert better control on its side of the border and the Afghan government exert better control on its side of the border. We do it in different ways. We operate more directly in Afghanistan because that is the relationship we have there and that is because the Afghan government is not fully capable yet. Pakistani government has the forces and has the intention, and I don't—I guess, you know, maybe the only difference between what some of you are saying and what I am saying is that we are all aware of the things that haven't been done and the problems that exist. I am also trying to put out some of the things that have been done and that have been achieved, because I think we have achieved a lot.

If you look at what has happened to the Taliban in Afghanistan, for example, last year they set out to take towns and cities and territory, and they failed. This year they set out again to take towns and cities, particularly looking in Kandahar, and they failed. They talked about a spring offensive which never materialized, so now they talk about a summer offensive. And, indeed, they have been able to mount some actions, but more often than not all they have been able to do is blow up school children like they did just the other day in a particularly horrible attack where they killed 12 school kids.

Taliban has not succeeded. It is a constant effort to get after them, to push them out of places in Afghanistan, but we have achieved a certain amount of success in the past year against the Taliban, and that has been both through our efforts and the Afghan government efforts, but also because of the pressure that has been brought on them from the Pakistani side.

We need to continue our efforts and our allies' efforts and the Afghan efforts and the efforts on the Pakistani side to be completely effective.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you. I want to thank you for your service to our country, as well.

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you, sir.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. The gentleman yields back.

Mr. Yarmuth, you are recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also appreciate your being here and appreciate this hearing.

One of the things that occurs to me as I have read through a lot of material and consumed much of the media in recent weeks is the question of expectations. It seems to me that Pakistan offers an example of that, and I am wondering whether we have expectations that are not realistic in the sense of looking at governments to do what we think needs to be done in combatting terrorism.

The thought occurs to me, we talk about polling, we talk about elections, and yet terrorism is, by definition, anti-democratic. If you have 99.9 percent of the people agreeing with a certain way of operating and you have 0.1 percent that is intent on undermining that, the democracy in a certain sense doesn't make any difference.

So I would like you to comment on that, with particular respect to Pakistan, but also recognizing we had elections in Iraq and obviously we haven't—it is obvious to me, anyway, that has not particularly helped combat terrorism. So the entire sense of whether our expectations of governments in combatting terrorism, again in the context of Pakistan particularly, are misplaced.

Mr. BOUCHER. I think it is a legitimate question. I think we need to understand the background of these situations without trying to make apologies for the way things are. The governing relationships in the tribal areas go back to British days. We read British books from 1903 about how they were trying to get a hold of the tribes of Waziristan. We see many of the same problems.

The government of Pakistan, when it came to being 60 years ago, was unable or didn't change those arrangements. Those arrangements were carried down.

And then you had the anti-Soviet period in the 1980's where we and the Saudis and others funnelled a lot of money into those areas and changed some of the relationships. The relationship was always the government dealt with the tribal leaders, the tribal leaders enforced order and discipline. But during the anti-Soviet period there were other people who rose up, the Mullahs and the Madrassas that were being heavily financed, the partners in the Mujah Hadin against the Soviets, a whole lot of other forces that came up in society.

So even now the same arrangements exist where the government goes to the tribal leaders and the tribal leaders imposed order, but the tribal leaders are no longer the sole repositories of power, and so it has become even more complex up there, so you have to deal with that situation. You have to deal with it in some areas where the government can act directly, like around Quetta and Baluchistan, some areas where they have tried to work with the tribal areas and it hasn't worked, like in Waziristan.

But overall you have to do everything you can to help them and expect them to exert government control, understanding that it is a difficult thing to do and that they are going to need different kinds of help.

One of the things we have been trying to help with now is the Frontier Corps, the people recruited into an army for a local area

from the area, people who know the area, because people from outside the areas, not just foreigners, you know, Americans or others, but people from other parts of Pakistan, you know, can go in there and get shot at, and that has happened many, many times to regular Pakistanis from other parts of the country. So we want to transform the Frontier Corps in a more effective force for stability and fighting force there.

I was down on the border in Baluchistan last month with a colonel who has I think 160 kilometers to protect. He has border posts. He has some body armor for his troops, but he has to divvy it up to the places where it is really important. Other troops have to go without. And he has some night vision goggles for some places; other troops have to go without.

So if we want them to be more effective in patrolling the area and controlling the border we have to be in there with them, and we are asking for money in our budgets, according to the 2008 budget, to support the transformation of the Frontier Corps to be a force that can exert better control in that area.

Mr. YARMUTH. Let me ask a slightly different question. It seems to me that it is possible—and I don't want to sound like I am insinuating, but I am asking you if this is possible—that we might have a situation in which you talk about successes—and yes there have been some, and some leaders have been captured and killed—that there is a calculation that I can, if I were Musharraf, I could bring in a couple of these token leaders in order to portray myself adequately as an effective fighter in order to generate continued support, while at the same time I can play both sides and allow some of these things to happen. Are you confident that is not happening in Pakistan, or is that a possibility?

Mr. BOUCHER. I suppose theoretically it could be there, but I don't really see it happening. I see a difficult situation they have dealt with in different ways. We have seen sometimes signs every now and then that there is not a wholehearted effort at all levels and all institutions in Pakistan, and we have raised those when we need to, but we have seen a great deal of cooperation against some very serious and difficult targets. They picked up really high level people from the Taliban and helped us get the highest level people from the Taliban, and we have seen, I think, more and more cooperation as the months go on. And I think particularly since about December of last year we have seen a lot more cooperation and a lot more effective cooperation.

Mr. YARMUTH. Again, looking kind of universally at this problem, one of the things that I think frustrates all of us is that we look across the spectrum of Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, myriad places, and see a variety of settings and situations, and yet there really doesn't seem to be any example of where the war on terror has succeeded. Again, going to the question of expectations, are we looking at something at which there will never be success, or just we haven't found the right approach to success?

Mr. BOUCHER. I think, to get back to your question about expectations, it takes a long time. I think, you know, I certainly think we are all going to be taking our shoes off at airports for decades to come. We are going to have to integrate a certain level of higher security in all our lives and all our actions throughout the world

and all our embassies, and what my colleagues will do in the future.

At the same time, this process of sort of getting government control, getting legitimate government control over all parts of the planet, you know, it has moved forward. It is certainly not done yet, and certainly not done in very important parts of my area, but I can see it proceeding. I can see the Afghan government building up, building out, expanding throughout its territory. I can see the pressure on the extremists in Pakistan and in Afghanistan.

You know, as we look, you say where has it succeeded. There are countries you could cite, I guess Yemen, Sudan, other places like that have turned around and have been forces against terrorism. In the area that I deal with, I think what we did last summer was to look at what works in Afghanistan, and what works in Afghanistan is a very comprehensive strategy, while integrated strategy where you move the troops in to kick out the Taliban and fight the bad guys, then you bring in district officers, government officers, agents from ministries, policemen, local forces to help provide safety, security, and justice to the people there, and you bring in the AID projects, the irrigation, the new crops, the roads, the electricity. If you do that in a comprehensive and integrated manner, we have been able to stabilize large parts of Afghanistan that way.

As we see some of these problems, they are more and more in certain areas of Afghanistan rather than throughout the country.

The same with the narcotics problem. One of the things you will see, despite the enormous crop that is going to be harvested this year, there are going to be more parts of the country that are largely poppy free. The problem of poppy is more and more associated with the areas of insurgency. Again, the basic question of having government control and giving people the benefits of government throughout the country.

So I think we have seen what works in parts of Afghanistan, and the reason we came into Congress this year with a supplemental request and the funding request of \$11.6 billion over 2 years for Afghanistan is because we looked at what worked and we said we have to do this more generally throughout the country.

Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Boucher, as you know the votes have been called, but there are three quick votes, and we are going to run right up to the time on the 15 minute vote and go down quickly. There will be a 5 and a 5. We will be back within 15 minutes. But Mr. Shays is going to take his 10 minutes now that will run us up to that time.

Mr. Shays, you go ahead; 10 minutes.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Boucher, I appreciate your being here. I think this is a hugely important issue. I have tremendous concerns about Pakistan. I think you have basically a dictator who took control from a secular government, and now to maintain control he is responding, in my judgment, to sectarian wishes. So the irony is I think he is more vulnerable to the sectarian pressures than a duly elected secular government would be. That is one bias I have.

Another bias I have that I want you to respond to is I find it outrageous that, of the 46,000 troops, we are 26,000. I have learned

that of the 20,000 NATO troops, only four countries are at the tip of the spear, so most of our troops are in direct line of fire, whereas some of the NATO troops.

I would like you to tell me why only four NATO troops are putting their soldiers at risk, because I find that just astonishing. With what we have to do in Iraq and Afghanistan, it seems to me our allies, if they don't agree with what we are doing in Iraq, should at least agree in Afghanistan. So I would like you to comment on that, as well, and then I have some other questions.

Mr. BOUCHER. On the question of sort of the stability of Pakistan and the military rule of military government there, I think on the one hand we all think Pakistan would be better off, more stable with an elected government, and that is why we are pushing so hard for fair and free elections this year, why we are supporting that with our rhetoric but also our money and our effort, why we are working with all of the political parties to try to achieve that. We believe that democracy is a force for stability. We believe that an elected government, particularly one that brings together the centrist parties, would be a better base on which to fight extremism in the country.

Frankly, I have heard that from political leaders, from opposition parties. I have heard that from President Musharraf, himself. I think everybody recognizes that is the case, so we all look to elections to be a force for stability.

We have seen a lot of change in Pakistan in the last 8 years. It is not purely a military dictatorship. We have seen a lot of politics, seen the growth of civil society. We have seen an explosion of media, free press. We have tried to support that and speak out in favor of it whenever it was under threat. But in the end it has created a direction for the society, more modern, moderate, open direction for the society, and one that has done well by most of its citizens.

So I think, as you look at the problems of extremism, it is just sort of the general process of building a stronger, moderate center is one that is very important to all of us. We have tried to support that.

Mr. SHAYS. How about NATO?

Mr. BOUCHER. NATO has, first of all, a lot of different countries involved in a lot of different ways. I do think we have to say that every contribution is appreciated and every contribution is important, whether you are trying to run a PRT in the north somewhere, where you may be dealing with local authorities and trying to extend the Governor and the government, or whether in the south fighting the Taliban and the drug traffickers.

Mr. SHAYS. Why is it that we only have four countries willing to engage in battle?

Mr. BOUCHER. It is probably more than four, but not too many more than four. I would have to do the counting.

Mr. SHAYS. Why?

Mr. BOUCHER. And the Canadians, the Dutch, the British, us. There are a few others, Romanians and a few others.

Mr. SHAYS. What about the French, the Italians? I mean, do they—

Mr. BOUCHER. They are there. Some of them are in different places doing different missions. We have argued very strongly, every NATO meeting we go to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, for countries to drop what are called their caveats. You know, We will do this, but won't do that. We will go here, but not there. And we have had a little bit of success over the course of the last 6 months getting some of those caveats dropped by some of the countries. We have had some success in getting more NATO troops there. There have been about 7,000 troops promised since last fall, but, again, half of those are American. Big chunk of British, Australians, a few others like that, Canadians. So the mission rests on—

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask you, what is their argument?

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. The countries to participate.

Mr. SHAYS. What is their argument? They can make an argument against Iraq. What is their argument against participating by risking their lives in Afghanistan like our troops are? What is their argument for not doing that?

Mr. BOUCHER. It depends on the country. Sometimes you get, well, you know, we are doing this in Africa, we are doing this in Bosnia, we are doing this in Kosovo, we don't have any more, you know, available. Sometimes it is, We don't have popular support and parliamentary support for a war fighting mission. We only have that support from our parliament to go on a peacekeeping or a humanitarian mission. There are a variety of things that you hear.

Mr. SHAYS. The bottom line for me is we have long-term and short-term needs. Our short-term needs are shutting down training camps, stopping threats to U.S. coalition troops in Afghanistan, and that is emanating from Pakistan. A long-term would be education reform, democracy building, women's rights, and so on.

Tell me how successful we have been on the short term.

Mr. BOUCHER. I think, first of all, I think you are right in the way you put it. We are involved in some transformations that will take years, but we are also looking for goals and results that need to be done now because people are under direct threat.

I guess I would come back and say we have had some successes in the short term. Part of the fact that we have been able to blunt the Taliban intentions and that the Taliban has failed this year in Afghanistan is because what we are doing in Afghanistan, but also because there is pressure on them and on the Pakistan side. So we have seen a great number of very dangerous people picked up and killed or arrested with the help of Pakistan. So we are making progress. We are not done with the problem.

Mr. SHAYS. My colleague had a question that he wanted to ask.

Mr. BOUCHER. Sure.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you for yielding.

I don't know that this question has been asked. Have the tribal leaders or any of the tribal leaders been cooperative in trying to stop the Taliban leaders?

Mr. BOUCHER. Sure.

Mr. BURTON. To my knowledge, that hasn't been really illuminated here. I mean, Musharraf has pulled his troops out of a number of areas, and the impression is that Al Qaeda has taken over

those areas because of the cooperation of the tribal leaders. So what I would like to know is do we have cooperation with a lot of the tribal leaders? And are they working with us and Musharraf to try to—

Mr. BOUCHER. I think we have seen cooperation between the Pakistan government and the tribal leaders. We saw the tribal leaders in some areas turn on the Uzbeks, for example, earlier this year, turn on some of the Taliban that were coming out of that area.

I think it is true that, as the checkpoints and the government presence in Waziristan was removed last fall, there was an influx of fighters, that Al Qaeda found more freedom to operate there, and then since about December there have been some steps by the government and the tribes to exert more control. There have been new forces that have been moved in there. There have been checkpoints re-established and taking back control.

Mr. SHAYS. Before my time ends, if we saw Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, what would likely our posture be? Would we wait to get permission and then fear that we would lose him, or would we just go in and get him, if he were in Pakistan?

Mr. BOUCHER. I think we would work with the Pakistanis to make sure that one way or the other he was gotten.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. The gentleman yields back.

Thank you for your forbearance and your patience, Mr. Ambassador. We are going to be gone for about 10 or 15 minutes, if you would like to take a little recess. We will be back for the concluding questions.

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Ambassador, thank you for your patience on that. We are going to reconvene.

Since we have such a great bipartisan committee here, Mr. Shays is speaking on the floor in another matter. He is perfectly comfortable with us proceeding in his absence. He will be back. Mr. Hodes, who was next to speak on this, is not certain that he is going to be able to come back, because he had a conflict. Mr. Van Hollen I understand is on his way back.

While that is all happening, I thought I would take the prerogative of the Chair and ask a few questions that we are probably going to have to put off until the end, but may not have to do that now.

I am sort of struck, I have to tell you, that with what I see as somewhat of a defense of the Musharraf actions here in all ways, and it seems to be the administration's position, so I don't leave it just with you, but it doesn't really seem to me to be what is happening on the ground, from our own observations or from the myriad of people that we have talked to.

I know you have spoken to a range of people, and so do we, an opportunity not just while we were in country but also back here, as witnesses and testimony. It seems like there is Mr. Musharraf's view of things and perspective and then everybody else's on that,

and that the administration is sort of coming down with the Musharraf view.

I am struck by your repetition that you think we are getting cooperation on the border area because a couple of people have been arrested and, you know, you say there is a number of troops on the border. My observation was they are not quite on the border, that they are up toward the border and that you have a few Frontier Corps groups up on the border, and they are not very active in that.

The issue I am seeing here is we have a government that appears—and Mr. Shays got a hit on that—to lack legitimacy because you have a person that took office through a coup, has been operating both as a military general and as a president. We have questionable progress toward election shares, some real serious concerns about whether they are going to be free and fair. And then we have today reported in a number of ways about a national intelligence estimate which apparently is classified but, par for the course, executive branch people seem to be chatting about it and then they want to blame it on Congress for a leak, I am sure, even to the point where people who are not talking directly but about it are testifying in front of congressional committees.

What they are telling us is that, you know, despite what you say and Mr. Musharraf says about all this activity, that area leaves Al Qaeda better positioned to strike the west, according to one of the National Counter-Terrorism Center commentators. John Kringen, who is the Deputy Director for Intelligence at the CIA, says Al Qaeda appears to be fairly well settled into the safe haven and the ungoverned spaces of Pakistan. We see more training, we see more money, we see more communications. It just goes on and on.

The new report concludes the group is stronger than it has been in years. There is a heightened concern over Al Qaeda's operational activity and operational levels among the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. One U.S. official said, "At the end we see a worse condition than it was before the agreements up in Waziristan." And it goes on and on that way.

So clearly to some of us, apparently not to General Musharraf or to you, there is not the kind of activity that we would hope we would be getting out of somebody that is supposed to be a partner, and a lot of it may well be because of the fear of the instability of his government.

We look at reports in the paper on July 8th about a United States' aborted raid on Al Qaeda chiefs in Pakistan in 2005. Reportedly the reason that we didn't go in, even though there was identification of targets we wanted to get, was a fear of the instability of the Musharraf regime and the fact that we were afraid of what ramifications it might have.

Wouldn't we be better off insisting that there be free and fair elections, that all participants be allowed to be in the country and take part in them so that there was a legitimacy behind any Pakistani government, so that when we needed to go after Al Qaeda types of Taliban in that area we wouldn't have to fear the instability of the government, would have a properly elected, duly appointed government with the legitimacy that could stand with us and do something there, as opposed to what we have now?

Mr. BOUCHER. Sir, I have tried to be objective with my statements here and tried to look at the whole picture. I have said the agreements in Waziristan didn't work. There was an influx of Al Qaeda. They found more freedom of movement when checkpoints were removed and they have been able to reorganize themselves to some extent in that area. That is a current threat, and that is an important threat to all of us—to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and to our homeland. We need to deal with it. We need to deal with it working with the Pakistanis.

But at the same time I think we need to recognize what they have done and we need to recognize the direction they are headed in and we need to look at how to help them to be more effective and completely effective.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, I guess we don't have disagreement about looking at what they have done.

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. I recognize Pakistanis have died there, and we would be wrong to not understand that they have suffered pain on that and people have given their lives and made the effort, and it would be wrong to not recognize that some people have been killed or arrested with their cooperation. But the fact of the matter is you say looking forward what they are doing. When we look forward from our perspective, you know, and see that they are not doing all that you seem to indicate you believe they are doing, you know, and their own NIE and reports of the NIE seem to indicate that, as well, that area is not getting the attention and the action that is needed.

You referred a couple of times to the Uzbeks out there. Let me tell you, we were there during that operation and we got variants of estimates between 100 Uzbeks to 3,000 Uzbeks. Depending on which intelligence agency you talked to, which military group, or what government you talked to, it ranged back and forth, but almost all of them recognized the fact that there essentially was one Taliban group fighting another Taliban group, with the government putting its foot on the scale at the tail end and then claiming that it had been instrumental in helping remove the Uzbeks.

If that is what you are referring to as, you know, their great efforts and looking forward how much they are being cooperative with us, I think we have a problem. You know, the fact really is that we are giving enormous amounts of military money, but I don't see any accountability of that being spent on equipment that will help in an anti-terrorism, international terrorism effort more so than stocking up on what may be a fear they have butted into you. With enormous moneys and basic support, then I don't think we have any accountability at all in terms of how much of that really goes for reimbursement of what they might have spent on military efforts, particularly when those military efforts don't show any fruits being born here.

I think in a nutshell that is really where we are going at here, and wondering why this administration continues. You say you have been objective, and I appreciate that, but I guess some of us are saying you may be too objective. You may not be standing here taking a subjective enough look at weighing in on what has not been done here and what could be done if we had, you know, a gov-

ernment with more legitimacy and willingness to stand up there and take a tough stand, both from the border area and as they at least started to do with some of the internal extremists that are going on with Red Mosque the other day.

Mr. BOUCHER. Let me try to answer quickly, but these are serious questions.

There is no doubt in our mind that there are real dangers that emanate from this area. There is no doubt in our mind that we need to deal with them and we need to work with the Pakistanis to deal with them more effectively, and that is what we are focused on. We are focused on getting after the rest of the Taliban, the Taliban on the Pakistan side, their supporters, Hakini network, people like that, focused on how to identify and get the Al Qaeda elements that are there, how to get the training camps, leadership bases, and things like that. That is something that is a constant daily, very close, very dedicated effort that we carry on.

Would all this be aided by an open election and democratic, incredible election and a better-strengthened, moderate center with more legitimacy in Pakistan? Absolutely. And that is why we have seen an election as a force for stability and a successful transition from military rule to civilian elected government this year as being one of the key elements in helping Pakistan come together in a moderate center in order to fight extremism better.

Mr. TIERNEY. Are we not conditioning some of our financial assistance on the performance of free and fair elections? Aren't we making it really clear to this Musharraf administration that, unless they start working more cooperatively and have the election and work more cooperatively in getting the registration in order, unless they do all the other things that are necessary to have a truly free and fair election, shouldn't we condition some of our resources that go to him, particularly the basic support, which I think there is some argument that some of that is a slush fund? Anyway, condition some of that on performance? Doesn't that make sense?

Mr. BOUCHER. Well, I mean, some of our money that we give to Pakistan is reimbursements, and so there are conditions that we pay for things. If they didn't have the 85,000 troops on the border area, God knows what would be going on out there. Not anything we could deal with ourselves, I am sure.

So the fact that they are there, they can do more, we can all do more. We are doing more on the Afghan side. We have asked for enormous influx of funds from Congress, which Congress has supported, so we can do more on the Afghan side. On both sides of the border there is a lot more to do.

In terms of sort of conditioning our other assistance, you have talked about the importance of education, getting a better public education system in Pakistan. You have talked about the support for democracy, for civil society, justice, things like that, and we need to do all those things.

It is not a question of conditioning and saying, unless you do this, unless you do that. It is a question of saying all these things are important to us, where there is no doubt in anybody's mind the United States wants to see a free, fair, and open election in Pakistan this year. There is no doubt in anybody's mind that we are

working very hard to achieve that, both in our work directly with the political parties, but also our work with the Election Commission and everything we do in Pakistan.

Mr. TIERNEY. I think, Mr. Ambassador, there is a real question about the urgency behind our wanting these elections to be free and fair and the urgency of making sure that it happens. I think that would be resolved by conditioning it, because I think that some people might not take it as seriously unless we do something more serious on that.

I am going to interrupt my questions because Mr. Van Hollen has joined us, and he is entitled to 10 minutes of questioning.

You are recognized for 10 minutes, Mr. Van Hollen.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this series of hearings on the situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other parts of South Asia.

Mr. Ambassador, let me just join others in welcoming you and thanking you for your service to our country. It is much appreciated.

As I understood your earlier testimony, you had a number of questions related to an article that appeared today on the front page of the Washington Post, essentially entitled: U.S. Warns of Stronger Al Qaeda. As I understood your response, you said you were not familiar with that report; is that correct?

Mr. BOUCHER. I have seen the Washington Post story, but the Washington Post seemed to have gotten the intelligence report before it came to my reading.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. All right. Here is my question. One of the things we as a country decided after 9/11—it was one of the key recommendations of the 9/11 Commission—was that we would try and get away from the stovepipe approach to collecting and analyzing information so that all people who were experts and had information to contribute with respect to this kind of analysis would participate.

I have to say I am surprised that you woke up this morning and read about this in the Washington Post along with the rest of us. This is obviously no fault of your own if you weren't in the loop, but it is surprising to me, given the fact that we did say we wanted more people to be involved in this process. I recognize it is an intelligence analysis.

On the other hand, you are essentially the senior policy person when it comes to South Asia. You obviously have a lot to say with respect to interpreting and analyzing information regarding the political and military situation in Pakistan. I have to say I am surprised to hear you didn't know about the report.

Can you enlighten us a little bit as to how this process works, should work?

Mr. BOUCHER. Well, if I believe what I read in the Washington Post, the report isn't even finished yet. Generally, NIEs, they finish it up before they send it around.

You know, that said, I am part of the information and analysis process every day, and I am constantly reading the raw material and the reports that are coming in from embassy sources and intelligence sources all over, all kinds of different sources, and I have a constant dialog with the folks in the intelligence community. We

meet on a very regular basis. I see somebody every morning that I talk to.

I know this is kind of the summary that is being done at this moment, that I may not have seen that particular document yet, but the underlying trends are something I think I am very familiar with because of these constant discussions, and we have talked about how the Al Qaeda has presence in Pakistan, has grown, and how it has been reorganized, and what the dangers are from that.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. OK. Well then do you share the assessment that was given by one of your colleagues who is in the intelligence community before the Armed Services Committee yesterday, the House Armed Services Committee, John Kringen, who said Al Qaeda seems to be fairly well settled into the safe haven and ungoverned spaces of Pakistan? Do you agree with that conclusion?

Mr. BOUCHER. I basically agree with the conclusion, but it is not the whole story.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. All right. I guess my question is: what has our position been, you as the head policymaker for this region, in terms of communicating to the Pakistani government whether we support their decision to essentially have these hands-off, described by your colleagues as safe haven areas, where, as I understand it, according to public reports our intelligence community has included, that has allowed Al Qaeda to strengthen itself. As he says, we see more training, more money, more communications. What have we said to the government of Pakistan with respect to our position on whether that was a good idea or not a good idea?

Mr. BOUCHER. Sir, I think we have made absolutely clear that the presence of Al Qaeda in Pakistan is a danger to all of us, in whatever strength they are at any given moment, and that we look to them for cooperation, as we have since 9/11, for cooperation against the Al Qaeda elements and the Al Qaeda elements who have been able to take refuge and operate from Pakistan.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Do you agree with your colleague—

Mr. BOUCHER. It is a constant effort.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Do you agree with your colleague that providing a safe haven has allowed Al Qaeda to strengthen itself?

Mr. BOUCHER. I do, but providing safe haven, I mean, let's not draw improper implications from that. This is not done with the authorization of the Pakistani government. They did some things that led to that influx and strengthening, but the Pakistani government has made very clear through its words and its actions that it, too, is opposed to extremism, it, too, is opposed to the presence of Al Qaeda. In these last few weeks you have seen President Musharraf at Jirga and Peshawar making that explicitly clear.

Over the course of time, you have seen hundreds of arrests of Al Qaeda people in Pakistan and you have seen pressure on various Al Qaeda associates and people that are in these tribal areas.

We know there are still a lot of them there. There is a lot of training. There is command and control that are still there that need to be gotten out. But they are not there, you know, as a policy of the Pakistani government.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. I understand. But, as you said, words and actions, and one of the actions the Pakistani government took was obviously to enter into this arrangement with the leaders in that re-

gion, and at least our publicly reported intelligence assessment is that has resulted in strengthening of Al Qaeda.

Let me just go on and pick up on a point that the chairman and others have made with respect to making sure we have open and democratic elections.

This committee, back in May, took testimony from a Dr. Samina Ahmed, who is the South Asia project director for the International Crisis Group.

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes, I know.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. I am sure you know her.

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. She provided testimony to this committee via satellite. Essentially, what her message was was that Musharraf had actually relied, to a certain extent, in terms of putting together a coalition, on some of the more religious parties in Pakistan to provide the majority he needed essentially to stay in power, in contrast to some of the more moderate parties.

In fact, I am just reading from her testimony. She said, "Lacking a civilian constituency, Musharraf remains dependent today on the religious parties, particularly his Coalition party in the Baluchistan government, the JUI, the pro-Taliban party, and the major partner in the MMA alliance to counter his moderate civilian opposition." That is her testimony.

My first question is: do you share that assessment?

Mr. BOUCHER. That is one of the results of the election in 2002 and some of the subsequent arrangements, and that is one of the important things about a new election: it gives an opportunity for the moderate center to reform.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. But, I mean, do you share that essential analysis of his political reliance on some of the religious parties to maintain his governing coalition?

Mr. BOUCHER. In some of the provincial, especially Baluchistan, he does rely on the religious parties. In the National Assembly, all of them are in opposition to Musharraf, and you have seen that in recent days the way they have spoken about the Mosque, frankly.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Now, in terms of the position we have taken with respect to the upcoming elections—and I appreciate your statement that we are pushing for free and fair elections—in specific terms, have we publicly called on President Musharraf, for example, to make sure that Benazir Bhutto is allowed to return to Pakistan?

Mr. BOUCHER. We have said that all the parties need to be able to participate and the voters need to be given real choices, but when it comes to individuals, I mean, each of them faces a particular situation with regard to justice and other things in Pakistan, and so no, we have not gone to endorse specific individuals.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Well, this does get to the chairman's question, it seems to me, about the urgency and the content, policy content behind the words, because I think many people would agree that, with respect to the People's Party, that if you have a leader who is the, you know, essentially the selected leader of her particular political party, and you don't allow them to come back and participate in the elections, clearly you are not allowing for a free and fair election.

It seems to me, if our position is that we want free and fair elections, we need to be making sure that anybody who wants to run individuals included as the head of their party are allowed to return.

Why shouldn't we do that? How is it consistent to say we want free and fair elections but not call upon the president to allow the return of the leader of one of the major opposition parties?

Mr. BOUCHER. Because our job as the United States I don't think is to endorse any particular party or any particular candidate.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Let me interrupt. I am not talking about endorsing any candidate. I am not talking about endorsing any candidate; I am talking about making real the statement that we want free and fair elections. I am saying we want to call upon the government to make sure that any individual who wants to participate—of course we should not go anywhere near endorsing any candidate in any election in Pakistan, but it seems to me, wouldn't you agree, that to have a free and fair election, every individual or certainly party leader who wants to participate in the election should be allowed to be present in Pakistan and fully participate?

Mr. BOUCHER. There are three different leaders of political parties in Pakistan who are outside the country, three major leaders—

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Right.

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. Who are outside the country, and each has different circumstances, different judicial circumstances and other things. They are out for different reasons, they face different things if they go back. Ms. Bhutto talks about going back, talks about facing justice. Whether she does that or not depends to some extent on what she decides and how it works out with the government. But, you know, an individual's circumstances I guess we think have to be addressed by the individual and the government.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. If I could just, Mr. Chairman, one question with respect to the situation in Afghanistan. I wrote a letter to the Secretary of State with respect to the situation there.

Mr. BOUCHER. I have seen it.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. I think we all agree on this issue, which is we want to make sure that, as we aggressively go after Al Qaeda and aggressively go after the Taliban, we do everything possible to limit civilian casualties, non-combatant casualties. After all, part of the mission is to make sure we win the hearts and minds of the people in Afghanistan. A concern that has been raised is that, partly as a result of the fact that there are, according to some assessments, not enough United States and Allied forces, ground forces, in Afghanistan, we have relied more on air power, which is less discriminating in terms of the targets, and that overall—and Karzai, himself, the president of Pakistan [sic], has said that he thinks that the level of civilian casualties has not been justifiable.

If you could just address this issue, because clearly we want to do everything we can to root out Al Qaeda and the Taliban, but it is clearly counter-productive if, in the process of trying to do that, we lose the support of the local population, because that makes it more difficult to accomplish our mission.

Mr. BOUCHER. Absolutely, sir. I think we all understand how very important this is.

I was just at the Rule of Law Conference for Afghanistan that was held in Rome last week, and President Karzai I think put it well. He said, you know, we are all there to protect the innocents of Afghanistan, and it is the innocent people of Afghanistan that deserve our protection and can't be made casualties of the fighting.

We know we are fighting an enemy that puts civilians in harm's way. We have had cases where they have, you know, kept people locked up inside compounds where they were operating from. We have had cases, you know, frequently where they take refuge in civilian compounds and areas, knowing that if we go after them there will be some civilian casualties, and then they publicize it.

So it is a difficult enemy, an enemy that often goes out to kill civilians and kill school kids, kill school teachers, kill policemen. Recognizing how difficult it is for our military people, I think we and our military all understand how critical it is to success and the bigger mission that they do everything that they can to minimize civilian casualties. So each one of these incidents is taken very seriously. Each one of these incidents is looked at very carefully. We do have strict rules of engagement that we are always trying to improve, and we need to do better. I think we are trying very hard to do that.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. I realize and understand fully the tactical challenge here, given the enemy that is being faced and the fact that they have been unscrupulous and, as you say, have killed civilians on the other side in brazen sort of terrorist type activities.

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. No doubt about it. But, as you say, in order to accomplish the larger mission, we need to make sure we go after them without in any way enlarging or expanding their political support.

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. As Karzai has said, it has been at least his feeling, as he publicly stated, that we can do better.

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. So I think we just need to make sure that we—

Mr. BOUCHER. I should address the other half of your question, air power versus civilian versus military forces. I am probably not the best qualified to try to address that. What I do know is that there is still a shortfall in the NATO force requirements, and we work very hard to try to get people to meet that force shortfall, and then there is the question of flexibility of the forces. Our feeling is that, you know, whatever commanders decide they need, they need to have the tools available. And we have pushed very hard on all countries to give the NATO commanders the flexibility and the capability to do the job in the best way possible with the minimum, absolute minimum, of civilian casualties.

So our feeling is that having that additional flexibility and capability would give the commanders more tools to use, and perhaps make it a little easier for them to avoid these casualties.

But I want to say that whatever they have as tools, whatever they can use, they make a very serious effort and continuing effort to improve this in order to avoid civilian casualties.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you. But do you believe that the fact that we haven't hit the full troop levels that we think that we need, that we are somewhat short, has resulted in a somewhat over-reliance on air power that would not otherwise be used?

Mr. BOUCHER. I have seen it said, but I am not qualified to judge.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you.

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Ambassador, does it at all trouble the State Department and the administration that Julaluddin Hakini continues to be free, despite the Musharraf administration and their military telling us they know where he is, and despite some pretty prevalent rumors that he may also be providing bin Laden protection as his guest up under the culture situation? I mean, why is it that we don't press harder for more definitive action to be taken against Mr. Hakini?

Mr. BOUCHER. I think he is one of a number of facilitators of the Taliban on the Pakistani side that are part of the problem and that do need to be taken out of the picture, arrested, eliminated, whatever. And, you know, there are a number of areas where we have seen support for the Taliban from people and groups on the Pakistani side. The Quetta Shura around Baluchistan was one of the major problems that we had earlier this year, and we have gone after—Pakistanis have helped us go after a number of those people.

There is a Hakani network. There are other facilitators. And yes—

Mr. TIERNEY. I mean, it is as simple as turning on the TV and watching Frontline, where they are interviewing members of the Musharraf regime saying, Yes, we know where Mr. Hakani is, and we know who he is. And when they are asked point blank why don't you just go in and get him, no answer. I mean, how is it that we are not pressing for something as simple as that to be done? Everybody understands the role this individual is playing and understands the need to do it.

Mr. BOUCHER. I think we all do understand the role that he is playing and is one of the targets that needs to be gotten.

Mr. TIERNEY. But not the inability to do it because they tried and failed, but the unwillingness to try to do it I should think would somehow color what has otherwise been by you pretty rosy picture of the cooperation of the Musharraf government.

Mr. BOUCHER. We have talked about things that have been done and things that remain to be done. This is one of the things that remains to be done.

Mr. TIERNEY. I say so.

You know, I am going to leave that issue and go to another, but a quote that one of our witnesses at our most recent hearing had is, "The choice that Pakistan faces is not between the military and the Mullahs, as is generally believed in the west, including the United States; it is between genuine democracy and a mullah military alliance that is responsible for the religious extremism that poses a threat to Pakistani, regional, and international security."

That was a sentiment that I found to be prevalent through all segments of the Pakistani society—people testifying here, people that we have met here in Washington, and the myriad of people from different occupations, as well as different political parties—that we met there.

I would hope that this administration at least has some recognition that is a fairly prevalent feeling amongst Pakistanis, and if we want to start being friends with the Pakistani people, as opposed to one individual who took over a coup in 1999, that we have to somehow reflect in our policy and our decisions that we understand that is their feeling, and maybe press harder in some areas.

Let me just cover some other areas quickly so I can let you go on this. I appreciate the time you are spending.

What is our strategy with respect to the FATA area, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas? You know, who is going to be our development partner up there? To whom are we going to give this substantial amount of money that you have mentioned? Is it going to be to local, non-government officials, to tribal leaders, to international NGO's? It is a considerable amount of money. How do we make sure that it is accounted for and that it goes to the purposes for which we intend?

Mr. BOUCHER. If I can comment on the Mullah military question?

Mr. TIERNEY. Absolutely. Sure.

Mr. BOUCHER. That certainly is a prevalent view, and it has, I think, been a clear view in the past that, you know, the Mullah—if you look at Pakistani history and the history of some of the military regimes, you see an alliance at various moments with some of the more extremist religious elements. That was accentuated particularly during the anti-Soviet fight. I mean, that was the core: the mullahs, the military, and the Mujah Hadin fighting the Soviets. So all the contributions that we and others made helped solidify that kind of alliance.

But I think, you know, times change, things change, and circumstances change over time. I find it hard to say there is a military Mullah alliance in Pakistan on the day that the military has just completed an operation against an extremist mosque.

Mr. TIERNEY. I guess the point there being it took them several months to get to that point. The people that make the statement rather recently—

Mr. BOUCHER. It took them 20 or 30 years to get to that point, but—

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, this particular government, but for Musharraf it took several months—

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. Particularly they have been dealing with it in the last 8 or 9 months.

Mr. TIERNEY [continuing]. From the time this started to do it.

Again, going back to Mr. Hakani and example after example of sort of an allowance for things to fester and to buildup without action being taken until absolutely forced to take it. And then yes, some people are going to be upset, but the point is, you know, but for their fear for that and what some people perceived as that alliance, things would have been done a lot sooner and would continue at a lot higher level on that.

But to the other point—

Mr. BOUCHER. Let me answer your question——

Mr. TIERNEY. Please.

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. On the tribal area funding. One of the key elements I think of the plan that was developed, the tribal area development strategy, was to build the institutions that can do things and handle funding and to build a tribal area development organization that can reliably use money, build the schools, build the vocational training centers, put in the roads, whatever needs to be done under that plan. They can do it reliably, effectively, get results, provide the information, make sure it was done the right way and money was not wasted.

And so a lot of the effort at the beginning of the program is, in fact, to build those institutions and capabilities there.

We also run——

Mr. TIERNEY. Can I just interrupt? Where do you think that stands right now? I mean, do you think you have completed that?

Mr. BOUCHER. I think it is just starting, basically. We are just getting started on a lot of this stuff.

We already have some pretty effective counter-narcotics programs in the area where we build roads, we provide training, do a lot of different things with counter-narcotics money in the tribal areas, and in some places we are able to do that, some not so well, but we use contractors to do things there. We are able to check up and make sure it gets done.

We have an AID program to build 65 schools in the tribal areas, and we use contractors there who do the work, but we are able to check and make sure it gets done properly.

Mr. TIERNEY. I don't know if you had something else to say. I just wanted to make sure we covered that point. Are you completed on that?

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

The money that we spend in Pakistan, broken down a little bit into different categories, and I am interested in your comments on some of the accountability. The budgetary support aspect, \$200 million: how do we account for that?

Mr. BOUCHER. A couple of different ways. I mean, account for it, we know where the money goes.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, originally.

Mr. BOUCHER. The question is——

Mr. TIERNEY. You deliver a check and you know who you deliver the check to. After that, where does it go?

Mr. BOUCHER. How do we know what gets done with it?

Mr. TIERNEY. Right.

Mr. BOUCHER. A couple of things. First, the first purpose of the money and providing it as budgetary support is so that they can take care of budget and fiscal policy in a way that strengthens the economy. It is macro economic reform money. So the first purpose is to check whether it is achieving macro economic goals in terms of budget deficit and a variety of other sort of indicators of macro economic stability, because that is why we give them money through their budget.

Second purpose is we sit down, we have a series of meetings every year called the Shared Objectives Exercise, and we sit down

with them and we define how our money shall be used. So of that \$200 million, for example, we define that, I think it is \$56.25 million will be used on education. Another chunk gets used, \$50 million, for earthquake recovery. Another chunk gets used for health. So we define with them together.

Then we set indicators that are not just how our money will be used, but what they are going to do in that sector, because the goal of our money is really to leverage their budget and make it possible for them to spend more and better on education.

So even though directly our money, of that amount \$56.25 million may go into education this year, we are looking at indicators that say are they increasing education as a percentage of GDP, are they increasing the number of girls in school, are they increasing the number of kids in school. So are they meeting those overall targets for these different sectors? And that is the second way we account for the money.

Mr. TIERNEY. So it is an output sort of a measure as opposed to identifying dollar for dollar where it actually gets spent?

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes. Are we catalyzing, accelerating the work in sectors that are important to us.

Mr. TIERNEY. We are told by some of the witnesses that were here that the education budget of Pakistan is hovering somewhere around 2 percent of the gross domestic product, and that still falls—UNESCO's benchmark usually would recommend somewhere about 4 percent. Are they moving and trending in the right direction here?

Mr. BOUCHER. They are. They spent \$1.3 billion on education dollars in 2003. That was almost doubled to \$2.4 billion in 2006, and they plan to continue to double education and health expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product by 2015. What we are trying to do is support that effort.

Mr. TIERNEY. I am a little bit troubled with the way that we are accounting for this, only because we never seem to be able to nail down exactly that the money has been spent where we hope it is. We have those shared objectives, and then sort of if things look like they are tending somewhere then we are satisfied, but we never get to see whether all of the \$200 million goes where we want it to go. I would hope that we think of a better way to do that at some point, which is one of the reasons why we sort of went in when we did that bill and took a little more money for education.

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. Because we really feel strongly that education gets more attention.

How many USAID personnel that are focused on education are currently on the ground in Pakistan?

Mr. BOUCHER. I have to check on that. I don't know the number.

Mr. TIERNEY. I say that because off the record we heard one. That would be a little troubling. I would think they would need a larger presence, you know, in order to do something really meaningful on that and to make those numbers move in the direction in which we want them to move and to send a message clearly that we expect more to happen there.

Mr. BOUCHER. One of the reasons we do some of this ourselves and some of it through the budget is because when we put the

money into their budget and they are expanding education sector, it can do things like pay salaries for teachers, hire and train more teachers, buy books, providing lunch to kids in school—I mean, things that aren't really projects that we would carry out. They are things that they can do as part of their education programs, and expand, you know, use Federal money to expand the availability of books and better curricula to the provinces and things like that. So the money goes to almost slightly different purposes than what we would spend directly ourselves in projects.

Mr. TIERNEY. And it seems we have to do a little bit better job on tracking where that is going to. Right now the indications we have are that, you know, we are still a long, long way to go in terms of teachers. We hear about the ghost schools—

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY [continuing]. And the opportunity there, and that is, I think, key to our long-range issue of how we are going to deal with it.

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. Not just in Pakistan, but a whole host of different countries.

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. What are we doing about providing good alternative education that doesn't push them back toward the sort of extremist Madrassas situation.

Mr. BOUCHER. I learned a long time ago in Africa, when I was responsible for cold storage of vaccines in an AID project, you not only ask do you have a refrigerator, you ask do you have electricity.

Mr. BOUCHER. Exactly.

Mr. TIERNEY. When I was up in the tribal areas, you know, looking at some of these schools that we built with AID money, the question is: is the school done? Are there teachers? Are there books? And the answers are yes. We are careful about a lot of that.

And I agree with you that some of these specifics of, you know, are they really expanding the availability of education as they spend more money, are important to track, as well.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, on our recent visit up in the Peshawar area and leading into the tribal areas there, we weren't convinced that you are very far along in putting this infrastructure together that you are going to need to really effectively spend the President's proposed program, so it may be that we need to take another trip out there before that all comes to fruition to see how that is going or whatever. I think the idea is good.

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. I think the idea is excellent. The question is: is it going to be executable? We would like to work with you at least on that part.

Can you give us a little run-down of what precautions the administration is taking to ensure that the military support money is actually going to the types of military equipment and purposes that effectively fight international terrorism, as opposed to some other purposes—for instance, Orion submarines and F-22 bombers and things like that actively look like they are shoring up against India than fighting international terrorism?

Mr. BOUCHER. I think, sir, we do try to do both. I mean, we try to help Pakistan with legitimate defensive needs, with its ability to patrol in the Arabian Sea in part of NATO missions out there, to provide maritime security in that area. So we do try to help them with their sort of basic defensive needs, and that is a chunk of our money. That is pretty much what the \$300 million for foreign military financing goes to is a lot of those kind of things.

But also some of that money and other things that we do—buy night vision goggles, body armor, you know, equipment for troops that are in the war on terror. And then in addition, then you have the money that is the reimbursement for the expenses on the war on terror, and the Pentagon is in charge of getting receipts and making sure they know how that money is being spent in the right places.

Mr. TIERNEY. I think there is a whole host of people here in the Congress that think those numbers, you know, ought to be swayed a little bit differently. There ought to be more toward international terrorism action and less toward the general part of it, which they already have their military designed and set up to do. But we will look at that as the budget comes through.

Have you had the opportunity to talk to General McNeil in terms of what he sees going on, in terms of communicating what happens in his eyes at the cross-border movement between the Taliban from the Pakistani side to the Afghani side?

Mr. BOUCHER. Sure.

Mr. TIERNEY. Do you have regular meetings with him on that?

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. And other intelligence officials, what they talk about in terms of them giving actual intelligence to the Pakistani side and the cooperation or lack of cooperation that they get back as a response to that?

Mr. BOUCHER. Sure.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK. I am a little surprised that you are still as positive about what is being done, because I have had conversations in depth on a regular basis with those people, and I don't get a very pleasant position—

Mr. BOUCHER. I have talked to General McNeil. I think the Dutch general, General van Loon, was just in Washington. I don't know if you saw him. He has been the general for Regional Command South, and, you know, he was saying there are things going on on the Pakistani side that are helpful, that are important to us. That is all I am saying.

I also know there is a regular flow of people across, that the ability to take refuge in Pakistan and regroup and organize has been a serious danger to our troops.

Mr. TIERNEY. And serious questions about people getting information or intelligence and have it not be acted upon, that then obviously puts our people in jeopardy. That is not an irregular situation; it is a fairly common occurrence, at least what is reported to us.

Mr. BOUCHER. It is something that happens, and it is an occurrence, and nothing ever quite happens as fast or effectively as we might like. But that doesn't mean abandon the effort. That means you continue to make it better.

Mr. TIERNEY. Just some comments on the judicial situation that is going on over there. How do you see that evolving and winding up?

Mr. BOUCHER. We have said that everybody needs to respect the decisions of the judicial process. There is a judicial process in Pakistan to handle these matters, and in the end everybody needs to respect that and let those decisions be made in a judicial manner. In the meantime, there are a lot of demonstrations. A lot of people I met the last time I was in Pakistan were out demonstrating and, you know, political parties are rallying. Part is just a reflection of the fact this is a very political year in Pakistan.

Mr. TIERNEY. Do we have any diplomatic comments to make to President Musharraf when he sacked Chief Justice Chaudhry?

Mr. BOUCHER. We asked a lot of questions. Again, it is going to be up to the Pakistani judicial system to decide if—a referral, it is called, referred charges to another judicial body—if the referral was warranted. I think we are going to have to respect that process ourselves.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, are we being firm and clear in our conversation with the Musharraf government that we expect them to also respect the process?

Mr. BOUCHER. We have been very clear that everybody should do that, including the government, and that is what the government has pledged to do.

Mr. TIERNEY. You made some comments in the Pakistani Times, I think it was last month, where you were talking about your belief that the media in Pakistan is free, so I thought that I would like to ask you about what you say about the recent reports about the government's detention of reporters, control of television coverage, and what appeared to many of us to be forms of intimidation that were initially started and pulled back eventually. How do you account for that?

Mr. BOUCHER. We have said it was a bad idea and we are glad that it was pulled back, and we think our comments probably had something to do with the fact that it was pulled back.

Mr. TIERNEY. And, last—I think it is last—A.Q. Khan. There was a little bit of discussion there. Now we are led to believe that he is under so-called house arrest, allowed to brunch and have tea with friends and family. Is that accurate? And what is your confidence level that the Pakistani nuclear secrets and materials are safe at this point? And what more ought Congress be doing to ensure their continued safety, if they are?

Mr. BOUCHER. I think we are confident that the Khan network is out of business, that we have been able to get at it in a lot of parts of the world, that he is no longer operating kind of black marketing that he was doing in the past. I think we are confident that Pakistan has good control over its nuclear materials. It is something we keep a close eye on.

Mr. TIERNEY. Are we making efforts to get in and question Mr. Khan, because I am sure that we must feel that he has significant information about other sales that he made prior to his detention, and that would be fairly useful to our efforts at nonproliferation.

Mr. BOUCHER. We are always interested in getting information—

Mr. TIERNEY. Are we getting any cooperation—

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. From him and about his network.

Mr. TIERNEY [continuing]. From Mr. Musharraf?

Mr. BOUCHER. We have gotten good cooperation in terms of the flow of information to us and to the IAEA and to others around the world.

Mr. TIERNEY. From questioning of Mr. Khan or from other sources?

Mr. BOUCHER. From Pakistanis and their questioning of Mr. Khan.

Mr. TIERNEY. But we have not been allowed access to him at this point?

Mr. BOUCHER. No.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Ambassador, I want to thank you for all of the time that you have given us this morning.

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. And for your candor and your answers and for your objectivity, I guess, although I might argue that, again, I would like to see some more subjectivity into it. But I appreciate it very much. Thank you for coming.

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you very much, sir.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

